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In memory of my father and brother with whom I spent many wonderful hours fi shing.

Abstract
During the last decade, Swedish fisheries have been in turmoil. Faced with depleted resources 
and demands from a wide spectrum of stakeholders, the Swedish Government recently made 
clear the need for institutional reform. Within the framework of this reform a more 
participative fisheries management system is expected to lead to more sustainable outcomes.
This explorative and empirically based study is concerned with fisheries co-management and 
analyses various institutional aspects of the issues relating to shared fisheries resources and 
ecosystems in the coastal waters in the coastal waters of the Skagerrak Sea in Western Sweden.
The research applies an actor-oriented approach and a common pool resource theoretical 
perspective and engages the interdisciplinary debates on collective action, property rights and 
co-management. In this way, the dynamics of the interrelations between the social and the 
ecological systems in fisheries are uncovered.
The study provides a critical analysis of the dominant centralised co-management regime, 
which has dissociated conservation from allocation and tends to block, or at least delay, the 
emergence of institutions using local fishermen’s management capacities. It reveals the 
significance of space and time in the organisation of coastal fisheries and demonstrates the 
impact that uniform policies and generic rules can have when applied to the use of common 
pool resources by a heterogeneous fishing community. It is argued that the lack of attention to 
the specificities of local coastal fisheries is closely related to the narrow conceptualisation of, 
and the limited knowledge base used in, fisheries management in general. A trend this, which 
has been reinforced by the way this management system has been organised and its responses 
to external factors and has constrained the local fishermen’s ability to participate in the 
management process and secure access to coastal resources.
The study further explores local fishermen’s initiatives to become more involved in co-
management, analysing their feasibility and uncovering the context of emergence of the 
ongoing reform. The change consists mainly of the nesting of more pluralistic system of local 
and regional co-management in an otherwise more centralised co-management regime with 
corporatist influences. 
Keywords:  Fisheries, local management, co-management, coastal management, common 
 pool resources, Northern Bohuslän, Swedish fisheries. 
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is concerned with the topic of natural resource management, specifically 
regarding fisheries in the coastal waters of the Skagerrak Sea in Western Sweden. It is about 
the complexity behind the problems confronted by local coastal fishermen in their attempts to 
share resources and participate in the management of coastal fisheries and ecosystems 
essential for fish. The study discusses how various aspects of the present institutional regime 
governing fisheries constrain the local fishermen’s ability to take part in the management 
process and secure access to resources. It further explores local fishermen’s initiatives to 
become more involved in co-management.
1.1 THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
In the last decade, Swedish fisheries have been in turmoil. In most parts of Europe and the 
world, those concerned with the management of fisheries are confronted with similar 
problems. Marine capture fisheries have increased from about 19 million tonnes in 1950 to 
about 80 million tonnes in the mid-1980s. But the annual rate of increase of marine catches 
decreased almost to zero in the 1990s. The global proportion of overfished stocks has kept 
increasing for the last 25 years (Garcia et al. 2001).
The following citations illustrate the global character of the problem:
“About 47 percent of the main stocks or species groups are fully exploited... Another 18 
percent of stocks or species groups are reported as overexploited. Prospects for 
expansion or increased production from these stocks are negligible... The remaining 10 
percent of stocks have become significantly depleted... Recovery usually implies drastic 
and long-lasting reductions in fishing pressure and/or the adoption of other management 
measures to remove conditions that contributed to the stock's overexploitation and 
depletion” (FAO 2002).
“There is a generalised consensus that fishery management policies have failed to 
maintain harvests at sustainable levels with detrimental effects on fish stocks, catches, 
employment, income and consumption and that there is a need of reforming policy and 
changing priorities” (OECD 1997). 
Symes (1996:8) has identified three broad tendencies of modernisation that severely affect 
coastal fisheries and underlie the turbulent condition of fishery management. These are: 
“ the penetration of capital through industrial modes of exploitation, formerly 
identified mainly with the offshore sector and especially with distant water fishing ... but 
now increasingly evident in the inshore fisheries and in aquaculture; 
 the appropriation of responsibility for fisheries management from local, industry 
based institutions and its relocation in the corridors of bureaucratic power in central 
government departments and supranational authorities like the European Commission;
 the globalisation of the food system as a result of which local fisheries no longer 
enjoy a monopoly of local or national markets but are increasingly engaged in intensive 
competition with sources of supply across the world.” 
2The list of challenges facing fisheries today at the global level is long. The following challenges 
have been recently identified in an FAO report: over fishing, with related issues of resource 
collapse and endangered species; fleet over capacity, with the related issue of subsidies; 
environmental impact of fishing; illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU); poor 
selectivity and discarding; the environmental state of the coastal zone; the integration of 
fisheries management into coastal zone management; fish trade eco-labelling; the interface 
between fisheries management bodies and CITES,1 and the collaboration between regional 
fishery bodies and regional environmental conventions (Garcia et al. 2001).
The situation described above is also relevant to Sweden. In Sweden, as well as in Europe, 
efforts have been insufficient in improving the situation with the resource and in 
counteracting the marginalisation of coastal fishermen. Recent studies and official documents 
conclude that despite tremendous efforts and good intentions, dominant fisheries 
management models have been ineffective in delivering sustainable outcomes. Fisheries in the 
coastal waters of Sweden suffer from problems of unsustainable fishing practices, with fish 
stocks being depleted and ecosystems deteriorating leading to there being less fish to share, 
and fewer and more elderly fishermen. Furthermore, recent studies in Sweden suggest that the 
established fishery management system has tended to privilege the offshore and recreation 
sectors, thereby further marginalising small-scale coastal fishermen (Hammer 1994; Hultkrantz 
et al. 1997). In addition with the increasing need for nature based leisure activities for people 
from the urban areas, the coast has evolved into an area where the values and interests of non-
residents frequently predominate. In general, in Swedish coastal areas the relation to nature is 
shifting from the use of natural resources for production to the use of natural resources for 
services which is also changing the livelihood strategies of the local residents.
This situation leads to conflicts with disappointed fishermen, managers, researchers and 
consumers. At the heart of these problems lies the openness of and interconnectedness in the 
marine ecosystem, the fugitive nature of the fisheries resources, the issue of their sharing and 
the implications this has on fisheries management.
Faced with all these problems the governments with their fisheries authorities and the fishing 
industry are expected to foster significant change. But, how? There is no one universally 
successful management system. 
1.2 THE RELEVANT POLICIES
The governing structures of the European Union have declared their intention to promote 
socio-economic development in regions that are dependent on fisheries, thus giving people, 
women and men, a prospect of staying in the region and contributing to the long-term 
survival of these communities (SOU 1998:24; European Commission 1999; European 
Commission 2003).
In a Swedish context the issue of keeping the rural coastal communities and archipelagos alive 
is addressed by the Swedish government. The notion of flourishing or living archipelagos - 
“en levande skärgård” – has become a recurrent theme in Swedish rural, regional and 
environmental development policies ( SOU 1996:153; Glesbygdsverket 1997; SOU 2000:67).
1 CITES stands for Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species. 
3In a Swedish policy context, fisheries management is expected to meet the criteria of social, 
economic and ecological sustainability. Sustainable development principles are formulated in 
terms of balancing three “E”s: Ecological sustainability, Economic efficiency and social 
Equity (SOU 1997/98:2). The use of such concepts could lead into a discussion of semantics; 
however pragmatically, it can be stated that fisheries management should a) safeguard the 
functionality of the ecosystem and the natural resource base; b) allocate the surplus among 
stakeholders using it efficiently; and c) guarantee that users share opportunities and the flow 
of benefits in an equitable way. In Sweden the management of fisheries should also guarantee 
that fish is a marketable product with accessible prices to society. In this sense the 
involvement of commercial or professional fishermen in fisheries management – which is the 
focus of this thesis – is a relevant research issue.
In 1998, and within the framework of the work with the development of an “Environmental 
Policy for a Sustainable Sweden”, the Swedish Government formulated national 
Environmental Quality Objectives (EQOs) for 15 areas (SOU 1997/98:145). The EQOs 
describe a vision of Sweden’s natural and cultural environment when ecologically sustainable 
development has been achieved, and set targets indicating the direction and time scale of the 
actions to be taken to reach it. One of these EQOs is titled “Balanced Marine Environment, 
Flourishing Coastal Areas and Archipelagos” (Naturvårdsverket 2003). 
Within the framework of these national and European policies and objectives coastal 
ecosystems and small-scale fisheries are expected to continue contributing to the maintenance 
of coastal settlements at the same time that resource users are expected to care for coastal 
ecosystems.
The government of Sweden has further stated that an important task for research is to provide 
knowledge about how to solve environmental problems and assess whether the actions taken 
are leading to improvements (SOU 1997/98:145). 
The above European and Swedish policies presuppose, however, that local producers have 
access to and control over natural resources in these areas, in other words, that the use and 
management of the local ecosystem and the “fish” is for the benefit of the local community. 
Taking this into account, and given the present panorama of depleted coastal resources and 
marginalised coastal fishermen, the Swedish government has recently declared the need for 
management reforms and is seeking alternative management approaches. This is a central 
theme in the lively Swedish debate over the management of fisheries, and to which this study 
seeks to contribute.
In 2003 the Swedish Parliament adopted two policy documents: one calling for a new marine 
strategy (SOU 2003:72)  and one calling for new strategies for fisheries (SOU 2003/04:51). 
The documents put emphasis on the development of local coastal fisheries, the consultation 
and influence of stakeholders, and the testing of local collaborative management initiatives2.
Collaborative management, referred to in the literature as co-management, is the sharing of 
responsibility and authority for the management of resources between the government and 
stakeholders. Both documents recognise deficiencies in the present management systems and 
highlight the need for increased user and civil society involvement. The Government suggests 
strengthening the influence of resource users at the local level within the framework of 
ecological, economic and social development, and in particular with regard to national 
environmental (EQO), regional and rural political goals. The National Board of Fisheries 
(NBF) has been commissioned to take the lead and coordinate pilot projects to test local co-
management. As time goes on, a more participative fisheries management system, with less 
elements of coercion and control and increasing responsibility taking by the resource users, is 
2  The Swedish term used in the official documents is that of lokal samförvaltning (SOU 2003/04:51). 
4expected to be the outcome of this process. The aim of this investigation is to contribute to 
this process.
1.3 THE RESEARCH BACKGROUND, PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS 
The research upon which this dissertation is based was conducted within the framework of a 
larger research program, the Sustainable Coastal Zone Management program3 (SUCOZOMA)
and its sub-program, Competing Interests and Conditions for Conflict Resolution (Glaeser 
and Píriz 1998; Bruckmeier 1998).
One central objective of SUCOZOMA, was that the research should produce knowledge to 
better inform decision making. Another was that the research should deal with the analysis 
and resolution of conflicts of interest surrounding natural resource based development and 
conservation in the coastal areas of southern Sweden. Multiple-use trends in coastal areas 
involving natural resource degradation, pollution, and depleted fish stocks were highlighted as 
critical tendencies deserving special attention. Another central aspect of the program was that 
the research projects should attempt to be interdisciplinary in character. In all individual 
projects emphasis should be given to natural resource management issues, the analysis of the 
established or dominant institutional framework governing the present situation and the 
analysis of alternatives. Prior to SUCOZOMA little research has occurred in Sweden about these 
issues.
SUCOZOMA’s fundamental premises can be interpreted as follows: first, natural resource 
conflicts in coastal areas and coastal fisheries development deserve special attention through 
research; second, to be able to cope with these type of conflicts, some innovation would be 
required; and finally, the research process and understanding of the problems involved would 
benefit from an inter-disciplinary approach that involves natural and social science and 
integrates non-scientific knowledge, particularly the knowledge of those depending on the 
environmental quality of coastal waters for their livelihood.
There are a number of ways in which natural resource problems and conflicts can be managed 
and problems in fisheries be studied. Research on fisheries in Sweden has traditionally focused 
on studying components of the ecosystem with emphasis on “the fish” and only recently upon 
how society through institutional arrangements conditions the fishermen’s abilities to access 
and safeguard the natural resources and their involvement in management. The involvement 
of the fishermen in management can be hypothesised as a set of tensions between user groups 
sharing a common pool of natural resources (cpr) and where cooperation and management 
alternatives emerge as a struggle for increased influence over the management of the 
ecosystem on which their livelihoods depend. Such issues have since the 1970s been explored 
by human ecologists and other researchers involved in interdisciplinary studies. 
Interdisciplinary studies inspired by human ecology traditions can broaden the narrow set of 
academic approaches and knowledge base shaping fisheries management.
This dissertation discusses problems confronting the shared use of common pool resources 
and how coastal fishermen from the West Coast of Sweden perceived the prevailing fisheries 
management regime in the late 1990:s.The main research question is:
What constitute barriers to fishermen’s involvement in the management of coastal fisheries? 
3 The SUCOZOMA program was launched in late 1997 and became operational in 1998. The Swedish Foundation 
for Strategic Environmental Research (MISTRA) funded the program. 
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There are three theoretical perspectives in this more recent interdisciplinary and institutional 
discussion of natural resource management which have inspired the orientation of this study. 
These are the collective action perspective, the property rights perspective, and the co-
management perspective. These perspectives all postulate that for the success of any natural 
resource management system it is necessary to get fishermen voluntarily involved in the 
management process. Behind these perspectives lies a shift of research focus from the “fishes” 
to the “fishermen” and the institutional mechanisms mediating the fisherman’s interaction 
with other fishermen and resource users and with the ecosystem.
This dissertation focuses on exploring what are perceived as barriers to the involvement of 
fishermen in the management of coastal fisheries in the dominant fisheries management 
regime. In its search for management alternatives that could promote the involvement of 
fishermen in the sustainability of local coastal fisheries, this study can be seen as a 
contribution to better understanding why and how current approaches to fisheries 
management are undergoing a process of transition in Sweden. Thus the study exposes the 
context of an ongoing institutional change and develops ideas and concepts, which the 
literature on natural resource management considers to be critical to the emergence and 
sustainability of alternative co-management arrangements. Finally, alternative forms of co-
management emerging from the local level are examined and their advantages and challenges 
are discussed. The views of the local coastal fishermen, seen as protagonists in co-
management theory, are given particular prominence.
At a more theoretical level the study is further connected with two interrelated debates. One is 
the debate on interdisciplinary approaches to the management of natural resources. The other 
is the debate on the need for rethinking the basic assumptions on which conventional fisheries 
management relies, including those which regard scientific knowledge as the only relevant type 
of knowledge in a management context. Implicit here is therefore the search for 
complementary knowledge and alternative management approaches that can contribute to 
coping with present deficiencies in the management of coastal fisheries with regard to the 
marginalisation of coastal fishermen. This is central to this investigation.
It is within this ambit that a set of sub questions for further research have been singled out, 
the literature reviewed and the research method shaped (chapter 4). The sub questions are:
¾ In what sense are the characteristics of living marine resources – fugitive and freely shared 
resources – problematic in resource management? 
¾ Why is the fishermen’s involvement in the management of the resources an imperative? 
¾ What management alternatives are there? 
¾ What are main characteristics and origins of the Swedish fisheries management system? 
¾ What characterises the local coastal fishermen’s common pool resource situation?
¾ What explains the failures of the present regime with regard to the involvement of fishermen? 
¾ Whose interests, knowledge and capacities are articulated in the dominant models?
¾ What can we learn from the coastal fishermen’s experiences and initiatives?
¾ What measures are needed to get the fishermen involved in the management of coastal fisheries?
1.4 THE OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
The dissertation consists of nine chapters. The chapters are organised in the following way: 
This short introductory chapter (1) together with chapter 2 set the context from which the 
dissertation and its research questions have evolved.
6Chapter 2 provides a broad description of the development of fisheries in the area of study. 
This chapter describes the ecosystem, gives an historical background of the fisheries with 
emphasis on the development of the institutional regime and presents base line information 
characterising the situation for fisheries in the area of study at the end of the nineties. It 
highlights the interrelations between the social and the ecological systems, by integrating, 
whenever possible, the description of the biophysical system, the resource, the technology, the 
community of users and the institutional setting. A central question pursued in this chapter is 
how the institutional regime governing coastal fisheries has developed over time. 
Chapter 3 is a theoretical chapter where selected pieces of the international literature on the 
management of fugitive and freely shared resources (common pool resources) are discussed. 
Concepts relevant to the understanding and discussion of the complexity involved in the 
management of coastal fisheries and institutional pre-conditions involving ownership and 
property rights, management and governance are discussed. Out of the description made in 
chapter 2 and concepts elaborated in chapter 3 a set of sub questions are singled out for 
further research and the research method is shaped.
Chapter 4 describes the research method which is primarily of qualitative type with emphasis 
on documents, questionnaire studies, open-ended semi-structured interviews, and attendance 
of meetings.
Thereafter the bulk of the empirical results are presented in four chapters. In chapter 5 
contrasting views of coastal fisheries are considered: a conventional view, expressed in policy 
documents and development plans, and an alternative view, as articulated by coastal fishermen 
from the study area. Ideas for reformulating the concept of professional coastal fisheries 
emerge from the analysis.
Next in chapter 6 the results of two questionnaires addressing the problem of multiple-use in 
coastal areas are presented and discussed in the light of more qualitative data gathered through 
interviews and participation in meetings. This chapter explores what it is that precludes the 
local fishermen from securing access to the resources in a multiple use setting. Internal 
diversity within the fisheries and other subtractive uses are the key problems identified by the 
fishermen.
The analysis of problems in certain rules and the interplay between actors influential to 
fisheries management is undertaken in chapter 7 which is thematically structured and draws 
mainly from interview material and participation in meetings. This chapter illustrates how 
fishermen’s local knowledge has been filtered out in the management system.
Concluding the empirical analysis, chapter 8 examines two specific case studies. The first case 
presents the local traditional management system of prawn fishermen in the area of Koster-
Väderö and shows how this system has been instrumental in Integrated Coastal Management 
(ICM), resolving cross sectoral conflicts derived from the proposal to establish a marine 
reserve. The second case consists of a proposal presented by a group of fishermen from a 
producers’ organisation in Northern Bohuslän, NBPO, in an attempt to resolve appropriation 
problems derived from the present resource crisis. The cases are discussed in the light of 
findings from extensive interdisciplinary research on common pool resource management.
In the final chapter, chapter 9, the findings are reviewed and discussed in the light of the 
common pool resource perspective and their implications for policy.
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SETTING THE SCENE
This chapter provides background information on the Swedish coastal fisheries along the 
Skagerrak Sea in Western Sweden. It describes the ecosystem and the resources, technology, 
fishermen’s community and origins of the present Swedish fisheries management regime. As 
will be seen in the review of the literature in chapter 3, these are dimensions or sets of 
variables that have empirically been shown to be important when understanding success and 
failures in the management of natural resources and are considered necessary for the 
understanding of further analysis. The context from which the present fisheries management 
system has evolved cannot be ignored: it is pertinent to the current quest for institutional 
reform. As a result the present description has a greater historical depth than what is usual in 
the literature on common pool resources management.
2.1 THE RESOURCE SYSTEM 
The coastline of Sweden covers a length of 7,600 km (Bernes and Grundsten 1991).1 The bio-
physical characteristics of the Swedish coast change from North to South and East to West, 
following gradients of temperature and salinity and alternating open coasts and archipelagos 
(see figure 2.1). In the Northeast the waters are almost fresh and are icebound for parts of the 
year. Here, the number of species commercially exploited is low (vendance, whitefish, salmon, 
trout and herring) and the fisheries are generally small-scale.
To the South, both temperature and salinity increase turning the Baltic proper into a brackish 
sea, too saline for most freshwater species and too fresh for some marine species. Here, the 
soils at the edge of the Baltic are fertile and suitable for agriculture.
Compared to the West Coast of Sweden the Baltic Sea has little biological diversity and a low 
density of local professional fishermen, but it currently sustains an important part of the 
Swedish cod, herring and sprat fisheries. Since the seventies (see below) fishermen from 
Southern Bohuslän take the largest proportion of these resources.
On the West Coast, the coastal environment is influenced by the North Sea and the salinity, 
biotope variation, and biological diversity increase as one moves northwards towards 
Skagerrak (see arrow figure 2.1). Whereas in the south, Kattegatt and the Sound are 
characterised by the influence of the brackish Baltic Sea, Skagerrak is, in oceanographic terms, 
a more stable marine environment. Skagerrak has been less investigated than the Baltic Sea. 
Crustaceans and molluscs grow abundantly in this area. Skagerrak or “Viken”, The Bay of the 
Vikings, is the only truly marine sea bordering Sweden and has been described by Swedish 
oceanographers, such as Fonselius (1990), as a “North Sea fjord”. However, while the North 
Sea is relatively shallow, with a mean depth of 94 m, Skagerrak has a mean depth of 210-m 
(Svansson 1975). The amplitude of the tide is insignificant in the area with a rather narrow 
inter-tidal zone.
In the north, Skagerrak borders Norwegian territory and to the south lies the tip of Denmark 
and the less saline Kattegat Sea. The southern border of Skagerrak coincides with the 
convergence of two central permanent currents: the Baltic Current and the Jutland Current. 
The convergence is commonly represented by an imaginary line between Skagen’s lighthouse 
                                                     
1 This estimation includes fjords, bays, and the perimeters of the major islands.
8on the tip of Denmark and the Paternoster lighthouse (the southern point of Tjörn Island) or 
Marstrand’s Island in Sweden2 (Fonselius 1990; SMHI 1994).
Figure 2.1 The geographic distribution of commercially important species, and salinity 
gradient on the Swedish coasts (The Skagerrak Sea is indicated with an arrow). 
(Source: Neuman and Píriz 2000).
Many important aspects of the abundance and diversity of resources in Skagerrak are 
associated with this border condition and water dynamics in Skagerrak.3
                                                     
2 Already in 1877 a pioneer oceanographer, S.L. Ekman, suggested a line between Skagens tip and the southern 
point of the island of Tjörn to be the border between Kattegatt and Skagerrak (Ekman and Pettersson 1893). 
Physically defined borders are not necessarily used in fisheries management. For example, in the fisheries 
agreement between Denmark, Norway and Sweden (The Triangle agreement 1967-2002) on equal access to 
each others’ coastal areas (up to 4 nautical miles from the base line) Skagerrak has been defined differently. In 
this agreement the southern border has been placed further south than the physical one. The line adopted in 
the agreement is that between Skagen’s lighthouse and Tistlarna’s lighthouse, south of Göteborg.
9The water residence time is relatively low, 3 to 4 months (Rosenberg et al. 1991). Three 
phenomena have been described as influencing Skagerak’s water quality: the Jutland current, 
which can reach high velocities, brings nutrients from land and takes different directions from 
Skagen depending on the winds (Fonselius 1990); the fresh water contributions from the 
Norwegian rivers including Glomma Elv4 (Rosenberg et al. 1991); and the counterclockwise 
water circulation, which turns Skagerrak into an important accumulation area for suspended 
matter and nutrients from the North Sea (Svansson 1975).
Southwest winds predominate in the area and influence the surface Baltic Current that follows 
the coastal line (Svansson 1975). The inflow of this water is strongest in summer and weakest 
in winter. Under its influence comparatively low salinity (30 ‰) and high temperature (15 ºC) 
can be found down to 20m deep where a halocline forms. In the coastal waters, this halocline 
is rather stable and primary production can start in early spring. Off the coast, the halocline is 
usually weaker and the water is stabilised by a thermocline (Rosenberg et al. 1991). The flow 
of waters with different densities and nutrients influences the biological life and the strong 
pycnoclines along the coast and these are believed to play a physical retention role for larvae 
and juveniles (Svansson 1985).
The waters of Skagerrak fringe a sinuous scenic coast with an archipelago consisting of more 
than 5000 islands, fjords, and bays providing refuge to a diverse marine life. Depending on the 
distance from land and the degree of exposure to marine influence, i.e. winds, waves and 
saltwater spray, the archipelago is divided into three zones: the inner, the outer, and between 
these a more heterogeneous intermediate patchy zone. Biological diversity is greatest in this 
zone (Loo and Rödström 1988). In the inner zone (depth 0-6 m),5 hard bottoms made of sand 
and sand mixed with mud, with eelgrass and algae belts as dominant vegetation are 
representative. Oyster and mussel banks are found in this zone. In less exposed shallow bays 
eelgrass plains (Zostera marina) and seaweeds of the genus Fucus dominate. These communities 
are known to provide shelter and food to early life stages of crustaceans and fish, but also sea 
birds and swans (Loo and Rödström 1988).
In slightly exposed areas, the vegetation is more varied (Fucus vesiculosus, F. spiralis, Ascophyllum 
nodosum and Cladophora glomerata). In the more exposed areas Laminaria dominates (Loo and 
Rödström 1988). In deeper zones hard bottoms consisting of shells mixed with gravel, sand 
and sandy clay are representative bottom types and substrates. Shellfish is common in these 
and deeper waters. Not far from the coast, a deep-sea fjord, known as the Norwegian Trench6
and also referred to as the Koster-Väderö Fjord, is found. Nilsson (1997) has recently 
reviewed existing marine biological literature about this area, with a focus on hard-bottom 
living communities. He concludes that the area most probably has the greatest diversity of 
marine species in Sweden. The growing marine influence, the water dynamics and the biotope 
variation are accompanied by the in-flow of larvae and juveniles of gadoids, flatfish, and 
shellfish from the North Sea. Seals and birds are also part of the marine wildlife preying on 
fish and shellfish. 
The most commonly reported species in Skagerrak’s fisheries have been listed in appendix 1 at 
the end of this thesis. For the purpose of collecting and analysing data about stocks of 
                                                                                                                                                            
3 The significance of these currents has been stated by many authors (Svansson 1985; Pleijel 1988; Fonselius 
1990; Rosenberg et al. 1991; Sjöberg 1992; Phil and Ulmestrand 1993; Nilsson 1997).
4 The volume of fresh water discharged by Swedish rivers to the Skagerrak is very small (45 m³/s) when 
compared to the volume discharged by Norwegian rivers (2190 m³/s). The major contributor is Glomma Elv 
with a mean discharge flow of c.a. 700 m³/s and a catchment area of about 41, 200 km² (Svansson 1975). 
5  The 0-6 m deep zone is classed by the Swedish Law as a zone of national interest deserving special protection. 
6  The Norwegian Trench has been referred in the literature as the Norwegian Rinnej (from German Rinne) and 
Koster-Väderö Fjord. The fishermen refer to it as “Koster rännan”. 
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commercial species, ICES has referred to Skagerrak and northern Kattegatt as sub-area III7.
Within this sub-area, ICES grid-grid-squares 4556 and 4656 are representative of the coastal 
waters of Skagerrak.
An examination of the fishermen’s 1997 logbooks8 done for this study, showed that 52 
identified species and a number of non-identified ones were reported in the “catch reports” 
(landing reports) from these grid-squares. This figure is high compared to the reports from 
other zones, e.g. the Baltic Sea. Figure 2.2 gives an approximate indication of the degree of 
permanence in the coastal waters of Skagerrak of adult individuals (spawners) of the species 
that shown to be commercially important.
Six “mobility” groups can be identified in figure 2.2: bivalves (1), crustaceans (2), flatfishes (3), 
gadoids (groundfish of the family of cod) (4), small pelagics (5), and eels (6).
Bivalves are permanent attached to a substratum (sessile) and known to be suitable for local 
management. The species belonging to the second group flow into Skagerrak’s coasts in their 
early larvae phases but as adults they tend to move within a confined area, they are sedentary. 
This is the case for the deep-sea prawn which has a patchy distribution and migrates vertically 
in the water column. Flatfish and gadoids together with eel spend their lives as juveniles in 
Skagerrak’s coasts but then move different distances to spawn.
High ȸ Permanence of adult individuals in the coastal waters of Skagerrak Ⱥ Low 
Bivalvia
1
Crustaceans
2
Flatfishes
3
Gadoids
4
Small pelagics 
5
Eels
6
Mussels   Plaice Withing   Hake  
 Lobster  Sole  Cod (North 
Sea stock) 
Sprat   
 Crabs  Cod (local stocks) Cod (Baltic stock) Herring  
  Nephrops Turbot  Haddock  Mackerel  
  Deep sea 
prawns
Common
dab
 Saithe    
   Flounder  Dogfish    
   Long 
rough
dab
 Catfish   Eel 
Figure 2.2 An approximation of the level of degree of permanence of adult fish and shellfish in 
  the coastal waters of Skagerrak. 
All in all in the Swedish Skagerrak coastal ecosystems are described as diverse, dynamic, and 
complex. The coasts of Skagerrak are important catchment areas for shellfish and a nursery 
area for the North Sea finfish stocks. The morphology of the coastal zone with the 
archipelago and the water dynamics can be viewed as components delivering ecological 
services. Diversity, dynamics, and complexity of the ecosystem, combined with the uncertainty 
                                                     
7 ICES has divided the Swedish waters into three main regions: the Gulf of Bothnia comprising ICES Division 
IIId (sub-areas 30 and 31); the Baltic proper comprising ICES Division IIId (sub-areas 24, 25, 27 and 29N); 
and the West Coast, including the Sound separating Sweden and Denmark comprising ICES Division III c and 
b and northern Kattegatt and Skagerrak comprising ICES Division IIIa.
8 Information about catches comes from two different and complementary sources. One is the fisherman’s 
logbook offering numerical data about daily (or monthly, for the small boats) catches by species, gear and its 
spatial correspondence with the ICES sub areas and grid-squares or in the best cases the position where the 
trawl is lifted. The other is the data provided by the first recipient in the market, often a fish auction. This 
information does not normally include what is caught and discarded, and can therefore neither be used as a 
measure of biological diversity nor of fishing mortality, these are considerably higher. 
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derived from the lack of comprehensive assessments complicate the users’ and the 
researchers’ ability to assess risks, predict yields and define maximum sustainable outputs. The 
significance of these characteristics for how coastal people have developed and managed the 
fisheries cannot be overemphasised. 
2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2.2.1 Property rights: the tenurial significance of  the land, the herring and the 
archipelago  
Historical documents on fishing rights in Swedish waters relate that the Crown was, for a long 
time, the ultimate owner of the waters and the fish and that the nobility had special privileges 
in relation to them (SOU 1925:19). The Crown collected taxes in return for the right to fish. 
Fishing rights in coastal waters were subject to regulation long before the appointment of the 
first Swedish Director General of fisheries in 1611.
In 1766, due to demands from the nobility and those who served the Crown in exchange for 
usufruct right to land and housing, a legal distinction was made between the ownership of 
inshore waters and the rights to fish there. The distinction was between "det allmänna" or 
public property owned by the Crown, and, "det enskilda" or private property where the 
landowner was in command. As regards fishing rights the main interest of the nobility seems 
to have been in getting access to salmon, eel, lobster and oysters (Hasslöf 1949), resources that 
were either staple foods for the peasants working on the farms or delicacies for the nobility9.
These species are either stationary (lobster and oysters) or characterised by seasonal 
abundance in inland or inshore waters (salmon and eels), making them easy to catch and their 
situational ownership easier to define (see chapter 3).
The 1766 law, privatising access and usufruct rights to inshore waters and the fish there, was a 
response to class struggles and its purpose was to deprive the landless of access to the shore10
(Eklund 1994). On the Baltic side, where land was an important asset and agriculture 
prevailed, and where spawning fish, particularly salmon, appeared seasonally in the inshore 
waters, coastal fisheries provided a supplement to agriculture and salmon was eaten by the 
peasants working on the farms. The right to fish in the inshore waters continued to be linked 
to the ownership of the land. A similar situation has been described by Eklund (1994) as 
existing on the coasts of Finland.
Eklund (1994) has portrayed the fishermen from the East Coast as fisher-peasants 
(fiskebönderna), fishermen from the West have been portrayed by Hasslöf (1949) as a crewman 
in the herring fisheries. In a more recent study carried out by Hazlehurst (1994) in Southern 
Bohuslän the author has referred to the west coast fishermen as the “boat owners”.
Northern Bohuslän has historically been subject to strong cultural influence from Denmark 
and Norway, and with regard to fisheries still is so. On the one hand, Bohuslän was a 
Norwegian province until 1658 and for a long time a large proportion of the manpower 
involved in the herring fisheries of Northern Bohuslän came from Norway. On the other 
hand, a large proportion of the Swedish catches have historically been landed in Norway and 
Denmark. To land in Denmark is also common today. In the West traditions of open access 
had prevailed for a long time due to the Norwegian influence and had previously been 
recognised by the Crown. This is made clear in the following text in SOU (1925:19) which 
quotes a passage from1658 whose central message has been translated here below.
                                                     
9 Sport fishing was introduced in Sweden by the British in the late 1800:s but the phenomena of sport fishing 
and fishing for recreation would not expand in Sweden until after the 1930s (Bo Bengtsson, pers.com). 
10 The landless have been referred in Swedish as “backstuge-sittare”, “torpare” and “strandsittare”. 
12
”...As a result Norwegian law continued to be applied in the non-Norwegian province of 
Bohuslän...” (own translation).11
Most troublesome was the implementation of the privatisation law in Bohuslän. The lack of 
arable land, the economic significance of the herring and other fisheries’ resources – together 
with outside influence of Norwegian and Danish traditions – influenced people’s relations to 
fishing rights on the West Coast in a markedly different way from that in the East. However, 
to protect the poor, the landowners’ exclusive fishing rights did not include the sea-based 
fisheries nor the herring and sprat fishing over which people from the parish were considered 
to hold customary rights. The latter was extremely important for Bohuslän. As a result the 
privatisation of fishing rights on the West Coast was only partial.
The 1766 law coincided with a boom period for the herring fisheries between 1752 and 1808. 
During this period the population of Bohuslän increased considerably and the port of 
Göteborg became the Swedish centre for the export and marketing of fish.
Herring has historically been especially important for the coastal communities of Bohuslän. 
After 1808, herring catches slumped; land netting and fishing in inshore shallow waters was no 
longer possible and men migrated from the Bohuslän archipelagos to join other sectors of the 
economy such as the merchant navy. Between 1877 and 1912 a new herring boom attracted 
people to the area reversing the population trend again (Haneson and Rencke 1923). Even 
though this period coincided with a wave of emigration from rural areas this did not much 
affect the demographics in the archipelagos of Bohuslän, where herring was abundant and 
good fishing attracted people to the islands. During this period herring was caught both 
offshore and inshore and once again the archipelagos absorbed some of emigrants from other 
rural areas (Hazlehurst 1994; Haneson and Rencke 1923).
Lindquist (1999) and Svansson (1999) have discussed the mystery of the herring booms in 
Bohuslän, for which science has not found convincing explanations. A passage from Otto 
Pettersson’s autobiography quoted by Svansson (1999) reveals the significance that the herring 
periods must have had for the people in the archipelagos of Bohuslän, even where other 
fisheries developed.
“...The herring appeared in the fjords of Bohuslän in such a sporadic and enigmatic way, 
that people compared the phenomenon to a beam of shoals of fish from the sea (en 
strålning av fiskstim utifrån havet). A fjord, which on one day had been a rich catching 
field with pound seiners in every bay, the next day, could be completely empty.”... (Own 
translation from Otto Pettersson 1938:5: En sjävbiografi. – W. Quoted in: Svansson 
1999:23).
The periods of good herring fisheries lasted for more or less 70 years (Lindquist 1999) and the 
herring disappeared as quickly as it had appeared. Thus the fishermen from the area had to 
develop a modus vivendi based on a more diversified fishery throughout the year.
However, in spite of the context described above, the 1766 Fisheries Law brought some 
constraints to the archipelagos in Northern Bohuslän. The decision to privatise fishing rights 
in the archipelago, where the irregular coastline required the use of diverse criteria to define 
the boundaries, was preceded and followed by conflicts. The law made a distinction between 
saltwater fisheries within the skerries (inomskärs) and saltwater fisheries outside the skerries 
(utomskärs). This statutory distinction between marine fisheries inside and outside the belt of 
                                                     
11 The Swedish text reads: “Genom freden i Roskilde 1658 tillförsäkrades genom fredsfördraget invånarna att 
”blifva vid deras vanliga rätt, lag och gamla privilegier och friheter oturberade och obehindrade, så vida de icke löpa eller strida
contra leges fundamentales af Sveriges krono”. Till följd härav fortfor norsk rätt att tillämpas i den från Norge avskilda 
provinsen Bohuslän samt Dansk rätt i de till det egentliga Danmark förut hänförda provinserna Skåne, Halland 
och Blekinge till dess med år 1683 svensk rättsskipning kan anses genomförd i dessa landskap” (SOU 1925:19: 
p 98).
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skerries was open to different interpretations and led to disputes with subsequent demands to 
change the law. Whereas the exclusive rights of the landowners to waters inside the inner belt 
of skerries were often accepted, the privatisation of fishing rights in the outer belt of skerries 
was highly controversial and questioned by the fishing communities from Northern Bohuslän.
In the first decade of the 1900s the fishermen from Northern Bohuslän, notably those around 
Strömstad, complained to parliament and the Crown. Consequently, an official investigation 
was ordered. The point of departure for the investigation was that the distinction between 
what was considered public (allmänna) and what was considered private (enskilt), based on the 
concept of "sea-shore", had to be more clearly defined. The different interpretations of this 
definition had turned into a matter of controversy. The investigation came to focus on the 
analysis of different actors’ interpretations of concepts defining rules in coastal fisheries. The 
meaning of, on the one hand, customary rights in private waters (expressed at that time in the 
law as ålder or age-old rights), and, on the other hand, conflicts about physical interference of 
fishing gear were also discussed. Different interpretations of the meaning and ideas of 
inclusiveness expressed in terms of "inside" or "outside" (inomskärs and utomskärs) and the 
tenurial significance given to the archipelago by local fishermen, maritime pilots, civil servants 
and land-owners are reflected in the minutes from the meetings held in 1911 (SOU 1925:19).
The debates from the early 1900s resulted in a clarification of the boundaries, and exclusive 
fishing rights were to apply to the fringe covering a distance of 180 meters from the 2 meter 
depth line (SOU 1925:19). Nevertheless, the controversies about fishing rights on the West 
Coast continued for many years only to be ended in the 1940s, under the influence of the 
Fishermen’s West Coast Association (SVC) established in 1930. In the 1930s and 40s new 
claims from the Swedish landowners in relation to the ownership of inshore waters were 
acknowledged and the distance from the seashore to be disposed on an exclusive basis by the 
landowner was extended to 300m and a depth of 3m, the current definition12. This decision 
was highly contested by SVC and protests from the West Coast were heard in the Swedish 
parliament. SVC argued that it was difficult to define property and rights to fish on the basis 
of distance from land or water depth, because these were dynamic variables that changed 
naturally.13
For the West Coast the whole discussion on the definition of fishing rights based on land 
ownership ended in 1948 when by petition from SVC a few parliamentarians jointly presented 
a motion to parliament that exempted the West Coast from the general rule. Following this 
debate the 1950 Fisheries Law (SFS 1950) made an exemption regarding fishing rights on the 
West Coast. In this Act access to the inshore and the fishing rights in the provinces of Halland 
and Bohuslän were disconnected from the ownership of the land. Thus the right to fish in the 
inshore in the West Coast was open to the public. Fishermen in this area were allowed to 
move and fish freely in both private and public waters. This right is sometimes referred as 
“equal access” (Yrkesfiskaren 1994) and as explained by Hasslöf (1949) it was originally 
adopted to benefit the poor. Only the right to exploit oyster banks in private waters was left in 
the hands of the land-water owners. The extension of the principle of open or free access to 
fisheries resources in not only public but also private waters was deemed to require an agency 
to define and enforce the rules governing fishing in these waters.
                                                     
12 Today as a general principle all Swedish waters within 300 m from firm land or inside the 3 metres depth curve, 
depending on which is the closest to firm land, as well as all waters within 100 m from an island are private 
waters. Here the owner has the right to fish as much he wants without any duties and reporting 
responsibilities.
13 In the West Coast of Sweden tides are not significant. 
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The following passage quoted by Hasslöf (1949:468),14 reveals the central message in the 
argumentation by SVC.
“The only way to resolve the issue of property rights relations on the West Coast seems 
to be, according to the association, to declare all fishing on this side of the country free, 
and to simultaneously give the local authorities, i.e. the County Board Administration (or 
provincial government) and their fisheries superintendents, the right after consultation 
with the fisheries associations and other affected actors, to issue rules of conduct” (Own 
translation).
2.2.2 The fishing community 
In Bohuslän, the “coastal society” in the archipelagos was, for long time, synonymous with a 
fishing community (fiskeläge). Here, teams of ten to twenty self-employed, share fishermen15
(lottkarlar), often with strong kinship relations fished together in crews (fiskelags) and their 
relatives were often involved in fishing related land-based activities. The crew also undertook 
cooperative tasks for the benefit of the local community as a whole. The crew and the fishing 
community were two important institutions through which collective action was organised. 
These two  institutions, –  together with the church, the household and extended family,16 the 
local landing harbour and the auction – played important roles in the everyday communication 
and inter-generational transfer of fishing knowledge and tradition, and so strengthened the 
coastal fishers’ sense of group identity and solidarity.
Although other livelihood related activities such as horticulture, cattle rearing, house 
construction, transportation, and workshops were very common, fisheries, dominated 
periodically by herring fisheries, were the basis of the local economy. In Bohuslän co-
operatives and producers’ organisations17 were common in the early 1900s. These 
organisations had multiple purposes. One of the problems these local organisations struggled 
with was the issue of the low prices paid by the buyers to the fishermen (Hessle and 
Verständig 1957). They were involved in marketing, collective purchase of oil and fishing 
supplies, credits, but also social activities towards the fishing community. A non-governmental 
organisation - the Rural Economy and Agricultural Societies (Hushållningssällskapen) – provided 
extension services to the rural producers including the fishermen and assisted them in 
organising co-operatives and local economic producers associations, and getting access to 
loans, for example. This organisation had extension officers in each county and was funded 
via contributions from the public, the producers and the state.18
In times of plentiful supply prices could fall rapidly and the buyers used the opportunity to 
make “good” deals with certain producers’ organisations or unorganised fishermen. This was a 
                                                     
14The Swedish text reads: “Den enda vägen att komma till klarhet och reda i fiskerättsförhållandena på västkusten 
synes enligt Förbundets mening vara att förklara allt fiske vid denna kust fritt samt giva de lokala 
myndigheterna, länsstyrelse och fiskeriintendent, rätt att efter hörande av fiskares organisationer samt andra 
berörda parter utföra de ordningsföreskrifter, som kunna befinnas erforderliga”. 
15 Crew members in Swedish fisheries fish for a share in the value of the catch rather than for fixed wages. The 
boat also gets a share. Attempts before the 1900s to create large fishing companies (like the ones that were 
developed in Holland and Spain) failed in Sweden. 
16Hasslöf (1949) describes the involvement of the family in the making of the gear and the processing of the 
catch.
17In the modern literature, producers’ organisations or PO are often considered as a new feature in Sweden 
having their origins in the European Union. However, this type of market-oriented organisation and the 
concept of PO were common in Sweden long before Sweden joined the European Union (SOU 1922:7; 
Gerhard 1995). The original POs were often assisted by the Rural Economy and Agricultural Societies. With 
time the roles of the POs and of the Societies were taken up by the main associations and the state 
respectively.
18 The history of Hushållningssällskapen can be found in www.hush.se. 
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source of friction between the fishermen. The West Coast fishermen have made many 
attempts to stabilize prices of fish and to avoid the low prices associated with heavy landings 
and imports.
The literature reveals that fishermen have used different collective strategies to overcome the 
problems resulting from an unbalanced supply-demand relation and the low prices paid by the 
buyers. Examples of such strategies are boycotting,  co-operative selling, supply control via 
landing or catch quotas (rations) and caging fish in shallow waters (live storage) for later sale 
when prices were firmer (see Hessle and Verständig 1957; Gerhard 1995). For example, the 
introduction of minimum landing sizes (MLS) which precedes the establishment of the FAs in 
the 1930s, had to do with the effect that smaller sizes had on lowering quayside prices. 
Similarly, the raison d’être of rules developed in the herring fisheries, consisting of minimum 
landing sizes and weekly landing rations (market share quotas), was to avoid saturating the  
market. The rules adopted by the fishermen were non-formal arrangements, i.e. far from being 
institutionalised within the FAs19 or the Government’s structures. From this perspective, one 
may argue that at the beginning of the 20th century fisheries management in Northern 
Bohuslän was community driven. Here the fishermen authorised to fish in the coastal zone 
were those acting in compliance with locally designed rules, the purpose of which was mainly 
concerned with the allocation of resources between the fishermen. 
The fishermen’s rules were rarely related to issues of resource conservation; they were mainly 
adopted as an attempt to solve problems of unbalanced supply and demand, the struggle 
against buyers and to guarantee equity of market shares among fishermen. In their struggle 
with the market situation the fishermen developed rules limiting input and output. Thus, the 
bulk of the rules were designed with an explicit economic and social aim, even though many 
of them may incidentally have a positive conservation effect. The availability of fish and the 
diversity of the catch was not a problem and the need to limit fisheries for conservation 
purposes was not as necessary as it is today. Diagram 2.1 is a reconstruction of the most 
important landings in Northern Bohuslän, as a Swedish fishery scientist described it in the 
1920s, when the fisheries for small pelagics, followed by the fisheries for gadoids and flatfish 
were central to the economy of the coastal communities of the area. 
After the 1920s, with the introduction of the engines and new fishing techniques, primary 
purse seine and the trawl, the geographical scale and the intensity of fisheries expanded 
considerably. It was from the main port of Göteborg that these new fishing techniques 
disseminated. The increased use of engines, purse seines and trawls was not conflict free, 
though. During the same time (1920-1940) the volumes of landed herring increased and so did 
the post-harvest industry and the export revenues. During this period large quantities of 
herring were stored on land. The struggle against the dealers for better prices continued and 
worsened with the increased landings. Problems of physical interference with the prevalent 
static gear led to conflicts between the local fishermen and those who trawled. 
Already at the beginning of the 1900s and in order to give preference to static gear in the 
Swedish territorial waters, the 4 nautical mile limit was used to exclude mobile fishing gear 
from coastal waters. This limit was used to allocate space between the communities of 
authorised fishermen by making a functional (or gear based) distinction. In practice the 4 
nautical mile limit became the limit of coastal fisheries. The trawling after deep-sea prawn in 
Koster-Väderö Fjord, where due to the great depth, static gear could not be used, was 
exempted from this rule.
                                                     
19The term semi-enforceable is used to refer to the rules that have been adopted within the fishermen’s 
associations. FA’s rules are often like a code of conduct and accepted by the administration but seldom 
transcribe into a legal instrument and are therefore only enforceable upon the members of the association i.e. 
semi-enforceable.
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Diagram 2.1 Seasonal variations in Central/Northern Bohuslän’s fisheries 
   in 1920s  
Catch  Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
 Apri May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mars
Herring    
Sprat    
Mackerel
Haddock
Cod
Whiting
Saite
Ling
Plaice
Turbot
Flounder
Sole
Prawn
Crab   
Lobster
Eel
The darker the grey colour, the more significant the landing in terms of volumes. 
Nephrops was incidentally caught and mussels were collected to be used as fishing bait and 
oyster were collected in only a few places SOU (1922:7:pp73).
Source: Based on of a qualitative description given by Hessle in SOU (1922:7 pp 69-79).
2.3 THE ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATIST CENTRALISED CO-MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM
2.3.1 The Fishermen’s Regional Association (SVC)  
The Swedish West Coast Fishermen Association (SVC) was established by the initiative of 
fishery communities in Southern Bohuslän in 1930. At this time it was difficult to find markets 
for the fish and to negotiate with the fish dealers and, at the same time new technology made 
expansion possible creating the conditions for a growing industry. This situation was 
understood to require a unified collective and an organisation able to negotiate and act 
economically and politically in its name. Many attempts to organise the fishermen at the 
regional level had been made before the 1930s but with poor results (Gerhard 1995). With its 
headquarters in the city-harbour of Göteborg, SVC became the base for organised collective 
action aimed at influencing the post-harvest sector and the political spheres to the benefit of 
the professional fishermen. 
The purpose of SVC was stated as follows:
“To promote the efficient development of fisheries activities and to represent its 
members as a fishermen’s organisation in their external relations, to act as the central 
intermediary between members and the authorities and to pursue the professional 
economic ideals and interests of its members with all available means. It is also the task 
of the Union to contribute towards eliminating economic and other associated conflicts 
of interests existing between various groups of branch members within the Union” 
(Statutes of the Union of Swedish West Coast Fishermen, Quoted in Hessle and 
Verständig 1957:79). 
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SVC was organised on the basis of a number of local fishing communities which became the 
local SVC branches. In contrast to traditional labour unions created during the same period 
this was an association of self employed fishermen: those who owned the boat and the crews 
of share fishermen. Besides being organised around the local branches (according to place of 
residence), the members were also organised according to functional specialities in committees 
(e.g. trawl committee, herring and deep-sea prawn committee). Although the association acted 
in the name of all associated fishermen (the whole collective) and had the motto of “solidarity 
and equal treatment”, its mode of organisation weakened the capacity for decision making in 
the smaller and remote coastal fishery communities.
SVC’s congress takes place at least once every third year and is, according to the organisation, 
the highest decision making body of the organised west coast fishermen. SVC’s statute defined 
the congress as the association’s highest decision making organ (Filipson 1980). The territorial 
set up of the association benefited the interests of fishermen living in areas with a high 
concentration of fishermen. Representation at the congress of SVC was (and still is) related to 
the number of members of the local branches. The number of delegates to the congress 
increased during and directly after the World War II (Filipson 1980). At that time, the number 
of members needed to send a delegate was 50. With the recession in fisheries, this number was 
changed to 20. By tradition, the elected chairman of SVC has been a fisherman from the 
islands in the vicinity of Göteborg in Southern Bohuslän.
The functional set up of the association (into groups by gear or species) would benefit the 
interests of fishermen who dominated a specific type of fishery. The membership fees to the 
association were related to the value of the catches. This made SVC economically strong but 
also dependent on those landing large volumes. 
With the establishment of SVC representation became more indirect and the locus of decision 
making was transferred from the local community to representatives of the association. Thus, 
SVC took over the regulatory function that previously had been locally organised at the 
community level. Already in 1932, the association limited the rights of its branches (the local 
fishery community) to make decisions that could negatively affect other members of the 
association. Thus, the rules of SVC applied to all its members. Violations were noted and 
discouraged, but in general, lack of compliance was not punished.
As a result the SVC showed a tendency to promote the interests of fishermen from Southern 
Bohuslän; they were numerous, had the largest and most mechanised vessels, and their fishing 
was more specialised. But the system could also benefit specific groups of local fishermen like 
those from Koster-Väderö who for some decades, were the only fishermen catching prawns 
on the West Coast. Their local rules could be easily adopted through the prawn fisheries 
committee of the association. This local management regime is still in operation and will be 
examined later in chapter 8.
In the following years, in order to solve the problem of low prices and the dominance of the 
buyers and dealers of the fish, SVC would invest much effort into negotiating minimum 
prices, regulating minimum sizes, setting weekly quotas (rations) per fisherman and investing 
capital in storage facilities, processing and marketing. To satisfy all members was not an easy 
task, and in many cases, the association adopted rules that were controversial within the 
collective. In 1932, for example, 969 delegates (against 59) approved the rule of Sunday and 
weekend rest, which prohibited operations on these days, and from 1934 to 1940 the 
fishermen of the West Coast were allowed to land a maximum of 10 boxes of herring per 
man/week (Gerhard, 1995). During World War II, for security reasons, trawlers were allowed 
to operate closer to land and the trawling boundaries were shifted accordingly. Since then, 
following petitions from the fishermen’s associations, the 4 nautical mile limit of the territorial 
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waters has become subject to incursion. By that time trawling had become important and the 
established trawling limits were no longer related to the boundaries of the territorial waters.
In Skagerrak, where the archipelago extends seawards and includes deep waters, the 4 nautical 
mile limit was rapidly changed to allow trawling closer to land and eventually replaced by a 2 
nautical mile limit. There is no rule without exceptions and even in this case, at the request of 
SVC, the authorities subsequently agreed on sanctioned regulations that allowed further 
trawling encroachment. This allowed mobile (dislocated) fisheries to operate in areas formerly 
considered the domain of the more small-scale static gear based coastal fisheries, which made 
the community authorised to fish in coastal waters more heterogeneous. In some cases, the 
exception were justified, as in the case of authorising trawling for deep sea prawns in deep 
coastal waters even when these are within the base line.20
2.3.2 The State 
Until the beginning of the 20th century the involvement of the state in fisheries was mainly a 
concern of the Crown which posted special experts in marine fisheries to the West Coast.
In 1890, the Board of Agriculture (Lantbruksstyrelsen) was established and took over the 
administration of fisheries. In connection with the establishment of the International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) in 1902, the Swedish government established the 
Swedish hydrographic biological commission (Svansson 2001, unpublished manuscript). This 
commission was an autonomous organisation with its own research vessel and oceanographic 
laboratory and had the task of studying the seas bordering Sweden from the point of view of 
fisheries. The development of fishery biological studies took off later in the 1920s and 1930s 
and was partly funded by private donations to the state (Wramner 1998).
In 1905 the government created the Ministerial Department of Agriculture and a regional 
structure consisting of 6 districts, each with a district official (intendent). The districts dealt with 
all types of fisheries (fresh, brackish or marine fisheries) and their district boundaries 
coincided with those of the County Administration. The importance of West Coast fisheries 
for Sweden was recognised by making Halland, Göteborg and Bohuslän one district, in spite 
of its comparatively small land territory (Andreasson 2004).  The district was subordinated to 
the Board of Agriculture, and had to coordinate its work with the fishery extension officers 
working locally under the umbrella of “The Rural Economy and Agricultural Societies” 
(Hushållningsällskapen).  The tasks of the district officials were diverse, e.g. to promote fishery 
development, assist in the organisation of fishermen, encourage the conservation of fish and 
bodies of waters by the public, collect data, and inform and advise to the public regarding 
fishery issues (see Andersson 2004:10). 
In 1930 (which coincides with the establishment of SVC), the inland fisheries were 
distinguished from the coastal and marine fisheries, and two specialised “salt water” districts –
one for the West Coast and one for the East Coast – were created in addition to the five 
remaining fresh water districts (Wramner 1998). 
Before World War II, the Government had appointed a committee to look into how to best 
guarantee the fishermen’s collective interests and consider the pros and cons of the 
establishment of a national fishermen’s association. The recently created National Food 
Commission first implemented a general price regulation on the West Coast in 1942. A 
                                                     
20 The baseline is the imaginary line that connects the most remote land points and islets or follows the low water 
line, depending on the morphological structure of the shore. According to Swedish law the Swedish sea areas 
are divided into inner waters (inshore waters), the territorial sea area and the open sea (SFS, 1996:374). Inshore 
waters are those within the base line, and the territorial sea extends from the base line up to the middle line or 
the 12 nautical miles.
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decision by the Swedish government to stockpile fish and secure fish for the Swedish 
population during the Second World War gave SVC a good position from which to negotiate 
compensation for lost income due to low market prices. After the War, the Committee 
appointed by the Government identified the need to regulate the market and proposed the 
following: a national association of fishermen for the marketing of fish should be established; 
an organisation for implementing a general price regulation system (normalisation) for fish 
and shellfish should be established and public funds allocated for its administration; imports 
and exports of fish should be centrally regulated; and supervision of the regulatory price 
system and the fisheries, through a Royal Board of Fisheries, should be established with its 
headquarters in Stockholm (SOU 1941:19). The intention of the proposal was to moderate 
market competition, and the adjustment of prices was to be determined by government 
authorities.
On the Government side, the district officials and the extension officers working in the 
County Administration were engaged in monitoring the implementation of regulations limiting 
the volume of landings (rations) and the minimum landing sizes (MLS) so that the established 
minimum prices could be guaranteed to the fishermen (Gerhard 1995). This arrangement was 
deemed capable of satisfying both the grass roots interests and the central administration.
This mutual dependency between the fishermen and the State (at the provincial and central 
level) with the FAs as intermediaries can be characterised as corporatism (Schmitter and 
Lehmbruch 1979). This model of corporatist management blossomed during the late 1940s 
and 1950s in Sweden when the state took a more prominent role in all production sectors and 
the expansion of the semi-industrial fisheries took off (see SOU 2000:1)21.
2.3.3 The interplay between the State and SVC 
Fishing to ensure food security and the presence of the fishing fleet in the Swedish territorial 
waters were considered important during World War II. By the end of the war, fisheries were 
perceived as a production sector of strategic importance, and in the West Coast there was a 
surplus of stored fish. In the post war period the State and the FAs turned the focus on to 
trade and exports. The national financial deficit, combined with the surplus of stored fish in 
the country, led to reductions of both the normalised prices and the compensation for low 
market prices given to the fishermen by the government. This created turbulence among the 
fishermen and frictions between the government and SVC, which with financial support from 
the Government had established its own marketing organisation (Västkustfisk) and taken over 
the administration of the landed fish that was not sold (surplus). Although the prices were still 
set by the Government, these were now less concerned with the food security issue and more 
concerned with opportunities to export fish and raise the standard of living of the fishermen.
By the end of the 1940s, Swedish exports of small pelagics caught offshore were larger than 
ever. The concentration of fishermen, vessels and capital to Southern Bohuslän was quite 
pronounced (Gerhard 1995). After the war, many coastal fishermen from Bohuslän joined the 
more specialised, semi-industrial offshore herring fishery operating in the North Sea. This 
fishery was dependent on land based processing facilities. By this time, SVC was involved in 
marketing and trading. The organisation sold the fish through the auctions and the surplus 
went to SVCs fillet and fishmeal industries in Tjörn and Orust. Therefore, guaranteeing 
minimum prices for its members and landing regulations (rations) were no longer necessary 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, the price regulation methods and the rations, as suggested by 
Gerhard (1995), had an income levelling effect among the fishermen. The development of the 
                                                     
21 From a theoretical perspective, the involvement of interest associations in the implementation of public policy 
falls within the domain of corporatism. In international comparisons Sweden is often placed among those 
states having a strong degree of corporatism (Williamson 1989; SOU 2000:1).
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offshore herring fisheries led to the main actors (the association and the government agencies) 
becoming less responsive to the needs of the local fisheries communities from other areas 
such as Northern Bohuslän, which had not experienced a herring boom since 1906 (Svansson 
1999).
The fishery policies of the immediate post war period were based on the need to develop an 
effective and rational fishery and the need for fishermen’s households to enjoy a standard of 
living equal to other groups in Swedish society. This was to be done by developing a 
technological and efficient fishing fleet, increasing export opportunities and developing a 
marketing system ensuring a reasonable income for the fishermen all year round.
2.3.4 The National Board of  Fisheries (NBF) 
As mentioned earlier, during and after World War II the fishery sector was perceived as a 
strategic national resource. The involvement of the state in production was increased and part 
of the work that had previously been done by the Rural Economy and Agricultural Societies 
was taken over by the state. This reduced the public funding for the local Societies which 
continued working under budgetary pressure. In fisheries, the end of the war also marked the 
start for international fishery negotiations in the North Sea. Already in 1946, the UK had 
organised an International Conference on Overfishing, which resulted in the establishment of 
a Permanent Commission. This Commission, founded in 1953, was the forerunner of 
NEAFC, and was given additional power and the right to establish stricter conservation and 
management measures. The Commission worked with the North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention22, and the establishment of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC). Thus, NEAFC formed the framework for international co-operation in the area of 
fisheries regulation beyond national fishing limits.
All these international discussions required the involvement of the government, whose remit 
was also expanded. This time the proposal made for a specific central agency for the 
administration of fisheries, the (Royal) National Board of Fisheries (NBF) was approved by 
the parliament in 1948, but the NBF’s headquarters were placed on the West Coast, in 
Göteborg.
NBF had an Executive Board which was, and still is, chaired by a Director General. The 
members of the Executive Board are nominated by the Government. The number of 
members has been rather constant (between 6 and 10) but its composition has changed 
considerably over time. For much of the period, economic interests were strongly represented. 
Representatives of the Swedish Parliament, the harvest, processing and aquaculture sectors, 
specific regions where fisheries were commercially important and associations for sports 
fishermen and consumers have from time to time held seats on the Executive Board.
The National Board of Fisheries essentially became an agency made up of mainly natural 
scientists and fishery technicians working within the administration and biologists performing 
assessments of the resource. The NBF was assigned the role of implementing national policies 
and providing advice and expertise to the Department of Fisheries the Ministry of of 
Agriculture.23 The previously autonomous Swedish Hydrographic Biological Commission, 
which delivered data analyses to ICES, was dissolved and its role assimilated by NBF which 
focused on collecting and analysing data for stock assessment and the setting of TACs, 
                                                     
22North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention entered into force in 1963 (for more information see 
http://www.neafc.org.
23The government in Sweden makes a distinction between the ministerial level and the public administration 
authority. The first are small units and define the policy the second can be large and are executive 
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negotiating quotas, designing and enforcing fishing regulations and delivering financial aid to 
the private sector for making production and technological modernisation.24
NBF’s responsibilities for the development of an efficient fishery sector and the exploration 
and conservation of fish stocks only concerned waters beyond the 4 nautical mile territorial 
limits. The stocks of three migratory species (eel, salmon and trout), together with the herring 
(and sprat) fisheries, were identified as the principal stocks deserving the attention of NBF. 
Thus the role and focus of the new central authority was limited to the fisheries in specific 
waters (international) and of specific species (migratory). The approaches to these fisheries 
will be different, with a conservation focus on salmon and trout, and a productivity 
development approach with focus on herring and sprat.
Thus, the NBF focused on salmon and trout conservation, offshore fisheries, international 
negotiations and the regulation necessary to develop more efficient modern fisheries, while 
the management of the fisheries within the territorial waters remained in the hands of the 
regional districts which worked in close cooperation with the County Administration. This 
division of responsibilities between the county and the central level reflected among other 
things an understanding of ecological specificities but at the same time redirected the focus of 
the central government away from the small-scale fisheries in coastal areas.
2.3.5 The National Association of  Swedish Fishermen (SFR)  
In the late 1940s, five large regional fishermen’s associations, including SVC, each covering 
different stretches of the coast, were established. Among the regional branches, SVC has 
always been the largest and economically strongest. However, these regional associations did 
not always speak in unison, and therefore the need for a single consolidated organisation was 
often raised in various quarters including the government authorities. The National Federation 
of Swedish Fishermen (SFR) was created in 1949,25 with its headquarters in Göteborg. SFR 
and other representatives of the fishing industry held seats in the executive board of the 
National Board of Fisheries. The foundations for a centralised corporatist co-management 
model were established, but it would take ten years for SFR to reach full momentum as an 
organisation.
2.3.6 The influence of  external factors 
The sixties and seventies represented a turning point for Swedish fisheries. During this period, 
the urban areas with their industrial production attracted manpower. Both fishing and farming 
went through a government supported process of rationalisation and sport and recreation 
fisheries expanded considerably. The focus of national policies was on increased efficiency in 
terms of volume of landings and processed fish per unit of financial capital, labour, and time 
invested. The use of subsidies and the output per unit of effort increased; the well-being of the 
fishermen and the availability of cheap fish to consumers were considered important aspects 
of a fishery policy.
Several coastal fishing communities in Bohuslän underwent a process of drastic population 
loss and the large fishing crews were dissolved. The coastal communities also became less 
dependent on local coastal fisheries. Up until 1960, the most significant decreases of 
                                                     
24 Other important bodies of the central administration with specific roles on fishery issues are: the Coastguard, 
involved in the surveillance of compliance with formal rules mainly fishing methods and landings; and, the 
Food Administration, involved in the quality control of products. 
25 According to the statutes of the Association (often referred as the Union) even trade organisations could be 
members.
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professional fishermen were recorded along the southern and eastern coasts of Sweden.26 The 
decline on the west coast came later in the 1960s (see figure 2.3). Since then, the number of 
fishermen has decreased steadily. In the archipelagos of Northern Bohuslän, retrenchment, 
diversification, 2 man crews, and pluriactivity, became strategies of survival. During this time 
period (1967) the regional administration was reformed and the local extension officers from 
the Rural Economy and Agricultural Societies became a part of the central state administration 
under the Agricultural Board and its regional system of county based councils 
(lantbruksnämnderna).
In the late sixties the Atlanto-Scandian herring stocks, subject to severe overexploitation, 
collapsed with serious repercussions for the Swedish fishing industry. During this period, the 
powers of NEAFC increased as it was allowed to set total allowable catch limits (TACs) and 
effort limitations, including the allocation of quotas. The first quota recommendation was on 
North Sea herring in 1974 and the year after, in 1975, NEAFC’s recommendation to ban 
directed industrial fishery for North Sea herring was accepted (http://neafc.org.se).
The work of SFR was crucial to the Swedish fishermen in the sixties and the seventies when 
the issue of exemption from fuel taxes was hotly debated, the fishermen’s employment benefit 
funds were created, subsidies for the modernisation of the fleet increased, and the 
international negotiations on the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) took 
place and the first TAC was introduced. These were issues that in the short term would mainly 
affect the interests of the large-scale and more specialised fisheries. During this period, the 
association gained ascendancy as a mediator between the fishermen, the government, and the 
international community. Consultation between the Government authorities and SFR was 
intense and occurred both formally, through meetings of NBF’s executive board, where the 
interest groups involved in the commercial sector held seats, and through informal contacts. 
In the executive board the fishing industry was consulted and informed about the adoption of 
fishing regulations, policy documents and assessment in progress, statements of referral, 
action plans and annual requests for funds.
The adoption of TACs and national quotas in the late seventies reinforced the role of SFR, 
because the issue of resource allocation among the fishermen was regarded as “internal 
affairs” to be resolved within the collective or associations. Thus, the allocation of resources 
among the professional fishermen, which is a central task in fisheries management, remained 
with the associations. Furthermore, government authorities and SFR sat side by side in the 
international negotiations to determine the Total Allowable Catch (TAC).
2.3.7 Licences for government development grants  
In the late 1970s, a licensing system was introduced for professional fishermen. The licence 
was voluntary and seen as an accessory to the vessel. It was not designed to limit the size of 
the fishing community but to direct the development of the fleet which was considered to be 
in need of renewal and modernisation. The licence, which was transferred when the vessel was 
sold, conferred the right to be considered for government development grants, and the system 
distinguished between vessel sizes. The grants were approved by the National Board of 
Fisheries. During this period a capital intensive semi- industrial offshore fishing fleet 
developed in Göteborg. The main strategy for this modern fishery was one of specialisation 
and non-dependence on local resources and ecological circumstances. The modern dislocated 
fishery and its related employment were no longer linked to the local ecosystem.
                                                     
26 The recession of fisheries in the southern and eastern coasts of Sweden has been discussed by Eklund (1994) 
and Hammer (1994). 
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Licences for boats of 12 m and under were issued by the provincial administration; those for 
larger vessels were issued by the central authority (NBF). This division between the provincial 
and the central level indicate that small-scale fisheries were viewed as a regional development 
concern and the modern larger vessels were viewed as a national concern. For the modern 
West Coast fleet the situation after the collapse of the Atlanto Scandian herring was 
aggravated in 1977, when the introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) led to 
changed national jurisdiction for fisheries. The Swedish fishermen were excluded from waters 
of the North Sea, where Swedish offshore fisheries had traditionally operated. The stocks of 
cod, haddock, plaice and whiting were at the time in good shape27, and supplies were welcome 
in both domestic and European markets, so groundfish fisheries expanded considerably. Thus 
to compensate for the lost fishing waters the offshore industrialised fleet was diverted to the 
coastal waters and cod fishing in the Baltic Sea. This shift was not seen as positive in the eyes 
of the fishermen from the East Coast, and SFR acted as a mediator between the various types 
of fishery and the regional branches in the East and the West.
In 1977 the legal framework of the fishery sector was reformed and the National Board of 
Fisheries received its own regional structure: the county based fishery councils (fiskenämnder)
with at least one officer in each county working in cooperation with the County 
Administration. The members of the executive board of the fishery councils were nominated 
by the County Administration.  The councils took over all the activities previously carried out 
at the local level under the Board of Agriculture and were integrated with the seven regional 
districts. In these councils the district officers, the former extension officers, and the County 
Administration under the umbrella of the National Board of Fisheries dealt with mainly inland 
and local coastal fisheries issues and water works. Transboundary issues in the large lakes (i.e. 
the lakes Vänern, Vättern och Hjälmaren-Mälaren) were dealt with jointly by representatives 
of the executive boards of the fishery councils and the County Administration concerned. 
Unresolved transboundary issues were forwarded to the NBF. Issues related to the marine 
semi-industrial fisheries were dealt with centrally by the National Board of Fisheries.
2.3.8 The concentration of  regulatory authority to the central level 
The late seventies and the early eighties are characterised by increased international 
involvement in environmental marine issues, even in Sweden. Stock conservation and 
environmental protection (combating pollution) become more integrated into the fishery 
policies and this motivated increasing government involvement in fisheries management. In 
the Baltic and the North Sea regional seas programs, conventions and commissions for the 
protection of the marine environment were institutionalised. Acting at the regional seas level 
was perceived to be the most appropriate approach both by the scientists and the 
administration for dealing with marine environmental questions. In the mid eighties the 
Swedish landings of cod and other groundfish peaked and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
increased the engagement of the government in intergovernmental negotiations in the Baltic 
Sea.
Regulation of the use of coastal waters was still done at the county level by the fishery councils 
(fiskenämnderna). The system of locally, sometimes regionally enacted rules was complex with 
different rules addressing fishing of the same species in different parts of the coast. The rules 
were not always based on scientific facts and the patchy pattern was problematic for the 
expansion of the modern fisheries in the coastal zone. In this context, it was felt necessary to 
simplify the regulation addressing coastal fisheries and scaling up the locus of decision-making 
                                                     
27 Svelle et al (1997) support the hypothesis that the so-called “gadoid outburst” was probably related to the high 
fishing pressure and disappearance of pelagic species in the 60:s because these pelagic species normally feed on 
larval and post larval phases of gadoid fishes. 
24
authority.28 During this period, a debate on the need to centralise all administration for 
fisheries started (Wramner 1998).
According to an assessment carried out in 1988 by a working group set up at the National 
Board of Fisheries, including participants from various administrative levels and the fishery 
sector, the problems and trends of an expanding recreational fishery,29 rapid advances in 
fishing technology and increased pressure on coastal resources had made rule-making at the 
county level dysfunctional (Fiskeristyrelsen 1988). The report argued that the regulatory 
system at the county level was overloaded and consisted of a mixture of disparate regulations 
which lacked coherence from a national point of view. The assessment concluded that the 
provincial regulatory level lacked a “holistic approach”, making the adoption of international 
agreements and the conservation of resource difficult (Fiskeristyrelsen 1988).
2.3.9 The policies of  the 1990s 
In 1991 and under the influence of the sustainable development debate the national policies 
were adapted to fit the sustainability issues and the demands for transparency and scientific 
rigour in the decision-making and the National Board of Fisheries underwent a reform. The 
NBF was assigned special responsibilities for environmental issues and biological diversity and 
the composition of the Executive Board was changed. The change consisted in a reduction of 
the number of members and the exclusion of the economic actors. The members of the new 
Executive Board came from Stockholm University, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
and the Swedish Food Workers’ Union, and included one Governor from the East Coast and 
two members of the Swedish Parliament. The new Board was expected to represent the 
interests of society as a whole. This was the first step to make consultation in co-management 
less corporatist and more pluralistic. With the entry of Sweden into the European Union, in 
1995, the main policy making arena was relocated to the corridors of Brussels and the FAs lost 
further power of influence.
At the national level, the membership in the EU was preceded by institutional reforms. As 
part of the preparation process in 1993, a new Fisheries Law was approved by the Swedish 
Parliament. This law concentrated the fisheries management authority to the National Board 
of Fisheries. Within the framework of this law, the decisions, procedures and regulations are 
to be taken with the aim of protecting the health of the stocks (biological grounds). The new 
law fine-tuned NBF regulatory authority which now involved: fishing for a certain species; use 
of particular fishing vessels, methods or gear; fishing within certain areas or for specific 
purposes; and use of gear, bait, vessels etc that may spread pests or diseases (SFS 1993:787). 
However, as with previous laws, no guidelines were given on how decisions would be taken, 
who should be consulted and how. This was in effect in the hands of the administration. In 
Sweden there is no legal instrument delegating regulatory responsibilities to the fishermen or 
their associations. However, even though the final responsibility for management is 
considered to rest with the Government, the distributive allocation function of fishery 
management – or the domain of user-user relations– remains in the hands of the fishermen’s 
associations. Provided the majority of delegates agree, the associations have the possibility of 
imposing regulations on its members. This formed the basic premise of the Swedish co-
management system which at the same time implied a clear separation of the management 
functions of the state and the fishing industry. Both, indirect regulations seeking to limit input, 
with emphasis on fishing and gear regulation, as well as direct regulations seeking to control 
                                                     
28 In a recently published paper Mikalsen and Jentoft (2003) have reported that similar processes occurred in 
Norway in the 1950s.
29 In the eighties the landowners were deprived of their right to exclude sports fishermen, but their exclusivity in 
terms of commercial fisheries was maintained.  For a more in-depth discussion about this issue the reader is 
referred to, for example (Sandström et al 2002).
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output by fixing TACs have been central instruments. In Sweden, fisheries regulations issued 
by the government administration (NBF) should preferentially not have a distributive purpose 
or aim to allocate resources among various categories of users. This is an old established 
principle in the Swedish fishery management system30 where political decisions are to be taken 
by the Swedish Parliament.
2.3.10 The European level 
Since 1995, as a member of the European Union and in line with the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP), Sweden transferred part of its decision making and management authority to the 
European institutional level. The fishery sector is one where the European authorities have an 
exclusive mandate. Thus the governing organs of the EU (in particular the Commission and 
the Council of Ministers) are involved in decisions regarding resource conservation, setting 
targets for the size structure of national fleets (in terms of capacity measured in gross tonnage 
and engine power) and regulation of the market. The regulations sanctioned at the European 
level concern only commercial fisheries. In an account of the Danish fisheries, Nielsen and 
Vedsmand (1999) briefly describe the decision-making arrangements within the EU’s common 
waters. Central instruments within the European conservation policy are, in addition to annual 
TACs and national quotas, the control of harvesting rates, the application of technical 
measures, such as mesh sizes and gear design, selective gear, and closed seasons and areas. By 
means of multi annual guidance plans (MAGP) the size of the fleets were intended to be 
reduced.
A basic principle of the CFP is equal access to EU waters and the living marine resources 
therein. Thus, in principle, Member State vessels have unqualified rights of access to all 
Community waters including the coastal waters extending from the baselines to the 12 nautical 
miles under member states’ jurisdiction. However, in order to protect the livelihood of coastal 
fishermen and safeguard the economic and social wellbeing of fisheries dependent areas, a 
derogation from the principle of equal access was granted in 1983 whereby Member States 
retained exclusive access rights in respect of the 12 nautical mile zone, subject to the 
recognition of historic fishing rights exercised by other Member States. The derogation has 
recently been renewed until December 2012. In the case of Skagerrak, Denmark and Norway31
have historic fishing rights up to the 4 nautical mile limits.
In the 12 mile zone, EU member states are also allowed to adopt conservation and 
management measures, provided these are not less stringent than existing EU legislation and 
provided the Commission has not already adopted special measures for the area. The 
measures taken in this zone must also respect historical fishing rights, and, when applied to 
fishing vessels from other member states must not be discriminatory.
The Law of 1993 introduced a new licensing system which defined who is an authorised 
professional fisherman. For a long time, entry to commercial fisheries was open to anyone 
fishing in public waters ("det allmänna"). The new licence, in force since 1994, was more 
restrictive than the previous one. It was obligatory and limited to those fishing for commercial 
purposes in public waters under the semi-regulated open access regime. With this licence, the 
definition of professional fisherman changed. Professional fishermen are now, by decree, 
those fishermen who possess an individual fishing licence and actively fish for their main 
                                                     
30 See for example texten in (Fiskeristyrelsen 1988) page 10 “Föreskrifter som utfördas av myndighet anses inte få 
ha till syfte att fördela fisket mellan olika kategorier fiskande så att en grupp gynnas eller andra missgynnas”. 
With the expansion of the recreational fisheries in inland and inshore waters, it was felt necessary in Sweden to 
allow for a preferential treatment of the professional fishermen. 
31 Norway is not a member of the European Union.
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income (Fiskeriverket 1993).32 The new definition of professional fisherman included share-
fishermen – crew members who fish for a share in the value of the catch rather than for fixed 
wages – as well as those who “own” waters and fish by means of exclusive fishing rights in 
private waters. These two groups, however, do not need a fishing licence, and the private 
owners are not obliged to report their catches.
To guarantee resources to those whose main income depends on fishing, the new licence 
leaves out of the system those fishermen who during the three previous years have failed to 
show their economic dependence on fishing. Part-time fishermen deriving their main income 
from activities other than fishing are designated “recreational fishermen” and their fishing and 
trading rights are constrained. The new licence, unlike the old one, has had a strong impact on 
the fishing community and clearly favours professional fishermen.
Within the EU – with the intention of guaranteeing fair income to producers, regulating prices 
and concentrating supply – the establishment of independent producer organisations (POs) 
was also made possible.33 The POs are recognised as having a crucial role in the 
implementation of the CFP in particularly on the stabilisation of the market and conservation 
aspects (Commission of the European Communities 1994). A PO can also determine the 
prices below which the fish is withdrawn from the market and the fishermen compensated. 
Minimum prices are defined and the Producers Organisations (PO) get paid for the landed 
fish that cannot be sold in the market at that price. Financial aid is available for the processing 
and storage of excess supply (Phillipson 2002).
At the national level, the central administration and the Producers’ Organisations were also 
expected to jointly develop plans for how the CFP was to be implemented, followed up, and 
reported with an emphasis on catch plans, to adjust supply to the market demands and in this 
way obtain the best prices for the catch. In some countries, the role of POs has subsequently 
been extended to include quota management (i.e. allocation, see for example the case of UK 
and particularly the Shetlands in chapter 3, box 3.3 b). But in the Swedish fisheries 
management model internal distributive aspects are to be taken care of by the FAs. Therefore, 
the POs have only marketing responsibilities. 
To conclude, the entry of Sweden into the European Union relocated part of the decision-
making locus to Brussels. Yet, the current system presumes considerable discretion for 
Member States to determine their own management approaches in the coastal zone (Symes 
and Phillipson 2001). The administrative reforms that in Sweden preceded membership in the 
European Union led to a concentration of fisheries management authority at the central level, 
but at the same time opened the system to other interests than those of the fishing industry. 
The Common Fisheries Policy made the establishment of independent Producer 
Organisations possible and these in turn would push for institutional reform (see chapter 8).
                                                     
32 To be able to apply for a professional fishery licence one has to make from fisheries an annual minimum net 
income equal to 50% of the basic amount, which is an index established according to the National Insurance 
Act and at present € c.a. 4.600. 
33 Phillipson (1999; 2002) has introduced the European producers’ organisations system and described the role 
and structure of producers’ organisations in UK. According to the European market legislation concerning the 
market of fishery and aquaculture products (see Council Regulation (EEC) No 2759/92 and its amendments 
1891/93 and 3318/94) POs include any recognised organisation or association of such organisations, 
established on producers’ own initiative for the purpose of taking such measures as will ensure that fishing is 
carried out along rational lines and that conditions for the sale of their products are improved (Article 4). 
Phillipson (2002) reports that there are a total of 173 POs in the EU and that Finland remains the only coastal 
fishing member state without a formally recognised PO.
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2.4 ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION AND COASTAL MANAGEMENT 
In the previous sections the development of coastal fisheries and the institutional systems 
directly related to fisheries management have been outlined. But there are a number of other 
institutions and organisations which influence the use of coastal resources affecting the 
different sectors and levels of decision making in the administration quite profoundly. Efforts 
to manage the use of coastal resources involve cross-sectoral and vertical political interplay 
and dialogue, commonly promoted under the concept of integrated coastal zone management 
(ICZM). At present the coordination and cooperation between different sectoral interests over 
the use and management of coastal and marine resources in Sweden is incorporated in several 
different legal Acts and instruments operating at different administrative levels and involving 
different stakeholders. In 1995, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency issued a report 
that describes the Swedish model for coastal zone management (Ackefors and Grip 1995).
In Sweden, the cross-sectoral and vertical dialogue is promoted through various instruments 
aiding decisions on an ex-ante basis. Relevant to fisheries are: the procedure of consultation 
through referral of proposals to stakeholders (public and private) for comments; meetings, 
working group and commissions; the Environmental Courts; the Comprehensive Municipal 
Planning; and the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). Policies and solutions 
concerned with nature conservation and fisheries issues are commonly exposed to the 
stakeholders via the first three instruments. The voluntary cooperation between authorities 
along both horizontal and vertical axes is rather common in Sweden and is based on dialogue, 
consultation, and joint working groups. With regard to the participation of resource users of 
state owned waters, the consultation process normally builds on representation. Through the 
procedure of referral of documents, those who represent particular interests – in the case of 
the fishermen, the FAs – can elaborate their position and present arguments in favour of or 
against a particular project or intervention. The Courts are used in specific cases to assess 
inter-sectoral externalities but also the need for compensatory measures.
The Comprehensive Municipal Plans attempt to direct local development, assess sectoral 
compatibility and allocate the use of space, and have not therefore been incorporated within 
the new Environmental Code. EIAs assess environmental compatibility, but have not yet been 
used to assess fisheries.
Here a short description of some cross sectoral coastal management instruments and 
procedures is introduced. The focus continues to be on the legal framework and formal 
management instruments, especially those which address competing interests and the vertical 
and horizontal integration of management in a multiple use situation.
2.4.1 The Environmental Code  
Sweden’s environmental legislation was reformed at the end of the 1990s when the pre-
existing principal acts were consolidated into an Environmental Code (SFS 1999:808) which 
came into force in January 1999. The purpose of the Code was to modernise and harmonise 
environmental law and to develop instruments to drive environmental policy forward. Overall, 
the Code has adopted a less utilitarian and development oriented approach than the pre-
existing individual laws. In the new Code, the roles of the various agencies at the different 
administrative levels have been clarified, new principles incorporated and rules and 
instruments dealing with species, biotopes and area protection brought together. The National 
Environmental Protection Agency (central level), the County Administration (provincial level) 
and Municipal (local level) administrations play important roles in implementing and enforcing 
the Code. The Environmental Courts have also been strengthened and environmental quality 
objectives and standards introduced. Each sectoral authority, including the National Board of 
Fisheries, has environmental responsibilities and is instructed to set environmental goals and 
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monitor progress by means of measurable indicators. But, the fishery regulations are 
sanctioned within the framework of the Fisheries Law (1993) which is not part of the Code. 
Fisheries regulations are sector based and primarily concerned with issues related to fisheries 
conservation; they are not intended to apply to the interrelations with other sectors. 
Instruments that address interrelations (externalities) between sectors – here referred as to 
integrative instruments – are found, however, in the various chapters of the Code. The 
fisheries administration is engaged when the issues addressed through these instruments affect 
fisheries resources.
The Natural Resources (Management) Act of 1987, is central to the Swedish resource management 
system and the Environmental Code. It guides other legislation relating to the regulation of 
land, water and the physical environment and relates to the concept of ‘ecological sustainable 
development.’ The intention of the 1987 Act was to provide a general framework for 
decisions against which other, more specific, cross-sectoral issues would have to be scrutinised 
by the County Administration on behalf of the central government. The Act established that 
‘land, water and the physical environment are to be used in such a way that they ensure long 
term good husbandry from an ecological, social and socio-economic point of view’ (SFS 
1987:12, author’s translation). Subsequently the Environmental Code has confirmed that: 
‘ Land and water areas shall be used for purposes for which they are best suited … Priority 
shall be given to use that promotes good management from the point of view of public 
interest … Land and water areas that are particularly vulnerable from an ecological point 
of view shall, as far as possible, be protected against actions that may damage the natural 
environment … [and] areas that are important for … commercial fishing or aquaculture 
shall, as far as possible, be protected against actions that may significantly interfere with 
the operations of these industries’ (SFS 1999:808:iv) 
The prioritisation of the natural environment and the protection of natural resource based 
industries is thus made clear. The notion of sustainable development is included and, through 
the way in which the Act is constructed, it incorporates the issue of development versus
conservation.
The remit of the Natural Resources Act extends 3 nautical miles seaward from the baseline, a 
fringe that is essential to the coastal fisheries. The Natural Resources Act also contains both 
general and specific management provisions for sectoral development on the one hand, and 
for the development of geographical areas delimited on the basis of the natural and cultural 
features, on the other. The prioritised sectors and areas were to be designated by the central 
authorities as Areas of National Interest and can overlap. Taking the protection of the natural 
environment into consideration, together with the notion of ecologically sensitive areas of 
national interest, all shallow coastal waters up to 6 m in depth in unexploited or lightly 
exploited areas are to be protected. Such areas of national interest are subsequently given 
special consideration in the application of planning instruments, environmental impact 
assessments and the Environmental Courts. 
The Act further stipulated that certain areas shall be used for particular economic activities of 
‘national interest’. These include: agriculture and forestry; fishing; the extraction of raw 
materials such as minerals, peat or sand; industrial production; energy supply and 
communications; water supply and waste treatment; and national defence. But the Act also 
stipulated that these economic activities are only to be permitted if they have no detrimental 
effects on: large, unexploited areas and ecologically sensitive areas; natural and cultural 
environments of ‘national interest’ for conservation and research; and areas set aside for 
outdoor and other recreational activities. The provisions in the Act were not, however, 
intended to hinder the further development of existing settlements, local industry, or national 
defence installations. Areas intended for outdoor recreation and land and water of significance 
to professional fisheries and reindeer herding have to be identified by the central 
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administration and taken into consideration in, for example, the comprehensive municipal 
planning process. In Northern Bohuslän, north of Lysekil, various national interests overlap.
The Act also reserved areas where recreation and tourism are to be given priority, many of 
which are located in coastal areas including those from Lysekil to Strömstad, here referred to 
as Northern Bohuslän. Here the central administration has the authority to prevent the 
introduction of certain types of industrial activity. The Act also defines certain activities which 
require special government permission for their establishment. Among these are heavy 
chemical industries, oil refineries, and sea platforms for wind power generation. Prior to any 
major development decision, such as the expansion of wind power, the government will 
normally commission an appraisal. Through this and other mechanisms, the sectoral, regional, 
and local organisations representing different stakeholder interests are consulted. Nonetheless 
the Natural Resources Act has been criticised both for its vague formulation and its 
subordination of local interests to national interests. These problems are often manifested 
when Comprehensive Municipal Plans are prepared or the development of new industries 
considered.
The Shore Protection Act of 1964 was originally utilitarian in the sense that it was intended to 
serve the recreational needs of the Swedish population. This was done by preventing the 
construction of summer houses within 100-300 m of the shore and in this way securing 
peoples access to sites for bathing and outdoor recreation. The application of these provisions 
is devolved to the municipalities, though exemptions from the Act have to be approved by the 
County Administration. Over time a new interpretation of the Shore Protection Act has 
evolved that acknowledges the primary function of protecting the shore and allowing the 
counties to extend the protected zone from 100 to 300 m from the shoreline. This extension 
has been used particularly in coastal areas classified as unexploited or of special natural or 
cultural value. Coastal buildings such as workshops needed for the daily operation of the 
professional fishermen are exempted from this ban on development. 
Allemansrätt is the practice which permits the public free access to countryside, land and water 
even on private property, provided one behaves in a socially acceptable manner. In Sweden 
allemansrätt is not applicable to fishing. Nevertheless, with the development of recreational 
fisheries and the commercialisation of fishing based tourism, individuals and companies have 
sought to claim access rights based on allemansrätt.
The Shore Protection Act of 1964 and the principle of allemansrätt reinforce the special 
consideration given to outdoor public recreation by the Natural Resources Act 
Under the provisions of the Environmental Code, permits are required for all kinds of 
construction work which might impact the local, regional, or national aquatic environments. 
These permits are issued by the Environmental Courts, previously known as the Water 
Courts. The Water Courts were originally developed to regulate the localisation of 
hydroelectric power plants in riverine locations. One of the main tasks of the regional districts 
officers in the 1960s and the 1970s when many hydroelectric power plants were constructed 
was to collect and provide fisheries related information to the courts (Andersson 2004). 
Today, applications for permits brought before the Environmental Courts involve pipelines, 
cables, marinas, quarries, roads and so forth. The main task of the Court is to determine the 
conditions under which these construction activities can best be undertaken with minimal 
disruption to the environment or to established economic activities.
The National Board of Fisheries may be asked to represent the fisheries sector in this instance. 
Programmes for monitoring the outcomes of the development in relation to fish and fisheries 
and compensation for any damage caused are the most common conditions advocated by 
NBF. Compensation is not necessarily used to mitigate the effects of damage locally where it 
occurred but rather to enhance fish stocks (primarily eels and salmon) by ranching or restoring 
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biotopes in general. As a rule, when a major development project is planned by a public 
authority at national, regional, or local level or by an established private enterprise, a process 
of informal consultation precedes the application to the Environmental Court. During such a 
process, where appropriate, the National Board of Fisheries can seek to influence the design 
and site selection for the development. NBF’s officers will collect information from the 
fishermen’s organisations and specialist research centres, and assess its relevance. Some recent 
cases brought to the attention of the fishermen’s associations and the media include proposals 
involving the construction of a new hydroelectric plant in the north of the country, sea- based 
wind-power parks on the west coast and underwater cables to transport electricity to and from 
Europe in the south, all cases related to the energy sector. 
2.4.2 Comprehensive Municipal Planning 
According to the Planning and Building Act of 1987, each municipality is required to prepare a 
comprehensive plan for the use of land, water and the physical environment. Comprehensive 
municipal planning in Sweden is commonly praised for the qualities of being decentralised, 
integrative in both the vertical (across administrative levels) and horizontal (cross sector) 
sense, problem oriented and based on the democratic process and the long standing principle  
of public review (Ackefors and Grip 1995; Johansson 1995).
How the municipal planning in the West Coast deals with coastal conflicts and local 
participation is the object of specific research within SUCOZOMA (see Morf, forthcoming). 
Hopefully, the present study and the project referred to above will taken together provide a 
more comprehensive picture of how the Swedish Coastal Management Regime influences 
local users’ access to local natural resources and participation in the management of these 
resources. It suffices here to mention some shortcomings which influence the resolution of 
conflicts of use in the coastal zone, and which should be highlighted in this thesis.
The Comprehensive Municipal plan is not a legally binding instrument, but is expected to 
guide decision making in line with the principles laid down in the Environmental Code and its 
Natural Resources Act. In general these plans direct new development and do not engage 
much in redevelopment.
The plans comprise maps and text describing the uses, regulations and recommendations. The 
plans are intended to encompass territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, 
but the seaward extension of the plans is often unclear and the criteria chosen for the outer 
limits vary. Some plans cover the totality of the territorial waters, others refer only to the area 
within 3 miles of the baseline – in line with the remit of the Natural Resources Act – and still 
others do not extend beyond the baseline itself. According to an assessment covering all 
coastal municipal plans (Boverket 1995: p71) ‘what happens or could happen on the coast is 
currently not prioritised in the municipal plans’. 
Comprehensive Municipal plans have a spatial development perspective and can be 
characterised as instruments to enable dialogue between central government and the 
municipalities concerning the detailed implementation of the Natural Resources Act and 
which national interests are to take precedence in the development of the particular 
municipality. The County Administration in fact represents central government interests, and 
its key tasks are to scrutinise the Municipal plans to ensure that national interests are being 
respected and focus on any transboundary issues.  The latter however are seldom discussed in 
the plans. An important reflection in the report by Boverket (1995) is that, in general, 
municipal plans mirror relatively few competing demands on coastal waters, and there is at the 
municipal level an impression that existing demands seldom result in conflicts of use. 
Boverket (1995) points out that competing claim over the use of coastal waters are often only 
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indirectly evident in the text of the plans. The report referred to identified 13 ‘hidden’ 
conflicts of which 11 involved fisheries. 
In most instances, the Comprehensive Municipal Plan is prepared by officials of the 
municipality, with the support of a committee of locally elected councillors, and experts 
brought in as consultants. In general, architects tend to be overrepresented in the preparation 
of the plans, most probably because this instrument is part of the Planning and Building Act 
and has its origin in urban physical planning. This physical planning and building tradition is 
believed to contribute to the rather static character of the plans, compared to process oriented 
concepts such as integrated coastal zone management. It also disconnects the planning 
process and the formulation of the plans – which are not binding instruments – from the 
implementation process and evaluation of the eventual outcomes. The latter is problematic 
when dealing with coastal and transboundary issues.
Ackefors and Grip (1995) argue that, even though Sweden has a long tradition of public 
reviews, planning remains a top-down process within the Municipalities. In general, planners 
do not actively seek out the involvement of resource users. During the planning process, open 
consultative meetings are arranged and the community, in the widest sense, is invited to 
present its views, which also need to be submitted in written form. The attendance at public 
meetings is usually rather poor. Once drafted, the plans are exhibited in public for a period of 
two months during which time the planning process and its outcomes can again be 
questioned. Safeguarding the interests of fisheries is usually left to the fishermen’s associations 
which will review the draft plans and bring it to the attention of the municipality if a plan 
appears to threaten essential fish habitats or access to fishing grounds.
More recently, new forms of local participative planning experiences are being tested both 
within and outside the context of the Comprehensive Municipal Plans. Among these are local 
Agenda 21 projects which involve citizens in environmental work, LEADER projects, a few 
in-depth Comprehensive Area Plans prepared at the local level, and consultation through 
focus groups. These experiences have benefited staff at the municipal and county levels as a 
learning process in participative management.34
2.5 COASTAL FISHERIES IN SKAGERRAK 
The coasts of Sweden occupy a prominent role in the life of the Swedish population and the 
concept of “quality of life” is very much related to access to the coast for recreation and 
leisure. The archipelagos are discussed mainly in terms of low or negative demographic 
growth and the valorisation of coastal land for leisure has led to the displacement of people 
formerly engaged in production. Compared to other economic sectors, the fishery sector in 
Sweden is no longer as important as in once was, neither in terms of numbers nor national 
economics35.
                                                     
34 Many of these initiatives appear, however, to be led by local elites or by new residents in the area committed to 
the protection of the environment, the empowerment of local communities or simply with personal stakes in 
the plans’ outcomes.
35 The minor economic significance of the Swedish fisheries from a national viewpoint was made clear by one of 
the informants who stated that the value of the Swedish fishery is, in terms of money, equivalent to the 
Swedish egg production. Expressions like “nobody would think of the idea of having a national board for the 
production of eggs”; “there is so much noise about fisheries”; “fishermen have always been troublesome”; 
“fisheries gets publicity, state attention and funds that are out of proportion”; “how many people are there in 
the administration? - 1 officer per 10 fishermen - and you cannot resolve the problems;” illustrate that some 
interviewees could easily forget that fisheries management has to do with renewable resources that theoretically 
can last for ever and produce food and income to coming  generations.
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The total number of professional fishermen in Sweden in 1998 was around 2800, and the 
fishing fleet in 1998 comprised approximately 2200 vessels, only a third of the number 
registered in 1970. Figure 2.3 illustrates how, after World War II, between 1945 and 2000, the 
number of professional fishermen in Sweden declined from around 16,000 to less than 3000 - 
a reduction of 80%.
Since the sixties the number of fishermen has decreased steadily, and to judge from the 
current age structure of those employed in the fishing industry, this trend is likely to continue. 
In the ten years up to 1995, the average age increased from 40 to 44; in the next three years it 
increased from 44 to 48 (Píriz 2000). There are clear geographical variations in the process of 
youth recruitment. The older generation is widely distributed along the coast of Sweden, but 
the ageing of the workforce is less noticeable in and around Göteborg, where the semi-
industrial fishery has its base (see table 2.1).
The vessels of the Swedish fishing fleet range from 5 to 50 m in length and up to 2500 gross 
tonnage (GT) (Gustavsson 1999). 80% of the fleet comprises boats under 12m length with a 
tonnage below 50 GT – the so-called small-scale, inshore fleet. A further 15 % range between 
12 and 24m, but the average age of the craft in this group is around 30 years. These are 
referred as the traditional or medium-size fleet. Only 5% of the total are above 24m in length, 
representing the industrial, or large-scale, sector. Geographical variations with regard to the 
size of the vessels and structure of the fishing fleet are also important in Sweden.
The industrial fleet is concentrated on the more urbanised municipalities of Southern 
Bohuslän, especially Göteborg and Öckerö, followed by Tjörn. The urban–based fishing 
interests in places such as Göteborg are increasingly privileged by the prevailing trends and 
dominant management regime. Fishermen from other areas e.g. the east coast who specialise 
in small-scale fishing of highly mobile species, be it cod, herring, salmon or eel, are those least 
likely to be able to absorb the effects of the Common Fisheries Policy.
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This thesis focuses on Northern Bohuslän, from Lysekil to Strömstad. Here fisheries together 
with tourism are important to the local economy and society and are considered a cultural 
icon. Yet with some exceptions the majority of the coastal communities are now primarily 
dependent on tourism rather than fisheries, and the remaining local fishermen, who are rarely 
younger than 40, often operate from small and/or larger but ageing vessels crewed by one or 
two men.
Table 2.1 provides some relevant figures about the significance of fisheries for the various 
municipalities of Bohuslän. The heavy line separates the municipalities in the north, which are 
in focus in this study, from the municipalities of Central and Southern Bohuslän. The table 
indicates a clear emphasis on deep-sea prawn and Norway lobster, commonly referred in the 
literature to as Nephrops, among the fishermen from Northern Bohuslän. The table also 
indicates that the fishermen from Göteborg stand for 75% of the catch taken on the West 
Coast.
A common means of assessing the contribution of fisheries to the local economy and society 
is to calculate the overall share of the total workforce attributable to fishing related 
employment. This helps to define the level of so-called fisheries dependence. In the EU where 
fisheries have only a very small share of the workforce, levels in excess of 1% have been used 
to define “fishing dependent areas” (FDAs). In Sweden, only 11 out of 85 coastal 
municipalities qualify even at this low threshold; of these four are located in Northern 
Bohuslän36 (see table 2.2).
The high level of fishery dependent employment registered in the Municipality of Sotenäs 
(25.09 %) is related to the processing industry. Gustavsson (1999) estimated that 50% of the 
total added value attributable to fish processing in Sweden originates from this area. In 
Sweden, the medium and large scale processing industry production is almost entirely based 
                                                     
36 Attempts to measure the regional or even local significance to the socio-economic fabric of communities of 
fishing related activities are complicated, costly and manpower intensive. This combined with the fact that in 
rural areas the fisheries are often of small-scale type and fishermen often have a diversified livelihood strategy 
with a pluri-active and often "non-formal" role in the local economies easily yields low figures and result in 
what apparently can be unconvincing socio-economic results.
Table 2.1 Selected data on fishermen and fisheries on the West Coast of
   Sweden  
Municipality Strömstad Tanum Sotenäs Lysekil Orust Tjörn Öckerö Göteborg 
(District) (SD) (SD) (LL) (LL) (UA) (GG) (GG) (GG)
West
Coast
Fishermen 81 139 119 41 31 110 265 316 1102
Male 80 139 119 40 29 107 264 316 1094
Female 1 0 0 1 2 3 1 0 8 
Age 54 48 47 48 48 43 41 38 46 
Proportion of crafts & catches as % of total on the West Coast 
Crafts 9,0 19,0 12,0 6,5 4,5 12,0 15,5 21,0 99,5
Deep sea 16,7 12,4 28,0 4,3 0,0 13,3 9,1 9,1 92,9
Norway 5,5 17,9 17,3 1,2 0,5 2,5 23,3 7,8 76,0
Eel 2,9 5,9 2,0 8,8 6,1 14,4 4,3 5,9 50,3
Other 0,3 0,7 1,1 2,4 0,6 0,9 19,8 52,3 78,1
Total catch* 25,4 36,9 48,4 16,7 7,2 31,1 56,5 75,1
The total catch figures for the West Coast also include catches made by fishermen from the 
province of Halland on the Kattegat Sea. This explains why the totals do not add up to 
100%.
Source: Based on the National Board of Fisheries Database (1999) 
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on herring and sprat or imported fish and products from Norway, Canada, Iceland, and Asia 
(Píriz 2001). Hence, there is no direct relationship between the fish landed by the local 
fishermen and the bulk of the production in the medium and large processing industries in 
Sotenäs. The bulk of what is landed in the area is marketed fresh in the Swedish or the 
European market. Before World War II the fisheries for small pelagics, followed by the 
fisheries for gadoids and flatfish supported the economies of the coastal communities of 
Northern Bohuslän (see figure 2.1).
During the seventies and the eighties the cod fisheries expanded and the landings peaked in 
1985. In the early nineties, the catches of groundfish declined sharply (see figures 2.4 and 2.5). 
Moreover, the biodiversity and productivity of shallow bays has been affected by pollution. 
Many areas that before the sixties and the seventies were open with sandy or muddy bottoms 
rich in eelgrass and seaweeds, and known to be good nursery and feeding grounds for young 
flatfish, are today covered with filamentous algae mats and often have low oxygen levels. The 
structural and functional changes occurring in shallow coastal ecosystems which affect not 
only the biodiversity but also the economic returns from both tourism and coastal fisheries 
have been noted by various authors (EU-Life 2001; Phil, 1994; 2001). 
Table 2.2  Relative contribution of the fishery sector in terms of    
  employment in Northern Bohuslän and number of people   
  employed in the main commercial sub-sectors (1997). 
Municipality Dependency rate 
%
Capture
sector
Processing
sector
Trade
sector
Sotenäs 25.1 119 714 46 
Lysekil 4.6 40 222 4 
Strömstad 3.9 81 1 16 
Tanum 3.7 139 6 3 
Source: Gustavsson, (1999); Píriz (2001)
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Today, the shellfish fisheries are considered the pillar of the economy of the local fishermen 
from Northern Bohuslän (see table 2.1). All other species, where available, are regarded as 
suplementary. The landings at Smögen’s fish auction in the municipality of Sotenäs, illustrate 
the trends (see figures 2.4 and 2.537). The figures also indicate how the shellfish fisheries have 
gradually developed to compensate the decline in demersal landings. A similar development 
trend as the one presented in these figures, where the fisheries for gadoids have collapsed and 
shellfish have had a stabilising influence, has been reported in other countries e.g. Great 
Britain and Canada (Hamilton and Butler 2001; Phillipson and Symes 2001). 
The Nephrops and the deep-sea prawn are the most important shellfish species for the 
professional fishermen in the area. While the stocks of deep-sea prawn are considered 
relatively stable, the state of the Nephrops stock is more uncertain. The Nephrops fisheries are 
economically important in
Sweden and occupy the third place after herring and cod. Eggert (2001) reports that in 1995, 
Swedish landings of Nephrops exceeded 800 tons, corresponding to a value of circa 7 million 
Euros. He explains that 40 % of the vessels, responsible for 70% of the total landings, had 
Göteborg as their main port.
Table 2.3 gives a synoptic view of the state of some biological stocks. The table mirrors the 
situation for the period 1998-2000 as reported by ICES, which in recent years has 
recommended fishing stops for several species in particular cod and other gadoids. The table 
also indicates whether or not there is a TAC allocated to Skagerrak (ICES sub area IIIa) 
(Svelle et al.1997). It is worth noting that, in contrast to fish stocks, which in the majority of 
                                                     
37 For reasons of scale, the landings of cod and shellfish in the same auction are presented in a separate figure.
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cases are outside or close to Safe Biological Limits (SBL),38 the lesser fugitive crustaceans 
appear to be in a better shape. 
The situation for the fisheries resources, the deterioration in the quality of coastal waters 
which serve as nursery grounds for species relevant to all kind of fisheries, the problems posed 
by the coexistence of different types of fishing activities operating on the same grounds 
and/or harvesting from a common pool, the competing claims to inshore waters made by a 
growing range of powerful stakeholders and the external pressures demanding the protection 
of biotopes and species, suggest that the fisheries sector is confronting severe and deep seated 
management problems.
In Northern Bohuslän, in contrast to the situation in Southern Bohuslän and on the East 
Coast, fisheries are more diversified. Here, the majority of the vessels – small-scale and 
medium size vessels, including old traditional wooden vessels – operate in coastal rather than 
in offshore waters returning to their home harbours almost every evening. The number of 
licenced fishermen registered in the municipalities of Northern Bohuslän (from Lysekil to 
Strömstad) totalled 380 in December 1999, a third of all fishermen registered on the West 
Coast.
Table 2.3  Information on the status and corresponding TAC of  
  commercially important stocks for the study area (2000). 
Species / Stock Skagerrak 
TAC
State Species Skagerrak 
TAC
State
Blue mussel (No TAC) N/A 0 Cod Yes 6
Crab (No TAC) N/A 0 Mackerel No 5 
Lobster (No TAC) N/A 2 Whiting Yes 4 
Deep-sea shrimp  Yes 1 Saithe No 4 
Nephrops  No 3 Hake No 4 
Plaice  Yes 1 Herring No 3 
Sole  Yes 1 Sprat No 2 
Haddock  No 1 Eel N/A 2 
0 Under exploited; 1Within SBL; 2 Unknown; 3 Uncertain; 4 Close to SBL; 5 
Outside SBL; 6 Collapsed
Source: Compiled on the basis of the following sources: (Svelle et al. 1997; Sjöstrand 
 1999; Sjöstrand 2000 pers.com.). N/A means non applicable and refers to the 
 non application of TACs.   
Fishermen in the area have adapted their fishing to the ecosystem’s high biological diversity by 
combining different fishing technologies on a seasonal basis. A glance at the logbooks from 
recent years shows that it is in this area where the number of different gear types reaches its 
maximum. Neuman and Píriz (2000) used the term “combi-fishermen” to refer to a large 
number of fishermen, characteristic of this area, who combine gear-types and target a large 
variety of species on a seasonal basis. Both static gear like fishing pots (traps), creels and fyke-
nets and gillnet sets, and mobile gear, mainly otter bottom trawl, combi-bottom-trawl are 
frequent;  purse-seiners also occasionally operate in the area. 
Most professional fishermen from Northern Bohuslän are members of SVC, which in 1997 
had a total of 6,275 members of which 1,155 were active. SVC in turn is organised in 38 local 
                                                     
38 In the ICES terminology, when spawning stock size is below the Minimum Biologically Acceptable Limit 
(MBAL) the stock is considered to be outside Safe Biological Limits. To determine the MBAL, information 
about the spawning stock size below which the probability of poor recruitment (annual replenishment) 
increases as spawning stock size decreases is used (Svelle et al 1997). 
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branches: 23 in Central and Northern Bohuslän, 12 in Southern Bohuslän and 3 in the 
province of Halland. The number of branches and delegates has decreased considerably. 
Filipson (1980), reports that there were 178 SVC delegates in 1958 but twenty years later only 
78. The number of fishermen (delegates) attending the 1998 SVC congress was 65. That puts 
the reduction of delegates over the last 40 years at 64%. Since the mid-nineties the fishermen 
are even organised into producer organisations; in this case SFPO (national) and NBPO 
(local). As will be made evident in the following chapters, they are also organised into a special 
interest organisation for coastal fishermen, Bohuslän’s Coastal Fishermen Association (BKF) and a 
specific group the Koster Fjord Group (KFG). As one may infer from their very presence in the 
area, the local fishermen have greater opportunities to adapt their fishing to the ecosystem 
than the more specialised fishermen coming from the South.39
2.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has described the origins and present set up of the Swedish fisheries management 
system with an emphasis on the situation of coastal fisheries on the West Coast. One general 
conclusion to be drawn from this description is that the present scenario – the state of the 
fisheries resources, the significance of the coastal fisheries for the archipelago communities, 
the institutional set up and its management modalities – is the result of process that has 
evolved over a long time. The system, policies and management strategies have been 
responsive to and strongly influenced by the context, and also by economic interests. 
Moreover, many events and decisions formative of the management system and its strategies 
have had their origins in external factors (wars, herring collapses, EEZ, cod collapses, EU 
membership). There are “external” in the sense of being problems and decisions outside the 
control of those living and fishing in the archipelago areas; hereinafter referred as the local 
coastal fishermen. 
The context in which the present situation has evolved can be presented in periods or stages: 
the World Wars and the inter-war years; 1960-1970s; 1980-1990s. During these periods the 
coastal communities of Northern Bohuslän have witnessed shifts in the institutional set up 
and the social and economic dependency on coastal fisheries, and the coastal fishermen have 
witnessed resource dependency shifts, from small pelagic to groundfish, and from groundfish 
to crustaceans. Over much of this time span, local fishermen lost influence over the resources 
and the management of coastal fisheries. The wartime emergencies brought new situations 
and several temporary measures were taken to adapt to the political and market conditions. 
After World War II the conditions again changed drastically. The technology developed and 
the use of trawlers expanded; the fishermen’s associations became well established; the 
struggle with the herring dealers was partially mitigated by SVC’s investment in processing and 
trading; government policies supported the development of more effective and rational export 
oriented fisheries; the privatization of inshore waters was resolved; the customary right of free 
access to fisheries resources was legally institutionalized, the exploration of the seas and 
fishery research expanded. During this period both the state and the fishermen established 
national organizations, NBF and SFR respectively. 
                                                     
39 Diversification is a form of adaptive responses to match ecological diversity and dynamics by which economic 
risks are spread. Specialisation is more oriented towards resource concentration and intensification of 
investment to one or few modes of resource use (McCay 1978). In fisheries there is a tendency to associate 
small-scale and local coastal fisheries with diversification and large scale ones with specialisation. Even if it 
sounds like a reasonable way to present differences between the two, one should pay attention to the fact that 
in fisheries high-technological mobile units can de facto apply both diversification and specialisation strategies. 
38
Within the ranks of the fishermen the locus of management authority had been transferred 
from the local community to the fishermen’s associations. As branches of the associations, the 
local fisheries communities could no longer define their own rules, unless these were adopted 
by the regional association, which now comprised members relying on different modes of 
production and with different interests. Prior to the centralization process the state was 
involved at the central and the regional level. While the former concentrated on the regulation 
and support for the offshore fisheries and the management of fisheries based on specific 
migratory species, the latter focused on the regulation of the fisheries within the 4 nautical 
miles.
For last 40 years the state and the fishing industry have collaborated but decisions have been 
taken at the central level and under corporatists’ influences. For many years, this central 
corporatist co-management system had its own dynamic and rules governing fisheries were 
taken in a small circle. FAs participated in decision making both formally in the executive of 
the National Board of Fisheries and informally through consultation. To resolve internal 
conflicts and secure fair distribution of fishing opportunities among its members was an 
important task of the FAs. It did not necessarily imply that the decisions taken looked out for 
all fishermen’s interests. For a long time the national policies have been shaped by a utilitarian 
and industrial approach. Such policies together with the fishermen’s associations involvement 
in processing and trading, the dysfunctionality of traditional management institutions (the 
fishery community) and institutional arrangements (local rules, trawling limits) that were 
appropriate before the periods of wars, the collapse of the Atlanto Scandian herring fisheries 
and the adoption of EEZ made the intrusion of modern modes of production in the coastal 
areas possible. In times of abundance, the open access regime strengthened the fishing 
communities, but it became problematic in times of resource shortage. By the end of the 
1960s the majority of the large crews in Northern Bohuslän had been dissolved and many 
fishing communities lost their character of being fisheries dependent.
In the eighties the landings of cod and other related gadoids reached their peak and the 
administration of fisheries was subjected to an institutional reform. Decision making was 
completely detached from the local level, and the local fishermen became increasingly 
dependent upon the associations which, in turn, became increasingly detached from their 
members and dependent on the state and supra national authorities.
The nineties brought radical changes to the national co-management set up, with, one the one 
hand, a relocation of part of decision making power to the European level and, on the other 
hand, a recognistion of new stakeholder and a pluralisation of the formal central consultation 
process. During this period the central level was strengthened and the FAs loss power of 
influence.
Nevertheless, questions regarding the internal allocation of resources among the fishermen 
remained in the hands of the National Fishermen’s Association. The situation in the coasts of 
Skagerrak in the 2000s is characterised by overfished stocks, deteriorating coastal ecosystems, 
elderly fishermen and new demands from marine conservation policies and movements. In 
addition, the pressures of other interests claiming access to coastal areas and resources are 
steadily increasing. The selection of questions in the following theoretical chapter should be 
seen against the background to this situation.
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CHAPTER 3
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT
Since the 1970s, much of the development of applied science relating to natural resource 
management has sought to deal with problems of depletion of natural resources. Whereas the 
analysis of the state of the natural resources is a traditional component supporting fisheries 
management, the analysis of social resources is poorly applied. This chapter brings together 
elements from the theoretical discussions on the collaborative management of common pool 
resources. By doing so the chapter provides some basic thoughts in relation to a number of 
issues surrounding the main research question.
The chapter introduces basic definitions and concepts which will be used throughout the 
thesis, and can be seen as providing a conceptual framework helping to identify the various 
elements that interact in the management of fisheries. But first, two methodological 
approaches underpinning fisheries management and undergoing a shift are summarized.
3.1 FROM SINGLE FISH STOCKS TO ECOSYSTEMS
Through fisheries management the living marine resources are to be kept in good shape 
(quantitatively and qualitatively) and the harvestable surplus allocated to resource users. As 
renewable natural resources, fisheries resources can endure over time. This is true, provided 
consideration is shown for their regeneration capacity or replenishment rate (resource flows) 
and the processes making that possible (ecological services).
Biology is a discipline that has traditionally contributed with scientific knowledge to fisheries 
management. As mentioned in chapter 2, scientific advice based on biological principles has 
been central in the Swedish and European conservation policies, i.e. the TAC and the quotas, 
mesh size regulations, fishing stops during spawning, nursery area closures, fleet size 
reduction, regulations restricting the use of less selective gear, and strength control.
The total allowable catches (TAC) for single stocks1 of commercial species in predetermined 
geographical areas are assessed by national experts within ICES and its Advisory Committee 
on Fisheries Management (ACFM). In-depth descriptions of the basic concepts involved in 
fisheries management and its application to the fisheries in the North Sea and the Skagerrak 
Sea can be found in, for example, www.ICES.dk; Svelle et al. (1997) and Sjöstrand (1997).
From the 1950s and until very recently fisheries management around the world and in Sweden 
has relied on the use of fixed rules for achieving constant yields. Conventional management 
have sought to achieve maximum and constant yields (MSY),2 which has been referred to as 
the classic utilitarian approach (Berkes et al. 2003). In this approach MSY was viewed as a 
target to reach. Besides, until the 1980s, deviations from the scientific advice about the final 
size of the TACs – agreed outside the scientific sphere, were not unusual in Sweden and 
within the European Union (EU). In the eighties, the concept of safe biological limits (SBL) 
was introduced in ICES advice.
Even though today the classic utilitarian view is less dominant and the MSY is understood 
more as a limit to be avoided (Garcia and De Leiva Moreno 2001), biological models cannot 
capture the complexity of the marine ecosystems and have proven insufficient to provide a 
reliable basis for fisheries resource assessment (Garcia 1994). They also are insufficient to 
1 A fish stock may consist of several populations. 
2 The MSY concept assumes however a certain degree of stability in both nature and fisheries.
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understand the socio-ecological interrelations derived from the use and management of 
fisheries resources.
Problems with the basic concepts and the assumptions dominating conventional fisheries 
management have been discussed for some time and by many authors (see for example: Mc 
Goodwin 1990; Hammer 1994; Garcia 1994; Hilborn 1996; McGlade 1996; Stokes 1996; 
Symes 1996; Hildén 1997; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes et al. 2003). Suffice to say, 
there are some shortcomings in the knowledge base on which the TACs rely. One problematic 
related to the methods used is that addressing single stocks and commercial fisheries has partly 
directed the attention of the research towards industrial fisheries.3 Another is the lack of 
reliable data, such as for example the knowledge about the species and quantities discarded in 
many fisheries. Another is the lack of knowledge and consideration of food web relations in 
the ecosystem. The case of the Newfoundland fisheries in Canada, where the scientific advice 
was considered among the best available in the world, is an example of how modern 
management can fail (Hilborn et al. 2003). Dealing with renewable resources means one needs 
to know about the state of fish populations (genetically differentiable). Population-based 
fisheries management is in practice difficult. Even when today fish populations can be 
genetically differentiated through DNA analysis in the laboratories, the age of DNA-selective 
fishing technology has not yet arrived. In the fishermen’s catches populations are always 
mixed and catches are more a time specific sample. 
In the last decade, in the search for better models and new reference points, precautionary 
coefficients and approaches to multiple species stock assessment have been incorporated in 
the calculation of the TACs (Garcia 1994). Today the ICES advice is primarily risk-averse, is 
based on precautionary biological reference points and aims at keeping the risk that the 
spawning biomass may fall below a minimum limit low (ICES 2003).4 Nevertheless, as 
explained in ICES documentation setting targets for fisheries management also involves socio-
economic considerations. Therefore, ICES does not propose values for Target Reference 
Points, and at least until now Management Agencies have not identified management targets 
based on socio-economic benefits (ICES 2003).
Still, the conventional fisheries management model assumes that if the stocks are assessed and 
the rules guiding fisheries based on the limiting conditions (TAC) and their implementation 
properly enforced, then yields will be stable and fisheries can be sustained. A number of 
problems with the TACs and the use of quotas or output control systems, as these are 
perceived by the local coastal fishermen from Northern Bohuslän, are discussed in chapter 7.
3 Finlayson (1994) who discussed the type of data used in fisheries management in for example Canada, describes 
how for a long time the main sources of data used in fisheries management have been the industrial fisheries. 
Thus, there is a risk that capture-oriented research approaches generate information that only serves the needs 
of particular types of fisheries and groups. In this regard when referring to the European context Symes and 
Phillipson (2001) explain that research on small-scale coastal fisheries has been largely ignored.
4 The minimum spawning stock biomass benchmark is described by the symbol Blim (the biomass limit reference 
point). The value of Blim is set on the basis of historical data, and chosen such that below it, there is a high risk 
that recruitment will ‘be impaired’ (seriously decline) and on average be significantly lower than at higher 
spawning stock biomass (SSB). Below Blim there is a higher risk that the stock could ‘collapse’. In ICES 
terminology 'collapse' does not mean that a stock is at high risk of biological extinction, but does mean that 
recovery to improved status is likely to be slow, and dependent of effective conservation measures. The fishing 
mortality rate should not be higher than an upper limit Flim which is the fishing mortality that, if maintained, 
will drive the stock to the biomass limit. Spawning biomass and fishing mortality can only be estimated with 
uncertainty. Therefore, operational reference points are required to take account of this. To keep the true risk 
low that spawning biomass falls below Blim, the estimated spawning biomass should in practice be kept above a 
higher level that allows for this uncertainty. Therefore, ICES applies a ‘buffer zone’ by setting a higher 
spawning biomass reference point Bpa (the biomass precautionary approach reference point). 
(http://www.ices.dk/committe/acfm/comwork/report/2002)
41
Predator-prey relations between species and multiple-species stock assessment models have 
also been tried.5 As opposed to the single species population and fixed maximum sustainable 
yields (MSY) these new approaches introduce complexity into management. This complicates 
the management process still further, because multi-species analysis also brings in multiple life 
cycles and a large number of spatio-temporal scales.
Marine ecosystems are diverse, dynamic and complex. Coastal living marine resources have 
characteristics making their governance and sustainable management difficult; they are 
submerged, mobile, fluctuate and are shared by many people. At sea there are no clear cut 
ecosystems boundaries, and sea-living organisms are generally submerged and fugitive. Even 
those living organisms which to the observer appear stationary or sessile, often have complex 
lifecycles with mobile stages where eggs and larvae drift long distances with currents before 
they settle. The diversity, dynamics and complexity of the coastal ecosystems of Skagerrak 
described in chapter 2 raise, for example, problems for fishery biology which at present is 
struggling to cope with single species stocks assessments, and needs to introduce multiple 
species and ecosystems assessments.
The Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel6 and the ICES Working Group on the Ecosystem 
Effects of Fishing (WG-ECO) explore how ecosystem management can be implemented. The 
ICES symposium on the Ecosystem Effects of Fishing (in Montpellier 1999) the WG-ECO 
held a session “Ecosystem management - Can it be made operational” (ICES 1999). The 
working group concluded that objectives for ecosystem management are needed in addition to 
those assuring conservation of the target species of fisheries. However, it also concluded that 
based on present knowledge, in most cases the additional objectives required for conservation 
of “the ecosystem” would probably simply be a list of objectives regarding an increasing 
number of single species. Ideas for an ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) are 
being discussed, but the scientific approaches are still under elaboration (Fifth North Sea 
Conference Secretariate 1997; Folke 1997; Symes and Pope 2000). The complexity of the 
marine environment – with many ecological factors still unclear – hampers the attainment of 
managerial solutions. Ignorance about ecological interrelations and uncertainties inherent in 
the various assessment methods cannot be totally removed, but they can be clarified and 
translated into policy decisions which err on the side of caution (Symes 2003).
The adoption of an ecosystem based approach to fisheries management is neither about 
making stock assessments for an increasing number of species, nor adding more and more 
species to the stock assessment models and enlarging the list of protected species. It is rather 
about maintaining biological diversity and ensuring that the functional integrity and dynamics 
of the ecosystem are properly safeguarded. It is about maintaining the resilience of the coastal 
ecosystem in the face of natural and man made processes, and its capacity to deliver the full 
range of environmental goods and services, including a surplus of fish to be commercialised 
(see for example Folke 1997).
The concept of resilience, introduced by Holling (1973), relates to the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be absorbed by a system without losing its functional characteristics. 
Holling has highlighted ecosystem dynamics, complexity and feedback mechanisms and 
rejected the ideas of linear dynamics and a unique ultimate state of balance in nature, 
introducing instead the idea of multiple states of equilibrium. The term adaptive management, 
used by Holling (1973) and co-workers (Folke 1997; Gundersson and Holling 2002; Berkes et 
5 See for example the multi-species virtual population analysis (MSVPA) in Christensen (1995) and its testing 
within the framework of the EcoPath program (www.ecopath.org). 
6 Recommendations by the Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel to the United States Congress were mandated 
by the Sustainable Fisheries Act amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act (1996). 
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al. 2003), refers to the design of management regimes to respond to these aspects and 
interrelated problems of ignorance and uncertainty, and is now widely used to capture the idea 
of robust flexible management systems that take ecosystem dynamics complexity and 
feedback mechanisms into consideration. The concept of social resilience is also used to refer 
to society’s capacity to adapt to social and ecological changes without putting at risk the 
functionality of the ecosystem and social system (Berkes and Folke 1998; Olsson 2003).
Discussing fisheries in ecosystem terms leads one to the problems of scales and system 
borders and the definition of units for management on physical and ecological grounds, 
something that always has an element of arbitrariness and cannot be universally resolved. The 
various definitions of “coastal ecosystem” are an example of this.7 In the coastal zone, the 
physiographic conditions, biotopes and ecosystems are far more diverse than those of the 
open sea. Here, where depths are commonly relatively shallow, factors such as light, solid 
substrates, nutrients, water turbulence and retention mechanisms, enhances dynamics, 
biological diversity and productivity and makes it difficult to assign a specific boundary. These 
characteristics of the coastal ecosystems are essential to sustain fisheries, but at the same time 
make possible other resource uses.
In the marine environment there is no one given method for defining the co-ordinates or 
specifying the size of an ecosystem. There is no scientific answer to this, because in an 
ecological sense the sea can be considered indivisible. In ecology, the ecosystem’s spatial and 
temporal scales are selected by the scientist and will vary from case to case depending on the 
research problem at hand (O'Neill 1986). This issue of fuzzy boundaries has made many 
marine scientists in general supportive of large scale management units and strong state 
intervention which has been shown to be problematic. 
It is not easy to find out the boundaries of the ecosystem to be managed in fisheries in terms 
of the temporal and spatial coordinates of multiple species and their interrelations, particularly 
if we think about the coordinates of high migratory species like eels and stationary species like 
crabs as part of the same management unit. The question of how to define ecosystem 
boundaries for management of fisheries at smaller and large scales has not yet been resolved. 
O'Neill (1986) has suggested that ecosystems should be seen as hierarchically nested across 
scales. Pragmatically, and as O'Neill (1986) explains, in the ecosystems there is a wide range of 
interrelated space-time scales and these must be defined relative to the scale of the problem 
being addressed. The boundaries of resource users and uses (e.g. fisheries) appropriating 
resources can also be defined. From this perspective the social dimensions of the time-space 
framework (in the sense that space and resources are appropriated under different spatial-
temporal regimes such as the local, small-scale and the dislocated, industrial fishermen), could 
be helpful in defining boundaries (see chapter 5).
Sherman, who has coined the concept of Large Marine Ecosystems (LME), suggests that in 
the sea there are “more or less” permanent structures and processes that can provide critical 
information for defining management units. The LME are relative large regions (~200,000 
km2) characterised by distinct bathymetry, hydrography, productivity and trophically 
dependent populations (Sherman et al. 1993).8 Yet the LME of Sherman are large systems 
involving a wide range of interrelated space-time scales far from the reality of the local 
fishermen. Today the LME-framework is being tested as the unit around which supra-national 
7 Oceanographic definitions of coastal zone are the most commonly used. From an oceanographic view point, 
the outer boundary of the coastal zone coincides with the depth at which the friction of the winds stops 
influencing the seabed, the depth of frictional influence (see for example Harvey 1976). This is, in practice, a 
dynamic boundary whose position will vary markedly from place to place and season to season. 
8 The use of LME as unit for management is promoted within for example the Global Environmental Facilities 
(GEF) program for international waters.
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management could be organised. From a coastal fisheries perspective, scaling up the unit of 
management to the scale of LME makes management rather difficult.
3.2 FROM NON-COOPERATIVE SINGLE FISHERMAN TO SOCIAL ACTORS
While aquatic living resources in a small pond can be sufficiently confined to be governed by a 
single household or individual, access to coastal and marine ecosystems and resources is rarely 
limited to single users. The issue of large marine ecosystems with non boundaries and mobile 
living marine resources opened to common use has alarmed both economists and biologists as 
“the commons” can lead to resource overuse and depletion. The problems associated with the 
common use of natural resources, which later came to be called “the tragedy of the 
commons” by Garret Hardin (1968), was described already in 1833 by William Foster Lloyd 
and followed up by Scott Gordon in 1954 (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990). The term “tragedy” 
qualifies the outcome in a negative sense, and refers to its implications in terms of resource 
depletion and users trapped in a downward spiral of production and economic inefficiency.
Traditional analyses according to property rights have classified resources as open access (res
nullius), 9 public property (res publica), common property (res communis) and private property (res
privatus) (Berkes 1989). Property rights are in this traditional view an institutional arrangement 
defining the nature and locus of ownership in relation to a particular resource. These are well 
established concepts filled with meaning (in the sense of institutions) which offer information 
in terms of entitlements and obligations. The point made by Hardin (1968), was that when 
natural resources are accessible to more than one user, used in common, then they will be 
depleted, because these users will act in a non-co-operative way to individually draw as much 
benefit as possible. Typical non-co-operative strategies leading to “tragedies” in fisheries 
include: “free-riding” and “the race to fish”. In a normative fashion, Hardin condemned the 
use of natural resources on a shared basis to a fate of overuse and depletion, and the collective 
of fishermen to being non-cooperative single individuals. From his perspective the absence of 
a full system of ownership (private property) or a system that command and control users 
behaviour by a strict enforcement of state regulations, have been blamed for resource 
depletion and degradation in, for example, forestry, aquatic ecosystems and fisheries. A salient 
deficiency of this model when applied to fisheries management is that it regards the individual 
as an independent calculating agent who carries the same information about reality as do 
others, and lives in a world where he cannot but compete to survive.
Thus, “the tragedy of the commons” as originally defined by Hardin for many years directed 
the attention of economists and policy makers involved in fisheries to the domain of 
institutional analysis, with a focus on the issue of ownership and the enforcement of state 
regulations.
In conventional fisheries management, where the resources are considered state property, the 
fishermen have to implement rules externally designed by the state authorities, the 
enforcement of which has required a strong state control apparatus. Nevertheless, despite all 
the efforts, conventional fisheries management models have been ineffective in their aim of 
achieving sustainability (Commission of the European Communities 2002; European 
Commission 2003; SOU 2003/04:51). To overcome the shortcomings of the state regulated, 
9 The use of the term “open access” has been sometimes disconcertingly and inaccurately referred to in the 
literature as equivalent to shared resources, communal /common property and the “commons”. Hardin’s 
contribution led to a confusion of terms because when referring to the “commons” he actually meant an open 
access situation where users did not communicate to clarify rights. Still, more than 30 years later, the 
clarification of such misunderstandings is needed. 
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often semi-open access regimes, right-based systems and users’ participation in management 
are currently seen as promising complementary approaches.
To define property rights is to define the bundles of entitlements defining rights and duties in 
the use of natural resources (Bromley 1991). The ownership of resources and clarification of 
rights to appropriate them allow normally owner and right holders to plan resource use. Rights 
and ownership can be individual or collective.
One example is the use of exclusive individual fishing rights in inland and shore waters which 
has been applied in Sweden for a long time. In some coastal areas of eastern Sweden and in 
the small lakes the land owner owns fishing rights in the waters adjacent to their land (see 
chapter 2). This model can be referred to as territorial private fishing rights (TPFR).
Another example is the use of individual ownership of fishing rights which is currently seen by 
many economists as a promising approach to managing fisheries. The ownership of fishing 
rights are alleged to allow the owner to plan resource use, care for the resources and harvest in 
the economically most efficient way (OECD 1997; Arnason 2004). The application of 
individual rights to harvestable surplus or quotas of specific fish stocks is being tested through 
individual transferable quotas (ITQ). Based on this approach fishery administrations around 
the world (e.g. Iceland, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, The Netherlands and Argentina) are 
being advised to parcel out the harvestable surplus of a specific fish stocks to individuals or 
firms.10
The experience with ITQs varies and so do the opinions about them. The experiences from 
Australia and New Zealand appear to be good. But the reports on the experiences with ITQs 
in Iceland are, for example, divergent. On the one hand, Arnason (2004) concludes that the 
results of the study of ITQ from an economic perspective are encouraging. The efficiency of 
the fisheries and the economic profits generated by the fisheries, as measured by the quota 
price, has increased dramatically. On the other hand Durrenberger and Pálsson (1985) report 
that the implementation of ITQs in Iceland has also made it possible for economically strong 
quota owners to buy quotas increasing their individual shares of the resources, thus reducing 
the number and diversity of fishermen, especially of the small-scale operators.
Some authors suggest that the sense of property given by the ITQ becomes an incentive for 
the holders of rights to provide for (conserve) the resource (stocks and flows) and the 
ecosystem (Arnason 2004), while others (Hanna et al. 1996; Berkes et al. 1998; Jentof et al. 
1998; Ostrom 1999a) indicate that private property may certainly permit the owners to 
increase economic efficiency of natural resource use but not necessarily lead to resource 
conservation. But, when used alone, IQs and ITQs disregard the opportunities to be found in 
the social (collective) system level.
While IQs and ITQs appear, for example, to be interesting for highly specialised ocean 
fisheries (Arnason 2004) with low bycatch (e.g. pelagic fisheries), they seem to be less 
appropriate for fisheries operating in ecosystems where biological diversity and bycatch are 
high. One should remember that the IQ and ITQs are output-based regulations predefined by 
the state, and as such have to rely on the quantitative assessment of stocks and the 
determination of the fishable surplus (TAC). This method, as was discussed above, still suffers 
from some deficiencies. IQs and the ITQs that are designed on the basis of single stock 
assessments disregard interrelations in the eco-system.
10 Such a tendency can also be seen in documentation prepared by the World Bank and the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).
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In the current situation with deteriorated ecosystems and depleted stocks as a general 
problem, fisheries scientists and managers have acknowledged the weak knowledge base both 
at a conceptual, theoretical and practical level. The top-down and centralised command and 
control system, as well as the privatisation of output quotas seem to have led to problems of 
distribution with strong resource concentration to a few, discards of large quantities of fish 
and high grading,11 and low levels of compliance.
Since Hardin (1968), more than 30 years of scientific empirical research has shown that 
individuals can co-operate and find ways to improve their joint long-term benefits and the 
outcome with regard to the natural resources and in this way overcome "tragedies of the 
commons" (Ostrom et al. 1994; Ostrom 1992). The idea that resource users’ choices and 
behaviour are always driven by an individual economic rationality has garnered much criticism, 
particularly from anthropologists.12 The critics argued that Hardin and his followers failed to 
take into consideration that individuals are social creatures, and, de facto do devise norms and 
rules of behaviour to govern the use of the resources held in common, even when their 
consumption is on an individual basis (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990). These ideas did not for 
example consider that in most cases, in rural areas in particular, people who normally share a 
natural resource system also share a common history and place of living. They have cultural 
similarities and may also have some common goals, and when they meet common problems 
can communicate and encourage each other to improve the situation. It should be mentioned 
here that the so-called new institutionalism (or “post Hardinian” institutionalism), has discarded 
the neo-classical assumption of economic, calculated rationality and, instead, assumes a 
situation of bounded rationality as the driving force behind individual behaviour (Steins 1999). 
From this debate evolved the idea of fishermen driven by a purposive rational behaviour that 
is bound up with the prevailing societal systems, i.e. a rationality that though strategic, is 
socially embedded and hence evolves with changing social values and communication among 
people.
Many studies have demonstrated that those who organise the use of natural resources on the 
basis of their local social and environmental contexts are very likely to take collective action 
and forge institutional agreements to resolve problems derived from the sharing of resources 
and thereby avoid tragedies (Ruddle 1987; Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom 
and Schlager 1996). The study of traditional local fisheries management has revealed, for 
example, that the allocation of rights does not necessarily involve the parcelling of resources 
into individual property. It can involve for example access and usufruct rights to a fishing 
ground for a collective of firms or individuals. The allocation of rights to a specific area on the 
basis of or fishing ground has been referred to as territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs), 
and remind of the allocations of use rights made on land. In the cases of TURF reported in 
the literature, the holders of rights are commonly locals attached to the area but formal 
ownership does commonly not apply. Some lobster fisheries in the US (Berkes 1989a) and in 
inshore fisheries in Japan (see box 3.3a) have been managed on the basis of collective 
territorial use rights. The studies indicate that the effectiveness of collective TURF as a model 
has only been tested with good results for relatively sedentary species, i.e. those that remain 
within the confines of the area (Christy 1982; Arnason 2004), so its ability to suit more mobile 
resources has been questioned.
11 Large individuals of a given species usually attract a higher market price than smaller individuals. This can lead 
to so-called “high grading” whereby large fish are retained in preference to smaller fish.
12 Godelier (1972) is a well-known anthropologist who criticised the neo-classical school of economics for 
assuming that individuals only tend to maximise their economic satisfactions and behave as a sort of eternal 
homo oeconomicus. In their contestation of the view of economic rationality as a universal and intrinsically human 
factor, many anthropologists have discussed the role of cultural aspects such as trust, kinship relations, religion 
and taboos. These aspects are often found in fisheries. 
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In many places around the world common property regimes have developed without the 
influence of outside intervention (Christy 1982; Baland and Platteau 1996; Berkes et al. 1989). 
Common property inspired regimes are regimes where a pre-defined (by themselves or by the 
state) group of people, because they are users having a particular characteristic (e.g. fishermen 
holding a licence and residing in a certain community) have specific access, appropriation, 
management and exclusion rights to the resource in question. In Sweden in the small lakes 
particularly, groups of landowners holding territorial private fishing rights (TPFR) have 
organised voluntarily around water management associations to draw advantage of their own 
collective action. In this way they both protect the resources and make business out of their 
individual rights.
The case of prawn fisheries discussed in chapter 8 can be seen as an example where TURF 
have evolved without the influence from outside intervention and is now evolving further 
with the consent of the authorities. 
Many concepts used in the natural resource management debate convey to the idea that 
resource users can de facto take into consideration other aspects than the maximisation of 
economic profit, and can involve their social and communicative capacities in management. 
The capacities mobilised are often referred to as “soft” assets, social capital, social resources, 
social endowments and social networks (Coleman 1988; Murdoch 1994; Scoones 1998; Falk 
and Kilpatrick 2000) and their recognition is seen as a pre-condition for the local users to be 
influential in management. The type of management promoting involvement of the users and 
their social capacities is commonly referred to as co-management, participative management 
or local management.
Such ideas underpin emerging and modern legislative frameworks, codes and declarations 
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1993), the FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fishing (1995); the Habitats and Species Directives,13;14 and The Malawi 
Principles15 amongst others.
To conclude, over the last decade, facing the failures of conventional management systems, 
new tendencies in the development of applied science relating to natural resource 
management have emerged. Natural and social systems are seen as complex systems in 
themselves and the management of environmental problems further involves the additional 
complexity derived from the interaction between the two systems (Berkes et al. 2003:2).
The shift in perspective from discrete stocks and fishermen to ecological and social systems 
suggests that fisheries management needs new interdisciplinary conceptual frameworks. In this 
thesis conventional fisheries management is problematised by looking at fisheries resources as 
common pool resources, and institutions as mediating interactions between the social and 
natural systems. It is proposed that improving the performance of the management of coastal 
fisheries requires an emphasis on the clarification of property rights, users’ capacity to take 
collective action and their involvement in co-management. These three notions are seen as 
central to the management of complex common pool resources and referred to in the 
following as the common pool resource management perspective.
3.3 THE COMMON POOL RESOURCE 
The concept of common pool resources (cpr) has been coined by the scientific community to 
refer to resources having two characteristics critical to their governance and management in a 
13 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora. 
14 Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the Conservation of Wild Birds. 
15 From the CBD Workshop on the Ecosystem Approach, Lilongwe, Malawi. 26-28 January 1998. 
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sustainable way. First, the exclusion of beneficiaries from access and use is costly, that is, the 
system has low excludability and the limitation of rights of actual users is a difficult matter to 
deal with. Second, when harvesting, users subtract from each others’ potential harvests, that is, 
the yield of the resource system suffers from high substractibility (Ruddle 1987; Ostrom 1990; 
Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom and Schlager 1996).
Here, the acronym cpr is used to differentiate the common pool resource situation from that 
of common property resources (often referred as to CPR). Common property refers to the 
status of collective ownership. By extension CPR can refer to a resource for which a group 
has been allocated a bundle of rights of use, management and exclusion. In contrast to CPR, 
the concept of cpr does not imply any information about the state of property, regime of rights 
or management model involved. Moreover, when one realises that fisheries resources are 
common pool resources, one also understands that the definition of rights of property, in the 
sense of ownership, is not sufficient for the management of fisheries.
Fisheries, where resources mobility and substractibility are high and resource storage, 
noticeability16 and exclusion are difficult, are associated with typical cpr problems. The 
complexity inherent in the coastal systems, with high biological diversity and dynamics, 
combined with the cpr characteristics of the resources and the fact that society uses and 
manage the marine environment in various ways, drastically reduces the ability of users, 
researchers and managers to have a complete picture and predict outcomes of use and 
management. Fisheries resources and coastal ecosystems can be seen as complex cpr and the 
management of fisheries can be seen as the management of a complex cpr system. 
3.3.1  Problems and dilemmas derived from the use of  common resource pools 
No matter what type of common pool resource is involved, resource users will experience a 
variety of problems. Ostrom et al. (1994) have categorised cpr problems as problems related to 
a) the appropriation or use of resources and b) the provision for or conservation of the 
resources (box 3.1).
Appropriation problems involve the allocation of potential yields (stocks and flows). 
Appropriation problems involve appropriation externalities which arise from excessive 
harvesting and are closely related to the high subtractability characterising the resources. 
Appropriation problems may also relate to the assignment of space, as in the case of crowding 
and races to the best fishing grounds. They may also involve technological externalities due, 
for example, to physical interference when fishing. The assignment problems are closely 
related to the low excludability characterising large and open systems. Technological 
externalities are, on the other hand, related both to the issue of subtractibility and the issue of 
excludability. The characteristics of mobility and fluctuation of the fisheries resource make 
fisheries a cpr where solving these problems becomes difficult. Schlager (1990) has found that 
fishermen are more prone to solve technological externalities and assignment problems than 
appropriation externalities.
Provision problems relate to the productivity of the resource system, ultimately the resource 
flows and ecological services. To provide, in this context, means to contribute to maintaining 
the production capacity of the cpr or avoiding its degradation. Provision problems relate to 
lack of motivation and deficiencies of investment in development, maintenance and 
protection of the ecological dimensions of the common pool resource system. Lack of 
motivation to contribute for the conservation of marine ecosystems can be related to, for 
example, ignorance about the dynamic and complex interrelations in the ecosystem and the 
16 The concept of noticeability is used to refer to the difficulties involved in the user’s ability to observe and 
monitor what other users do.
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users’ uncertainty with regard to the current state, spatial distribution and abundance of the 
resources. It can also relate to the conviction that other users take large advantage (i.e. free 
ride) of ones conservation efforts. That is, it relates to the users’ lack of information about the 
state of the resource and the effects that other users may have on these in other places and at 
different times. Information about the use and state of resources in fisheries is certainly not 
symmetric.
The diversity and dynamics of the coastal resources and ecosystems make coastal fisheries a 
special cpr system with regard to appropriation and provision problems. The likelihood that a 
coastal fisherman will be able to capture the benefits that may derive from his efforts to 
husband (provide for) coastal resources under multiple uses is lower than is the case for users 
that husband, for example, a forest. In the marine ecosystem changes in relation to natural 
resources may happen in different places and times, without our noticing them or considering 
them a problem requiring action. Among those changes that we do regard as problems, some 
may occur naturally. Some problems may have their sources in changes in attitudes, i.e. the 
attribution of new meanings or values to things, making them part of new experiences, such as 
our attitudes towards recreation and fish as food.17 The coastal fishermen’s perception of their 
common pool resources situation is one of the questions addressed in this thesis (chapter 6).
The cpr characteristics of fisheries resources complicate the issue of sustainability in fisheries. 
When situations of high demand, overfishing, and degraded ecosystems prevail – which is 
often the case in coastal areas – these conditions can transform cpr problems into 
disagreements over access to, use of and control over natural resources, commonly referred to 
as natural resource conflicts. But not all cpr situations produce tragic outcomes, exposing users 
to the dilemma of choosing between individual or group interest. Ostrom et al. (1994) clarify 
that even when in cpr situations individuals’ choices may lead to tragic situations –  where the 
outcome is not rational from the perspective of the group – not all situations where 
individuals jointly appropriate and/or contribute to the maintenance of production capacity of 
the cpr will evolve into tragic situations with dilemmas.
First, some cpr situations may not induce resource users (e.g. fishermen) to adopt individual 
strategies that produce “suboptimal” outcomes. Second, in other cpr situations users may have 
already adopted rules to cope with the problems derived from the common use (Ostrom et al. 
1994). The extent to which the conditions become critical to users, requiring changes in the 
17 One can illustrate this by means of the meaning given to salmon and salmon fisheries (including the cultivated 
fishery) in Sweden, which has changed considerable in less than hundred years. From being considered a 
fishery for mainly local subsistence, the salmon industry developed and became heavily commercial with 
extensive export plans. It later became increasingly valued as a recreational resource eventually becoming 
identified with international sports and leisure tourism. Similarly, the perception of seals by urban youth and by 
the rural fishermen may be different. These different meanings exist side by side and may lead to controversies.
Box 3.1  Type of cpr problems
Appropriation Problems   Provision Problems
Appropriation externalities    Development failures 
Technological externalities    Maintenance problems 
Assignment problems    Degradation problems 
Source: Ostrom et al. (1994) 
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rules in use, and the users’ degree of ability to change these, will vary from one cpr situation to 
another (Ostrom 1990) and is therefore an empirical question.
In the case of coastal fisheries, a suboptimal situation can be the result of a combination of 
internal and external factors, and the institutional frame or governance regime needed to cope 
with the problems can be a combination of rules and rights.
With the term “external or contextual factors” most authors refer to aspects affecting the cpr
situation and the decisions taken there. External factors can be almost any force, event or 
"thing" affecting a situation confronted by an individual or group of individuals (community) 
which cannot be influenced by the individual or group of individuals. They can also be any 
process formative of the cpr situation and the dilemma but beyond the control of the chosen 
community of study. Thus the term “contextual factor” refers to changes having their origin 
in arenas to which the community of users under study do not have access or power of 
influence.
External factors influence the supply and demand side of production systems such as fisheries, 
and can determine whether a fishery is viable or not (Edwards and Steins 1998; Ostrom et al. 
1994). For example the scarcity and price of oil, or poor land transport facilities to the 
auctions can be seen as contextual factors that have historically constrained the development 
of fisheries everywhere. These are examples of contextual factors affecting the supply side. A 
contextual factor can also be a situation of changes in demographics with a concentration of 
population on urban centres or changes in consumption patterns, substitutes or a situation of 
war. These are examples that can affect the demand side. World-wide, fishermen have 
developed individual and collective strategies to adapt to contextual factors such as 
fluctuations in the market (examples of this have been accounted for in chapters 2 and 8). 
Adaptations of the technical type include, for example, the storage of fish in cages, while 
economic adaptations include the establishment of cartels. Compensation models have also 
been devised, mainly through financial support from the state (see chapter 2).
By examining what the coastal fishermen from Northern Bohuslän perceive to be factors 
leading to “suboptimal” outcomes and their experiences and ideas with regard to feasible 
institutional alternatives (see chapter 8), this thesis addresses the issue of barriers to 
fishermen’s involvement in the management of coastal resources. 
3.3.2 Frameworks for the analysis of  common pool resource situations 
Much work has been conducted on the development of analytical frameworks to describe 
central elements and their interrelations in the management of common pool resources. Such 
frameworks help to direct attention to the more important variables in a common pool 
resource situation, that is, those more likely to affect decisions about the institutional regime 
governing the use and management of the resource pool and whether change is necessary or 
desirable (Edwards and Steins 1998a).
The first frameworks were inevitably rather simple and focused on variables influencing 
internal relations (see for example the framework by Oakerson 1992). With the growing 
debate on environmental degradation and resource depletion, studies of common pool 
resource management have grown quickly. The list of disciplines and sub disciplines that have 
contributed to the further development of new frameworks is long – ecology, sociology, social 
anthropology, political science, public administration, geography, environmental economics, 
and human ecology.
Wade (1987); Ostrom (1990); Oakerson (1992); Thomson et al. (1992); Ostrom et al. (1994); 
Baland and Platteau (1996) Edwards and Steins (1998a); Folke et al. (1998), Berkes and Folke 
(1998) are some of the authors who have applied and developed such frameworks providing 
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guidance about what ought to be described and why, in order to understand the emergence of 
rules coping with problems in the cpr situation.
Common to these frameworks is that the analyst:
¾ starts with the diagnosis of an outcome or problem and lets the analysis work 
backwards;
¾ describes the characteristics of the biophysical environment, the technology available, 
“the community” and the rules at work and analyses their relationship to the incentives 
and disincentives faced by users managing the resources;
¾ applies qualitative methods; 
¾ examines the perceptions of resource users. 
These steps can also be found in the analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
These types of frameworks are the results of empirical case studies and have also guided the 
design of further empirical case studies.
The first generation of empirical studies contributing to theory building for common pool 
resource management focused on long-lasting self management regimes in rural areas in less 
developed countries and the internal relations of users of single and often stationary resources. 
Steins (1999) points out that in most cpr studies multiple use situations are not considered and 
that the analytical frameworks developed on the basis of single cpr situations are therefore 
insufficient to describe problems in coastal areas.
In general, in the first generation of cpr research, the focus has been on the resource users’ 
interrelations at the local level. The focus was on the structure and function of enduring 
resource management institutions without paying much attention to their context of 
emergence. McKean (1997), Steins (1999) and Agrawal (2003) are authors that have 
highlighted the significance of contextual factors. These authors assert that the absence of 
analysis of external or contextual factors in the first generation of frameworks has seriously 
limited our understanding of the context of emergence of collective action and institutions.
As discussed by Agrawal (2003) in many cases these frameworks clearly show the background 
and preferences of the particular scholar involved. Wade (1987) has described the empirical 
characteristics of the setting for cases of successful forestry management in India. Ostrom 
(1990) has prepared a synthesis of many and varied case studies from various places. Baland 
and Platteau (1996) have made a comprehensive review of the literature and a synthesis of the 
results of specific cases. These authors all concur in considering that the characteristics of the 
resources, the users of the resources and the rules in use will influence the users’ ability to 
design new rules. All refer to the importance of rules defining resources and users, allocation 
and social equity elements, authority to take decisions, monitoring and enforcement, arenas 
and mechanisms for internal negotiations and negotiations with the state.
In these frameworks, most cpr scholars have emphasised that in order for one to be able to 
make a critical analysis of the management of natural resources the components of the 
ecosystem and the social system must be analysed together. Institutions in the sense of set ups 
for decision making, decision making processes and rules are seen as the mechanism to 
address problematic cpr situations, and are examined through institutional analysis.
The framework developed by Ostrom and co-workers (Ostrom et al. 1994)18 is frequently 
referred to in the literature and includes the analysis of the attributes of three main constituent 
18 The Institutional Analysis Development Framework (IAD) has been used in political theory and policy analysis 
under the strong influence of scholars from Indiana University (Ostrom 1990).
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parts or set of variables in the cpr situation. The three sets of variables central to their 
framework are: 1) the biophysical environment and material assets as technology, 2) the 
community of users, and 3) the institutional arrangements or rules at work. In the framework 
guiding this study the elements in the first constituent have been separated and the 
significance of external factors (e.g. relations with the state and the market forces) highlighted 
(see fig 3.1).
The term “institution” can be used in many ways and its use deserves further clarification. The 
first distinction to be made is that between institutions and organisations. Following North 
(1990) organisations are groups of individuals bound by some common purpose. North (1990) 
uses the concept of institution in the sense of the rules of the game framing the arena within 
which the players (individuals, groups, organisations, and state administration) can play. Scott 
(1995) uses the concept in a wider sense. In his view institutions consist of cognitive, 
normative and regulatory structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behaviour. In his definition different types of knowledge (e.g. scientific and practical) and/or 
perceptions can play different institutional roles.
Following Ostrom (1990), institutions are defined here as:
“The set of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in 
some area, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, 
what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and 
what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions” (Ostrom 
1990:51).
Institutions shape the interests of those interacting, and are at the same time shaped by them 
and the arrangements they lead to. The concept of institutional arrangement is more 
frequently used and refers to the basic idea of formal and informal agreements or rules 
specially designed to frame cpr users’ behaviour. Both institutions and institutional 
arrangements structure people’s decisions, actions, and interactions - with both the ecosystem 
and the social system.
Figure 3.1  A framework for analysis of common pool resource situation  
 and factors influencing the emergence of institutional change
Source: Adapted from Ostrom et al. (1994:37). 
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Ostrom (1990) has classified the set of rules (formal or informal) that determine what actions 
are allowed or constrained in a cpr setting into three levels:
1. the operational level of the daily use of the cpr, and determining the interactions both 
between the users and the resource and among the users; 
2. the collective level, or the level which defines who can access and harvest the cpr and
how;
3. the constitutional level, or level which defines who is eligible to formulate the rules and 
how these are to be formulated.
All fishermen follow operational rules defined by themselves or by external actors involving 
day to day decisions on where they are going to fish, at which time, and whether or not they 
will use a particular type of gear. Collective rules can be designed and applied by users, their 
representatives and/or external authorities and include agreements about how operational 
rules are to work, be used and enforced. These rules thus define how the resource will be 
managed and define policies for its allocation and use. Constitutional rules govern the process
of creating rules. These are the rules defining who is eligible to determine the collective rules 
that in turn affect the set of operational rules and day to day decisions (Ostrom 1990). Cpr
users may or may not participate in the elaboration of rules at these various levels, when they 
do we refer to as co-management. 
Rights are the result of rules developed to clarify and enforce authority between individuals as 
regards actions and resources. The issue of who participates in the design of which type of 
rules and how has to do with the chosen modality of management. Rules and rights may be 
formal and codified (the jure) or informal and uncodified (de facto). Fishermen’s rules are often 
referred to in the literature as informal rules. Several authors refer to institutions at the various 
conventional administrative levels: local, national, regional, international and global. 
Institutional change has often been seen as coming from outside the community of users 
rather than from within, as a means to force “traditional actors” to adapt to new contexts and 
scientific knowledge. As will be shown in this thesis, this is not always the case. The variety of 
rules and rights and their variation in space and time as well as the level of decision at which 
rules are taken, are also a source of institutional differentiation.
The thesis also makes reference to the institutional regime governing a situation or governance 
regime (Young 2000; Kooiman 1993). A regime can be conceived as the complex of 
institutions (norms and knowledge base, procedures, institutional arrangements, property 
rights) that jointly define the resource outcome, in other words the composite of institutional 
factors governing a cpr situation. The concept of governance regime goes beyond the concept 
of management system and can be useful when one wants to understand complex interactions 
in fisheries involving a variety of knowledge, behaviours, arrangements and procedures 
involved in the governance of the use of a common pool of resources. In the concept of 
governance regimes, in addition to the day to day operational and collective institutional level 
instruments, the values, images and views which guide the dominant discourses are also likely 
to influence the outcomes (Kooiman 2001).
3.4 CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO COLLECTIVE ACTION
Both Wade (1986) and Ostrom (1990) argue that it is likely that self-governing processes and 
collective action for managing common pool resources will emerge when users face a dilemma 
and certain preconditions are present. These authors have identified conditions of a resource 
(R) and resource users (U) that are most conducive to local users self-organising, taking 
collective action and developing arrangements that take them out of a cpr dilemma. The 
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attributes of the resource (R) and the users (U) as summarised by Ostrom (1999) are described 
below:
Attributes of the Resources:
R.1. Feasible improvement: The resource is not at the point of deterioration such that 
it is useless to organise or so under-utilised that little advantage results from organising. 
R.2. Indicators: Reliable and valid information about the general condition of the 
resource is available at reasonable costs. 
R.3. Predictability: The availability of resource units is relatively predictable. 
R.4. Spatial extent: The resource is sufficiently small. Given the transportation and 
communication technology in use, that users can develop accurate knowledge of external 
boundaries and internal microenvironments. 
Attribute of the Users: 
U.1 Salience: Users are dependent on the resource for a major portion of their livelihood 
or other variables of importance to them. 
U.2. Common understanding: Users have a shared image of the resource and how their 
actions affect each other and the resource. 
U.3. Discount rate: Users have a sufficiently low discount rate in relation to future 
benefits to be achieved from the resource. 
U.4. Distribution of interests: Users with higher economic and political assets are 
similarly affected by a current pattern of use. 
U.5. Trust: Users trust each other to keep promises and relate to one another with 
reciprocity.
U.6. Autonomy: Users are able to determine access and harvesting rules without external 
authorities countermanding them. 
U.7. Prior organisational experience: Users have learned at least minimal skills of 
organisation through participation in other local associations or learning about ways that 
neighbouring groups have organised (Ostrom 1999:3). 
The presence of all or some of these conditions is understood to facilitate the emergence of 
users’ collective action in a situation of dilemma, and their involvement in the development 
and enforcement of rules or management institutions. When reviewing cpr studies Baland and 
Platteau (1996) are of the opinion that among those studying common pool resource 
management there is a consensus that to be able to solve dilemmas the user group must be 
relatively small, live close to the cpr, and be free to set access and management rules in their 
own way. In the cpr approach those sharing history, gender, language, degree of dependency, 
technology and distance from the cpr as well as rules and types of rights may find it easier to 
co-operate. Ostrom explains that each setting will require different and particular rules, 
specially designed to take advantage of specific attributes or confront specific problems 
(Ostrom 1990).
In chapter 8, case studies will tested against these theoretical ideals for robust common pool 
resources co-management institutions and the likelihood of emergence of institutional change 
in Northern Bohuslän will be analysed against the preconditions listed above and using this 
nomenclature.
Certainly, when fishermen sharing those characteristics and meeting the conditions listed 
above will found cooperation easy. But what may not be so easy is just to find such fishing 
communities and conditions in the coasts of industrialised countries where the traditional 
inshore fisheries sector has been influenced by processes of modernisation and social change 
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in coastal areas referred to in the previous chapters. All these processes have made the 
boundaries between traditional inshore fisheries and modern offshore fisheries less and less 
clear (Symes and Phillipson 2001), at least with regard to the sharing of fishing grounds and 
their legal rights. In chapter 5, different definitions of coastal fisheries are examined and 
compared.
Schlager et al. (1994) have made use of a group of variables to distinguish between groups and 
subgroups of fishermen. According to these authors fishermen belong to the same group of 
users or “fishing community” when they fish in the same fishing ground and are relatively 
similar with regard to their: 
i) legal rights to appropriate fish,  
ii) withdrawal (extraction) rate of fish,  
iii) exposure to variation in the supply of fish,  
iv) level of dependency on fish extracted from the cpr system, and
v) use of the fish they harvest.  
Heterogeneity in type of resource, livelihood strategies and assets (e.g. technology) as well as 
heterogeneities stemming from the social and cultural setting or from institutional aspects 
such as formal or informal rights will position users differently. This will influence resource 
users’ perceptions of what is problematic and in need of institutional change. Heterogeneity 
does also stems from the multiple use situations. As stated by Steins (1999), various activities 
may relate to the coastal cpr differently and affect a single fishery differently, but most will, in 
one way or another, further reduce the coastal fisherman’s ability to define and influence 
decisions about the use of the cpr. Based on this reasoning, Steins (1999) goes on to argue that 
the trend towards increased multiple use is a process that increases the alienation of traditional 
users.
In her synthesis of case studies from different parts of the world, Ostrom (1990) has 
formulated eight design principles or preconditions that characterise robust and long lasting 
institutions governing the use of complex common pool resources (see box 3.2) such as 
fisheries.
Ostrom’s principles are very attractive and have been endorsed in a prescriptive way by both 
researchers and development agencies (Steins 1999). They work better at the local level where 
the social and ecological interactions and the effects of the rules can be observed and 
continuously adapted. As earlier discussed, ecologically speaking the sea can be seen as a pool 
of resources where the clarification of boundaries (principle 1 in box 3.2) is not an easy task. 
However, Oakerson (1992) has emphasised that physical limits in nature provide critical 
information for devising rules. He refers to local features and specificities of the bio-physical 
system that can be perceived (constructed) as limiting conditions and can help us in 
determining the exclusion of non authorised users from the system. Oakerson (1992) refers to 
the “excludability of nature”. Tangible physiographic barriers such as chains of islands, fjords 
or bays have been reported to perform excludability functions in the coastal zones and 
therefore are useful in the management of coastal fisheries. The tenurial significance of the 
archipelago for the local communities and fishermen in Northern Bohuslän was discussed in 
chapter 2.
The concept of resource storage capacity discussed by Schlager et al. (1994) can be linked to 
the ideas of Oakerson (1992) about the perception of the bio-physical system as limiting 
conditions. Schlager et al. (1994) discuss for example the challenge that mobility and the 
presence and absence of concentration of resource flows allowing storage poses for the 
construction of workable rules. The authors assert that in contrast to the case of agriculture 
(where seed can be stored in silos), resource systems having a low storage capacity challenges 
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the user’s willingness to provide for the resource and get involved in any management system. 
From their perspective in the world of fisheries, aquaculture would then have the effect of 
increasing motivation for management. It should be noted that processes allowing storage 
(facilitating the allocation of appropriation) not only involve man-made processes, such as 
aquaculture. Migratory resources can seasonally concentrate in the coastal zone, as for 
example cod in the coastal areas of Lofoten, in Northern Norway and previously herring in 
the archipelago of Bohuslän. Similarly shellfish larvae drift with currents and commonly settle 
according to a particular pattern and concentrate on specific areas.
This type of concentration of fish stocks to confined areas in space and time can facilitate 
their management, particularly if fishing is restricted to the concentration areas. Many 
biological processes have a resource concentration effect and these often occur in the coastal 
zone connected to physical processes and structures (concentrations to spawn, larval drifts 
due to currents and retention due to water stratification, nurseries in sheltered semi enclosed 
areas, feeding concentrations in upwellings and on hard substrates). These patterns are 
commonly studied under fisheries hydrography, but the knowledge of coastal water dynamics 
has been little used to direct fisheries management.19
Chapter 2 discussed how the physical limits of the archipelago, the high storage capacity of the 
ecosystem and the herring were viewed as factors determining a bundle of property rights. 
Information about the morphology of the sea floor and how this is interpreted by fishermen, 
an issue which is little discussed in the literature, was found to play an exclusion role in the 
local management by the prawn fishermen of Northern Bohuslän (see case 1 in chapter 8).  It 
is more difficult, on the other hand, to find in the water column critical information for 
devising rules to see how oceanographic phenomena, such as pseudo tangible structures, 
could play a similar exclusion function. Imaginary lines can only solve this. In contrast to, for 
example, the excludability that an archipelago area can play, in the open sea, the level of 
19 Proposals to take more consideration of physical processes in the design of fisheries management have been 
there for some time (Cushing 1975; Laevastu and Hayes 1982; Svansson 1985).
Box 3.2 Design principles for long-enduring cpr institutions
1. Clearly defined boundaries. Individuals or households with rights to withdraw (extract) resource 
units from the cpr must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the cpr itself
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. Appropriation 
rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions 
and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or money. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements. Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate 
in modifying the operational rules. 
4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit cpr conditions and appropriator behaviour, are 
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators. 
5. Graduated sanctions. Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) by other appropriators, 
by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both. 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost 
local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise. The rights of appropriators to devise their own 
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities. 
For cprs that are parts of larger systems  
8. Nested enterprises. Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
Source: Ostrom (1990: 90). 
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“natural exclusion”, in the sense of limiting conditions that enable exclusion based on 
information about nature, is in general very low. The nature of the open sea partially weakens 
Oakerson's statement about the existence of information in nature, and forces one to use 
arbitrary sets of boundary conditions such as imaginary lines or vessel size to exclude people 
(see chapter 5).
When dealing with large marine ecosystems and mobile resources such as fisheries, there is a 
need to structure the management system so that the management of the parts or subunits 
does not negatively affect other units. To take this type of large complex systems into 
consideration Ostrom makes use of the concept “nested enterprises” (see box 3.2) to refer to 
a system where the procedures, rules and rights ruling the various subsystems work at the 
same time. Elaborations on the eighth principle, which is particularly interesting for fisheries, 
are rather recent, though. McKean (1996a) has introduced the concept “resource federalism” 
to refer to nested common property regimes for very large ecological systems. She suggests 
that a small collective can manage a subsection of the resource but federations of these 
collectives can be called into action if externalities among subsections arise. This is a system in 
which small units operate independently as long as they do not affect each other, but 
amalgamate into larger wholes to cope with problems that cannot be handled within single 
units (McKean 1996a).
3.5 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF cpr
Rights of access to natural resources on land are normally defined by additional rights derived 
from the ownership of the land; if you own the land you normally own the plants and the 
trees growing there as well. Thus in natural resource management, the concept of property 
rights has been used to include both the type ownership and the rights derived from it in 
terms of access, and thus serves the purpose of excluding potential users.
The concept of property is, however, less applicable to fisheries resources, where the substrate 
(water), the resources, the resource flows, and the ecological services are transient, and the 
social interdependency derived from the use of the resource base is comparatively higher than 
on land. In the highly dynamic marine ecosystems, de jure property often in the hands of the 
state hardly coincides with the definition of de facto appropriation of resources. This partly 
explains why fisheries resources are commonly considered state property and the 
responsibility of their management is ultimately placed in the hands of the state.
A salient deficiency in the traditional classification of property rights introduced before (see 
3.2) is the idea of attributes inherent in the resource defining the type of property, when in 
reality there is nothing in nature binding natural resources to one or another type of property. 
Property is by definition a man-made construction, a social choice. But it is also clear that 
certain natural resources may lend themselves better than others to definition in terms of 
property. From this perspective the conventional categorisation of resources as property, in 
the sense of ownership and authority of exclusion previously introduced in section 3.2, seems 
to be difficult to apply in fisheries.
Property is an important element in the management of natural resources but the bundle of 
entitlements derived from ownership is not universal and can vary with the type of cpr and the 
rules and management modality that apply.
In addition, the characteristics of fisheries imply that instruments other than de jure rights of 
property can be used to appropriate natural resources. Capital investment, technological 
development, market relations, storage capacity, individual skills, local knowledge, 
involvement in management and agreements on rules of use are some of these instruments. 
These can be seen as means of expanding access to and control of natural resources, or means 
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of governing common pool resources. However, the issue of mobilisation of other 
instruments than formal property rights mediating the appropriation and concentration of 
common pool resources is poorly discussed in the cpr literature on fisheries. In this context, 
Giddens' (1997) distinction between allocative and authoritative resources could be used to 
better understand the mediation of resources and governance of the cpr by, for example, 
artefacts. Allocative resources can refer to those having physical existence, tangible assets. 
Natural resources, material means such as technical and storage capacities are, together with 
the produced goods (e.g. canned herring), examples of allocative resources. Authoritative 
resources are those used in the process of gaining access and control over allocative resources, 
including natural resources. Political processes, the organisation of decision-making, the 
working rules or social agreements allocating the use of space and time, and local knowledge, 
are examples of authoritative resources. These apparently different types of resource not only 
interact and strengthen each other but can also exchange roles. For instance, with changes in 
the context, a resource having an allocative function today may become functionally 
authoritative tomorrow. The emphasis in Giddens’ classification is, given the premise that 
resources are defined in relation to human needs, more on the resource’s function as a means 
to appropriate resources. Following his line of reasoning one may argue that in fisheries 
control over the situation is gained through allocative and authoritative resources enabling and 
reinforcing each others’ functionality (Giddens 1997).
The nature of resources and of people’s perceptions of them can per se also offer information 
(in the sense of Oakerson) of allocative and authoritative types (in the sense of Giddens): a 
lake or an enclosed bay can be perceived as carrying different allocative and authoritative 
information or properties than the sea. To conclude, one can argue that in complex and 
transient cpr systems such as coastal marine fisheries a comparatively large variety of resources 
(in a wide sense) and processes can fulfil allocative and authoritative functions. Which 
resources play a significant role will vary with the socio-ecological context, the different 
property rights and the management system in place.
The institutional debate has gone beyond the traditional analysis of property rights in the 
sense of resource ownership, and has assembled new concepts to sort out the authority 
emanating from different notions of rights with regard to the governance of the cpr. Ostrom 
and Schlager (1996) have defined property rights as: “an enforceable authority to undertake 
particular actions related to a specific domain”; rights are the result of rules.
These authors have developed a typology of rights together with the characteristics (positions) 
of different rights holders (see table 3.1). These are the rights to access, to harvest or extract, 
to manage, to exclude and to alienate. Their typology can be used to make distinctions in 
fisheries. These positions have to do with the power of authority of the user in the cpr
situation. Thus, they regard “access” and “withdrawal” to be operational-level rights related to 
the use of cpr. Access is defined as the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-
subtractive benefits (e.g. sailing), and withdrawal as the right to extract resource units or 
products of a resource (e.g. catch fish). Management, exclusion and alienation are conceived 
by the authors as collective choice rights. Through these rights, the way in which future rights 
can be exercised is to be defined. In contrast to the authorised entrants and users, the 
claimants, proprietors and owners have formal rights to mobilise authoritative resources 
(Giddens’ terminology). Claimants, proprietors and owners are able to limit the allocative 
resources used by the authorised entrants and users. 
In Ostrom and Schlager’s classification “management right” is the right to regulate internal 
use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements. An exclusion right is the 
right to determine who will have right of access and who will not, and how that right may be 
transferred. Finally, alienation is considered the right to sell or lease either or both of the 
above collective-choice rights (Ostrom and Schlager 1996: 133). 
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There is an essential difference between the first two types of rights (access and extraction) 
and the latter three (management, exclusion and alienation). A heavy line has been drawn to 
represent this in table 3.1. It is the authority to devise future rights, which makes the 
management rights so powerful and therefore a collective choice. Where the authority of 
management is placed is therefore a critical matter. 
This can be clarified through an example. A fisherman who has a professional licence 
authorising him to harvest on the basis of a national quota in Skagerrak in Western Sweden 
holds only two types of rights: the right of access to Skagerrak and the right to 
withdraw/extract fish. Formally, he has little management authority, cannot exclude others, 
nor sell his licence or share of the national quota. On the other hand, he can mobilise 
allocative resources to appropriate more resources. In many parts of Eastern Sweden, on the 
other hand, where inshore waters are privately owned, the owner of the land/water will have 
the right to grant others access to and harvest rights in the private area. Here the landowners 
on the East Coast of Sweden held a monopoly of access, withdrawal or extraction, 
management, exclusion and alienation rights. Today with the expansion of recreation, the 
rights of the owner of the water have been constrained with regard to sports fishermen using 
fishing rods, who cannot be excluded. With regard to commercial fisheries the owner of the 
land/water can hold almost the entire bundle of rights listed in table 3.1. He/she can authorise 
others’ access to the private waters and the fish there, he/she can authorise the extraction of 
resources, he/she can exclude professional fishermen from fishing there and finally he/she 
can transfer all these rights by selling his piece of land. But, in the marine ecosystem he/she 
cannot prevent the ecosystem being affected by other users or cross scale resource subtraction 
from happening. However, the fugitive characteristics of the fisheries resource and the right to 
management confined in space and time, implies that in neither case will the owner be able to 
define and govern the outcome. To do that, the owner must be able to influence events 
outside the local scale of management, (see Ostrom’s eighth principle). Situations of multiple 
use, where different uses and users affect each other, will also bring about complexity. The 
“right” to pollute coastal waters can, for example, deprive any owner of exclusive fishing 
rights of his ability to benefit from his bundle of rights. As discussed by Edwards and Steins 
(1998) to assume that a group of fishermen holding individual rights will have monopoly of 
use of a mobile resource and be able to govern its state, is rather unrealistic. Aspects related to 
the subtractive characteristics of the cpr such as fisheries cannot be solved through property 
rights.
Awareness of this complexity has a direct bearing on the debate concerning governance, 
which relates to the broader view of governing as opposed to the narrower perspective of 
government as the main decision making political entity (Kooiman, 1993). The concept of 
governance is interesting because it embraces the outcome of both use and management. It 
Table 3.1 Bundle of rights associated with cpr users
 Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorised user Authorised entrant 
Access ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
Withdrawal/extraction ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
Management ¥ ¥ ¥
Exclusion ¥ ¥    
Alienation ¥     
Source: Ostrom and Schlager (1996:133) 
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captures in one term, the idea of the outcome being the result of a combination of factors, 
processes and actors.
This suggests that the modality of management and the knowledge used in management are 
important factors determining who has a chance to be influential in the governance of the 
resources and who does not. As previously mentioned, the findings by Ostrom and co-
researchers, which is based on extensive research in the field and testing in the laboratory, 
have often been endorsed in a prescriptive way triggering decentralisation of authority to the 
local governments and processes of full or partial devolution of political power to the users. In 
more recent studies Ostrom (1999a:525) has discussed the advantages and limitations of a 
fully decentralised system, where all responsibility for making decisions related to smaller-scale 
common pool resources is localised. 
The advantages and limitations of such systems discussed by Ostrom are listed in table 3.2.
Table 3.2  Advantages and limitations of independent local governance of common pool 
 resources
Some may put the question of why the state (in the sense of a government administration) 
may be needed at all. Why not devolve all authority and decision making with regard to the 
management of natural resources to the local level? Actually a basic assumption that supports 
the intertwining of the state and the user community in management in fisheries is that local 
communities, by themselves, are very limited in their capacity to manage common pools, and 
particularly fugitive resources. In general, those viewing fisheries in this way question the 
capacity of the central government or the individual users to be able to resolve common pool 
resource problems in fisheries on their own, and to extend the boundaries of authority in 
management. Certainly the increasing understanding of the interactive characteristics of 
fisheries means that problems encountered by those depending on fisheries can not be 
resolved by users at the local level of by governments at the central level. Cpr problems in 
fisheries can only be dealt with collectively within and across spatial scales and levels of social 
organisation, and that multiple users and managers must co-operate.
Ostrom (1999a:528) uses the concept “polycentric multi-layered system” to refer to systems 
linked across scales involving higher levels of government as well as local systems. This type 
of systems she means mirrors better complexity and is able to cope even more effectively with 
tragedies of the commons. In these systems citizens are able to organise not just one but 
multiple governing authorities at differing scales and where each unit may design and enforce 
rules within a circumscribed scope of authority for a specified geographical area.
Advantages Limits 
Use of local knowledge Some appropriators will not organise 
Inclusion of trustworthy participants Some self-organised efforts will fail 
Reliance on dis-aggregated knowledge Local tyrannies may prevail 
Better adapted rules Stagnation may occur 
Lower enforcement costs
Redundancy
Inappropriate discrimination may result from the use 
of identity tags 
Access to scientific information may be limited 
Conflict may arise among appropriators 
Appropriators may be unable to cope with larger-
scale common-pool resources 
Source Ostrom (1999a:526-527)
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While some analysts, e.g. Ostrom and co-researchers, have focused on self-management 
studies and analyse “intra-use”’ community forms of interaction and rules, others, e.g. Jentoft, 
McCay and co-researchers, have focused on co-management studies and analyse forms of 
interaction between the government and the community of users, and more recently other 
social actors such as researchers and the nature conservation movement. When dealing with 
fisheries management both approaches seem to be needed, internal organisation for users’ 
collective action (or self-management of local resources by local users) and the more open 
notion of participatory management involving the world of external relations in resource 
management. The interdependency and transboundary aspects of the fish stocks and the 
expansion of multiple interests following the intervention of new claimants and outsiders, 
require the involvement of the government across scales. This comprises the difference 
between the concepts of self-management and local co-management and what following 
Ostrom (1999a) could be referred to as nested polycentric participatory management or co-
management.
This section touches on the fundamental characteristic of coastal fisheries being a composite 
of heterogeneous groups of resource users with different needs, rights and management 
capacities. Further it supports the argument that what makes it possible for certain fishermen 
to dominate is their ability to successfully mobilise and combine allocative and authoritative 
resources and rights. In situations where the availability of resources is critical, specific 
combinations of resources, in a wide sense, will compete with other. The extent to which the 
fishermen are able to combine freely will very much depend on the prevailing management 
system or institutional regime. When rules and rights in fisheries are discussed, analysts often 
distance themselves from the management through which decisions about rules and rights 
emerge. In view of this, and having already reviewed aspects critical to their collective action, 
the following section will focus on modalities of management and on co-management in 
particular.
3.6 MODALITIES OF MANAGEMENT
As previously mentioned, through fisheries management the living marine resources are intended 
to be kept in good shape (quantitatively and qualitatively) and the harvestable surplus allocated 
to resource users. Central aspects of fisheries management are who is to be involved in 
defining the management system, how the resources and the users’ community are defined for 
the purpose of taking management decisions, the scale of the management unit, the prevailing 
regime of rights, and finally the degree of transfer of decision making power, authority, 
administrative responsibilities and resources to partners in co-management.
McCay (1996) identifies the following modalities of management:
i) Laissez-faire or “no management”, allegedly associated with open access is prone to 
“tragedies of the commons” in situations of high pressure on resources. 
ii) Market regulation, which enables market mechanisms and should be distinguished from 
private property, even though the latter allows market regulation to work more 
efficiently.
iii) Communal governance associated with local users’ governance, irrespective of the rights 
and property involved.
iv) State governance associated with a central role taken by the state. This is commonly the 
case when the resources are considered public property and are treated as open access, 
but may also occur in the case of private property. 
v) International governance referring to international organisations involved in regional 
and global cpr issues (McCay 1996:115) 
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McCay (1996) highlights the difference between property rights and management systems. Her 
typology seems useful even though in practice these management types are seldom present in 
fisheries in a pure form. They can actually exist simultaneously and be found irrespective of 
the rights and property involved, but their functionality will vary with different property rights.
With the exception of the “Laissez-faire or no-management” modality, these modalities of 
management are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Crean (1999) argues that under the 
influence of contextual forces different forms of management shift back and forth, from the 
local to the central locus, from community-based management to centralised government 
management. The Swedish case studied in this thesis illustrates how the different types of 
management modalities can appear in mixed forms, apply to different tasks, embrace different 
scales, and undergo continuous transformation. Communal governance can, for example, be 
transformed into a more Laissez-faire modality. Market mechanisms may be present wherever 
the locus of management authority is placed, and should be seen as possible in all the 
remaining management models. 
In spite of this when discussing models for the management of fisheries the debate is often 
polarised between two possible forms: complete command and control exercised by the 
central government or complete command and control exercise by the individual (via the 
privatisation of rights) or a group via self-management. But the cpr studies suggest that the 
governance of fisheries is distributed, which means that the involvement of both the state and 
users in management or collaborative management is a precondition for its effectiveness. 
3.6.1 Features and experiences of  co-management  
Although there is no formal definition of co-management, the term was coined to denote a 
situation where the management capacities of the resource users and the government are 
pooled, and both are involved in the decision-making, implementation, monitoring and 
control of resource use. In fisheries the co-management of resource use is essential. The rules 
will only work if resource users understand them and are willing to implement them. In co-
management non-scientific, local knowledge can be articulated and incorporated in the 
regulatory decision making processes.20
According to Jentoft (1989) the expected advantage of co-management is that, when users 
obtain more management responsibility in functional terms, they are likely to behave more 
responsibly in moral terms. But the reasons why the state enters into collaborative 
arrangements with different economic actors or users can differ. Whereas in co-management 
theory the role of economic actors is seen as important in sustaining resources in the long 
term, in corporatist theory the state enters into collaborative arrangements in order to gain a 
measure of influence over the behaviour of economic actors in production through their 
interest associations (Williamson 1989). As will be seen in this thesis approaches to co-
management in Sweden are changing from corporatist, central co-management to more 
pluralistic, local co-management.
Based on the analysis of some co-management cases and fundaments of social theory, certain 
institutional preconditions have been identified as crucial to any co-management regime (see 
for example Jentoft et al. 1998). As a partnership where resource users are to be involved, co-
management involves some of the key issues already discussed above with regard to the users’ 
property rights and the conditions needed for them to self organise and take collective action. 
20 Within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity (article 8(j)), the governments and 
Contracting Parties have undertaken a program to enable the involvement of local communities in decision 
making and policy planning and the articulation of traditional knowledge with regard to natural resource use 
and management.
62
In general Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for robust institutions presented in box 3.2 
above, can also be applied to a discussion of institutions for co-management.
Co-management can be seen as a process that pools resources and looks for compromise 
between the two extreme forms of management: state driven and self-driven management. In 
the words of Kooiman (2001) “next to doing things alone, things can be more effectively done 
together”. Co-management is thus about interrelations between people and Jentoft et al., 
(1998) have highlighted the importance of trust, referring to co-management as an ongoing 
collaborative and communicative process, where resource users, together with government 
representatives and other actors, share an entrepreneurial and creative role. Co-management, 
the authors explain, is not so much about the rules per se as about the communicative and 
collaborative process through which these rules are formed: who participates, how debates are 
structured, how knowledge is employed, how conflicts of interest are addressed and how 
agreements are reached.
Fisheries management involves a multitude of tasks related to the conservation and allocation 
of resources, and some or all of them can, in theory, be accommodated in co-management 
practices (Sen and Nielsen 1996). One key question in co-management is thus what tasks can 
be more effectively performed with the involvement of whom, and at which level? As 
concluded by Jentoft and McCay (1995), co-management may take place at different levels of 
decision making, and at these levels involve users, stakeholders, and the state differently.  
Ostrom’s (1990) conceptual distinction of operative, collective and constitutional levels of 
rules seems useful even when dealing with co-management, because it helps to distinguish 
between the different levels or orders (1st, 2nd and 3rd order) of decision making that have to be 
approached through management. If the involvement of users only pertains to the 
implementation of rules that are designed by others, the result will not match the users’ 
knowledge about their own situation (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002) and will lead to little 
participation or involvement.
Since the types of arrangements in co-management can differ, they are often portrayed as a 
spectrum of the degree of involvement of the partners from government driven management 
to user or community driven management (see for example Sen and Nielsen 1996). The locus 
of authority in co-management can vary from the local to the supra-national, a wide range of 
actors can be involved and their degree of participation can vary from task to task.
The arrangements can refer to the sharing of authority and responsibility between government 
and user groups, today also extended to stakeholders (Berkes et al. 1991; Baland and Platteau 
1996; Hanna 1998; Jentoft et al. 1998). The term “stakeholders” has a different meaning than 
the term “user group”. It is used here to refer to individuals or groups whose position (as 
proprietors, claimants, etc) in relation to fisheries results in them being likely to affect or be 
affected by the use and management (or non-management) of fisheries. What makes a group, 
or even an individual, a stakeholder has to do with its involvement in the issue in question, 
and the recognition of its legitimacy to argue for or against a change proposed by the 
dominant regime. In a country like Sweden, with long standing democratic traditions, the role 
stakeholders can play in the formation of the fisheries of the future is not to be disregarded. 
Still, some stakeholders may have influential power while others may not, and some may be 
more aware of their influence than others. In chapter 6, where problems in the common pool 
resource situation found by the local coastal fishermen from Northern Bohuslän are explored, 
some stakeholders are identified. In chapter 7, the issue of an increasing number of 
stakeholders influencing the management of the coastal fisheries in Northern Bohuslän is 
discussed.
Although the co-management of fisheries in its varied forms is widely used, the discussion on 
co-management experiences in Europe is rather recent, and the cases reported relatively few. 
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Box 3.3:a and 3.3:b present in a synoptic form some instances of co-management in fisheries, 
which are generally held to be successful in the literature.
The cases are examples where the process of clarifying rights and authority in management 
has been advantageous from the view points of conservation and social equity. It should be 
noted here that some of these cases have also been discussed from the perspective of self-
organisation and collective action. Self-organisation strengthens co-management.
In all cases, the need for co-management seems to have evolved from fisheries specific 
conflicts and involved reorganisation. The examples of co-management mentioned in box 
3.3:a seem to have emerged to mitigate conflicts of spatial and resource distribution (social 
equity), due to user and gear crowding. The examples of co-management mentioned in box 
3.3:b are more recent and have emerged to mitigate conflicts of resource distribution due to 
scarce resources (social equity and conservation).
Common to all the solutions found in these cases are processes of making distinctions among 
users, users’ re-organisation, assignation and specification of users’ rights, definition of 
procedures for decision making and the form of representation, adaptation of rules to the 
local socio-ecological situation and enhancement of users’ participation in monitoring and 
control – all applied within spatial boundaries. The point made by Ostrom and Schlager (1996) 
about the need for influence at the collective and constitutional level of choice or decision-
making seems to have been considered in all the cases. As earlier mentioned this is crucial to 
resource users because it allows them to take part in the definition of future collective rights 
(Ostrom and Schlager 1996) and enhances their ability to make long-term plans with regard to 
the use of the resources.
Another common factor is that some responsibilities have been delegated to the fishermen’s 
organisations. In the Japanese and Norwegian cases, organised fishermen are granted by law 
Box 3.3: a   Cases of co-management reported in the literature
The Japanese case. Ruddle (1987) has described the Japanese fisheries management in coastal areas where the
regulatory locus of authority is placed at the national and regional levels but which grants fishermies cooperatives
associations or FCA at the local level decision making power and special rights. The system is based on collective
territorial use rights (TURF), which were historical practices and are now legally protected. Three types of rights have
been created. These are temporary (5-10 years) and cannot be commercially transferred: joint fishery rights given to a
collective (FCA), confine rights of access to an area to more local activities such as small-scale fisheries, aquaculture
and rights vested in the individual. To join fisheries every FCA has an exclusive management area or sea territory. The
FCA has the responsibility of allocating the quotas assigned by the regional authority and participates in the design and
enforcement of local operational rules within the area. The FCA has to enforce the national fisheries regulations,
which involve area specific conservation measures such as minimum size, closed areas and closed seasons. Fishing
licences in coastal areas are issued by the FCAs and can be inherited within the family (assuming residence in the area)
in case of decease. The cooperative assembly also has the power to expel a member. Those getting a licence operate
under free competition and the FCAs can close a fishery and authorise individual fishermen to switch fisheries
depending on changing environmental, technological or social circumstances. The cooperatives are also involved in
the coordination of other activities supporting the fisheries such as supplies, fuel and credits. When it comes to rights
for offshore, large-scale fisheries, fishing licences can be allocated to individual fishermen (boat owners) by the
government authorities. In this case territorial rights do not apply. The government also has retained the definition of
the TACs. 
The Norwegian Lofoten case. Jentoft (1989) has described the emergence of the Lofoten co-management system.
In the late 1890s, due to crowding and growing numbers of fishermen participating in the Lofoten cod fisheries, where
the Arctic cod has its spawning grounds, the Norwegian government enacted special legislation. The new legislation
delegated responsibility for the regulation of the fishery to the fishermen. The Lofoten system is an exception in
Norway where co-management is based on consultative arrangements. According to Jentoft (1989) the system under
which the local fishermen of Lofoten have been given exclusive rights by the government can be considered a success.
Special district committees of fishermen representing different gear groups were set up to make the rules for the
fishery. The rules defined fishing times; which gear is allowed on which fishing grounds; and how much space should
be reserved for which gear. In addition to elected fishermen inspectors, a public enforcement agency was locally
established to ensure that the rules enacted by the fishermen were being obeyed.
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considerable management authority within a geographical area, where they can take 
constitutional decisions, define the collective share of quotas and determine specific 
conservation rules.
In the Japanese and the Norwegian cases the fishermen can authorise entrance and are 
involved in control. In the case of UK the producers’ organisations have quota allocation 
responsibilities. In all cases, the fishermen seem to been involved in delivering data and 
monitoring the total catch.
A significant aspect is that in all cases the organisations involved in co-management have had 
a certain degree of autonomy. Besides, the scale of organisation to which responsibilities has 
been delegated, in all cases, appear to be the local level. The latter allows for individual 
participation and the organisations at the local level to take the form of multi-purpose 
organisations which saves transaction costs. This reinforces fishermen’s cooperation both 
around the organisation of activities that benefit them in the short term and in the 
management functions (Jentoft 1989). All cases seem to have empowered small-scale 
fishermen and led to the adaptation of rules to local circumstances, but the authority for 
defining fishing boundaries has remained in the hands of the state and the fishermen.
In all the above examples except the Canadian case, which is actually under development, the 
wider “stakeholders” community has apparently not been involved in the definition of, for 
example, allocative rules. In the Canadian case, the emergence of co-management required the 
organisation of stakeholders at the regional and local levels and a process of decentralisation. 
This suggests a distinction between the type of co-management that involves pooling 
resources or partnership involving only single users’ groups (professional fishermen) and the 
government and the type of co-management that involves pooling the government and a 
wider constellation of stakeholders (multiple-users, researchers, NGOs). The multiple use 
situations found in coastal areas also call for horizontal (or inter-sectoral) co-ordination, or a 
form of co-management involving multiple users groups.
Steins (1999) has suggested the use of “platforms” for resource use negotiation.21 She suggests 
that situations of increased complexity require the re-negotiation of institutional frameworks 
and that this can be achieved by establishing local platforms for resource use negotiation 
which can play an important role in facilitating collective action among multiple-user groups 
(Steins 1999). 
The examples of co-management involving multiple users reported in the literature are few in 
number. In Steins’ example, professionals have focused on consensus building and worked 
closely with stakeholders in establishing a process involving mutual understanding and win-
win agreements. These experiences sound interesting for Sweden. 
21 The concept of "platforms for resource use negotiation" was introduced by Röling at the Department of 
Communication and Innovation Studies at Wageningen Agricultural University (Röling 1994; Röling and 
Jiggins 1998).
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The lessons of such cases of co-management suggest the importance of clarifying certain 
institutional variables that will influence the nature of the co-management regime and 
probably also the outcome. In all the above mentioned cases, the local level has been given a 
role under different conditions. Ostrom (1990) has pointed out that for the local governance 
to survive, external government authorities should not challenge the right of local 
appropriators to design their own rules. What emerges is that assistance and support by the 
government administration and external organisations is necessary if collective action and local 
co-management systems are to both emerge and survive. Local governance appears to require 
a clear commitment from both the government and the fishermen. Yet the role that external 
actors (outside the fisheries sector) may play in the emergence of local governance institutions, 
is poorly discussed in the cpr literature.
Most co-management systems seem to have been triggered by natural resource conflicts and 
to have evolved from the existing management system, and they have been formed according 
to a specific political system and democratic tradition. The locus of authority in co-
management can vary from the local to the supra-national, and a wide range of actors can be 
involved. When an established central co-management system is to be reformed by shifting 
locus or involving new stakeholders, the relations of power in the governance of the common 
Box 3.3: b   Cases of co-management reported in the literature 
The Canadian case. Canada is often used as an example of failures. More recently Baland and Platteau (1996) have
reported on the emergence of new experiences. In the Canadian Atlantic fishery, the so-called Maritime Fishermen’s
Union (MFU) started in the mid-1970s as a militant fishermen’s organization that wanted to break the dominance of
inshore fishery by big commercial companies and defend their way of life. MFU has as members mainly fishermen
who own and operate small and medium size fishing vessels (less than 14 metres in length) and covers a very long
coastline on eastern Canada. The fishermen concerned rely primarily on lobster fishing, but they also catch other
species. Their communities have usually been quite successful in regulating access to the fishing grounds for lobsters
as well as in enforcing state conservation measures for that species. The co-management of lobster has been
considered a success and an “advisory committee” model based on multiple-stakeholders for decision making or
consultative co-management has evolved on the East Coast. Newfoundland, where 70 per cent of the cod fishery is
found, was originally excluded, however. The MFU intends to strengthen its role by co-managing other fish resources,
which are more problematic than lobsters. The process has triggered a deconcentration of functions from the central
to the regional offices of the Ministry and a devolution to the MFU of the tasks of distributing the fishing licences and
enforcing specific regional quotas set on the basis of conservation considerations.
The UK case. The emergence of co-management cases in the UK has been described by Crean (1999) and Symes
(2001). In England and Wales, management has devolved to the Sea Fisheries Committees (SFC) which have
existed since the 1880s. SFC:s are empowered to, within the 6 nautical miles, establish bylaws and regulating orders,
subject to approval of the ministerial authorities. The accession of UK to the EEC in 1973 led to the establishment of
POs essentially to improve the marketing of their members’ catches. Here the POs have no territorial rights but have
assumed a co-management function vis-à-vis the management of quotas. POs are responsible for the distribution of
quotas among their members as well as the enforcement of the quotas and the system which in practice has resulted in
positive discrimination of the small-scale fisheries. In Shetland the Shetland Fish Producer Organisation (SFPO) has
taken a leading position in the promotion of community held fish quota as well as spatial and time based regulations.
In 1996 the Shetland Fishermen’s Association (SFA) established a management group for shellfish involving a wider
group of stakeholders, the Shetland Shellfish Management Organisation consisting of representatives of local
Government, processors, environmental groups and scientists as well as the SFA. The group set out objectives within
the 6 mile fringe of the coast and has worked intensively with the regulation of the shellfish fisheries. Since the mid
1990s, taking advantage of the opportunity to purchase fish quota in association with the decommissioning of vessels,
the fish producers’ organization (SFPO) in conjunction with the Islands Council, has purchased whitefish quota
allocated to Shetland and created a collective pool of fish quota. The quota is then leased back to individual boats
enabling young fishermen to enter the industry without buying expensive quota as well as preventing quota from
being sold out of the area. Crean (1999) describes that Shetland’s fisheries professionals have been able to generate a
momentum from which a community based management regime is evolving from within the European regime, which
is still subservient to centralised control. Symes (2001) asserts further that in these cases an important fine-tuning of
European and national legislation occurs where fishermen are able to create their own menu of regulations adapted to
the local circumstances. Both authors note the coexistence of co-management at different levels. 
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pool are altered and special attention must be paid to supportive instruments and legislation. 
The exact choice or form of co-management will therefore be problem- and scale-site specific.
In a centralised co-management of fisheries the negotiations between the government 
authorities and the fishermen often occur through indirect representation of the fishermen at 
the central level. Centralised co-management can evolve as a response to the state’s needs for 
intervention in production, rather than as an understanding of the capacities to be found 
among the local users. Such co-management will be referred to here as centralised-corporate 
co-management (Williamson 1989). Central co-management can involve devolution (or 
transfer of power and responsibilities for the performance of specific functions) to 
fishermen’s organisations, but not necessarily a reallocation of the locus of authority to the 
local level.
Problems that can arise when fishermen’s organisations take part in designing, implementing 
and enforcing fishery regulations through representation have been discussed by Jentoft 
(1989), who suggests that in general members tend to identify themselves with smaller rather 
than larger organisations. He reports that in large organisations, where the participation in 
decision-making process is organised though indirect representation, free riding and conflicts 
occur more often (Jentoft 1989). His conclusions are supported by Pollnac (1988) who states 
that there are cases where fishermen’s organisations failed because they grew so large that 
members no longer felt that the group was their own. Moreover, specific local issues may not 
lend themselves to discussion within a large organisation. The description made in chapter 2 
was illustrative of this problematic and its impact on the local coastal fishermen from 
Northern Bohuslän. Here, centralised forms of co-management based on indirect 
representation seem to have contributed to the marginalisation of the local coastal fishermen 
and the local communities from the management of fisheries resources.
It is interesting to note that in the management of other common pools (such as forestry and 
watersheds), management reforms have been moving in the direction of more decentralised 
co-management forms. The transfer of rights and responsibilities has been referred to as 
decentralisation and devolution. Within the government, decentralisation may only mean the 
delegation (sometimes the term deconcentration is also used in the literature) of functions to 
local or regional units of the central government authority. An example of delegation in 
Swedish fisheries management is the transfer of research and monitoring responsibilities 
within the National Board of Fisheries, from the central office to the coastal laboratories. The 
term delegation is meant to capture the idea of the transfer of some authority and decision 
making power to, for example local offices, while maintaining at the central level the right to 
take back the decisions and delegated power. One may say that in the Canadian case above the 
authorities have delegated certain responsibilities to the lobster fishermen and the consultative 
advisory bodies, even though this process has taken time. 
A decentralisation process transfers both decision-making authority and accountability to 
lower levels of government. When the transfer of power and authority to perform certain 
functions is transferred from the government to the fishermen or from the central 
government to the local government without reference back to the central government, then 
the transfer is political, not only administrative, and is called devolution. The Japanese and the 
Norwegian cases can partly be seen as examples of decentralisation involving devolution.
But decentralisation can also be needed within the users’ organisations, which seems to be the 
case in Sweden. This suggests that a distinction needs to be made between centralised −often
of corporate type − co-management working through indirect representation, and local co-
management, often of community-based type and participative, even though these may coexist 
and occur in mixed forms.
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Decentralisation, devolution and co-management do commonly evolve as complementary 
programs and can reinforce each other. Co-management at the local and other levels can help 
to overcome some of the limitations of self-management discussed by Ostrom (1999a) (see 
table 3.2). In contrast to the term self-management, local co-management does not imply that 
the local level has an independent role to play in the management of natural resources in 
relation to the regional and the central level. Local co-management means that the rules are 
designed and agreed jointly by the users and the authorities in cooperation with other relevant 
stakeholders and closer to the local users i.e. the local dimension is legitimised in the 
management system. Local constellations of co-management can better adapt to the diversity, 
dynamics and complexity derived from the use of an ecosystem than central constellations 
(Ostrom 1990). Problems manifested at the local level can be dealt with more quickly and 
effectively through local organisations than through recourse to central organisations.
However, in fisheries management the transition towards co-management and the processes 
of decentralisation have been slower than in other sectors such as forestry. This has to do with 
the impact that such a step may have on the social interrelations resulting from the use of a 
very complex common pool resources system. Even though today most management experts 
recognise that the effectiveness of any fisheries management model will depend on the extent 
to which the model is legitimised by the fishermen, in the case of fisheries and mainly due to 
their characteristic of being a transient cpr, the authorities have taken up a cautious attitude. 
Which powers and functions should remain in the hands of the central government and which 
will be entrusted to the local level, have to be clarified in a continuous learning process of 
institutional adaptation. 
In the case of complex cpr such as coastal fisheries, both the local and other levels – the users, 
the stakeholders and the state – appear to be necessary for co-management to be effective. 
Co-management in fisheries needs to address issues at and beyond the local community level. 
It has been mentioned earlier that self and community-based fisheries management tends to 
be more difficult due to the complexity of fisheries. But arrangements of community-based 
co-management can be seen as an integral part of co-management at larger scales. In a nested 
system the shortcomings of local institutions can be overcome.
The nature of the resource base “recommends” the clarification of users’ rights, the 
organisation of collective action, and the institutionalisation of co-management in multiple 
layers.
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reviewed a set of concepts, frameworks and conditions that provide a deeper 
understanding of the social relations in the use and management of common pool resources 
systems.
A common perspective until very recently was to seek disciplinary solutions to environmental 
problems. The literature describing fisheries in Sweden seldom reflects on how society, 
through institutional arrangements, conditions fishermen’s involvement in management. 
Conventional scientific approaches have treated the environment as discrete boxes of single 
resources, the yields of which could be individually maximised (Berkes and Folke 1998) and 
the resource users as driven by an individual economic rationality. Today it is admitted that 
these models display conceptual, theoretical and practical problems and there is an emerging 
consensus about the complexity lying behind these problems. Natural and social systems are 
seen as complex systems in themselves, and the management of environmental problems 
further involves the additional complexity derived from the interaction between the two 
systems (Berkes et al. 2003:2).
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The chapter has elaborated certain characteristics of common pool resources that are critical 
to the management of coastal fisheries. Coastal fisheries have been presented as complex and 
transient cpr, for which there is no one given property rights system, and where resource 
appropriation rights can be secured in different ways. The characteristics of the resource make 
collective action and co-management a must in fisheries. Accordingly, the search for answers 
to the fishery crisis requires a focus on institutional analysis and reform.
When account is taken of the empirically grounded cpr studies, Hardin (1968) seems to have 
made theory out of a “constructed dilemma” which in reality may or may not arise. Thus the 
cpr debate is about the “contextualisation” of Hardin’s ideas, the appreciation of collective 
choice and the conditions needed for the emergence of collective action and institutional 
change. When applied to fisheries the postulate is that the local coastal fishermen are 
particularly prone to take collective action and take an active part in the management of 
coastal common pool resources. These statements make the cpr studies discussed in the 
literature also relevant for the study of the management of local coastal fisheries in Sweden. 
In the search for alternatives to state driven command and control or privatisation modalities, 
fisheries co-management is discussed and presented as an alternative form of management 
where rights and collective action are seen as integral parts. Elinor Ostrom and co-researchers 
have formulated design principles or preconditions that characterize robust and long-lasting 
institutions governing the use of common pool resources. In the case of complex and 
transient cpr such as coastal fisheries more inclusive nested institutions across scales seem to 
be needed.
Most case studies in the literature are derived from long lasting self management regimes in 
rural areas in less developed countries. The weakness of these first studies has among others 
been highlighted by authors discussing fisheries and coastal management and related problems 
and the role of contextual factors (see for example Schlager et al.1994; McKean 1997; 
Edwards and Steins 1998; Steins 1999; and Agrawal 2003).
Despite these methodological shortcomings resulting from the context-dependence of the 
case studies reviewed in the literature, it is proposed here that the conceptual apparatus, 
principles and ideas developed by cpr scholars can generate new insights for coastal fisheries 
management. They do not appear to lose relevance in the analysis of multiple-use cpr situations 
in western countries: firstly, because there is no way to describe the entire complexity of a 
multiple cpr situation; and secondly, because the users, individually or collectively, will act in 
accordance with their perception of the situation and based on their own knowledge and 
experience, independent of the level of complexity around them. From this perspective, it is 
the resource users’ perceptions of reality, and the information they choose to bring to bear on 
their decisions which counts, regardless of whether they are valid or not. It follows that 
understanding the perceptions of problems and solutions in the cpr situation is crucial to the 
analysis of fisheries.
As asserted by McKean (1997) few studies seem to have engaged in the problems and 
processes by which these regimes are created. Thus from a critical perspective she invites 
researchers to advance the research agenda by incorporating complexity. This can be done by 
paying more systematic attention to the management of cpr in western countries and by 
shifting the analytical approach from single to complex cpr systems like coastal fisheries. It can 
also be done by focusing on the users’ external relations in co-management rather than on 
their internal relations within groups of users. The analysis of the literature indicates that, from 
an institutional perspective, the management of natural resources needs to refer to at least four 
central dimensions: 1) the type of resource whether common pool or not and the 
particularities of the common pool resources including mobility and storage capacity, 2) the 
bundle of property rights that applies, 3) the particularities of the community of users and its 
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capacity to make collective action work, and 4) the modality of management. All these aspects 
will influence the outcome of fisheries management in ecological and social terms and need to 
be addressed. In addition there is the issue of external or contextual factors. Thus, fisheries 
management involves several dimensions that go beyond the determination of total allowable 
catches and the definition of who owns the resources.
Common pool resources systems like coastal fisheries imply dimensions with a high degree of 
variation with multiple users making use of different livelihood assets, with actors and their 
knowledge, bundles of users’ property rights and diverse management styles. In all these 
dimensions in the coastal zone there is in the field setting a tendency towards increasing 
heterogeneity. Consequently, the nature of the resource base in fisheries and the social 
implications of its use and management suggest the clarification of users’ property rights, the 
organisation of users in collective action, and the institutionalisation of (co-) management in 
multiple layers, i.e. a nested polycentric co-management. The debate on institutions can help 
to translate the cpr debate into alternative proposals for management of common pool 
resources such as fisheries.
The cpr school of thought has been criticised for being romantic and conservative. The study 
of ongoing experiences and new management regimes emerging within a turbulent fishery in a 
country such as Sweden, is a promising and less travelled approach. When looking at fisheries 
as a common pool resource and bearing in mind the description of the context of emergence 
of the dominant management system and the present critical situation with the fisheries 
resources described in the introduction, the goal of securing long-term access to resources for 
the Northern Bohuslän coastal fishermen can be studied from the cpr perspective of their 
possessing rights of management. An examination of what the local coastal fishermen from 
Northern Bohuslän perceive to be barriers to co-management in their complex cpr situation is 
a logical next step.
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD 
This chapter describes the methods used in carrying out the study. More details about 
methodological aspects are provided in the empirical chapters.
4.1 THE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE AND CONTEXT
As stated in chapter 3, in the search for solutions to the problem of resource depletion 
Swedish fisheries management has relied mainly on scientific knowledge concerning the state 
of the fish stocks, the biology of the species and the functioning of the ecosystems. In this 
study, fishing is seen as depending on common pool resources and the institutional regime 
mediating the interaction between resource users and the ecosystem. Consequently, an 
appropriate way to go about the study of barriers to and conditions for increased involvement 
of fishermen in management is to scrutinise how the management regime relates to the issue. 
Prior to SUCOZOMA little research had been conducted in Sweden on these issues.
The study of fisheries in the light of the common pool resource perspective would include 
social components and incorporate fishermen’s (non-scientific) knowledge. Such a study can 
no longer respond to particular scientific disciplines or knowledge forms. The cpr perspective 
therefore suggests a research approach based on both social and natural sciences and the 
integration of practical or tacit knowledge. The perceptions of problems and solutions by 
resource users must be captured and understood, because regardless of whether these could 
be considered as “real or false”, “right or wrong”, they will contribute to the understanding of 
the cpr situation, the search for and implementation of solutions, and ultimately the fishery of 
the future. Implicit in the research perspective then, is that this is critical to the level of 
incorporation of other types of knowledge and scientific method supplying fisheries 
management.
This study is essentially exploratory and based on substantial empirical fieldwork. It lets 
empirical data, facts and the theoretical discussion cross-fertilise. It seeks primary to involve 
the opinions of selected informants who can best answer the key research questions and to 
build a picture based on their ideas. By making local coastal fishermen, seen as protagonists in 
the cpr co-management debate, the focus of attention and by gathering together their 
experiences on problems relating to the use of cpr, the investigation is adopting an actor 
oriented, bottom-up perspective. This implies that the investigation evolves from the analysis 
of actor-defined issues. One obvious benefit of gathering fishermen’s knowledge in this way is 
the likelihood that when incorporated into designs of institutional change, it could provide the 
basis for improved co-management.
This approach provides the rationale for selecting a qualitative perspective. In a qualitative 
methodology, inductive logic prevails where the “context-bound” reality constructed by the 
informants gives information on patterns and helps explain a phenomenon (Creswell 1994). 
The phenomenon that is explained here is that of the emergence of new fisheries management 
policies and institutions. It follows that the thesis is the result of processes of interpretation.
The research project took place in Sweden between 1998 and 2003, with some interruptions. 
The research coincided in time with a period of emerging problems in the fishery sector with 
resource depletion, conflicts between resource users, the destabilisation of the central co-
management system, the involvement of new stakeholders and the search for new alternatives 
for coastal fisheries management. The understanding of processes of institutional change does 
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not lend to the use of case studies of photographic style. On the contrary this requires the 
understanding of the historical context (Yin 1989).
4.2 THE METHOD
In the following sections, the methods used in carrying out the study are briefly discussed with 
special reference to the empirical work. Methodological considerations are discussed more in 
detail in some of the chapters. 
The study involved several research tasks, methods, key informants and types of data. These 
are synthesised in appendix 2. The research methods used were reviews of literature and 
documents, questionnaire based surveys, open-ended semi-structured in-depth interviews, 
personal attendance at meetings and informal consultations. The collection of empirical data 
mainly took place from March 1998 - March 2001. Simply put, the data consisted of written 
and oral material.
4.2.1  The analysis of  written material 
In addition to the questionnaires prepared within the framework of this study, three types of 
written documentation have been used. The first type consists of documents, reports and 
scientific articles, public administration and fishermen’s organisations. The second consists of 
figures on catches and landings based on fishermen’s logbooks as well as other type of socio-
economic statistics. The third consists of correspondence between different stakeholders.
The review of scientific literature focused on the topics of natural resource management, 
coastal management and fisheries management. The purpose of the review was to gain 
knowledge of theoretical perspectives and concepts as well as results from other studies and 
countries that could be used to understand problems with the use and management of coastal 
fisheries resources in Sweden. Ethnographic and historical studies and sectoral assessments 
from the beginning of the 1900s were used to describe the historical development.
To understand which questions were considered important by policy makers, fishery policy 
documents, assessments and legal acts produced by the Swedish state administration in the 
second half the 20th century were examined. Motions presented in the Swedish Parliament 
addressing fishery-related issues in the mid-nineties were also examined. Regulations and 
policy documents produced by the European Commission in the nineties were analysed.
Project reports and Municipal Plans were consulted to check coastal development trends in 
the specific study area.
In addition to these official documents, reports and minutes produced by the Fishermen’s 
Associations were studied. These reports contained relevant historical data and accounts. The 
fishermen’s associations’ journal “Yrkesfiskaren” for the period 1994-1999 proved a good 
source of information about the positioning of the FAs in relation to several issues discussed 
in this thesis.
On a more informal level, correspondence between fishermen and other stakeholders (e.g. 
their associations and the administration) provided an important source of data in preparing 
the case studies in chapter 8. In the case of the prawn fishermen the material analysed was 
found in personal files, containing letters from the 1930s to 1998, made available by two local 
representatives of the fishermen’s associations. Similarly, correspondence from the NBPO, 
since its establishment in 1994, gave important insights into the PO’s proposals for the 
resolution of appropriation issues (see chapter 8).
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In order to describe the fisheries in the area of study, data sources for catches and landings 
were used. Two sources of different but complementary types were examined: the catch 
database based derived on fishermen’s logbooks at the NBF, and information from the fish 
auction. The fisherman’s logbooks offer numerical data on daily (or monthly for the small 
boats) catches by species, gear and position with reference to the base line, the territorial 
waters and the ICES sub areas and grid squares. The credibility of the fishermen’s reports can 
be questioned and so the reliability of this type of data which may suffer from errors in the 
data storage system. The alternative data source is the first recipient in the market, often a fish 
auction. In both cases the information does not include data on discards, and cannot therefore 
provide a measure of biological diversity or fish mortality. All these considerations normally 
pose methodological problems in quantitative studies. In this study, however, the data is not 
used to draw quantitative conclusions but merely to support other scientific results and the 
qualitative discussion.
4.2.2 The questionnaires  
Two questionnaires were designed to investigate what professional coastal fishermen in 
Bohuslän regarded as problems pertaining to fishing in a multiple use context and provide a 
snapshot of the recent and current situations. In both cases the questionnaires comprised 
multiple-choice questions together with some open questions (see chapter 6 for details).
The set of factors offered in the multiple use answers was based on problems affecting 
fisheries in the coastal zone as a) identified by staff of SVC, the National Board of Fisheries 
and the Provincial Government in preparatory interviews and consultations, b) discussed in 
the Fishermen’s official journal Yrkesfiskaren during the period 1994-1997, and c) taken up in 
the comprehensive plan of the Municipalities in the area. The coastal management reports 
prepared by Ackefors and Grip, 1995 and Boverket, 1995  were also used for problem 
identification and the design of the questionnaires. The questionnaires were “pre-tested” with 
two fishermen, two fishery officers, and one social scientist.
The questionnaires addressed two different groups of coastal fishermen. The answers to the 
open questions offered new insights into perceived problems, some of which had not been 
included in the multiple-choice questions but which were useful in generating new questions 
and in designing the second phase of investigation.
The first questionnaire focused on problems found in a specific area in the Väderö 
archipelago outside Fjällbacka in the Municipality of Tanum and within the ICES grid square 
4656. To identify those fishing in the area the questionnaire was sent to the 208 fishermen 
who had reported operations there during 1997 in their logbooks. Out of 48 respondents who 
stated that they indeed had fished there during 1997, only 33 fishermen, all domiciled in the 
study area itself, completed this questionnaire. Thus in the first questionnaire (the Väderö 
questionnaire) the study group consisted of 33 fishermen living in the study area and sharing a 
small fishing area.
The Väderö questionnaire consisted of two parts, one prepared for this study and one 
prepared by the Coastal Laboratories of the National Board of Fisheries (NBF). The fact that 
this questionnaire was part of another investigation requires further comment. Sending the 
questions together with another questionnaire was advantageous because it reduced project 
costs and provided access to additional data, but disadvantageous because it delayed the data 
processing for this particular study. Furthermore, the use of the Coastal Laboratories of the 
National Board of Fisheries as the channel to establish contact with the fishermen was 
undertaken with some apprehension, because of the possible inference by the fishermen that 
they were being interrogated by the central authority. To overcome this problem, a covering 
letter emphasised the importance of gaining knowledge about the fishermen’s understanding 
of problems. The respondents were also invited to contact the investigator by telephone if 
there were any questions or unclear issues. Telephone calls received during the weeks after 
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posting the questionnaires revealed enthusiasm and a willingness to contribute rather than 
doubts over the project’s authenticity.
The second questionnaire was distributed to all delegates attending the 1998 congress of the 
Swedish West Coast Fishermen’s Association (SVC) and those considering themselves coastal 
fishermen were invited to respond. Forty (40) fishermen, out of 65 registered participants, 
answered the questions and returned the questionnaire the same day. In this second study 
group, the fisherman’s role as a representative in the fishing community was the important 
variable.
Considering that the respondents did not constitute a random sample but a predetermined 
study group who decided to answer the questionnaires, statistical methods for treating 
sampling errors were not applicable. Further, considering the size of the groups the use of 
more advanced statistical testing to check significance was not deemed necessary. Simple 
frequency procedures were applied. 
The use of questionnaires involves certain methodological problems. Chambers (1997) among 
others is of the opinion that questionnaires can restrict communication and reinforce the 
researcher’s preconceived ideas and views of reality. Through questionnaires, he argues, the 
researcher constructs and simplifies reality in the process of first pre-selecting questions and 
then interpreting answers. In this case, also the small size of the samples could be an issue. To 
overcome this weakness, Bernard (1995) suggests the combination of questionnaires with, for 
example, interviews, in a two step process. When combined with other research tools 
questionnaires allow triangulation and increase the degree of reliability of the study as whole. 
In this case the answers to the questionnaires were valuable in informing the design of the 
interviews. More details about the questionnaires are given in chapter 6. 
4.2.3 The interviews, meetings and informal consultations 
The informants 
The informants can be broadly categorised as either belonging to the fishing community or 
not. The latter category consisted of staff working directly or indirectly with fishery issues, 
within or outwith the fishery administration. The categorisation presented in table 4.1 shows 
the actor’s institutional affiliation.
All informants are in one way or another dependent on fisheries, either for their income or 
their professional career.1  The interviews were central to the study.  The majority of the 
fishermen interviewed were economically dependent on shellfish, and resided in Northern 
Bohuslän. It was never intended that the interviewees and the questionnaire respondents 
should be one and the same persons.
The non-fishermen included civil servants involved in the decision making process and 
working with fisheries related issues at different levels in the state administration. Local 
entrepreneurs and managers from the local processing industry and fish auctions, scientist, 
project leaders, and staff working in the other sectors’ organisations (such as farmers’ and boat 
owners’) were also interviewed but mainly to discuss specific issues emerging from the 
interviews with the fishermen.
                                                     
1 The role of belonging to a small group of professionals with a similar background has been discussed by among 
others Finlayson (1994) and Dietz et al. (1989). Dietz et al. (1989), suggest that participants in environmental 
policy debates tend to subscribe to definitions of conflicts that legitimate the resources they value, i.e. their 
jobs, the professions of which they are members and the disciplines they represent. In this way the policy 
supported by their employers and the paradigm directing the disciplines behind that profession becomes 
dominant. This is an argument for more disciplinary pluralism in fishery management that so far is dominated 
by biologists and, to a lesser extent, economists.
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The interviews 
The questionnaires used in the first phase of this investigation generated important 
information about what were or were not major problems perceived by the coastal fishermen, 
particularly shellfish fishermen, and supplied much factual information about their fishing 
activities. A total of 68 open-ended, semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted 
during the period from September 1998 to March 2001. The open-ended, semi-structured, in-
depth interview is a more flexible method than the questionnaire, and can give the interviewee 
the opportunity to relate their experiences, opinions and aspirations. In addition the researcher 
has the opportunity to follow up issues that arise during the conversation. In this case the use 
of the method was based on practical guidelines prepared by Townsley (1993) which provides 
advice on communication with fishermen. The questions on which the semi-structured 
interviews were based can be seen in appendix 3. In total 29 professional fishermen and 37 
non-fishermen were interviewed in sessions lasting between one and two hours. The 
interviews with the fishermen were generally conducted onboard the vessel or in the 
fisherman’s home.
A large majority of the fishermen interviewed were active in the coastal waters of Skagerrak, in 
Central and Northern Bohuslän, extending from Southern Tjörn to the Norwegian boarder, 
and in the municipalities of Öckerö (2), Tjörn (2), Orust (2) Lysekil (2), Sotenäs (8), Tanum 
(5), Strömstad (8). All but three defined themselves as coastal fishermen, while three others 
regarded themselves as partly coastal fishermen partly offshore fishermen (i.e. fishing coastal 
waters from time to time). Their vessels varied between 9 to 24 m (median value = 16) in 
length and their catches were diverse, but with a clear focus on shellfish. The average age of 
the fishermen was 49, which is a bit low by comparison with the regional average of 53. More 
details about the fishermen interviewed are given in chapters 5, 7 and 8.
Interviewees were selected in various ways. A number of local leaders from Northern 
Bohuslän were contacted by phone and visited and these initial contacts provided suggestions 
of further interviewees. Attending fishermen’s meetings also proved useful in establishing 
initial contact with fishermen and follow their debate. So as not to exclude those who 
normally do not attend such meetings a final selection of potential interviewees was made 
from the register of fishermen held by the NBF. Several interviews were subsequently 
followed, in most cases through less formal contacts and repeated meetings or by phone, and 
in a few instance a second interview.
Interviews began with a description of the fishing activities undertaken using a time-line 
approach (Townsley 1993). In general, each interview was allowed to take its own course in 
order to maximise the individual responses. Most questions were open ended and their exact 
formulation varied according to the expertise of the interviewee, the nature of the information 
sought and how the conversation was developing. The information generated was used in part 
to rephrase, change a particular question or open up a new line of enquiry in an ensuing 
interview.
The interviews with the non-fishermen were held at the interviewee’s place of work. The 
interviewees consisted mainly of staff working at the fisheries department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the public authority for fisheries or National Board of Fisheries, the county board 
administrations of Göteborg and Bohuslän, the municipalities and NGOs.
The interviews were documented through written notes. Only in six interviews was a tape 
recorder used, as tape-recording generally appeared to inhibit the respondent.
The notes from the interviews mainly comprised a record of statement made by the 
respondents, together with any numerical data and drawings made available during the 
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encounter. As a rule, interviews with fishermen generated more text and covered a wider 
variety of themes than those with non-fishermen.
One limitation of this method is that not all interviewees were equally articulate, involved and 
informed. Although several interviews provided interacting information relating to personal 
situations (disputes, conflicts, etc), this information has not been reported in the thesis.
The meetings 
The proceedings from 26 meetings were recorded for use as research material. The meetings 
were helpful in illuminating the divergent interests and divisions between various stakeholders 
and within the collective of fishermen. The convenors of the meetings were diverse and are 
listed in table 4.1. Notes were taken from four types of meetings dealing with: 1) the 
preparation of a plan for the sustainable development and conservation of the archipelagos of 
Bohuslän; 2) the conservation of marine-life resources in the area of Koster–Väderö; 3) the 
process of negotiation regarding the establishment of a marine reserve in Koster-Väderö; and 
4) fishermen’s meetings organised by fishermen’s associations and local organisations.
The informal consultations
Informal discussions proved a useful complement to the more formal meetings and interviews 
and were used partly to collect specific information, often in order to triangulate information 
collected by other means. Through these various means, changes in the argumentation of 
different actors in different situations could be observed. Opportunities for informal 
discussion presented themselves in several ways, often related to participation in special events 
and meetings. Travel to and from meetings provided a good opportunity to discuss different 
issues. Visiting the area and talking with local people and fishermen in the quayside was also a 
means to becoming better acquainted with issues and developments in the study area. On 
occasions, informal consultation took a more contrived form whereby specific questions were 
put to persons without previously informing them that they were in fact being “interviewed”. 
This form of consultation usually involved approaching the target expert (by phone or face to 
face) to ask an opinion on a particular matter. 
4.2.4 Presentation of  the material  
The results of the interviews and meetings are presented in the form of illustrative quotations. 
When several interviews, statements from meetings and consultations show the same line of 
argumentation, these are illustrated in the thesis by quotations usually presented in a box. 
When the material is used to contrast different argumentations the quotations are presented as 
an integral part of the text. The text in the quotations is a rough translation of the Swedish 
text made by the author. To provide information about the nature of sources but without 
identifying the individuals concerned, two digits and one record number are given in the text. 
The first digit describes the method or situation from which the opinion is gathered (see table 
4.1): in-depth interview (0), informal consultations (1) and meetings (2). The second digit 
describes whether or not the interviewee is a fisherman (0) or not (1). Thus a quotation 
followed by (1.0#31) means that the method for gathering the information was an informal 
talk and the source a fisherman and that this was the source of data nr 31. 
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Table 4.1  Data about interviews, informal consultations and meetings
Interviews Informal   Meetings 
consultation
Type of Informants 
(N = total sample; M = male; F = female) 
N M F N M F N 
Total 68 59 9 59 46 13 26 
1. Fishery sector
Licensed fishermen 29 29 0 22 21 1
Fishermen’s Wives  0 0 0 5 0 5 1 
Fishermen’s Associations (central/regional) 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
Fishermen’s Organisations (local)* (2) (2) 0 2 2 0 4 
National Board of Fisheries (national) 4 2 2 9 7 2 1 
Fisheries division County Board Administration 
(provincial)
3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Fishery department (ministerial cabinet)  3 2 1 1 1 0 0 
Fishery biologists (Research Institutes)  2 2 0 5 5 0 0 
2. Nature conservation
Environment Protection Authority (national) 1 0 1 2 1 1 2
Environmental department (ministerial cabinet) 1  1    2 
County Board Administration Nature-conservation 
authority (provincial) 
3 2 1 2 2 0 7 
Scientists  2 2 0 3 2 1 1 
Conservation NGOs  1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
3. Connected to fishery
Fishing auction’s staff 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Processing industry, managers 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Educators involved in fisheries 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Local entrepreneurs, fishery related  (local) 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 
Project leaders, fishery related (local ) 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 
4. Other actors at the local level 
Municipal staff, planners (local), harbour 2 2 0 1 1 0 1
Users associations, other sectors 2 2 0 1 0 1  
Local entrepreneurs (coastal related) 3 2 1     
*The local fishermen leaders are active fisherman and part of this sample (33). 
4.3 THE SELECTION OF STUDY AREA 
Coastal archipelagos are found in the eastern and western parts of southern Sweden. In 
deciding between a case study on the East or West coast a number of criteria were taken into 
consideration. Since complexity, dynamics and diversity of both the natural system and the 
social system are aspects often referred in the literature as influencing the management of 
common pool resources (Kooiman 1993; Becker and Ostrom 1995; McGlade 1996; Berkes 
and Folke 1998), an area having these characteristics had to be found. The area of study 
should thus combine the attributes of highest diversity in terms of species, fishing technology 
and users, particularly the fishing community. In the Baltic Sea diversity in terms of species is 
known to be low. Furthermore, fisheries in the area selected should be significant in economic 
terms for a significant number of fishermen. A first screening made by means of plotting all 
licensed fishermen’s post-codes on the Swedish map showed that in Sweden fishermen are 
either concentrated in small pockets or highly dispersed along the coast. The pocket-like 
distribution pattern was more frequent on the West Coast, while the dispersed pattern was 
more characteristic of the East Coast. As the coasts of Skagerrak fulfils these criteria, it was 
therefore selected as the area for empirical studies. 
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Based on such criteria, the chosen area of study involves the municipalities on the shores of 
Skagerrak (from south to north Tjörn, Orust, Lysekil, Sotenäs, Tanum, and Strömstad) with 
focus on the area referred to as Northern Bohuslän, from Lysekil to Strömstad. In fishery 
statistics terms the area of study coincides with the grid squares 4556 and 4656 of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 
4.4 SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Like any study, this one has a number of limitations; some limitations related to the specific 
methods have been presented above or are mentioned in connection with the specific 
chapters. In the following additional limitations are accounted for.
Selection of the study area: the geographical scope 
Any form of case study must acknowledge the constraints imposed by the fact that the results 
are site specific. As a result any attempt to extrapolate the findings from the thesis to the East 
Coast of Sweden, in general, must be done with caution. The ecosystem, the tenure system, 
and the social and cultural characteristics in which coastal fisheries are embedded, are likely to 
be very different.
Selection of informants: the social scope 
The scope of the study is also limited in social terms through its focus on local coastal 
fishermen. Other forms of contemporary fisheries e.g. subsistence and recreational fisheries, 
lie outside its scope.
Nor does the thesis adopt a gender perspective analysis. However, the extractive phase of the 
fishing economy in Sweden is strongly gendered. Writing about fishing in the coastal waters of 
Sweden is to write about fishermen. Fishing is in general a male activity, while women 
involved in fisheries are commonly engaged in shore-based activities. This study does not deal 
directly with the problems or opportunities of women in the sector. For complementary 
information about women’s participation and constraints in the Swedish fishery sector, the 
reader is referred to Píriz (2001). 
Lack of ecological and economic analysis 
The list of factors that influence the state of the marine living resources and ecosystems and 
how fishermen relate to these and to other fishermen and actors is both long and complex. 
Comprehensive studies are therefore difficult. The present study emphasizes the institutional 
aspects of fisheries management with a focus on fishermen’s involvement. Even when the 
characteristics of the ecosystem and some facts of local economic dependence on fisheries are 
considered, the underlying ecological and economical relations have been neither investigated 
nor deeply discussed. This emphasis on institutional aspects should not be interpreted as an 
expression of disregard for ecological and economic aspects. Other studies and projects in 
SUCOZOMA (see for example Söderqvist et al. 2000; Gustavsson and Johnsson 2000; Ogemark 
et al. 2000; Karås et al. 2001; Eggert 2001; Elmgren et al. 2001; Sandström et al. 2002; 
Saulamo and Neuman 2002)  focus specifically on ecological and economic aspects of the 
Swedish fisheries and management alternatives. More importantly, by focusing on institutional 
aspects attention is drawn to mechanisms connecting the social to the ecological system, thus 
illuminating the significance of social-ecological interrelations in the management of fisheries.
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Methodologically related limitations 
In a qualitative study the only reality that is valid is that constructed by the individuals who 
participate in the research situation. The data consists of “stories” and my interpretation of 
these. Implicitly, therefore, the questions posed, the research method and the interpretations 
of results should be seen in the light of the researcher’s own values, pre-understandings of 
problems, academic background and professional experiences. 
The mainstream paradigm in fisheries management maintains that knowledge about 
measurable variables in the fish stocks and the fishermen’s effort are sufficient to resolve 
management problems. It further maintains that a fisherman will act on the basis of a 
calculated profit, independently of the context embedding him. I regard these variables as 
interacting, and the fisherman as benefit driven, contextually bounded, based on experience 
and guided by social norms, processes, and demands negotiated through continuous 
communicative processes.
Prior to the present study my main professional experiences were with fisheries development 
and environmental conservation problems in less developed coastal states. More specifically, I 
worked with the monitoring and evaluation of projects concerned with coastal management 
and the sustainable development of coastal fisheries. Through my previous work I came to 
understand the nature of weak public institutions and the distances between the policies, the 
research informing fisheries management and the reality of the people fishing coastal waters. I 
also learned the importance of developing institutions that make local fishing communities 
“the guardians” of the coastal ecosystems. This and the normative approach of the 
SUCOZOMA program are two aspects that have influenced the choice of methodology deployed 
in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 5  
WHAT IS MEANT BY COASTAL FISHERIES?
Several authors (Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom and Schlager 1996) have 
shown that the management of common pool resources needs clear boundaries for the 
community of users and the resources. The very idea of defining socio-ecological boundaries 
is central to the management of common pool resources and research issues related to coastal 
fisheries management. This poses a research problem from the outset: the need to find 
feasible definitions. The present chapter discusses the issue of boundary setting for 
professional coastal fisheries by examining different views: a conventional view, as 
conceptualised in institutional arrangements, sectoral policy documents, and development 
plans and an alternative view, as articulated by coastal fishermen from Northern Bohuslän 
during interviews undertaken in 1998-2001.
Before examining the various existing definitions and boundaries there is first a need to 
summarise the variables that could de facto be used to describe fisheries in the coastal waters 
of western Sweden.
5.1 POSSIBLE VARIABLES FOR DESCRIBING FISHERIES IN SWEDISH COASTAL 
WATERS
Table 5.1 presents a synopsis of descriptive variables that could be used to characterise 
fisheries in the Swedish coastal waters (4 nautical miles). Some of these variables are used 
more frequently than others to characterise coastal fisheries (see for example Pitcher and 
Pauly 1998). The list of descriptors in table 5.1 indicates that “coastal fisheries” is a much 
more heterogeneous activity than the basic descriptors found in the literature might suggest. 
Fisheries can serve as a source of income, for subsistence or recreation; the focus in this thesis 
is on income generating coastal fisheries commonly referred to in Sweden as professional 
fishing (yrkesfiske).
Several different basic terms can be used to characterise fisheries, though each may describe 
quite different attributes. Among the terms denoting the location of fisheries, the most 
commonly used are “inshore” and “coastal” which contrast with “offshore” and “high-sea” 
fisheries. From a physical viewpoint, the outer boundary of the coastal zone coincides with the 
depth at which the largest waves begin to influence the seabed. This is, in practice, a dynamic 
boundary whose position will vary markedly from place to place and season to season. In the 
less exposed coastal areas in Sweden, this boundary is considered to occur at depths from 30-
50 m (Sjöberg 1992). In the archipelagos of Northern Bohuslän however – where the 200 + m 
deep Norway trench (Koster fjord) is found– depths vary considerably. Despite such depths, 
no one in Sweden would question that this archipelago, even including the trench, is a part of 
the coastal zone. Some pragmatism is therefore needed to define what is meant by “coastal” 
for the purpose of management in fisheries, and this is commonly achieved through the use of 
arbitrary lines. According to Symes (1999), the 12 nautical mile territorial limit would appear to 
provide a useful universal legal definition, embracing most small-scale fisheries and shellfish 
stocks and aligned with the national territorial limits.
The term "artisanal" has been used to label the fisheries that are based on simple technology1
whereas "traditional" fisheries have been used to describe those based on local knowledge 
                                                     
1 In France, the term “artisanal” can also apply to a type of ownership of the vessel and the fishing enterprise 
(Thom 1998).
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transferred from generation to generation. These terms are often used in contrast with more 
“modern”, “industrial” fisheries. Here, these terms have been used to denote the organisation 
of production (i.e. large volumes of catch, dislocated, capital and technology intensive). In 
Sweden, the term “industrial” fishery has also been used to refer to fisheries directed towards 
indirect human consumption (foderfiske), identifying the end use of the product rather than 
the organisation of production.
The distinction between "small-scale" and "large scale" fisheries seems to be an important and 
universal one (Thomson 1980; Mc Goodwin 1990). The term “small-scale” is considered 
useful for the purpose of describing fishermen who share a similar ecological, economic, and 
social environment. Small-scale fishermen share locations and problems, and their capital 
commitments and levels of production are relatively low compared to other fisheries. 
Thomson (1980) has compared small and large-scale fisheries at the global level, and the 
differences between these two types in terms of environmental losses and social gains.
These then are some of the variables that can be used to describe coastal fisheries. Although 
the diversity of terminology may be confusing, they mostly point in the same direction, 
identifying coastal fisheries by their spatial location, temporal scale, level of capital investment, 
technological sophistication, and social relations. 
Arguments supporting better opportunities for small-scale coastal fisheries and fishery 
dependent regions are also found within the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy2.
Symes and Phillipson have compiled and analysed national studies about the management of 
small-scale fisheries in the inshore waters of Europe. In their analysis they found that small-
scale fisheries have tended to receive less attention within the wider critiques of fisheries 
management. As a result, there is notable lack of material for comparative analysis or upon 
which to found effective policy decisions and development (Symes and Phillipson 2001). 
In Sweden, the term coastal fisheries ("kustfiske") is commonly used, and, as previously stated 
in chapter 1, coastal fisheries are supported within Swedish national and regional policies, 
especially for their potential contribution to the maintenance of a living archipelago 
(Glesbygdsverket 1997; SOU 2000:67; SOU 1996:153). The list of policy documents and 
motions to the Swedish parliament that in the late 1990s highlighted the importance of 
sustaining fisheries for the sake of supporting and developing local coastal communities and 
the archipelagos is long and wide-ranging.3
In Sweden the term "coastal fisheries" has been used in an ambivalent and ambiguous sense. 
In the debate the different participants (politicians, fishery officials, scientists, fisheries 
associations, and fishermen) often discuss coastal fisheries issues, but there is no common 
definition of what they mean by coastal fisheries. In the Swedish parliamentary debate, for 
example, "coastal fisheries" is either discussed generically, as linked to employment and the 
local economy of rural communities, or it is used as a synonym for small-scale fisheries and 
fishing based on static gear. In this way, in the political discourse, coastal fishermen are 
generally placed in the same category as local small-scale fishermen. In line with this 
reasoning, one may assume that the coastal waters and resources de facto are the domain of 
the local small-scale professional fishermen, which is not necessarily the case. 
                                                     
2 See for example: Commission of the European Communities 1995; Commission of the European Communities 
1997; Commission of the European Communities 1998; Commission of the European Communities 2002. 
3 See for example: (Commission of the European Communities 1995; Miljödepartementet 1996; Regeringen 
1996; Commission of the European Communities 1997b; Glesbygdsverket 1997; Ericsson D -Christian 
Democrat party- 1997; Lager P-Green party- 1997; Lindvall G. - Moderate party - 1997; Lönnroth - Left party - 
1997; Regeringen 1997; Commission of the European Communities 1998; SOU 1996:153; SOU 2000:67. 
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What coastal fisheries are today is the result of an ongoing process of adaptation to the 
changing social and ecological circumstances and decades-long influence of diverse external 
and internal factors (see chapter 2).
Table 5.1 List of variables that could be used to capture the degree of variability of
  fisheries within the Swedish coastal zone
Type of Variable Degree of variability 
Water environment Fresh Brackish Marine  
Coastal morphology Fjords & Bays Archipelagos Banks Open Sea 
Functionality of the fishing area Reproduction Nursery Feeding  
Fishing specialisation Low High   
Resource stocks Molluscs Crustacean Finfish Diadromous 
Behaviour of the target resource Sessile Migratory Demersal Pelagic 
Purpose Commercial Subsistence Recreation Sport 
Economic dependency Specialised Polyvalent   
Dedication Full-time Part-time   
Frequency Year around Seasonal Sporadic  
Time at sea Daily tours 2-3 days Weekly tours Shift based 
Relation to fishing Life style Business   
Relation to resource Optimising Maximising   
Capital involved Small Medium Large  
Size of the boat < 12m < 15m < 18m < 24m 
Gear employed Stationary Active   
Technological level used Artisanal Mechanised High technology  
Size of crew 1 man 2-3 men 4-6  
Production organisation Traditional Industrial   
Processing Fresh Frozen Processed Reduced 
Destination of product Human
consumption
Animal fodder   
Type of enterprise Individual Family Owned Company  
Distance from land Base line 3 nm 4 nm 12 nm 
Distance from home Local Dislocated   
Relation to port Permanent
local ties 
Temporary
no local ties 
Mixed
Social relations Multiple
stranded
Single stranded   
Ownership of Water Private Public   
Management authority Centralised Delegated   
Locus of management authority Individual  Collective FAs - State EEC - State 
Bundle of rights Access Withdraw Management Exclusion 
Access Regime Closed Exclusive Common Open 
Participation in decision making Direct Indirect No -participation  
Nature of conflicts Intra-sectoral Inter-sectoral   
5.2 COASTAL FISHERIES IN FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
In fishery terms, Swedish law defines coastal waters ("kustvattenområden") as all waters within 
the base line (i.e. the inner waters) and the territorial sea out to 4 nautical miles (SFS 1993; 
Fiskeriverket 1993a  Fiskeriverket 1993b4). However, there is nothing in this definition that 
precludes various types of fishing taking place in these waters and targeting the same species. 
                                                     
4 From a juridical perspective, the Swedish seas are juridical divided into inner waters, territorial sea, and open sea 
SFS (1996). Inner waters are those within the base line. Depending on the physical structure of the shore, the 
base line links the outer points of the land (islands and islets) or follows the low water mark. The Swedish 
territorial sea, previously considered to cover waters up to the 4 miles, now extends from the base line to the 12 
nautical mile limits (or the middle line).
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As described in chapter 2, the development of fisheries in the coastal waters of Northern 
Bohuslän has occurred within a particular institutional framework. One way to clarify the 
meaning of coastal fisheries is to establish a set of boundary rules. Boundary rules affect the 
types of participants with whom others interact (Ostrom 1999a). There are four institutional 
arrangements that can be identified as playing a clear boundary role effect in the sense of 
exclusion of participants from the coastal waters of Sweden with regard to fisheries. These are 
the fishing licensing system, the exclusive rights to fish in private inshore waters, the 
preferential access (and management) rights of Member States in Community Waters, and the 
trawling limit. Each of these four arrangements can be used to define boundary terms as will 
be discussed in some detail below. 
5.2.1  Preferential access and management rights in EU coastal waters 
Within the European institutional framework, the 12 nautical mile limits have recently (once 
again) been given special significance in terms of fisheries management. This is a consequence 
of the derogation from the principle of equal access to Community waters, which reserves full 
access to these waters for the coastal state’s own fishing vessels (Commission of the European 
Communities 2002). Moreover, the principle of preferential access reserves access to waters 
within this zone (beyond the 4 nautical miles) to neighbour states having traditional rights to 
EU coastal waters. As mentioned before, in the case of Skagerrak, the Swedish fishermen have 
been granted exclusive fishing rights to the coastal waters up to 4 nautical miles and share 
common rights with professional fishermen from Denmark and Norway from the 4 nautical 
mile limit and seawards. This arrangement thus defines the community of professionals 
operating in these two areas and privileges the Swedish fishermen with regard to the 4 nautical 
mile area, but does not help to make distinctions within the authorised community of Swedish 
fishermen in the area.
5.2.2  Property right-based boundaries 
The exclusion of potential users from access to coastal resources is probably the oldest 
arrangement that has contributed to the definition of the coastal fishing community in 
Sweden.
As described in chapter 2, in 1766 the Crown withdrew its claim to near-shore waters and 
transferred the right of exclusion to the owners of the land. This system of private waters, to 
which exclusive or territorial private fishing rights are attached, still applies on the Southern 
East Coast and in the inland waters of Sweden (with the exception of the two major lakes, 
Vänern and Vättern). With this privatisation of coastal waters, the right to define the 
authorised fishing community was vested with the individual landowner. The owner of the 
land was not always a local resident, and he or she could transfer the rights to outsiders for 
cash or services. Furthermore, exclusive rights holders were exempted from the obligation to 
provide records of their catches. The latter remains a factor contributing to uncertainty in the 
management of the Swedish coastal fisheries. 
Before 1766, the fishing community was defined by the parish, that is, by grouping people 
according to their place of residence and possession of a common history and culture. In the 
case of private fisheries differences between individuals in relation to the ownership of the 
shore-land were thus highlighted; i.e. the landless and those whose property did not border the 
sea, were excluded. The relatively well-defined inshore fishing community in eastern Sweden 
can be contrasted with the fishing communities with free access on the West Coast. Here, the 
fishing community was not considered to be in need of boundaries, and the institutional 
arrangements defining exclusive rights to inshore fisheries in private waters were not 
applicable.
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5.2.3  The fishing licence  
Boundaries for fishing can be drawn by means of licences that authorise the right to fish. The 
rights assigned to the authorised fishing community can be conditioned by more or less 
specific rules. As recently as in 1994 a new type of licensing system was introduced (SFS 
1993:787) This more restrictive licence aimed at limiting the number of resource users in the 
public waters under the hitherto open access regime. Those fishermen who for the three 
previous years had failed to satisfy the new definition of professional status on the criterion of 
economic dependence on fishing, were not issued a licence and were excluded from the right 
to fish with certain gear and for commercial purposes.
The introduction of the new licence was justified on the grounds of resource conservation and 
distributive policies at the national and European level.5 The main arguments for the 
introduction of the new licence were: the problem of scarce resources and the need to adapt 
catches to availability (by reducing the number of fishermen); the need to strengthen the rights 
of those fishermen who were substantially dependent on fisheries; and finally, the need to 
control the entry of non-Swedish fishermen into Swedish territorial waters, something that 
would happen when Sweden became a member of the European Union. The new licensing 
system was expected to lead to a situation where fewer fishermen would result in reduced 
catches, and that it would somehow be easier to adjust the total allowable catches (TAC).
As described in chapter 2 and will be discussed later (chapter 7), the arguments for the 
excluding role of the licence have not been forthcoming. In Sweden, the number of 
professional fishermen has decreased considerably, but the catches have increased as a result 
of the concentration of the industry into fewer but stronger hands.
From a comparative cpr perspective, the definition of the fishing community by means of 
licensing systems that convey exclusive fishing rights to a group of individuals is a sound step 
(see chapter 3). But, to be effective, it needs to be accompanied by a process where the 
allocation of rights and internal distributive rules among the authorised individuals or groups 
of users are explicit. The new licence defined the community of professionals but did not 
make any distinction between them; in this sense it was generic or unspecific. 
5.2.4  The trawling limit as a functional boundary  
With the technological developments of the diesel engine and the trawl it became necessary to 
limit trawling, and the trawling limit was set to match the limit of territorial waters, at that time 
located at 4 nautical miles (see chapter 2).
The original intention of the trawling limit was to resolve problems of physical interference 
between static and mobile gear. The trawling limit was introduced to make a functional (or 
gear based) distinction among all fishermen (professionals and non-professionals) and to 
allocate space between people fishing inside or outside the 4 nautical miles. This institutional 
arrangement gave preference to fishermen operating static gear within the Swedish territorial 
waters. The 4 nautical miles limit was considered the formal boundary of coastal fisheries; 
methodologically trawling was deemed antithetical.
However, after World War II, trawling became much more widespread. Since the 1940s, 
following petitions from the SVC, on grounds of food security and safety, trawling was 
permitted within the 4 nautical miles limit. This and further exceptions to the original 4 
                                                     
5 An examination of applications for new fishing licences that were rejected by the National Board of Fisheries in 
2000, showed that in most cases the administration justified the rejection on conservation grounds (Píriz 2001). 
In most cases, these grounds were related to the present fishing pressure on one single species, namely cod. 
This type of generalised argument could be interpreted as managers considering all species biologically 
equivalent to cod and their particular characteristics as without management significance. 
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nautical mile limit debate (see chapter 2) legitimising operations of mobile gear and non-local 
(dislocated) fisheries in areas formerly considered to be the domain of the small-scale, local 
coastal fisheries, caused the trawling line to become dysfunctional. One consequence of this 
was that the heterogeneity of the authorised professional fishing community increased.6
Fishery regulations in Sweden have confirmed the extension of coastal waters to 4 nautical 
miles. They could be referred to as the institutionalised “spatial boundaries” of coastal 
fisheries in the sense that they define their ecological space.  These boundaries have been 
further complemented by institutional arrangements aimed at defining the community of 
users.
The institutional arrangements described above were found to be formative of the spatial and 
social boundaries of coastal fisheries in Sweden, though only partially. The continuing 
derogation of the principles of equal access to European waters was a clear indication – on the 
part of the European Community – of a willingness to act pragmatically in favour of small-
scale professional fisheries. Licensing systems, property rights, and physical and functional 
limits are instruments commonly used to make distinctions in fisheries. However, their use in 
western Sweden – in the sense of a generic licence system, an open access principle, and a 
dysfunctional trawling limit – has not really clarified the boundaries between the different 
professional fishing communities. The way these institutional arrangements have been used 
has served to make distinctions between different kinds of fisheries (professional and 
recreational) and between Swedish and non- Swedish professional fishermen, but has not 
helped to clarify the terms within the heterogeneous community of Swedish fishermen 
operating in coastal waters. On the contrary, it has made the identification of discrete groups 
more difficult, and contributed to obscuring the internal diversity within the fishing industry, 
which from a common pool resource management perspective would have been relevant to 
the management of fisheries.
In the next section, therefore, definitions of professional coastal fisheries as presented in 
policy documents and development plans are examined. By exploring such operational 
definitions of coastal fisheries one can see how the central actors involved in fisheries 
management have conceptualised it. 
5.3 COASTAL FISHERIES AS CONCEPTUALISED IN POLICY DOCUMENTS
Operational definitions of coastal fishing can be found in sectoral assessments commissioned 
by the Swedish government aimed at directing policy and management decisions. Operational 
definitions can also be found in national sector development plans. Within the CFP, the latter 
have mainly been used as an instrument to guide the allocation of financial aid to individual 
firms and in this way direct investment.
In table 5.2 some of the changes to operational definitions of coastal fisheries during the 
second half of the 20th Century are indicated.
                                                     
6 It is relevant to mention here that a proposal for re-establishing the 4 nautical mile trawling limit has very 
recently been prepared and approved by the National Board of Fisheries. As a general rule the proposal extends 
the position of the trawling limit to 4 nm but permits the operation of smaller trawlers (< 20 m in length) in 
various areas including the deeper waters of Northern Bohuslän provided these make use of specific selective 
gear. This proposal can be seen as an attempt to revive the functionality of the original trawling limit while 
taking into consideration the fact that the use of trawlers in the last decades has expanded considerably even 
among small-scale local coastal fishermen. This time the functionality of such trawling limits is not so much 
about physical interference between static and mobile gear; it is about the appropriation of resources from the 
common coastal pool.
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Table 5.2  The conceptualisation of professional coastal fisheries in Swedish sectoral
  assessments 
Period/
historical events 
Source Definition of coastal fisheries Type of 
definition
Before World War II Report regarding 
the promotion of 
the fishery industry 
(SOU 1922:7) 
All fishing within territorial waters (4nm). 
The trawling limit (4nm) was used to limit 
trawling.
Spatial
Functional
1960-70s
Technological
developments. The 
Atlanto Scandian 
herring collapsed. 
Offshore fleet 
incursions into the 
coast.
Assessment of 
future fishery 
sector
(SOU 1977:74) 
All fishing within territorial waters (4nm). On 
the South and the East coast trawling was 
exempted from the definition.
Note: When production is calculated within 
and without the 4nautical miles all captures of 
"migratory" stocks and deep sea prawns are 
transferred to the so called sea fisheries.
Spatial
(Functional)
1980s EEZ
established. Territorial 
seas extended to 12 
nautical miles. The 
outburst of cod; 
intensification of 
coastal fishing.
Assessment of a 
better professional 
fisheries  
(Jordbruksdeparte-
mentet 1984:6) 
Coastal fisheries are not defined. But a 
differentiation is made between sea fisheries 
and archipelago fisheries and their relation to 
the ownership of the water. Sea fisheries are 
considered all fisheries occurring in public 
waters “det allmänna”. The archipelago-
fisheries on the West Coast are referred to as 
free fisheries independently of the state of 
ownership of the waters. 
Rights-based
approach
1990s  Preparing for 
EU. Community 
waters embracing all 
marine waters beyond 
the base line (under 
derogation within the 
12nautical miles). 
Many fish stocks 
depleted.
Environmental NGOs 
mobilised. Internal 
conflicts in fisheries. 
Assessment of the 
Swedish Fisheries 
(SOU 1993:103) 
All catches made within the base line from 
vessels of 12 m and under were derived to 
coastal fisheries. In addition, all Nephrops
catches made with creels; all catches in the 
Bothnian Bay; all catches made with purse-
seiner; all catches of whitefish, vendace, pike, 
pike-perch, perch and trout within the base-
line independent of the vessel's size were also 
derived to coastal fisheries. Deep-sea prawn 
fishery was explicitly excluded from the 
definition.
Spatial
Structural
Functional
Resource-
based
Before World War I, “coastal fisheries” were synonymous with all fishing taking place within 
territorial waters, i.e. within 4 nautical miles of the baseline (SOU 1922:7) but the trawling line 
gave precedence to static gear based fisheries in these waters.
In a sectoral assessment (SOU 1977:74) commissioned by the Government in 1975 and 
published in 1977,7 coastal fisheries on the West Coast were conceptualised on the basis of a 
spatial definition, and included all fisheries within the territorial waters (4 nautical miles) 
irrespective of the actual mode of fishing or gear used. On the South and East coasts the same 
spatial definition was used, but here trawling was excluded from the allowable activities. Such 
functional specification was not considered necessary on the West Coast. This conceptualisa-
                                                     
7 1977 was the year when the 200 nautical mile economic zone was internationally recognized.
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tion of coastal fisheries on the West Coast was therefore more inclusive than the previous 
one, which excluded trawling from the 4 nautical mile limits.
At the beginning of the 1980s, following the adoption of the 200 nautical mile EEZ and the 
extension of the territorial waters to 12 nautical miles (UNCLOS 1982), the government 
presented an assessment of the situation to the parliament (Jordbruksdepartementet 1984:6). 
The report recognised the increasing pressure on coastal resources and the need to create 
better opportunities for professional fishermen in territorial waters. It focused, however, on 
the issue of distributing available resources (quotas) between fishermen fishing for different 
purposes (income, subsistence and recreation) and between fishermen fishing under exclusive 
fishing rights regimes in private waters or under free access regimes in public waters. With 
respect to the West Coast, the report distinguished between open sea and archipelago 
fisheries. The former were characterised as all fisheries occurring in public waters (det allmänna)
and the latter as free fisheries independent of the ownership status of the waters. It recognised 
the existence of a heterogeneous fishing community in coastal waters but did not define 
coastal fisheries.
The Swedish fishery of the eighties was characterised by an expanding cod fishery, where 
small scale and offshore vessels fished side by side in coastal waters and were profitable. The 
situation experienced with the cod at that time does not seem to have required any specific 
attention being paid to the differences between these two types of fisheries.
In the early nineties, when Sweden was preparing to join the EU, a review titled The fisheries 
sector, its state and development possibilities (SOU 1993:103), was published. Here the 
conceptualisation of coastal fisheries was based on a combination of spatial, structural, 
functional and resource based criteria. With the exception of deep water prawns; all fish 
caught within the base line by vessels of 12 m and under were deemed to be derived from 
coastal fisheries.8 All catches of Nephrops with creels were included in the definition, 
independently of place and the size of the vessel. Similarly, most fisheries of fresh and 
brackish water species on the Baltic coast were included independently of location and size of 
the vessel used.
The 1990s definition of coastal fisheries has several explanations. One was the need for the 
national authorities (NBF) to legitimise the European common access policy and to facilitate 
the implementation of the CFP, which embraces all marine waters beyond the base line, at the 
same time as dealing with the intersection of European and national regulations in coastal 
fisheries. The race to fish was a recurrent problem and landings of cod and related species had 
decreased considerably. There was also a need to distinguish small-scale fisheries from other 
fisheries in order to facilitate the adoption of specific policies to assist their development. The 
assessment predicted an increasing economic importance for coastal fisheries and proposed 
that a special program be designed for their development. The assessment also recognised that 
in order to provide specific assistance to these fisheries it was necessary to complement the 
spatial, “ecological” boundaries with boundaries based on structural, functional criteria and 
resources (the vessel, the resource, and the gear).
5.4 COASTAL FISHERIES AS CONCEPTUALISED IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
Throughout Europe, national structural9 plans have been adopted in order to determine how 
the European structural goals (i.e. reduction of fleet capacity) are to be reached at the national 
                                                     
8 In general there is a direct relation between the size of the vessel and the gear employed, and in Sweden 
fishermen operating from vessels of less than 12 m often operate static gear. Under the last few years a trend 
towards small trawlers is being noticed (see chapter 7).
9 Structural refers here to the structure of the fleet. 
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level. In the context of the Swedish Action Plan for the structure of the fleet (Commission of 
the European Communities 1997), all vessels smaller than 12 metres (excluding trawlers and 
purse-seines) were excluded from the capacity reduction targets and referred to as coastal 
fisheries.
In the late 1990s and early 21st century, under strong public criticism of the inefficiency of the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) including its impact on the small-scale coastal fisheries and 
fishery dependent areas (FDA), the Commission started a process of reformulating the CFP.10
In the evolving European policies differential management in relation to small-scale coastal 
fisheries was possible11 and funds could be redirected for collective measures taken by this 
group. This was seen as an opportunity to promote collective action and rebalance the 
concentration of funding on modern fisheries. 
In the process of revising the criteria for the preparation of the national development plans 
and the financial aid aimed at their implementation, the need to define small-scale coastal 
fisheries increased in Europe and in Sweden.  To agree on a European definition of small-
scale coastal fisheries was not easy, and in Sweden there were different opinions about where 
the vessel-size boundaries should be set.
Table 5.3 shows the vessels sizes that were discussed and the significance of these different 
definitions in terms of inclusiveness or vessels involved in Sweden. The first definition 
suggested by the Commission limited the definition to fishing vessels up to 12 m in length, 
excluding trawlers. In Sweden, the 12 m limit has long been used to distinguish between small 
and large vessels.12 The number of vessels with an overall length  12 m operating trawl 
fisheries is not negligible. The total number of registered vessels involved in the Swedish 
professional fisheries was 2135 in 1999; of these 1764 (82 %) were 12 m or under,13 which 
should be compared to the figure 1584 given in table 5.3. In terms of volume, the landings 
from  12 m vessels accounted for 4 - 5% of total landings in Sweden. In terms of value they 
account for about 20%, with virtually all landings going for human consumption.
The Commission’s proposal was contested by the delegation of the Swedish government 
(among others), which proposed an extension in vessel length to 15 m and the inclusion of 
trawlers in the definition. A small producer organisation of local fishermen in Northern 
Bohuslän (see chapter 8) argued, on the other hand, that 16 m (including trawlers and purse 
seines) was a more appropriate threshold.
The representatives of the FAs found that defining coastal fisheries was pointless; three 
quotations taken from interviews explain how defining coastal fisheries was considered not 
only pointless but potentially dangerous.
“We do not need to define coastal fisheries because all Swedish fishermen are coastal fishermen. Seen 
in a European context, we are all coastal fishermen here in Sweden, our fleet is rather small” {1.1 
#26}.
“In Sweden, we do no have distant fisheries, we are all coastal fishermen” {2.1 #95}.
                                                     
10 For a critique of the inefficiency of the CFP over the last 20 years the reader is referred to the European 
Union’s Fisheries Department’s own website: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries. 
11 See for example the green paper about the reform of the CFP (Commission of the European Communities 
2001) and Council Regulation (EC) 2371/2002. 
12 This generic rule goes back to a regulation established not for the purpose of describing fishing activities, but  
to register vessels from the merchant fleet. According to the regulation (SFS 1891) vessels larger than 12 m 
were mortgageable, i.e. the owners had the right to use them as guarantee for the repayment of loans.
13 At the risk of creating confusion it should be mentioned that one fisherman may own more than one vessel. 
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“There is no reason to define coastal fisheries because, within certain given structures, coastal fisheries 
and technology in particular change all the time. Definitions are dangerous because, when used, they 
can create a status quo and constrain development” {0.1#28}.
Table 5.3  Different proposals for a definition of professional small-scale coastal
  fisheries in  relation to the development plans
Source Definition 
MAGP IV: Swedish Action Plan
for the structure of the fleet 
(Commission European  1997) 
Fishing from vessels of an overall length of less than 12 metres, 
excluding trawlers and purse-seines. Note: This definition is estimated to 
include circa 1584 vessels or 74 % of the national fleet. 
First proposal for MAGP V by the 
Commission (Commission of the 
European Communities 1998)
Fishing carried out by vessels of an overall length of less than 12 
metres, excluding trawlers. Note: This definition is estimated to include 
circa 1631 vessels or 76 % of the national fleet. 
Swedish Delegation
(Source: interviews)
Fishing carried out by vessels of an overall length of less than 15 
metres.
Note: This definition is estimated to include circa 1896 vessels or 88 % 
of the national fleet. 
Northern Bohuslän PO 
(Source: interviews) 
Fishing carried out by vessels of an overall length of less than 16 
metres.
Note: This definition is estimated to include circa 1910 vessels or 89 % 
of the national fleet. 
National Fishermen’s Association
(Yrkesfiskaren 1999) 
“If coastal fisheries are to be classified in small-scale coastal fisheries, 
these should include vessels of an overall length of at least 18 metres”. 
Note: This definition is estimated to include circa 1964 vessels or 92 % 
of the national fleet. 
Final proposal for MAGP V by the 
Commission (Commission of the 
European Communities 
1998a;b)
Fishing carried out by vessels of an overall length of less than 12 
metres.
Note: This definition is estimated to include circa 1764 vessels or 83 % 
of the national fleet. 
The National Fishermen’s Association (SFR), contested the Swedish Government’s proposal 
and questioned the views from Northern Bohuslän. SFR argued that 18 m (including trawlers 
and purse seines) was a more appropriate size (Yrkesfiskaren 1999).  The option of 18 m 
preferred by the fishermen’s association would include only 18% more vessels than the initial 
definition proposed by the Commission. However, when compared in terms of volumes of 
catch the percentage increases considerably. From the perspective of the FAs, the promotion 
of a more inclusive definition would enable more FA members to benefit from the structural 
funds made available to Sweden for the development of “small-scale” coastal fisheries in the 
European Community, and probably also give them a say in the development of future coastal 
fisheries management strategies.
The new plans, the debate and different proposals created some turbulence among the 
Swedish fishermen and in the ambit of decision making. By making special reference to small-
scale coastal fisheries, the new plans indirectly recognised the presence of a small and a large-
scale fishery in the European coastal waters. By recognising this, the heterogeneity in coastal 
fisheries was made explicit. The approach was new to Sweden where, as previously mentioned, 
definitions had followed a spatial criteria and not made distinctions between professional 
fishermen.
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Still the central variable in the definition of coastal fisheries in these plans was the size of the 
vessel - an asset or physical capital – which made the structural-functional approach a rather 
generic one. From a cpr perspective, where the clarification of social and ecological boundaries 
adapted to the context is considered an important condition for effective management, 
attempts to define the social boundaries of coastal fisheries with reference to vessel size might 
appear counter-productive. The definition of small-scale coastal fisheries on the basis of vessel 
size raises practical problems at the local level, where the financial system cannot provide 
incentives for cooperation between neighbours fishing from boats of different sizes. One may 
argue that if the central idea was to promote collective action for the conservation of the 
coastal habitats and the fish stocks, then the definition should not have excluded local 
fishermen fishing from larger vessels in the coastal zone.
Moreover, the plans are prepared to direct public and private investment, and investment in 
physical capital, e.g. the vessel and the gear, had been viewed as a strategy benefiting 
everyone.14 Inherent in directing public investment to the vessel is the problem of 
technological change and its implications for fishing efficiency. Such an approach is not only 
inappropriate in addressing needs and capacities of a diverse fishing industry but, as will be 
discussed later, it is also highly problematic, because in a common pool resource system the 
increase in efficiency by one unit/fisherman affects the efficiency of another unit/fishermen 
(see chapter 3).
To summarise, the issue of boundaries has been matter for formal discussion for the last four 
decades. The need to redefine coastal fisheries seems to have been influenced by changes in 
the state of the resources and contextual factors, and institutional arrangements at the 
international level (wars, EEZ, herring collapse, EU membership). Until the 1990s, the 
dominant approach sought to make the definition of coastal fisheries more inclusive. This has 
certainly led to the use of generic institutional arrangements, which have contributed to 
making the boundaries between distinct types of professional fisheries in coastal waters more 
blurred.
Until the early 1990s, the use of spatial variables was dominant in defining the boundaries of 
coastal fisheries. In the nineties the size of the window through which the authorities 
conceptualised coastal fisheries was drastically reduced to cover fisheries within the base line. 
Since then, the concept of territorial waters has lost its importance; the 4 nautical mile limits 
found in the Swedish fishing law lost their relevance, and the 12 nautical mile limits adopted 
by the European Commission have not been used.
For the management of coastal fisheries to be successful, the spatial definitions – be they the 
zone within the base line, the 4 nautical miles or the 12 nautical miles– must be accompanied 
by a definition of the community of users governing them. In a sense the definition from the 
1990s comes closest to the theoretical ideal of clear boundaries. However, as will be made 
evident in the analysis of the coastal fishermen’s views, this definition was far from achieving a 
good approximation of reality.
                                                     
14 Chambers (1997), refers to this type of “one instrument fits all” approach as one that is rather common within 
the national administrations which, by standardising what in reality is highly diverse, save administrative costs 
and efforts. Standardisation, he argues, not only minimises administration but also protects against accusations 
of political favouritism (Chambers 1997). His reasoning seems to be relevant to the Swedish case. 
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5.5 COASTAL FISHERIES AS PERCEIVED BY COASTAL FISHERMEN 
5.5.1 Some methodological considerations 
In this section, the analysis turns to the opinions of the coastal fishermen themselves. Twenty-
eight (28) fishermen from the West Coast of Sweden were interviewed in-depth.15 Here some 
specific information about the fishermen interviewed is provided. This information is also 
valid for the following chapters where further results from these interviews will be presented. 
The interviewed fishermen were residents of the following Municipalities Öckerö (2), Tjörn 
(2), Orust (2) Lysekil (2), Sotenäs (8), Tanum (4), Strömstad (8). All but three defined 
themselves as coastal fishermen, while the rest regarded themselves as partly coastal fishermen 
partly offshore fishermen (i.e. fishing coastal waters from time to time). Their catches were 
diverse, and the fishermen could be classified as shellfish and “combi” fishermen (see 
Neuman and Píriz 2000). Their vessels varied between 9 and 24 m (median value = 16) in 
length and their catches were diverse but with a clear focus on shellfish. The average age of 
the fishermen interviewed was 49 which compared to the regional average of 53 (LL and SD), 
is a bit low (see Píriz 2000). All but one fisherman, the youngest (26), had fished for 15 years 
or more. All but one had grown up in a family of fishermen in the area, and all but three were 
married. The wives of the fishermen interviewed were either retired or employed in the public 
sector at the municipal level.16
The interviews with the fishermen began by letting the informant describe his fishing activities 
through the construction of a time-line (Townsley 1993). Then the time-lines were used to ask 
the fishermen about the social and ecological variables conditioning the fisheries. The 
interviews also included questions such as: do you regard yourself a coastal fisherman and 
why? When does a fisherman stop being a coastal fisherman? But the emphasis was on 
exploring what they saw as central problems in Swedish fisheries and the current management 
system, and their ability to influence and promote change.
5.5.2 Spatial boundary dynamics 
Among the fishermen who defined themselves as “coastal fishermen” (22 out of 28 
interviewed), no one fished exclusively within the base line, less than one third (6) fished 
exclusively within the 4 nautical mile limits, and less than half (8) fished within the 6 nautical 
mile limits. About one-third (8) indicated they sometimes extended their range of activity up 
to the 12 nautical mile limits and beyond. The majority of coastal fishermen interviewed (15) 
operated within the 12 nautical mile limits, which supports the argument of Symes (1999).
Among those interviewed, there was no agreement regarding which distance from land that 
should be used to define the spatial limits of coastal fisheries. However, when explicitly asked 
to choose what they thought would be the best spatial indicator, the majority of the interviews 
chose a distance between 6 to 12 nautical miles. A number of fishermen specifically argued for 
a broad and variable zone from 6-12 nautical miles depending on “the weather, what you fish and 
the vessel and gear you have”, rather than a single definition. One fisherman, with experience of a 
wide range of small-scale fisheries, extended his concept of “coastal fisheries” to 25 nautical 
miles, to an area where old vessels have been dumped, and where he planned to long line for 
                                                     
15 In the following, texts excerpted from the interviews are presented as quotations. The quotations are written in 
italics and are followed by a code – e.g. {0.0 # 31} – referring to the method (0=interviews) and the source 
(0=fisherman); the last number (31) represents one informant.
16 The wives of the fishermen interviewed worked as home assistants, social workers, kitchen assistants, teachers, 
nurses, clerks and accountants, all female dominated occupations suffering from institutionalised value 
discrimination. That is the discrimination that exists when different evaluation scales are present, with female 
dominated work being rated lower than male dominated work, even though the requirements in terms of skills, 
education and responsibility are the same (see Píriz 2001).
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mackerel. In this instance the preference expressed reflects not only experience but also future 
aspirations. The use of the base line as a generic boundary for defining coastal fisheries does 
not seem to find any empirical support among the coastal fishermen interviewed in this study.
Logbooks show that both small vessels and vessels of 12 m and above do operate within and 
beyond the base line. The number of vessels that reported operations within the base line on 
at least one occasion during in 1998 was 1073. Of these, 822 (77%) had a size of  12 m. 
These generic definitions of coastal or inshore fisheries have little relevance to practising 
fishermen. In their view the boundaries of coastal fisheries are both fluid and dynamic and 
associated with the type of fishing and specific mode of operation.
5.5.3 Fishing in home waters, time and social relations on land 
When referring to the location of their fishing activity, the fishermen referred to “fishing in 
home waters” (hemma vatten) rather than using the term “coastal waters”. Fishing in “home waters”,
together with “we, who overnight at home” and “we, living here” were the most typical and recurrent 
expressions used as a descriptor to distinguish themselves from other fishermen. These terms 
were used to contrast themselves with the fishermen operating offshore or residing outside 
Northern Bohuslän.
But, where do the waters stop being “home waters”? How far from shore were the limits of 
their “home waters”? A common view among the fishermen was that the North Sea, the 
Kattegat and the Baltic Sea were neither home nor coastal waters. For the fishermen living in 
Strömstad, on the very border with Norway, Norwegian waters were regarded as “home 
waters”. Crossing national frontiers and entering Norwegian waters was very common among 
those trawling for prawns. Those with experience of fishing inshore waters far from their 
home port – for example on the Swedish East Coast – questioned the idea of regarding such 
fisheries as coastal fisheries because these waters were certainly not “home waters”.
In the fishermen’s accounts hemma vatten embraced waters that, in terms of distance, allowed 
them to return to the local port on a daily basis and to spend the night at home. Some prawn 
and combi-fishermen prolonged their time at sea, and in their definition of coastal fisherman 
those returning home within two to three days are included. Expressions like “we sleep at home”
or “we are back before Friday and spend the weekend at home” were frequently used to contrast their 
life styles with those spending longer periods –“an entire week” – away from home.17;18
The use of time as one important descriptor of coastal fisheries but also as a management 
instrument to limit output in fisheries was important to all the local fishermen interviewed. It 
made sense to all fishermen interviewed. For the older men it meant an opportunity to slow 
down due to health, tiredness and demands from the
“Old lady who worries and is alone at home taking care of the grandchildren” {0.0#10}.
The fathers of young families preferred to return home daily or after only a couple of days 
away and to avoid fishing on weekends in order to be able to
“Join their kids at the football game” {0.0#13}.
                                                     
17 Time is important when handling the catch. The quality of e.g. crustaceans is dependent on time. Prawns are 
often pre-cooked in salt water onboard and can therefore last few days. Nephrops, on the other hand, have to be 
landed alive to be sold as fresh. To keep the Nephrops fresh on board for some days, the more industrialised 
vessels use additives such as sodium sulphite. 
18 The people working in the local fish auctions also made a similar categorisation of coastal fisheries. From their 
perspective there are three types of fishermen working in the area: those landing daily 4-5 days a week, those 
landing every 2-3 nights and those landing weekly or less frequently. The latter group was not regarded as 
coastal fishermen. 
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Most fishermen justified their time at sea by referring to both their social relations on land and 
their productive and reproductive roles.19 In other words, the fishermen organised their 
fishing in terms of their life as a whole. Fishing in hemma vatten and returning home frequently 
was important for the youngest fishermen (26-34) not only because it allowed them to follow 
the rhythm of other family members and meet friends, but also because in these waters one 
can operate a relatively cheap, second hand vessel quite efficiently.20
 “Even we want to go to the cinema and spend a weekend in Stockholm” {0.0#16}.
“One should be able to buy a boat and not be in debt to your mother in law” {0.0#24}. 
The possible strategies discussed by the coastal fishermen to tackle the situation with scarce 
fisheries resources were: i) to extend operations in space and time; ii) to invest in or change 
the vessel; iii) to change from stationary gear to small trawls; iv) to diversify the target species; 
v) to diversify business structure within and outside the fishery sector; and vi) retrenchment.
Increasing time at sea and fishing far from land were two possible ways of increasing catches. 
However, fishing in more distant waters was regarded as undesirable because the costs 
involved had to be offset by increased catches, for which there was little scope. In general, the 
accounts of the coastal fishermen reflected a preference for continuing to fish the local 
(home) waters and not be forced into fishing more distant waters. Extending their use of time 
and space, i.e. giving up daily landings, and fishing further offshore, ran counter to their way 
of living and was not viewed as an alternative to being coastal fishermen.
The concept of hemma vatten, which is essentially an expression of social space rather than 
distance, is based on a range that permits a particular organisation of the use of time. This has 
a bearing on two ideas important in cpr theory (see chapter 3). First, that human interaction 
with the eco-system should be understood in the light of social relations and social structure; 
and second, that the use and management of fisheries is an issue for both natural and social 
science.
Landing the catch regularly all year round at local harbours was considered central to the 
survival of coastal fisheries and to other fishing related activities, generating employment, such 
as fish auctions.21 The people employed in land based fishing related activities, though small in 
number, were regarded as crucial to maintaining local communities on a year round basis and 
hence a concern of the whole local community.22;23 To survive, the facilities on land require a 
certain level of activity and a minimum number of fishing units in the area. From this 
perspective, most interviewees were willing to see more local fishermen living in the area, 
notwithstanding the lack of fish. In their opinion, the number of local fishermen had in many 
places already reached a critical minimum threshold to sustain both the fisheries and the 
related activities on land. A willingness to make individual sacrifices for the well-being of the 
local community was central to their way of thinking.
The development plans discussed above made use of the vessel as the central variable to 
distinguish between fishermen (see section 5.5). When coastal fishermen were explicitly asked 
                                                     
19 I use the term reproductive role here to contrast it from productive role. By reproductive role I mean non-
income generating activities such as taking care of the children, making dinner.
20 As will become evident in chapter 6 with the establishment of a market for vessel tonnage the availability of 
relatively low price second hand vessels has changed in Sweden.
21 Traditionally the fish auctions had been owned and managed by the Municipalities but in many places the 
auctions have closed due to low supply of fish. The Smögen’s auction is still owned by the Municipality, with 8 
employees (1998). The fish auction in Strömstad with 4 employees (1998) is now owned by a group of 
fishermen.  The biggest auction in Sweden, the auction of Göteborg is owned by SVC. 
22 The conversion factor used in Sweden to estimate fishing related employment is 1.5.
23 In the case of the prawn fisheries, all year round landings were seen as the only way to compete with the 
import of Norwegian industrial prawn fisheries (see chapter 8). 
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about an appropriate vessel size they were of the opinion that fishermen operating vessels 
larger than 22-24 metres should not be authorised to work coastal waters. But reserving 
fisheries resources in home waters for local fishermen was more important than the size of the 
vessel per se.
When the views of the coastal fishermen are compared with those who did not identify 
themselves as coastal fishermen and fished waters “far from home”, there are some major 
differences. Such fishermen operate larger vessels and are not dependent on the existence of 
local harbours for landing. They referred to time in terms of nights on board rather than 
nights spent at home. The vessel and modern technology held an important place when 
comparing themselves with local coastal fishermen. For them the vessel was both means of 
production and a cultural space where knowledge and experience are exchanged. This is 
supportive of Hazelhurst (1994), who has studied “the prototypical fisherman” from an island 
in the vicinity of Göteborg in Southern Bohuslän, and concluded that in this group it is the 
vessel that forms the location of shared experiences and learned work routines.24
Thus the main difference between the two types of fishermen was perhaps that local coastal 
fishermen, depending on home waters, followed a fishing strategy shaped by and adapted to 
patterns of social relations on land rather than relations on board the vessel. As will be 
discussed in chapter 7, from the perspective of resource appropriation, the vessel mediates 
property rights. 
5.5.4 The issue of “lack of fish”  
Analysis of interviews indicated that coastal fishermen were confronting a problem with 
scarce resources. The most common expressions among the fishermen interviewed were “the
fish are gone”, “we lack the fish”, “there are no fish left”. Statements made by local coastal fishermen 
presented in box 5.1 below illustrate how they perceived themselves to be affected by the 
shortage of fish in their home waters. For this reason and the relatively good market for 
shellfish, the dominant pattern of the fishery in the area of study has shifted from fin-fish to 
crustaceans. A large majority of the local fishermen interviewed had previously caught both 
fish and shellfish but were now dependent on catching shellfish.
As expected, the lack of fish was seen to exert an effect on income. Even when declining 
income was mentioned as a problem, among the shellfish fishermen, the issue of low income 
could with little difficulty be interpreted as their main problem.25 According to the 
interviewees, the reduced income due to the “lack of fish” has been partly offset by the 
abundance and by high demand of shellfish, particularly for the Norwegian lobster (Nephrops).
For those relying on prawns the situation is more critical.
                                                     
24 Hazlehurst (1994) is interested in cultural cognition and how cultural knowledge is organized in the Swedish 
offshore fisheries, referred to as “big fishing”. Hazlehurst’s portrayal of the prototypical offshore fisherman 
from Southern Bohuslän includes a gambling nature due to uncertainty, true commitment and being success 
oriented, collectiveness, competition and hard work, ownership of a vessel, proficiency and technological 
advances, religion and morality, shared income, kin, gender and man’s role. 
25 The questions about income were only put indirectly to the interviewees; no actual income figures were 
discussed. At the time of writing this thesis the quotas for fin fish had been drastically reduced and the prices 
of shellfish in the market had drastically changed. As a result the shellfish fishermen faced both appropriation 
and economic problems.
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Box 5.1  Coastal fishermen’s statements about the lack of fish 
“Twenty years ago, I used to alternate fish and shrimp, but today there is only shrimp left. In 
the eighties I got 70-80 kg of marketable fish per day that was sold at the local market and 
gave me 50,000 to 70,000 Sw. cr. per year. The average today is 5-7 kg per day, ten times less! 
What has saved us here is the increased price of Nephrops” {0.0#21}. [Economic dimension] 
“Variety in fishing means health and makes fisheries more interesting. Catching large fish is 
fun and you have something to show and talk about when you reach harbour” {0.0#7} 
“When there are big fish, fishing gets more exciting. Have you ever got a 30-kg cod? Only 
then you can know the feeling?” {0.0#12}. [Recreation] 
“Before, we could fish cod and other species with nets close inshore, now we have to be at 
sea longer periods; when there are fish one can be at home more” {0.0#7}. [Social-
Household relations] 
“Ordinary people cannot afford to eat Nephrops or prawns once a week and we cannot offer 
them an alternative from the sea so the alternative is to eat chicken and pork fed on fish, this 
is a shame” {0.0#24}. [Food security and Bio-ethics] 
“If we do not have fish to catch we lose shares in the domestic market, then we lose the local 
auction, and if we lose the auction we are finished. We’d then have to close the harbour and 
the related business and would have to leave the business; this impacts our families and the 
entire community” {0.0#11}. [Community fishery dependency, Living archipelago] 
“Although the absence of fish indicates that something is wrong with the health of the 
marine environment, nobody cares. Tell me why should the fish swim into coastal waters? 
When the plankton die very fast, the shallow areas lack oxygen, the small fish that should 
have been natural feed for the ground fish are used to make fishmeal... everything is going 
wrong”.{0.0#18}. [Environmental problems, Management failure] 
“My father left me a profession and abundant fish in the water; to my son I can leave 
nothing” {0.0#131}.[Intergenerational equity] 
“Soon we will disappear from the map; you will only have tourist resorts 3 months a year, the 
“Mallorca of Sweden”. Isn’t that what you people from the cities actually want? You can eat 
lobsters from China and prawns from Norway anyway” {0.0#12}.[Views of life]
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
The comparatively good economic situation of the Nephrops fishermen was cited by many non-
fishermen interviewed as a reason for questioning the credibility of local shellfish fishermen 
from Central and Northern Bohuslän, who, according to them, had no legitimate grounds for 
complaint. Fishermen as well as non-fishermen corroborated this in statements like the 
following.
“Even when our [a Nephrops fisherman] economy is not bad and our children lack 
nothing....”{0.0#13}.
“If your monthly salary at the University is around 20,000 Sw. cr. before taxes as you said, 
then I earn considerably more than you do”{0.0#47}.
“Although it is a fact that the situation with the fish in coastal areas is critical, shellfish 
fishermen have never earned so much money as they do now. Today shellfish fishermen 
[meaning Nephrops fishermen] are making more money than ever. Because, on the one hand, 
the shellfish stocks are stable and shellfish thrives in the absence of the fish, its natural 
predator, and, on the other hand, the European market pays very high prices for the 
shellfish”{0.1#28}.
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The statements in box 5.1 indicate that for the local fishermen “fish” has different meanings 
and “the lack of fish” means more than the lack of money. Local fishermen have traditionally 
organised their fisheries on the basis of seasonal variations (see chapter 2). Thus the problem 
of shortage of fish is not only associated with the loss of economic benefits, but also relates to 
the state of the environment, the need for specialisation, opportunities for their children, 
recreation and fun, communication and social relations, gaining professional respect, staying 
close to home and spending more time on land.  The need to recognise that fishermen obtain 
more from their profession than money – something that is probably valid for most 
professions – has been highlighted by social scientists (Pollnac 1988; Hazlehurst 1994; Hart 
and Pitcher 1998; Jentoft 1998). Hart and Pitcher (1998) argue further that fisheries 
management regimes should recognise this and examine the role that the social context and 
other cultural factors play in influencing fishermen’s decisions. 
Box 5.2  Time-space information provided by the coastal fishermen 
• Deep sea prawn fisheries 
Best time:  January – February, when the prawn goes up to spawn.  
Worst time:  Summer, when the prawn sheds its shell.  
Best sites:  The prawn appears in patches and does not move long distances. Also one 
should return to where one found it the week before. The deeper the prawns 
are found the larger is the proportion of large individuals. 
Critical variable: The depth. 
Best winds:  South-west and south-north directions.  
Bad winds:  Northeast and southeast. 
The moon:  During full moon the water runs faster and it is more difficult to manoeuvre 
the trawl. On the other hand there is abundant fish. 
Associated species:  Whiting, “skoläst”, jellyfish, rays cod and mackerel.  
• Nephrops fisheries
Best time:  January – February and when the water is brown and then September.  
Worst time: March – April – May, due to atmospheric pressure.
Best sites:  In summer and autumn depths of 50m; in winter depths of 80m; in spring 
depths of 150m.
Critical variable:  The light. 
Best winds:  North either east or west. “We normally say that land wind is good for Nephrops
and sea wind good for fish”. 
Bad winds:  South. 
The moon:  During full moon you can fish later in the night. 
Associated species:  Small flatfish, shells, molluscs, and starfish.
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
5.5.5 The coastal fishermen’s time-space knowledge 
The fishermen possessed rich time-space information about the home waters and the 
dynamics of biological resources there, especially about fisheries hydrographics, i.e. dealing 
with the relation between variations in the abundance and distribution of fish and variations in 
the physical environment.
As illustrated in box 5.2, the coastal fishermen related their shellfish fishing experience to 
light, winds, currents, depth, atmospheric pressure, and temperature. For example, spawning 
was associated with weather and temperature, feeding with depth, motion with light and the 
colour of the water. Similarly, the handling of gear was referred to as being adjusted to the 
morphology of the bottom, the predominant winds, the phases and light of the moon, and the 
currents. Two parameters often used by the fishermen to indicate their fishing location were 
depth and migration patterns of the various species fished. A few referred to coastal fishing as 
extending to depths of 50 fathoms of water (90 m) while the majority reported that they fished 
to depths down to 80 - 100 fathoms of water (160-180 m) “where the cod turn around”.
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Regarding the issue of the lack of fish, the information provided by the fishermen from the 
area of study was frequently on gadoid fisheries and ecology, with a focus on cod. The 
fishermen were aware that gadoids mature at a relatively late age, from 2 years onwards, and 
that this characteristic makes them more vulnerable to environmental changes and fishing 
than, for example, small pelagics.
Fishermen related that these species have:
“Two distinct phases in their juvenile life on the coasts of Skagerrak, one inshore during the first year 
and the second in deeper coastal waters during the second year. During the 3rd year, when these 
reach a size of approximately 30 cm they migrate back to the North Sea to spawn” {0.0 #23}. 
Some fishermen referred to three stocks of cod: the local, which they said had collapsed; the 
Baltic stock, which was in a better shape; and finally the North Sea stock, which they inferred 
would collapse in a very near future.
“The Baltic cod reaches Skagerrak by means of the Baltic Current but returns fast to the Baltic Sea to 
spawn” {0.0 #13}.
“The North Sea cod and other ground fish entered on the Jutland Current in spring (April-May) as 
juveniles and spend the first winter close to land” {0.0 #14}.
The richness of the fishermen’s knowledge about the fish and the ecosystem, on which their 
livelihood depends, has long been asserted by anthropologists. The interviews with scientists 
and officials showed that such information is not systematically collected in Sweden. 
Combining such information with scientific data and analysis may offer potential for 
improving the effectiveness of management. 
To conclude this section, the difference between the institutional reality and the fishermen’s 
perceptions is evident. The coastal fisheries in home waters exhibit properties resulting from 
the complexity and dynamics of both the biophysical and the social context. An analysis of the 
accounts of the coastal fishermen from Northern Bohuslän indicate that a coastal fisherman 
was a local resident, who fishes near home (no farther than 6-12 nautical miles from the base-
line), fishes various species and uses a mix of gear, lands his (diverse) catch in the local port, 
rests and lets the ecosystem rest during the night and on weekends, possesses knowledge 
about the local ecosystem and the social system, trusts other local fishermen and does not 
invest in the vessel more than he can earn.
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A growing body of research indicates that for common pool resources management to 
succeed certain basic conditions to enable and effectively sustain collective action have to be 
in place. The clarification of ecological and social boundaries is one such condition. From that 
perspective the clarification of “who” is authorized to fish “how much of what”, “how” and 
“when” in coastal waters becomes relevant.
In this chapter definitions of coastal fisheries as conceptualized in the dominant fisheries 
management regime and as articulated by the fishermen have been examined. The 
arrangements comprising the institutional framework were described. On the West Coast, 
these only partially contributed to delimiting boundaries of professional coastal fisheries. This 
is one illustration of how professional coastal fishermen are treated as a single entity, a view 
deeply rooted in the prevailing regime, and not merely among administrative staff preparing 
plans and assessments.
The analysis of policy documents and development plans showed that the dominant regime 
has opted for generic definitions. From a cpr perspective to do so is questionable. The various 
operational definitions have attempted to mirror the empirical situation, but the need to define 
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the boundaries has evolved as a reaction to institutional changes decided outside the 
fishermen’s context. These operational definitions, whether based on spatial, structural and/or 
functional approaches, rely on measurable variables: distance from land and vessel size. As will 
be seen in chapter 6, from the cpr management perspective, to describe the spatial boundaries 
of coastal fisheries at sea is a step forward, but not on its own sufficient. At sea, the use of 
spatial definitions alone is problematic because wherever the limits are set there will always be 
transboundary problems and a degree of mis-match between artificial boundaries and nature’s 
complexity. Indeed, the ecological nature – indivisible and fugitive – of the common pool 
resources system on which fishing activities are based, limit our ability to rely on spatial 
delimitation alone for the purpose of management.
The conventional definitions of coastal fisheries draw upon structural and spatial 
characteristics but ignored the fact that the coastal area is also a place for living, and that 
people sharing home waters may also share social networks on land and a feeling of 
interdependence with the wider local community. It is well known that, as in many other 
places, residents in the Swedish rural coastal areas (including fishermen and their families) 
normally meet to resolve local problems related to youth education, cultural and religious 
activities, developing basic infrastructure, harbour and provision services, etc. This type of 
experience based on interpersonal relations and communication can strengthen the 
fishermen’s ability to communicate and help in resolving problems associated with the local 
coastal fisheries.
Vessel size seems to be an insufficient way to distinguish among fishermen whose livelihood 
assets differ. The size of the vessel does not reflect political, social, or cultural boundaries. As 
will be evident in chapter 7, the focus on the vessel has de facto favoured those whose 
livelihoods are not dependent on the local ecosystem and for whom the vessel is the main 
instrument for securing fishing rights.
From the foregoing analysis, it can be argued that one important aspect of the management of 
coastal fisheries is to find complementary variables supporting the definition of operational 
boundaries. Significantly, the conventional definitions show weaknesses with regard to the 
consideration of the social dynamics/parameters of coastal fisheries and the congruence 
between these and the boundaries of the ecosystem, which condition the management of 
common pool resources. As a consequence their utility for management practice is low. By 
doing so, the dominant regime has for many years supported a development towards 
increasing heterogeneity of the authorised professional fishing community in coastal waters. 
Together with more general development trends, e.g. recreation, the lack of distinctions has 
contributed to the notion of local fishing community having lost its relevance. In the light of 
the cpr perspective, such development has probably led to management opportunities being 
lost.
The chapter opened with a question: what is meant by coastal fisheries? Even though the 
answer remains somewhat elusive, there were clear differences between the institutional 
reality, with its conventional definitions, and the fishermen’s perceptions of their own 
fisheries. Both attempts to outline universal definitions and use of labels such as “coastal 
fisheries” or “coastal fishermen” in fisheries management are problematic. First, because 
coastal fisheries conceal a high degree of diversity, and, second because such labels insinuate 
that there is a consensus about the characteristics that form the basis for their recognition. If 
coastal fisheries are to serve the living archipelago policy they have to be accorded distinctive 
modes of management and be further specified. Some fundamental differences, that have 
been lost in the conventional definitions but which are articulated by the fishermen, should 
indeed receive more attention.
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The interviews indicated that the term “coastal” was not only an ecosystem-related 
geographical term having little to do with arbitrary lines, but also and perhaps more 
importantly, an expression of “locality” and of relations between the fishing community and 
the community on land. These facets of the term are important dimensions in the theoretical 
approach of cpr management (see chapter 3). The descriptive variables of coastal fisheries 
articulated by the fishermen during the interviews included more variables than those normally 
used in policy documents and plans.
In the fishermen’s descriptions coastal fisheries are about individuals and small crews sleeping 
and landing at home, fishing more or less close to land in different ways and involving various 
species, depending on for example changes in the weather. Coastal fisheries are also about 
household dynamics, jobs in the local community, changing demands from the market and 
shared opportunities. As will become evident later on, coastal fisheries are also about 
individuals making use of different individual and collective strategies to secure access to the 
resources. These results are supportive of Jentoft (1998; 1998a) who has emphasised that 
fisheries management should not only be related to markets, efficiency and quotas, but also, 
among other things, to households, gender, communities, power, equity, democracy and 
knowledge.
In the fishermen’s accounts, there are fundamental differences between the actual community 
fishing coastal waters and those fishing home waters. The distinctions are not so much about 
measurable variables or scales in terms of vessels, but more about locality, social relations on 
land, and the use of time. To use time as a management instrument would clearly be in their 
interest. All in all, it can be argued that the concept of local coastal fisheries as a sub-system in 
fisheries does not seem to be well institutionalised in the dominant regime governing fisheries 
on the West Coast of Sweden. This deficiency constitutes a barrier to the involvement local 
coastal fishermen in the management of coastal fisheries.
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CHAPTER 6
THE COASTAL FISHERMEN’S CPR SITUATION
Over the past hundred years the coastal economy has evolved from simple commodity 
production based on farming, fishing and forestry to considerable commercial diversity. First, 
the coastal zone became the location of industrial, land-based activities that were not directly 
dependent on marine living resources for their existence but whose coastal location proved to 
be economically efficient through savings in costs of assembling the basic components, 
distributing the finished goods or disposing of waste materials. A more diffuse and somewhat 
later development was the use of the coastal zone for permanent or seasonal residence; large 
tracts of Sweden’s coastline became extensions of the living space for the expanding urban 
population.
With industrialisation and the increasing need for nature-based leisure activities mainly for 
people from the urban areas, the coastal zone has evolved over time into an area where the 
values and interests of non-residents frequently predominate. In such a situation there is 
always a risk that the needs of local, small scale coastal fishermen for structuring their 
profession become lost in intra- and inter-sectoral trade-offs. As stated by Steins (1999), 
different activities may relate to the coastal cpr differently and affect a single fishery differently, 
but most will, in one way or another, further reduce the coastal fisherman’s ability to define 
and influence decisions about the use of the cpr. Steins (1999) has argued that the trend 
towards increased multiple use is a process that increases the alienation of traditional users, 
and Schlager and Blomquist (1999) have argued that heterogeneity among users in terms of 
property rights and technology renders collective action and co-operation difficult (see chapter 
3).
The present chapter explores what the fishermen considered to threaten their current fisheries 
seen as a complex common pool situation, i.e. with multiple uses and users. Its purpose is to 
explore the fishermen’s awareness of the interdependencies that exist between these multiple 
uses and the local fishermen’s ability to access fisheries resources and influence their 
governance.
The fishermen’s perceptions of who or what are likely to have an impact on the state of the 
resources and their fisheries are critical to their willingness to conserve the resources and the 
ecosystem, their trustworthiness and involvement in the management system and their 
understanding of who should have a role in co-management of coastal fisheries.
6.1 SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The chapter presents the results of two questionnaires. The surveys were carried out in 1998 
and investigated what professional coastal fishermen in Bohuslän regarded as problems 
pertaining to fishing in a multiple use context. No account is taken of the perceptions of other 
resource users or how professional coastal fisheries may affect their activities.
Some aspects of the questionnaires have already been discussed in chapter 4. The Väderö 
survey was in the form of a postal questionnaire consisting of two parts.1 The first part was 
prepared by the Coastal Laboratories of the National Board of Fisheries (NBF) in order to 
assess the fisheries in the same area, in terms of total catch by species and gear and types of 
fishery (professional as well as recreational). The results have been published elsewhere 
                                                          
1 The questionnaires were by ordinary mail in early 1998 with paid return envelopes. A reminder letter was send 
to those that had not returned the questionnaire within 2 weeks.
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(Lagenfelt and Svedäng 1999). The second part comprised a single sheet with six questions 
(five closed and one open) specially designed for this study. It addressed 48 fishermen who 
indicated they had fished in a small but highly diverse fishing area within the base line, around 
the Väderö archipelago outside the town of Fjällbacka in the Municipality of Tanum (see 
figure 6.1). Responses from 33 fishermen were received and analysed.
The second questionnaire addressed delegates to the 1998 congress of the Swedish West 
Coast Fishermen’s Association (SVC) and consisted of two pages. In this second study group, 
the fisherman’s role as a representative was the important variable, as this latter group may or 
may not live in the study area and/or interact locally. In this case the fishermen were left to 
decide whether they were coastal fishermen or not. 40 fishermen, out of 65 registered 
participants, answered the questions and returned the questionnaire the same day. Unlike the 
first questionnaire, respondents were attending a meeting and the time they had to fill in the 
questionnaire was inevitably limited. For this reason, this questionnaire was less 
comprehensive and the respondents were, for example, not asked to rank reported factors.
Finally, the discussion of the problems deemed critical by the coastal fishermen in their 
common pool resource situation was further informed by facts and information from 
secondary sources, and data gathered through meetings and interviews. Information on the 
latter methods can be found in chapter 4.
6.2 THE VÄDERÖ ARCHIPELAGO STUDY
6.2.1 The Väderö Archipelago area 
The Väderö Archipelago is located in the coastal waters of Skagerrak in the municipality of 
Tanum, in northern Bohuslän (see figure 6.1). In the archipelago where the southernmost part 
of the Norwegian Trench (referred to as Koster Trench or Väderö-Koster Fjord) meets the 
most western group of Swedish islands, the baseline2 was far enough from land to account for 
a significant diversity in terms of biotopes and fisheries. Several economic activities and 
interests converge in the area and, some of these – professional fisheries, defence, outdoor 
recreation and nature conservation– are regarded as being of national significance.3 In terms 
of fisheries statistics the area falls within the ICES’s grid-square 4656, referred to in chapter 2. 
The selection of this area was based on the criterion that the area should combine the 
attributes of high diversity in terms of biophysical environment, resources, and fishing 
technology.
The examination of catch data from this grid-square (4656) based on the fishermen’s 1997 
catch log-books (see chapter 4), showed that they included more than 50 identified species, 
and a number of non-identified ones (see chapter 2). A recent review of the biological 
knowledge for the area has concluded that Sweden’s biotope variation and marine biological 
diversity probably reaches its maximum in Northern Bohuslän (Nilsson 1997).
Most studies addressing user communities’ use of common pool resources are based on 
geographical residence or the community of place; in the present study however the selection 
is based on a shared fishing area. The data analysed in this investigation are derived from the 
responses of professional fishermen who have reported fishing activities within the base-line, 
                                                          
2 Together with the ICES grid-squares, the base line, the 4 nautical miles line and the 12 nautical miles lines are 
used to provide a spatial point of reference in the fishermen logbooks. 
3 The Natural Resources Act (1987) now integrated in the Swedish Environmental Code (1999) includes both 
general and specific management provisions for sectoral development and for the development of geographical 
areas delimited on the basis of the natural and cultural features. Thus prioritised sectors and areas can be 
designated by the central authorities as Areas of National Interest. 
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in a delimited area of ca 90 km² (Latitude: N 58° 40'; S 58° 33'; Longitude: W 11° 05') (see fig 
6.1).
6.2.2 The study group  
To reach those fishing in the area, the questionnaire was sent to all professional fishermen (all 
male) who in 1997 had reported operations to the National Board of Fisheries in ICES grid-
square 4656. According to the catch logbooks 208 vessels had reported operations in this grid-
square during 1997. But the ICES grid-square was larger than the study area in this survey and 
consequently the fishermen reporting catches there formed an interim group from which it 
was still necessary to identify those who had actually fished the Väderö area.
Table 6.1 describes the process of response and selection. The table shows that 180 (87%) 
returned the questionnaire but only 48 (or 26%) stated that they had de facto fished the 
Väderö area indicated in the questionnaire. Only those fishermen who had fished the area 
around Väderö (see figure 6.1), were invited to respond the questionnaire. Respondents were 
asked to state whether they had fished the area for a number of consecutive years and from 
what date (year). When the respondents’ level of completion of both questionnaires and their 
fishing experience in the defined area were taken into consideration, the effective study group 
(“sample” size) was reduced to 33 fishermen, all domiciled in the study area itself .4
The average time spent fishing in the area was relatively high, 21 years (median 13 years). 
Three of the fishermen have been fishing in the area for almost 50 years.5 The respondent 
with the longest experience in the area had been fishing since 1935 (with a focus on eel and 
lobster). None of the respondents had started fishing in the area between 1943 and 1974. In 
the mid and late eighties, however, fishing the area apparently became more popular. Among 
those who reported that they have fished the area since the eighties there was a clear tendency 
to target Nephrops by means of creels. Five fishermen had started fishing the area relatively 
recently (in the early-and mid-nineties). They were mainly fishing for Nephrops and deep-sea 
prawn. Overall, a majority of those who answered the questionnaire have fished the area for 
many years and should be well acquainted with the local conditions.
                                                          
4 The number of vessels that operate in an area cannot be used to represent the number of fishermen involved in 
the fishery; the number will depend on the composition of the crew and whether one and the same fisherman 
owns one or more units.
5 The licence register of the National Board of Fisheries shows that West Coast fishermen fishing eel and prawn 
are in general older than other fishermen. Nephrops’ fisheries are more recent phenomenon. In the eighties, 
many fishermen have shifted from fish fisheries to Nephrops’ fisheries. 
Table 6.1 The study group Väderö Questionnaire 
Received the questionnaire (fishing units) 208 
Returned both parts of the questionnaire 180 
Indicated having fished in the Väderö area marked in the 48 
Completed this part of the questionnaire 36 
Had fished in the area more than two consecutive years 33 
Source: Väderö-questionnaire 1998 
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Figure 6.1 Map of the West Coast indicating the area for the Väderö-questionnaire
(Questionnaire 1 marked with dotted line in the ICES-grid square 4656). 
 4656
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6.2.3 The fisheries in the Väderö Archipelago 
The results of the first part of the questionnaire based on the answers of 48 fishermen 
reported by Lagenfelt and Svedäng (1999), are useful in helping to provide more detailed 
description of fishing activities in the area. As table 6.2 indicates, catches from the designated 
area only represent a small proportion of the total harvest reported from grid-quare 4656, 
suggesting that in this area most catches are taken beyond the base line, and that the state of 
the resources within the designated area will be influenced by what happens outside this area. 
As a group, shellfish was more frequently mentioned than finfish. The table also shows that, 
in terms of weight, shellfish dominated throughout the area. Nephrops and deep-sea prawn, and 
to a lesser extent lobster, are all relatively stationary stocks, but their abundance in this area 
depends on the inflows of larvae and juveniles from the North Sea.
It may be also inferred that stocks of ground and flatfish, traditionally part of the fisheries in 
this region, were not abundant during that year (1997). According to the interviewed 
fishermen, with the disappearance of predatory ground fish shellfish have grown more 
abundant.
The majority of the respondents to the questionnaire could be characterised as combi-
fishermen,6 reporting mixed gear-types and a variety of species caught. However, when 
trawling was used this gear determined the dominant mode in terms of catches. Several 
fishermen reported a clear specialisation in terms of catch, in the sense of reporting only one 
species. This was more frequent among those fishing shellfish by means of trawl, eel by means 
of fyke-nets or herring. Among the species that were absent from the fishermen’s report, but 
which according to Lagenfelt and Svedäng (1999) should be present, were pollack, saithe, 
                                                          
6 Fishermen in the area have adapted their fishing to the ecosystem’s high biological diversity by combining 
different fishing technologies on a seasonal basis. Diversification is a strategy to spread economic risk by 
matching ecological diversity and dynamics. Specialisation is more oriented towards resource concentration and 
intensification of investment to one or few modes of resource use (McCay 1978). In fisheries there is a 
tendency to associate small-scale and local coastal fisheries to diversification and large scale to specialisation. 
Even when it sounds to be a reasonable way to present differences between the two, one should pay attention 
to the fact that in fisheries high-technological mobile units can de facto apply both strategies: diversification and 
specialisation.
Table 6.2  Respondents reported catches in the Väderö questionnaire and its
  relation to the logbook reported catch in ICES’ Square 4656  (ton). 
Species Catches reported by 
respondents (N=48) 
Reported catch in 
log-books
Square 4656 N=208) 
Väderö respondents 
% of catch 
Total 168,8 960 18% 
Deep sea prawn 89,6 229 39% 
Nephrops 36,8 100,6 37% 
Herring 15 17,5 86% 
Dogfish 14 21,7 65% 
Eel 5,3 27,5 19% 
Mackerel 2,9 12,6 23% 
Lobster 1,9 0,8 238%* 
Sole 1,5 0,3 500%* 
Cod 1,08 7,9 14% 
Haddock 0,5 2 25% 
Plaice 0,09 0,09 100% 
Crab 0,07 16,6 0% 
Whiting 0,05 0,2 25% 
Note: * Shows inconsistence with the reporting 
Sources: Lagenfelt and Svedäng (1999) and National Board of Fisheries database.
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turbot, flounder, sprat, garfish and brown trout. The reported catches of cod, whiting, 
mackerel, crab, eel and salmon were low when compared to earlier data.
As we saw earlier in chapter 2, figures 2.4, and 2.5, tracked the changes in landed fish at the 
fish auction in Smögen displaying a marked decline in many of the historically important 
species, mainly groundfish. Both table 6.2 and figures 2.4, and 2.5, corroborate the view that 
fisheries for small pelagics have completely lost significance for local fishermen and that a 
switch has occurred from groundfish to shellfish fisheries. In contrast to the absence of 
groundfish in the fishermen’s reports, the absence of other certain species such as salmon, 
trout, garfish, and crab in the professional fishermen’s reports was less a cause for surprise. 
Commercial fishing for these species is not well developed in the area.7 The extremely low 
reporting of eel and flat fish species was more remarkable, though the situation of the eel 
stocks throughout Europe has been reported as critical (Fiskeriverket 2001). Nevertheless, the 
level of diversity, in terms of species, was high when compared to other areas of Sweden.8
The data from the present survey and the logbook data for the respective ICES-grid-square 
show how important shellfish are. Table 6.2 reveals some inconsistencies between the 
respondents’ information, for sole and lobster catches, and what has been reported in the 
logbooks. Lobster, a non-quota regulated resource, is heavily fished on a seasonal basis by 
both professional and recreational fisheries, highly valued by relatives and well rewarded on 
the informal market. These are factors which may encourage misreporting.
As a group, static gear - with an emphasis on pots (traps), creels and fyke-nets and gillnet sets - 
was mentioned more frequently than mobile gear. But the most common single type of gear 
was the trawl. 86% of the informants indicated they have used some type of static gear and 
64% some type of active gear (otter bottom trawl, combi-bottom-trawl and trolling). More 
than 50% of the fishermen combined static and active gear. For example, those fishing 
Nephrops with trawl and belonging to the active gear group could make seasonal use of static 
gear for lobster, eel or crab by means of pots. Still, their dominant fishery was Nephrops.
Typical combinations as regards catch and gear were:
 Deep-sea prawn and Nephrops, fished by means of active gear (trawling)
 Deep-sea prawn and mixed fish fished by means of active gear (trawling).
 Nephrops and fish fished by means of active gear (trawling).
 Nephrops, lobster and mixed fish fished by means of static gear.
 Lobster, eel and mixed fish, fished by means of static gear. 
Clearly, despite the relatively small size of the area, the diversity of species and habitats 
involved is reflected in the coexistence of various fishing techniques, adapted to work 
different depths and types of sea bottom. Traditionally diversity in small-scale fisheries has 
provided a means of insurance against the natural fluctuations in local abundance of resources 
that characterises the coastal waters. 
Changes in the respondents’ fisheries
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they had experienced changes in their fishing 
practices and catches from the area in recent years. 30 fishermen out of the 33 respondents 
indicated that there had been some change, while only three indicated no change. They were 
                                                          
7 Recreational fishermen commonly mention these species in the reported catches (Lagenfelt and Svedäng 1999).
8 For comparisons see Lagenfelt and Svedäng (1999) and Neuman and Píriz (2000). 
107
then invited to indicate the nature of these changes by selecting from a pre-selected range of 
answers (see table 6.3). 
The answers indicate that the issue of diversity loss is a phenomenon not only observed by 
marine scientists but also perceived by the fishermen. The only other observable trend was 
that the area covered when fishing, the time spent at sea and the costs of fishing have not 
diminished, further underlining the fact that decline in diversity reflects resource availability 
rather than any conscious reduction in fishing effort. In general in fisheries increases in the use 
of resources (capital, time, space) are either associated with expansion due to abundance or 
with compensation for poor availability of fish. In coastal fisheries, increased time spent at sea 
is often related to less catch per unit of effort. In this case, two informants said that time at 
sea, expenditures or area covered had decreased (table 6.3). But they also indicated “there was 
no fish available, that seals and poaching were problematic” and “that it did not make sense to 
fish” (see table 6.4). Thus, in this case, the poor availability of fish had probably resulted in a 
reduction of fishing operations in the area. 
Those who indicated that in their experience catch volume had decreased were involved in 
fishing Nephrops with static gear. This group also noted that the fishing area and time at sea 
had increased. Likewise reports of increased fishing costs came mainly from static gear 
fishermen. By contrast, those who reported improved or unchanged situations were involved 
in trawling for prawn alone or combined trawling for Nephrops. There was consistency in their 
answers to the effect that species diversity and operating costs had not changed significantly in 
recent years.
It is well known in fisheries, that coastal fishermen have their “preferred fishing spots”. 
Fishermen were asked whether they had stopped fishing any of their preferred locations 
within the area and to offer any reasons why. Ten of the 33 informants stated they had 
abandoned favourite fishing sites. Their answers are presented in box 6.1 and indicate some of 
the problems that the local coastal fishermen are facing: shortage of fish due to poor water 
quality, natural predators and other fisheries. These responses are consistent with the results in 
chapters 5 and 7.
Table 6.3  Respondents’ perceived changes with respect to their   
  fisheries in the Väderö-area.
Q: Have you experienced changes in your fishing from the area in the last few years? 
N No of 
respondents
Yes No Left blank
33 33 30 3 0
Q: If yes, have you experienced any of the following changes?
Type of change Increased Decreased No 
change
Left blank 
Volume of catch 9 11 8 2 
Catch diversity  0 15 10 5 
Area covered 10 1 11 7 
Time at sea 9 2 11 8 
Costs 12 1 7 10 
Source: Väderö-questionnaire 1998
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6.2.4 Problems faced by the respondents in the present cpr situation 
In order to find out what the fishermen themselves regarded as problematic they were asked 
to answer the following question: When fishing in the area, have you found obstacles that you 
relate to any of the factors here below? A list of twenty-two possible factors was given (table 
6.4). The respondents were asked to add new factors to the list where necessary. The results 
are presented in table 6.4. Thirty-one of the 33 informants stated that there were obstacles to 
their fishery. They were also asked to assign a value, from 1 to 5, to each factor. In the scale 
used to assess the factor 1 represented not problematic, and 5 a severe problem (see note in 
table 6.4).
The assignation of values of 3-5, denoting what could be interpreted to be the more serious 
category of problems, accounted for only a third of the answers. In the table a bold line has 
been drawn where the degree of disturbance seems to become weak. The results suggest that 
most fishermen did not consider the majority of listed factors as representing serious 
problems.  Reasoning in this way is interesting considering that the factors presented in the 
questionnaire were selected on the basis of the analysis of the fisherman association’s 
newspaper, Yrkesfiskaren, and consultations with various actors involved in the management 
of the coastal zone and the fisheries. Yet only six informants made use of the opportunity to 
include additional factors namely: trawling (3 respondents),9 poaching and theft (1 
respondent), divers (1 respondent), bureaucracy (1 respondent) and abandoned mussel farms 
(1 respondent). These were assigned the values 5, 5, 5; 5; 4; 4; and 4 respectively. These 
additional answers have been included in tables 6.4 under the pre-identified factors: “other 
fishing” (trawling), “control” (poaching), “summer visitors” (diving), “fishing regulations” 
(bureaucracy) and “fish farms” (mussel farms) respectively. As a result of this, “fish farms” 
was reformulated as aquaculture.
                                                          
9 It is worth mentioning here that the three respondents who assigned 5 to trawling under the item “Other 
factors” fished for Nephrops with creels. 
Box  6.1 Reasons for abandon “preferred fishing spots”
Q: Have you stopped fishing in any of your “preferred spots” within the area? 
N No of respondents Yes No Left blank 
33 33 10 23 0 
Q: If yes, please explain why 
• New rules in fisheries and threatened fish stocks due to eel fyke - net fishery (static gear & active gear). 
• Most fish is finished due to seals and cormorants. As soon as you start hand-lining mackerel the seals arrive 
(static gear). 
• There is no food fish left (matfisk), it does not make sense to fish there (static gear). 
• Poor water quality, too many pleasure boats, gear poaching, abundant of algae and seals (static gear) 
• There is no more fish to get there, so I gave up fishing. Plankton survives only 10 days after hatching (static 
gear).
• Catch of fish (flat - or round fish) has diminished or run out completely (active gear). 
• Prawn and flatfish is gone, Nephrops creels hinder access during long periods (active gear). 
• The size of the prawns has diminished considerably (active gear). 
• Too many large trawlers have started fishing there too (active gear). 
• I have stopped fishing on some patches where the bottoms are dead, with oxygen deficiency due to nutrient 
overload. There are dead bottoms in Jore and Rödhammar fjords (active gear). 
Source: Väderö-questionnaire 1998 
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Table 6.4 presents the frequency of values assigned to all factors. Even with the inclusion of 
these additional factors, the notion of “serious problems” still only accounts for a third of all 
responses. In table 6.5 all factors from above the dark line in table 6.4 and assigned values 5 
are presented. The factors in table 6.5 have been arranged according to frequency of assigned 
values 4 and 5. 
Turning to those factors which are considered problematic by the coastal fishermen, a number 
can be grouped together as related to the same phenomena or derived from a common 
source: 1) seals and cormorants; 2) leisure boats, summer guests and sea based transport; 3) 
fisheries with static gear and other fisheries;10 4) nutrient discharges; 5) fishery regulations, 
marine reserves and control (see table 6.6). These will be discussed in section 6.5 below. 
                                                          
10 The term “other fisheries” is vague and makes the interpretation difficult.
Table 6.4 The respondents’ assessment of factors affecting their fisheries
Q: When fishing in the area, have you found obstacles that you relate to any of the factors on the list?
N No of respondents Yes No Left blank 
33 32 31 1 1
Q: If yes, please assign a value to the factors presented in the list. 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
 Seals 2 1 2 6 7
 Cormorants 3 0 8 1 3
 Recreation boats 3 5 2 2 3
 Other fisheries (trawling) 4 6 1 1 3
 Summer visitors 4 6 0 1 3
 Marine reserves 6 0 0 0 3
 Nutrient discharge 2 1 2 1 2
 Fishery regulations 3 1 3 1 1
 Fisheries with static gear 7 1 3 2 1
 Maritime transport 5 2 1 0 1
 Control 5 0 0 0 1
 Water quality 2 2 1 1 0
 Fishery with hand gear 6 4 0 1 0
 Windmills 6 0 0 1 0
 Aquaculture 7 0 0 1 0
 Military activities 6 1 2 0 0
 Bottom artefacts 6 2 1 0 0
 Oil industry 6 0 0 0 0
 Industrial facilities 6 0 0 0 0
 Shore protection Act 6 2 0 0 0
 Dredging 7 0 0 0 0
 Landowners 6 1 0 0 0
Total number of mentions 108 35 26 17 28
Note: For further analysis, the values 4 and 5 are assumed to represent what was perceived as a severe problem, value 3 
to represent a moderate negative attitude, value 2 to represent a weak negative attitude and finally value 1 is assumed to 
represent that the factor is not problematic at all.
Source: Väderö-questionnaire 1998
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Table 6.5  Frequency of values 5 and 4 assigned 
  to the factors.  
Factors/Value  4 5 
 Seals 6 7 13 
 Recreation boats 2 3 5 
 Cormorants 1 3 4 
 Other fisheries (trawling) 1 3 4 
 Summer visitors 1 3 4 
 Marine reserves 0 3 3 
 Nutrient discharge 1 2 3 
 Fisheries with static gear 2 1 3 
 Fishery regulations 1 1 2 
 Maritime transport 0 1 1 
 Control 0 1 1 
Source: Väderö-questionnaire 1998
6.2.5 Problems of  the future 
Respondents were also asked to indicate whether they believed any of the current less 
problematic factors might become a threat in the future. Seventeen respondents answered this 
question by assigning an X to one or more of the listed factors to indicate possible future 
threats (see table 6.7). 
Those who responded each selected between one and three factors. The pattern found in the 
answers broadly accords with the responses to the questions in table 6.4. Once again factors 
that had ranked high in the list of current issues (wildlife species and pollution) also appeared 
as future threats. Sea-based recreational activities were, on the other hand, not seen as a 
potential threat; fresh water quality on the other hand, was of greater concern. Those who 
trawled for shellfish –the most numerous group of respondents– perceived marine reserves 
and fishery regulations as future problems. Marine reserves (not so widely regarded as a 
present threat in table 6.4) were seen as a more significant future problem along with fishery 
regulations.
Table 6.6 The problematic factors in an aggregated form 
Factors  4+5
1) Competition within the ecosystem  17 
2) Sea based recreational activities  10 
3) Competing fisheries  7 
4) Institutional arrangements  6 
5) Deterioration of the ecosystem  3 
Source: Väderö-questionnaire 1998
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6.2.6 Communicating concerns: patterns of  interaction in the search for 
solutions
To identify to whom they turned for solutions to the problems they faced, the fishermen were 
asked to nominate one or more actors from a prepared list of 33 (or to add any actor not 
mentioned on the given list). The list included organisations and actors directly involved in 
fisheries as well as those involved in coastal environmental protection, community 
development and political representation (see table 6.8). As a complement this question was 
expected to provide information on the networks that fishermen use and their willingness to 
discuss their professional concerns within such networks. It was also hoped that information 
on inter- and intra-sectoral communication at local, regional and national levels might give 
some indication of how they would rate potential actors in a co-management perspectives. 
All 33 fishermen responded to this question, but almost half claimed that they had not 
contacted anyone on the list to discuss any of the problems, even though they may have 
perceived them as severe and in fact assigned them a value 4 or 5 in table 6.4.  Less than half 
the actors on the list were selected by the respondents. With the exception of one fisherman, 
who communicated with 14 actors11, the majority of those indicating they had already 
discussed the issue with someone actually selected between 3 and 5 actors from an effective 
                                                          
11 The fisherman who claimed to have contacted 14 actors from the list trawled for shellfish and had selected 
marine reserves as his sole choice of existing problem. As an exception this is highly interesting because it 
illustrates just how extensive the network of influential actors can be in relation to a specific issue. It also 
suggests that the growing diversity of activities and interests in the coastal zone implies that the network of 
contacts that fishermen have to consider in searching for solutions to cpr problems is becoming very much 
more extensive. Simply put, this exceptional case exposes elements of the spectrum of actors that are 
influential to the management of coastal fisheries, which is increasing.
Table 6.7  Potential threats to fisheries as indicated by professional fishermen
  fishing in the area of Väderö. 
Q: If you see there are factors on this list that are unproblematic today but you 
think will be problematic in future please mark this/these  factors with an “X”. 
N No of respondents Left blank 
33 17 16 
Potential threats No of answers 
Marine reserves 6 
Nutrient discharge 4 
Water quality 4 
Fishery regulations 4 
Seals 3 
Oil industry 2 
Cormorants 2 
Control 2 
Bottom artefacts 2 
Fishery with static gear 1 
Fishery with hand gear (angling) 1 
Other fisheries 1 
Summer visitors 1 
Industrial facilities 1 
Note: Only factors identified by the respondents have been included.
Source: Väderö-questionnaire 1998 
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list of 17 out of the original list of 33. Colleagues in the fishing industry proved the most 
common choice.
No additional actors were put forward by the respondents, and the following listed actors 
were not selected: Local Development Association; owner of private fishing rights; Water 
Owners Association; Environmental NGO; EU-project; Fishery Division of the County 
Board Administration; Fisheries controller; Subsistence Fishermen’s Association; Fish farmers 
Association; Processing Industry Association; Sport-fishermen Association; Coastguards; 
Environmental Protection Agency; Member of the European Commission. Moreover a third 
of the actors listed on table 6.8 were mentioned only once or twice. By far the majority made 
exclusive use of colleagues and family members. Apart from family members and professional 
colleagues, the most frequent contacts were with the fishermen’s association at local and/or 
regional levels, SVC in particular. Indeed, rather surprising was the apparent reluctance to use 
other, more formal channels.
In general the fishermen kept their search for solutions within the fishery sector and at the 
local level. This suggests that discussing local fishing problems directly with the Swedish 
National Fishermen’s Association (SFR) or the National Board of Fisheries (NBF), the two 
organisations that were the pillars in the Swedish central co-management, was not common. 
No communication appears to occur with resource users in other sectors, and contacts with 
authorities outside the fishery sector were very uncommon.
The lack of communication between the fishermen and other resource users over the state of 
the coastal environment may be explained by the facts that problems contained within the 
fisheries sector were prioritised and possible sources of mediation readily identifiable in the 
form of the fisheries associations. The mode of working of sectoral organisations may inhibit 
the development of more broadly constructed arenas for discussions involving a range of 
different stakeholders. 
Those who accounted for the widest network of contacted actors were the fishermen using 
active gear (trawl) who ranked marine reserves as a potentially severe present and future 
threat. By contrast, those fishing with static gear either contacted no one or used a very 
narrow network consisting mainly of colleagues or relatives. One can speculate that the 
narrow network of those fishing with static gear can partly be explained by the characteristics 
of the problems confronted– seals, leisure boats, and eutrophication – and partly by the 
organisation of their fisheries. These problems involve boundary-less, “fuzzy” communities of 
users whose identification and circumscription is rather complicated. Fixed gear fishermen 
tend to be more dispersed, and often work alone or with a close relative. In the particular case 
of the eel fisheries, the catches are not delivered to the local auction but are collected directly 
by the buyers. As a result, eel fishermen have a rather narrow ecological and social space of 
action in their professional lives.
The results also indicated that static gear fishermen may have less access to influential arenas 
of negotiation than those engaged in trawl fishing. This in turn prompts the question as to 
what issues are considered crucial by delegates to the regional association, SVC: do they, in 
fact, coincide with those identified by local fishermen in Väderö, and how? This question was 
addressed in the second questionnaire. 
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6.3 AN INQUIRY WITH LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES
Chapter 2 described how the fishermen’s associations (FAs) came to play a potentially 
influential role in fisheries management and in the resolution of specific problems identified 
by members. The opinions of the delegates to the regional association therefore merit separate 
analysis. Accordingly, a second but less comprehensive questionnaire was distributed among 
fishermen attending the 1998 annual congress of the Swedish West Coast Fishermen’s 
Association (SVC). Its purpose was to examine the perceptions of problems by the delegates 
and the extent to which their perceptions conformed to the problems perceived by the local 
fishermen from the Väderö archipelago area.
According to its statutes, each local SVC branch has the right to send to the congress one 
delegate for each 20 active members.12 With the recession in fisheries some branches may be 
unable to fulfil the minimum criterion of 20 active members. It is in the South, in the 
surroundings of Göteborg, that local branches with the largest number of members and most 
young fishermen are found. It is also the base for the semi-industrial fishing vessels. The 
system of representation is significant. Indeed, scrutiny of SVC’s 1998 list of active members 
indicated that as many as 19 out of 38 branches failed to reach the threshold for nominating a 
delegate  to  the  1998  congress. Three branches  from  Southern  Bohuslän,  11 from central
                                                          
12 Membership in the Association is open to all fishermen, vessel owners, and crew members alike on equal 
terms. In 1997, SVC had a total of 6,275 members of whom 1,155 were active fishermen. 
Table 6.8  Actors with whom fishermen have discussed what they 
 perceived to be severe problems. 
Q: Have you contacted any person or organization to discuss problems you have 
assigned a value of 5 or X in the question above? 
N No of 
respondents
Yes No Left blank 
33 33 17 16 0 
Q:  If yes, please identify among the instances listed here below or nominate yourself.
Actor No of answers 
Colleague 16 
Family member 10 
Swedish West Coast Fishermen’s Association 7
Local Coastal Fishermen’s Association  4 
Producers’ Organisation. 3 
Institute of Marine Research, (NBF–Lysekil)  3 
Swedish National Fishermen’s Association (SFR) 2 
Fish merchant 2 
Municipal Officer 2 
County Administration, Nature Conservation 2
Other scientists 2 
Media 1 
Local politician 1 
Fish auction 1 
National Board of Fisheries  1 
Member of the Swedish Parliament 1 
Ministerial Fisheries Department 1 
   
 Source: Väderö-questionnaire 1998 
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Bohuslän and 5 from northern Bohuslän ought therefore to be disqualified.
In other words, the system benefits the representation of fishermen living close together in 
concentrations, or a “pocket-like” distribution. Such conditions occur around the main 
landing harbours and fish auctions. This will tend to favour certain types of fishing that rely 
on good harbour facilities and auctions, which is not the case for, for example, the eel 
fisheries. This problem can take on an extreme dimension when it is appreciated that the 
crews of two semi-industrial vessels can together generate sufficient members to appoint one 
delegate. While crew members can easily meet together and prioritise the same problems, this 
is probably not the case for 20 fishermen fishing alone or in pairs. 
6.3.1 The study group and problems of  representation 
The 1998 congress took place in the coastal city of Varberg in the province of Halland, south 
of Göteborg, and the delegates came from the entire West Coast of Sweden. Those who 
attend the congress are normally delegates nominated by their local branches. SVC was at that 
time organised in 38 local branches: 23 in Central and Northern Bohuslän, 12 in Southern 
Bohuslän and 3 in the province of Halland.
Of the 65 registered participants, 40 (62%) identifying themselves as coastal fishermen 
completed the questionnaire. Table 6.9 displays some of the basic descriptors of these 40 
respondents and their fishing activities. When the data presented in table 6.9 are compared to 
data from the fishermen responding to the Väderö questionnaire, some differences 
immediately become evident. Among the delegates who filled in the questionnaire, only a 
small minority (20%) deploy static gear; the majority fish outside the trawling limits and 
roughly two-thirds are involved in trips involving more than 24 hours absence from the home 
port. All this points to a distribution skewed towards larger fishing vessels rather than the 
small scale, inshore units. Nevertheless all respondents, despite these differences, defined 
themselves as “coastal fishermen” posing once again the question of how professional coastal 
fisheries are conceptualised in the dominant management regime (see chapter 5). 
The common denominator throughout all the regional modalities was trawling for shellfish 
with a focus on Nephrops. The composition of the delegates was heterogeneous in terms of 
residence, size of the vessel, crew, and fishing pattern. In terms of fishing type, there was 
evidence of fairly distinctive regional specialisation; trawling for finfish and Nephrops were 
characteristics of the representatives from Southern Bohuslän, who often operated with crews 
consisting of more than three men, and who were at sea for more than 24 hours; trawling for 
deep sea prawns and Nephrops were characteristics of the representatives from Northern 
Bohuslän, who operated with smaller crews and for periods of three days or less.
Table 6.9 also provides information on the area of residence of the informants. Their 
geographical representation was rather balanced, and the geographical range of residence was 
expected to generate differences in terms of the identification of problems. Therefore, place 
of residence was considered a useful variable to categorise the fishermen’s definition of 
problems.
6.3.2 Problems associated by the respondents with the multiple-use situation 
In order to investigate what the delegates perceived to be problems in the multiple use 
situation, the questionnaire offered a list of 19 possible factors (see table 6.10) and 
respondents were asked to select a maximum of 5 factors constraining coastal fisheries in the 
West Coast. Most respondents chose to answer with 3-5 factors which explains the high 
number of responses. The responses of the delegates have been grouped according to the 
delegates’ origin: north or south. 
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Some of the factors listed differed slightly from those used in the Väderö questionnaire and 
the selection procedure was simpler.13 Therefore direct comparisons can only be made with 
caution. Responses in table 6.10 do not appear to reveal a very different set of priority 
problems than those previously assigned by local fishermen from Väderö. The common 
problems are: competition from within the ecosystem, the deterioration of the ecosystem, 
different fishing practices and institutional arrangements. 
Perhaps, not all that surprisingly, responses from the North did in fact coincide well with 
those identified by the local fishermen in Väderö. Again, the fishermen were given the 
opportunity to add any relevant factors to the list. Only one fisherman from the South chose 
to use the option, adding the name of a particular producers’ organisation from Northern 
Boshulän (NBPO) pursuing ideas on the devolution of management to the local level (see 
chapter 8). 
Likewise, concerns about industry related activities were common to all delegates. However, 
while problems of competition within the ecosystem – seals and cormorants, nutrient 
discharges and demands from nature conservation – remained a concern for the delegates 
from the North, they were less frequently mentioned by those from the South. For delegates 
from the South, on the other hand, much more frequent problems were industrial pollution 
and nutrient discharges, followed by industry-related activities such as dredging, and sports 
fishing (anglers). This is only to be expected, as industrial and urban activities on the West 
Coast increase towards Göteborg in Southern Bohuslän. Thus, delegates from the South 
clearly brought into the debate problems from their own immediate area, strengthening the 
significance of spatial variables and of local ties in the definition of problems. By contrast, 
                                                          
13 The list of factors in this questionnaire included a few new factors that could be relevant to fishermen living in 
more urban and industrialised areas (mussel farms and harbour activities) and excluded some factors which 
were shown irrelevant for the area (landowner, shore protection act, bottom artefacts). Finally some wording 
was adapted; fisheries, was better specified by making use of the terms trawling, subsistence fishery, sport-
fisheries and other coastal fisheries. Marine reserve was changed to “nature conservation in the form of 
protected areas” and fishery regulations specified as capture limitations to protect stocks. Finally the term 
“leisure boats” was divided into two: “tourism development” and “sea-based transport”.
Table 6.9  Basic attributes of fishing activities of the responding SVC-delegates 
  (N=40) 
Attribute Variability/range in the attribute
No of answers 
Left blank 
Area of residence  North* 
23
South**
13 4
Type of fishing gear  Active 
31
Active & Static 
6
Static
2 1
Fishing operations in relation 
to the trawling line 
 Outside 
26
Within & Outside 
8
Within
4 2
Fishing operations in relation 
to the belt of sherries (base-
line)
 Outside 
30
Within
8 2
Days at sea  24 hours 
13
1-3 days 
15
> 3 days 
12 0
Size of the crew  > 3 men 
16
2-3 men 
13
1 man 
4 7
Note: *North includes: Central & Northern Bohuslän; **South includes Halland and Southern Bohuslän. 
Source: SVC-questionnaire 1998 
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concern over subsistence14 fisheries, defined as “husbehovsfiske” are more uniformly 
experienced throughout the West Coast, though concerns over sports fishing appeared to 
harden in the South of the region. Issues related to nature conservation and the establishment 
of marine reserves feature rather less prominently and are regionally differentiated.
What is perhaps notable in the fishermen’s selection of factors is an apparent lack of concern 
for the problems posed by fishery regulations, though this situation changes appreciably once 
the delegates are asked to answer in their own words questions on the perceived threats to 
their own fishing activities (see table 6.11). In an attempt to confirm and amplify the results 
presented in table 6.10, the informants were asked to express in their own words what they 
considered as the main threats to their own fishing activity. The factors identified by the 
respondents are listed in table 6.11.
                                                          
14 The term subsistence comes from agriculture (subsistence crop). In fisheries, it is commonly used to refer to a 
type of fishery where the fisherman and his family consume most of the catch, leaving little to be marketed in 
the local community. 
Table 6.10 The responding SVC delegates’ assessment of problems 
Q: Which of the following activities do you think have a conflict relation with coastal 
fisheries?  Select among these a maximum of five (5) you consider to be the most urgent ones 
to be resolved. You are welcome to add new factors. 
 Factor No of 
answers
South* North** Undefined
Area of 
residence
N° of respondents  40 13 23 4 
Nutrient discharges  25 10 11 4 
Discharges industrial activities  25  12  9 4 
Seals 24 4 17 3 
Subsistence fisheries 21 7 12 2 
Sport-fishing 16  8  6 2 
Nature conservation, 
protected areas 16 5 9 2 
Dredging 15 8 5 2 
Cormorants 12 3 8 1 
Diverse sea based transport 8  4  4 0 
Fishery regulations 7 3 3 1 
Trawling 6 1 4 1 
Spills from vessels 5 2 3 0 
Other coastal fishery 4 2 2 0 
Defence activities  3  1 2 0 
Mussel farms 2 0 1 1 
Fish farms 2 0 2 0 
Harbour activities and 
constructions 3 1 1 1 
Tourism development 1 1 0 0 
Wind power 1 0 1 0 
Other (NBPO) 1 0 0 1 
 Total 197 72 100 25 
*South includes: Halland & Southern Bohuslän; **North includes: Central & Northern Bohuslän.
Source: SVC-questionnaire 1998 
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32 fishermen provided 57 responses; most respondents mentioned between 1-3 factors. In 
some instances the respondents chose merely to repeat factors from the list provided, notably 
nutrients discharge (5), subsistence fisheries (3), seals (2) and maritime transport (1). But as 
many as 29 fishermen chose to formulate the factors in their own terms.
What emerges is a somewhat different picture than that previously generated. In particular, 
issues relating to fisheries management become more prominent; both in terms of concern 
over specific regulations to allocate resources (e.g. quotas) and in terms of the process of 
decision making and the actors directly involved. In a sense, the fishermen left the world of 
multiple-use activities, which had dominated the multiple choice list of factors presented to 
them, and emphasised institutional issues.
The respondents indicated that the rules and the actors are very much part of the problem. 
Quotas, marine reserves, TACs, rations, control, and complicated rules are all directly related 
to the management instruments. The first three were more frequently mentioned by the 
shellfish fishermen from the North (the study area); the next three by fishermen from the 
South. Eight respondents drew attention to actors involved in the debate and design of 
management instruments, i.e. authorities, NBPO, bureaucrats, the EU, decision-makers, 
biologists, and Swedish and foreign fishermen. 
By doing this, the respondents revealed which actors they considered to be influential in a 
situation where the governance of fisheries is distributed and engages many actors. Also in the 
Väderö case, elements of the socio-political network through which modern governance of 
fisheries is distributed were exposed, but actors identified by the delegates were not these 
included in the narrow network of the local fishermen from Väderö. One may also argue that 
when discussing the critical involvement of others in the management of fisheries, the 
delegates also revealed problems related to their own low degree of influence over 
management.
NBPO, a Producers’ Organization bringing together shellfish fishermen from Northern 
Bohuslän, seemed to be controversial. NBPO had questioned the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of the current national management regime and opened up the debate on alternative 
management regimes. This issue will be analysed in detail in chapter 8. 
Table 6.11  Problematic factors as formulated by the respondents
Q: Could you give examples of problems that you regard are threatening your own fisheries? 
N No of respondents Left blank 
40 32 8 
Factor Mentioned No of 
answers
Factor Mentioned No of 
answers
Quotas  7 EU  2 
Marine Reserves  5 Foreigners  2 
TAC  4 Authorities  2 
NBPO 4 Complicated rules  1 
Expenses  4 Ignorance among decision makers 1 
Lack of fish  3 Biologists  1 
Bureaucrats  3 Poor youth recruitment  1 
Fish prices   2 Poor co-operation among fishermen 1 
Control  2 Poachers  1 
Rations  2 Import of prawn  1 
Source: SVC-questionnaire 1998 
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6.4 DISCUSSING CRITICAL FACTORS IN THE CPR SITUATION OF THE 
FISHERMEN FROM NORTHERN BOHUSLÄN.
The discussion now focuses on those factors deemed critical by fishermen from Northern 
Bohuslän and identified in the tables.
6.4.1 Seals and Cormorants 
Fishermen, especially those fishing with static gear, believe seals to be the most serious 
problem affecting the coastal fisheries. In Sweden, the population of seals and the relationship 
of human society to what is often regarded as charismatic species has undergone drastic 
change15.
“Thirty years ago the Swedish fishermen were paid a bounty for each seal they shot” 
{0.1#146}.
In 1974, following recommendations from the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), general seal 
hunting was prohibited in Sweden16. In the seventies and the eighties, seals became 
endangered species and protection measures were adopted. In the Baltic Sea seal populations 
were threatened by biocides (DDT and PCBs) polluting the waters while on the West Coast 
the threat came mainly from a viral epidemic.17
Debates addressing seal related issues have occurred from time to time in the Swedish 
Parliament throughout the last 20 years. While the issue of seal management has continued to 
be debated the type and magnitude of the problem has altered with changes in the number of 
seals. The debate in parliament has gone from a spirit of “saving the seals” from extinction, to 
a spirit of “demonising seals” as a consequence of their population explosion and the 
increasing damage and cost.18
In the mid nineties the seal populations had recovered and become a substantial problem for 
small-scale local coastal fishermen. The fishermen’s association was therefore strongly in 
favour of hunting as a solution to the problems caused by the increased number of seals. 
Today, however, seals are protected by international conservation policies. Indeed nothing 
seems to energise the marine conservation movement as much as the protection of seals.  
Furthermore, for the tourism sector and the sea-based leisure community, seals are important 
natural resources. Few cases that better exemplify a value-laden conflict. 
That in the last decade seals have caused severe problems to the fishermen in the Baltic Sea is 
a well-known fact. On the other hand, Lunneryd (1999) reports that about 1000 grey seals die 
every year in the Baltic entangled in fishing gear.
Not only the fishermen, but also the seals and the state are in trouble: the seals because they 
often become trapped in the gear, and the state and tax payers because they  must compensate 
the fishermen for losses valued at millions of Swedish crowns and support the development of 
                                                          
15 Three different species of seals are found in Swedish waters: the ringed seal (Pusa hispida), the grey seal 
(Halicoerus gripus) and the harbour seal (Phoca vitulina). The first two occur in The Baltic Sea and the latter occurs 
in The Skagerrak.
16 “Protective hunting” was permitted until 1987 (Olsson 1996).
17 Phocine distemper. 
18 In Sweden the fishermen are compensated for damaged gear. Estimates made by the National Board of 
Fisheries on the total annual economic losses throughout Sweden in terms of lost catch, damaged gear and 
state compensation, refer to figures exceeding 30 millions of Swedish Crowns (Westerberg et al. 2000). 
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new, more selective fishing gear. Estimates put the harbour seal population in Kattegatt and 
Skagerrak at 5,000 individuals in the early 1990s and 15,000 individuals in 1998 (Lunneryd 
2001). In Skagerrak, where the seals (harbour seal) are numerically fewer - about 1700 animals 
according to Lunneryd (2001) - and where the fisheries are focused on shellfish species the 
damage to fishing and the loss of seals through incidental capture is less pronounced. 
Scientists argue that, in general, the number of seals is still comparatively low compared to at 
the turn of the century, and that there should still be scope for the populations to grow 
(Lunneryd 1999; Westerberg 1999). According to the fishermen from Northern Bohuslän, 
seals were previously not considered a problem in this area, partly because they were less in 
number, partly because there was more fish available and partly because more fishermen were 
fishing at greater distances from the shore.
“Today they are around here (meaning the inshore) and as soon as you set the net, they 
come” {0.0#139}. 
Those fishing with static gear reported that the harbour seal searches for food in the fyke-nets 
used in the eel fisheries where by-catches of juvenile cod and flatfish occur. The fishermen 
reported that seals also poach the long lines used, for example, in mackerel fishing.
Westerberg (1999) and Lunneryd (2001) confirm that seals mainly affect eel fishermen making 
use of fyke-nets. They also speculate that the increasing problem with the seals in this case 
may be related to changes in food availability in offshore waters, which force seals to forage in 
shallow areas where the eel fishery takes place. The authors’ hypothesis is consistent with the 
overfishing of both small-pelagics and the gadoid and the ecological shift to crustaceans. Such 
reasoning links the issue of seals met by the small-scale fishermen to the fishing patterns of 
larger-scale modern fisheries, and shifts attention from the seals as being the problem, to the 
modern fishery practices and their management.
The fact that in the questionnaires fishermen operating active gear also reported the seals to 
be a problem was somewhat unexpected. Even when the interviews revealed that many 
fishermen from Northern Bohuslän actually combined gear their focus was on shellfish and 
they did not report as many damaged set of gear as those from the Baltic. This may indicate 
that the fishermen from Northern Bohuslän were already saturated with problems and that the 
issue of the seals was “the straw that broke the camel’s back”. 
Shellfish fishermen were, in general, concerned about the harbour seal as consumers of fish 
(ca 4-6 kg fish per individual and day). They claimed that seals consumed at least as much or 
more cod and groundfish than was allocated to the Swedish fishermen in the quotas. Similar 
observations have been made by Lunneryd (2001).
Studies by Härkönen and Heide-Jørgensen (1991) confirm an average daily intake of 4 kg per 
day and cod as the most important food item in the diet of the harbour seal. The same authors 
had earlier indicated that the total fish consumption by harbour seals of commercially 
important species in 1989 did not exceed 1 % of the catches by the fisheries in the entire 
Skagerrak. As discussed by Lynneryd (2001), the calculations of Härkönen and Heide-
Jørgensen (1991) are based on different figures. The fishermen exclude catches of small 
pelagics made by the more industrial fisheries in the entire Skagerrak, which are included in 
the scientists’ calculations.  This underlines the problem of shortcomings in the methods used 
to assess stocks, on the one hand, and the ideas advanced by ecologists and the representatives 
of conservation NGOs, on the other hand:
“The consumption of resources by seals should be accounted for by multi-species stock 
assessments and reflected in the TACs” {1.1#69}.
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As seals have their specific feeding grounds, reduced TACs could alleviate the pressure on the 
fish stocks in general, but not necessarily alleviate the situation for the local fishermen.
Lunneryd (2001) argues that one way to solve the conflict between the seals and the fisheries 
might be to reduce the seal population and to treat seals as a natural resource. However, any 
hunting to reduce the seal population must be done within safe biological limits and the size 
of the minimum viable population of seals, in theory, can only be determined on biological 
grounds. Yet the size of the population and its historical development is still subject to debate 
and different estimates lead to different arguments concerning strategies. Consequently, the 
debate has been plagued by methodological problems and different expert findings on the 
state of health of the seal populations. This uncertainty has made the decision-making process, 
normally grounded in scientific results, more difficult.
In the case of wildlife conservation, the situation becomes complex, and the authorities often 
rely on scientific facts while the more critical value laden issues are often downplayed. The 
tactic of focusing on facts and figures and characterising the issue as “seals versus fishermen” 
can play into the hand of the fishermen, because it obscures the value debate to which today’s 
society is highly sensitive. The latter is illustrated in the following excerpt from an interview.
“In 1995 a working group, comprising the National Environmental Protection Agency, 
the National Board of Fisheries, the National Museum of Natural History and the 
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation,19 was established to consider the seal problem 
and seek solutions. But the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation was unwilling to 
discuss any solution which might involve restoring the hunting of seals, and left the group 
at an early stage” {0.1#34}.
In the above case, the conservation NGO was not prepared to discuss the possibility of seals 
being hunted or harvest. This “putting the seals first” position was not found among 
interviewees resident in the study area. 
In 2002, a limited cull of seals was permitted on the East Coast. On the West Coast, a new 
viral epidemic had spread rapidly drastically affecting the mortality of harbour seals. This 
might be expected to have decreased the uptake of cod for some time. If there is a simple 
relationship between the number of seals and the availability of cod in coastal areas then the 
reduced number of seals due to viral epidemics ought to lead to a rise in cod stocks both in 
the 1990s and again for a few years after 2002. However, the analysis made by Lunneryd 
(2001) with regard to possible positive effects on the cod stocks after the viral epidemic of 
1998 showed no clear relationship. During that period the seal problem on the West Coast 
had lost much of its immediacy but it quickly returned when the epidemic was over.
Each definition of a problem embodies presumptions about who or what caused the problem, 
and who or what must change (or be changed) to solve it (Dietz et al 1989). In Sweden when 
it comes to the advocacy of nature’s rights and the ascription of values to nature, the central 
government plays a leading role. The central government represented by the National 
Environmental Protection Agency (SNV) and the County Board Administration are involved 
in policy implementation and control. Nature conservation initiatives are often triggered by 
international agreements or by pressure from established national or international nature 
conservation NGOs. The fishermen and their associations cannot do much more than lobby 
and petition the authorities. This is commonly done along sectoral lines and the fishermen’s 
experience of negotiation and collaborative management with actors outside their particular 
sector seems to be poor. Meetings with authorities other than those representing the fisheries 
                                                          
19 In Swedish Naturskyddsförening. 
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sector were unusual. Besides, in the interviews fishermen expressed a feeling that the NGOs 
engaged in nature conservation and sports fishing organisations had far more capacity to 
influence government authorities than the fishing industry’s own associations.
The scientific literature on natural resource conflicts relates mainly to conflicts of interest 
between resource users,20 or between them and people chosen to represent wildlife,21 not 
between users and wildlife. The natural resource per se is only involved in the discussion of 
conflicts as a right or an interest of actual or potential resource users. In Sweden, there is a 
tendency to discuss the situation in terms of problems and with the support of scientific 
figures, which is easier than discussing in terms of conflicts.22 Moreover, in the Swedish debate 
and documentation on the issue of seals, this is often referred to as a problem affecting 
fisheries or as a conflict between the seals and the fisheries or the fishermen. In this case one 
may argue that from the perspective of the fishermen the problems are caused by seals and 
cormorants; they eat the fish and damage the gear. As a result, the conflict is partially hidden, 
because, when defining the problem as a conflict between seals and fishermen, one is actually 
taking part in a process which obscures who the de facto claimants are, their different positions 
and characteristics. The very title of the project proposal “Conflicts between seals and fishery 
in the Baltic” submitted by the Swedish EPA to the HELCOM – Commission (Statens 
Naturvårdsverk 1994) is evidence of how the situation is formally presented. In such a 
proposal, there are no discernible claimants directly opposing the coastal fishermen, only 
wildlife.
Cormorants have also increased in number, affecting fishermen in much the same way as seals. 
Nevertheless, the debate about the cormorants has been less heated. In contrast to the seals, 
cormorants are seldom seen as symbols of natural beauty requiring conservation, and Swedish 
society’s approach to them is more influenced by an anthropocentric perspective23.
Furthermore, cormorants are unpopular even outside the fishery sector, because of the 
damage they cause to the trees where they nest.24
Before Sweden became member of EU, shooting of cormorants was permitted seasonally 
from August to February. When Sweden joined the European Union cormorants (both
Phalacrocorax carbo carbo and Phalacrocorax carbo sinensis) whose populations were previously 
regulated by hunting and by puncturing the eggs, came under the protection of the Habitats 
and Birds Directives. The region most affected by cormorants is that of Kalmar on the Baltic 
coast in the south-eastern part of Sweden. Due to complaints from fishermen from the area, 
the provincial government of Kalmar decided to permit limited shooting (protective hunting) 
during 1998 and 1999. Cormorants were to be hunted only near fishing gear between August 
and March, while their eggs could be punctured between January and July.
Seen from the perspective of many conservation NGOs, seals, cormorants and biological 
diversity have an intrinsic value, while the fishing crisis results from the dominance of a more 
anthropocentric perspective. But the intrinsic value of wildlife does not seem to be absolute. 
                                                          
20 See for example Bavinck (2001) for a discussion on conflicts between fishermen; and Dietz et al (1989) for a 
discussion of how professionals position themselves in terms of resource conflicts. 
21 Steins (1999) has reported on a successful case in the Wadden Sea where birds were at stake.
22 The “seals versus fishermen conflict” and the point of whether this is to be seen as a “conflict” has been a 
matter of discussion both in Sweden and within the SUCOZOMA program. This discussion has been partly 
reported by Bruckmeier (1999) who comments that this is a conflict constituted by different conflicts and 
complicated definitions of interest; the controversy moves back and forth between science and politics.
23 To enter a discussion about the anthropocentric and biocentric perspectives goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For a discussion about these perspectives the reader is referred to, for example, Merchant (1997).
24 In Sweden the cormorants were introduced by man and became established in the late fifties, after having been 
absent as a breeding species for almost 50 years due to human persecution, and have during the last 10 years 
rapidly increased (Engström 1998).
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While, theoretically, the seal and cormorant problems can both be merged as problems in the 
ecosystem, in terms of the strength of feeling they generate among people they do not merit 
comparison. On the contrary, by comparing the ways in which society relates to cormorants 
and seals, one can understand how perceptions of nature influence our ways of resolving this 
type of problem. As Susskind and Weinstein (1980) have observed, a factor contributing to 
the complexity of this type of dispute is the inseparable conjunction and mixing of values and 
facts.
The consumption of fish by seals and cormorants can be seen as appropriation problems 
involving appropriation externalities and, indirectly, technological externalities (see chapter 3). 
Issues of this kind involving interaction with the ecosystem are not discussed in the common 
pool resource management debate but can become a disincentive for co-operation to resolve 
other problems in the commons and generate provision problems. Expressions like the 
following were frequent in the interviews. 
“Why should I do this and that, when the seals will bring me to ruin anyhow”
{1.0# 139}. 
Seals and cormorants are both common pool resources and users of the common pool. Cpr
theoretical perspectives and frameworks address relations between human user groups and the 
necessary conditions for collective action and co-operative behaviour to resolve problems of 
interdependency through the use of shared ecosystems; they do not account for 
interdependencies within the ecosystems themselves. It is useful to highlight here that, 
although “putting seals first”- a biocentric perspective - is attractive, it is not sufficient because 
it does not help to resolve aspects of distribution which are critical in the management of 
common pool resources. Unless one takes further steps in the analysis of the seals issue, 
linking it to changes in the ecosystem and the effects of this on different fishery patterns, as 
Westerberg (1999) and Lunneryd (2001) try to do, the cpr theoretical debate has little to 
contribute.
6.4.2 Boat based activities  
Over time, with increasing nature based leisure activities undertaken by people mainly from 
urban areas, the coast has evolved into an area where the values and interests of non-residents 
frequently predominate. In the Environmental Code (following the former Swedish Natural 
Resource Act) the coastal areas of Central and Northern Bohuslän have been formally defined 
as areas of national interest for nature conservation, professional fisheries and outdoor 
recreation.
The increasing number of boats is considered to have negative ecological effects due to oil 
pollution and other spills, sewage and solid waste disposal, antifouling leakage, noise, and 
disturbance of birds and other habitats (Naturvårdsverket 1992). From this perspective boat 
based activities involve degradation problems from which provision problems arise. Being 
activities that subtract indirectly from the ecosystems, these could also be discussed from the 
perspective of activities leading to appropriation externalities. However, recreational activities, 
because they are non-extractive in purpose, are normally presented as non-consumptive, and 
their interaction with fisheries is discussed in terms of assignment problems. In the interviews 
the fishermen did not discuss in terms of possible indirect subtraction made by recreational 
boating. The problem was mainly related to physical interference or technological externalities 
in the inshore waters affecting those fishing with static gear. Similar results were found in the 
Väderö questionnaire study. This type of problems is often solved through space allocation.
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The interviews indicated that in general locals did respect fishing spots where nets were laid, 
and the direction of current transport activities could be influenced through local planning. 
The problem was mainly related to visitors.
Today the number of leisure boats (motor and sailing) in Sweden has passed the one million 
mark, and the sea-based leisure community is discussed in terms of a people’s movement 
(Sveriges Turistråd, 1987). Coastal waters are openly accessible to yachts and sailing boats, 
“errant” authorised entrants. These normally anchor in natural refuges or in private or 
municipally run marinas. In the interviews, the fishermen reported damage to nets when 
visitors sought to anchor in natural harbours and increasing problems with lobster poaching 
during the summer season.25
Eggert and Ulmestrand (2000) have referred to the interaction between creel fishermen and 
the leisure community as partly explaining the reductions in reported landings of the creel 
fisheries of Nephrops during July. In one interview, a Nephrops creel fisherman explained that 
during the summer he normally switched from static gear to night trawling, not necessarily due 
to the congestion but rather on account of the biology of Nephrops in relation to the phases of 
the moon. Several shellfish fishermen indicated that during summer the harbours become 
overcrowded and that this made their job more difficult. In most cases rules have already been 
adopted to cope with problems of assigning space in landing ports. Petitions from the 
fishermen’s local organisations addressed to the harbour office or the Municipality had in 
most cases been successful. 
In other countries multiple use problems in harbours are dealt with through an umbrella 
organisation involving multiple users which co-ordinate the relationships between the various 
activities (see Steins 1999). In Sweden, the process of consultation of multiple-use stakeholder 
around the harbours is often processed by the Municipalities’ technical committees dealing 
with harbour development, or through the physical planning process. As a result, most 
harbours have given priority to fisheries and organised the use of space by different users 
groups. The comprehensive municipal plan of Tanum, for example, states that in the harbours 
economic activities such as maritime transport and fisheries should be given priority (Tanums 
Kommun 1990). In the same way, the comprehensive municipal plan of Strömstad 
recommends that priority be given to fishing rather than to sailing or tourism (Strömstad-
Kommun 1997). This creates a conflict situation as space in the harbours is limited and the 
financial contribution from the recreational boats is significant for the Municipality.
The Swedish planning and negotiation systems seem to be satisfactory when allocating space 
on land and at fixed facilities such as harbours, but weaker in handling cpr problems and 
conflicts derived from the use of space at sea.26 This is particularly valid when cpr problems 
involve mobile resources and errant users such as recreational boat owners, whose behaviour 
is guided by general social norms but not collectively agreed rules.
The literature reports that fishermen often solve internal assignment problems and 
technological externalities, where only fishermen are involved, on the basis of informal 
agreements (Acheson 1989; Berkes 1989; Schlager and Ostrom 1993). The interviews 
indicated that fishermen take the initiative of making informal agreements on a cross-sectoral 
basis. In the interviews, fishermen gave an example of how the problem of damage to their 
                                                          
25 Anchoring is often free out in the archipelago. The use and services provided by marinas involve a fee. These 
are normally owned by the municipality, a sailing society or privately.
26 Ackefors and Grip (1995); Boverket (1995); Morf (1999) are among other authors that, in one or another way, 
have discussed how these plans relate to coastal issues and resource conflicts. They show that what happens or 
could happen on the seaside of the coast is currently not prioritised in the municipal plans. The plans and the 
legal system in Sweden are still very much oriented to resolve problems on land. Within the framework of 
SUCOZOMA, specific research on this set of problems is carried on by Morf (1999).
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trawl nets from large granite blocks lost at sea during transport (bottom artefacts) had been 
locally resolved (see box 6.1).
The probability that the fishermen could make use of similar informal local mechanisms to 
negotiate and solve problems derived from the interaction with the sea-based leisure 
community where the sources of the problem may be difficult to identify seems to be rather 
low. In the interviews the planners indicated that the involvement of the “leisure community” 
in the municipal planning process is a difficult matter to deal with, mainly due to its transitory 
character and lack of readily identifiable representatives.
The fishermen felt that influencing the recreational boat based user groups lay far beyond 
their own, their association, or the fishing authorities’ capacities. The group was perceived as 
too influential, too powerful in both political and economic terms, and yet highly diffuse. 
Indeed, the sea-based leisure “movement” cannot be referred as a “community”, at least not 
in terms of spatial unity, social structure and shared set of norms. With whom should the 
fishermen negotiate when there is no discrete group of users?
In general, approaches to dealing with conflicts of use in the coastal zone often fail to address 
such non-discrete and transitory users’ groups. Indeed, these types of groups bring more 
complexity to the cpr situation and difficulties to its management. This is not to say that the 
group of users cannot be identified, approached and engaged in a problem solving exercise. A 
group of users that at sea can be considered as diffuse and consisting of unorganised 
individuals, such as the recreation boat owners, does not need to be diffuse and unorganised 
on land. In Sweden, for example, there are three major national organisations and more than 
1000 local boat clubs disseminating information and facilitating training (Sveriges Turistråd 
1987). Through these organisations, the boat owners’ insurance companies and the physical 
concentration of boating activity in harbours and marinas, a large proportion of this users’ 
group can be reached.
One informant who had worked with the management of local harbours in the area over the 
last thirty years suggested that a change of the behaviour of the sea-based leisure community 
in Sweden will require the following major elements: 
 “An obligatory registration and visible identification, a boat driver’s licence, a code of 
conduct, and penalties for noncompliance” {0.1#135}. 
The interviews confirmed that fishermen operating in inshore waters have recognised their 
interdependence with this diffuse movement; they have yet to find ways to communicate with 
Box 6.1 Resolving cross-sectoral problems having clearly identified sources and 
 coordinates 
Sea transport of granite blocks from the otherwise dormant quarries increased in the early 1990s and 
continued during the period of construction of the Öresund Bridge linking Sweden and Denmark. 
According to the fishermen interviewed, exchange of views with the authorities failed to bring 
improvements to the situation. Faced with the problem of getting the blocks entangled in their trawls, 
the local fishermen made an informal agreement with the quarries that the loading of the cargo would 
be inspected before leaving the harbour. The inspection was conducted by a rotating team of fishermen 
and advised the quarries on how to secure the blocks onboard. This minor example is an illustration of 
how fishermen, when facing local problems, can make a concerted effort to protect their fishery, even 
when the effort involves another sector. In this case, the source of the problem and the actors involved 
were easy to identify. In addition, the outcome was beneficial for both resource users, those in the 
business of cutting the blocks, who lost fewer blocks and the fishermen. It was a win-win situation.
Source: Interviews 1998-2001. 
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the recreational community in searching for mutual gains. A few had already started by mixing 
fisheries and tourism. But in general, those interviewed did not see any alternative strategy that 
could produce a better outcome. Diversity of their business and individual fishing strategies 
(in terms of space, time and gear) rather than collective action seems to be their main means 
of coexisting with an expanding and transient group of coastal resource users such as the sea-
based leisure movement. The economic significance of the leisure activities for the local 
communities along the coast is reflected in the seasonal expansion of all sorts of commercial 
activities. The number of people, and the social and economic interests involved, in this broad 
and expanding sector, are substantially greater than those involved in local coastal fisheries, 
and particularly the inshore fisheries based on static gear. On the other hand, tourism and 
recreation in coastal areas stimulate the demand for fresh marine products and can provide 
opportunities for the fishermen to earn additional income (Van Ginkel and Steins 2002).
The fishermen’s strategies of adaptation to the changed situation during the high summer 
have varied. While some fishermen continue fishing as usual, at the cost of smaller catches and 
risk of losing their gear, others close their business for a period (seasonal retrenchment) or 
diversify their activities. The latter could take the form of changing business (diversification 
outside the fishing sector), fisheries (diversification within the fishing sector), or gear 
(technology diversification). One fisherman, for example, mentioned that during July he 
normally worked on the ferryboat, another that he usually rented out his house during this 
season and went on vacation. A third fisherman was planning to open a summer seafood bar, 
a fourth mentioned he hired out his boat for recreational fishing trips and a fifth was planning 
to invite business people to hold meetings and seafood lunches on board. It was clear that 
they saw linking fisheries to tourism as providing new opportunities to earn additional income.
Symes and Phillipson (2001) see a potential for pluriactivity within the European fishing 
households embracing new sectors such as tourism. Combining fishing with tourism and with 
cultural values can have a positive effect because fishery products can be presented as having a 
cultural and social value and may therefore attract higher prices paid by visitors; the local 
fishery thus becomes part of the tourism experience. Moreover, new opportunities may arise 
for exchange of knowledge between generations.
6.4.3 Pollution  
The issue of coastal pollution seems to be one about which there is consensus among the 
fishermen of Northen Bohuslän. While the local fishermen from Koster-Väderö were mainly 
concerned about nutrient discharges, the SVC delegates were also worried about industrial 
sources of pollution, especially those living close to more industrialised areas of Southern 
Bohuslän.
Nutrient enrichment of the coastal zone from diffuse land-based sources (agriculture, forestry, 
and transport) has been a problem for many years in Sweden. The sources of the nutrients 
reaching the coast of Skagerrak are many and diverse (agriculture, domestic waste, transport, 
and forestry). The consequences of eutrophication cut across a range of resource users both 
on land and at sea (e.g. tax payers in general, fishermen and tourists).
The enrichment of nutrients in semi-enclosed bays, combined with the reduced water 
circulation (due to man-made infrastructures such as road embankments), has led to ecological 
changes particularly in shallow soft substrates which form the natural nurseries for fish, and 
are attractive fishing grounds for the eel fishermen. The situation also affects the people living 
close to shallow bays who experience the visual and olfactory impacts of recurring algae 
blooms and lack of oxygen, and a consequent decrease of property value. It also concerns the 
tourism sector, which requires good water quality for bathing. Many areas that in the 1970s 
were open water with sandy or muddy bottoms rich in seagrass, and known to be good 
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nursery and feeding grounds for young flatfish, are today covered with filamentous algae mats 
from May-September under low oxygen conditions. The structural and functional changes 
occurring in shallow coastal ecosystems, which affect not only the biodiversity but also the 
economic returns from both tourism and coastal fisheries, have been noted by Phil et al (1994) 
and Phil (2001). Phil (2001) has calculated that the recruitment of plaice could be reduced by 
40 to 60% as a result of algae mats developing on the nursery grounds.
Concerns about nutrient discharge were more common among those using static gear than 
those using trawls. Among the latter, those trawling for deep-sea prawn were the most 
concerned. Interviews with eel fishermen in particular indicated deep concern about massive 
seasonal blooms of short-lived filamentous macro-algae in shallow bays. The implications of 
eutrophication for to the eel fishermen and their gear are illustrated in the following 
quotations.
“These sticky algae grow in many of our former fishing grounds, where the eels used to 
be before. These days we have to go around with the boat and look for new places, use a 
larger number of fyke-nets and empty them more often” {1.0 #143}.
“Look at this sticky green mass, it takes us very long time to clean it” {0.1 #145}.
“I have found that I can compost this material, where I let worms work, to reduce 
considerably the time involved in cleaning. This means, however, I need to have a large 
number of fyke-nets” {0.0 # 139}. 
Thus, locally, eutrophication is associated with development failure and lost habitat; it involves 
assignment problems, but is also associated with technological and appropriation externalities.
But the problem of eutrophication has more serious implications than those reported at the 
local level by the eel fishermen. Interviews with shellfish fishermen showed that the problem 
of eutrophication was a concern especially for prawn fishermen, who blamed the lack of fish 
in Northern Bohuslän partly on the eutrophication of the coastal waters. They referred to 
recurrent micro-algae blooms spread along the coastal zone, associating the blooms with run-
off from farmland, the installation and poor efficiency of treatment plants along the coast and 
the polluted waters of the Glomma River in the North.27
“Nobody knows where the fish has gone. There must be something wrong with the 
water” {0.0 #11}.
“The water has changed colour. First came the water treatment plants, then came algae 
blooms and now they say we are getting radioactive spills from UK” {0.0 #10}. 
The prawn fishermen were mainly concerned at the degradation of the ecosystem derived 
from the increased outflow of nutrients. Both biologists and fishermen regard the coastal 
waters of Skagerrak as the “nursery of the North Sea”. This means that the ecological changes 
and the functionality of the local ecosystems also affect fishermen out in Skagerrak and the 
North Sea. Compared to other countries Sweden has made considerable progress with the 
reduction of pollution from point sources. Nevertheless, and despite the all ‘end of the pipe’ 
efforts to reduce leaching of nitrogen and phosphorus from point and diffuse land based 
sources, such as the transport and agriculture sectors, the problems still remain.
Lann and Oscarsson (1999), reported on the state of nutrient discharge in the study area. 
According to their findings, farming accounts for 40% or more of the total nitrogen and 
                                                          
27 In this area poor water quality and occurrences of red tides during prolonged periods of summer heat, are 
associated with high inflow of nutrients and suspended matter from land. In the literature this is linked to two 
influential physical phenomena: a) the fresh water contributions from the Swedish Göta Älv and b) the 
Norwegian Glomma Elv and Skagerrak’s counter-clockwise coastal water circulation drawing out inshore 
waters rich in nutrients coming from land (see references made to Svansson 1975; Svansson 1988; Rosenberg 
et al. 1991 in chapter 2). 
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phosphorous discharged in Northern Bohuslän. The authors argue that the intensive technical 
assistance provided to farmers in the area on how to reduce the use of fertilisers during the 
last ten years has not had much effect. They further explain that the monitoring program by 
the County Board Administration has shown that leakage of nutrients from agricultural land 
has been constant since the beginning of the 20th century. The authors conclude that what has 
in fact changed is the natural drainage capacity of the soil.
The new environmental management strategies aimed at fixing and recycling nutrients from 
sea to land are becoming increasingly important. The Swedish EU-Life algae project and the 
“Levande Skärgård” program have addressed eutrophication. To mitigate macro- algae blooms 
in local bays these programs propose the removal of infrastructures obstructing water 
circulation and the harvesting of large quantities of macro-algae. The strategies proposed to 
mitigate problems in the coastal zone are, apart from continued technical assistance to the 
farmers on how to economise in the use of fertilisers, the transformation of farming land into 
wetlands and the promotion of mussel cultivation (EU-Life 2001; Lann and Oscarsson 1999). 
If well planned, the restoration of wetlands could prove an attraction for wildlife tourism and 
become a join enterprise between the farming and tourism sectors. Similarly, groups of 
fishermen and farmers could be offered concessions and investment support to collectively 
run mussel farms.
The character of the pollution source, whether local or diffuse, influences the likelihood of 
involvement of the organisations and the fishermen. Minutes from SVC (1971) show that in 
the 1970s, the organization was engaged in debates in the water court (now the environmental 
court) dealing with the establishment of and techniques used in domestic water treatment 
plants. Yet, the involvement of the organization and/or the fishermen in cases related to more 
diffuse sources of pollution (in or out of court) has been minimal. Pollution of the marine 
environment is typically a transboundary problem, and as such is commonly addressed at the 
national, the regional seas level and internationally. As in the case of seals, fishermen expect 
the government to come up with solutions to problems of pollution. Several respondents 
considered the major difficulty lay in identifying who was responsible for the pollution in the 
firs place – a situation not dissimilar to that previously recounted for recreational boating.
The creation of communication channels between the parties involved, users as well as 
authorities, is a prerequisite for mutual understanding of their problems and potentials for 
collaboration in searching for a solution. There is, however, a major difference between the 
leisure interests and farmer, in that the latter is also a local person. Furthermore, in contrast to 
the leisure interests, farmers are like the fishermen, well organised groups. Farmers and 
fishermen and the institutional regimes governing their production systems are functionally 
interconnected through the affected ecosystem. It is more likely that a farmer, also a local, will 
take active part in the protection of coastal waters for the sake of a neighbouring coastal 
fisherman than that he will comply with national regulations on nutrient reduction. But the 
political institutional interplay between these local resource users and their organisations, if it 
exists at all, seems to be rather ineffective. In any case, fishermen and farmers in Sweden fail 
to collaborate in the search for collective action for mutual gain.
Therefore, in this case, the facilitation of “user platforms” as proposed by Steins (1999) may 
be a promising mechanism for looking at ways to satisfy each others interests and concerns, 
and explore the scope for mutual gains. Similar findings have been reported by Susskind and 
McCreary (1985:373) who conclude that “What appear to be win-lose situations often can be 
transformed into win-win outcomes if the parties in dispute can be brought together in a 
process of face-to-face negotiation”. The authors suggest that when it comes to coastal 
multiple-use situations there is a clear need for independent or state offices for mediation.
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The interviews showed that local fishermen did not know what to do to combat this problem. 
In general, the quality of coastal waters in Sweden is seen as the responsibility of the 
Municipal and/or County Board Administration. Apart from farmers, as receivers of technical 
assistance, and their potential effort to reduce the use of fertilisers, the involvement of other 
resource users is not mentioned in proposals prepared by the authorities. The government for 
its part is investing funds to compensate farmers for the unilateral actions taken. When targets 
are set and reductions of nutrient discharges monitored and enforced, farmers will be asked to 
pay if the targeted reductions are not achieved. Such a strategy can certainly mitigate the 
problem, but does not encourage collaboration between fishermen and farmers. On the 
contrary, it inhibits understanding of their interdependency. Eventually, it will probably imply 
that the current losers (the fishermen) and the winners (the farmers) of today both become 
losers, or will simply swap positions. Unfortunately, formal approaches (legislative, 
administrative, judicial and municipal planning) on which the fishermen and society rely for a 
resolution of these types of inter-sectoral problems often fail to produce win-win outcomes, 
but rely on outcomes of a win-lose type. 
6.4.4 Problems within fisheries  
In the questionnaire surveys, fishermen were asked for their opinions on problems arising 
from different fishing practices. In the interviews with fishermen from Northern Bohuslän, it 
was apparent that problems were more likely to be related to the decline in specific fish stocks 
that to conflicts between different forms of fishing. There was general agreement that, with 
the exception of lobster fisheries, appropriation and development problems occurring within 
professional fisheries were of greater consequence than the problems posed by recreational 
fisheries.
Recreational fisheries
Recreational fisheries have increased considerably in the last few decades and in some inshore 
waters areas now account for as much as 75% of the total catch (Svedäng et al 1998; Neuman 
and Píriz 2000). In the study area, however, Lagenfelt and Svedäng (1999) found catches of 
non-professional fishery to be low (26% of the total catches in 1997) when compared to other 
areas.
The expansion of non-professional fishing activity in Sweden will probably continue, and 
assessing the volume of the catch for its consideration in the TACs and the status of non-
professional user groups in the management of fisheries has turned into a complicated issue.
While professional fishermen tend to associate non-professional fisheries with problems, 
recreational and subsistence fisheries have very different connotations for many people in 
Sweden. The expansion of these fisheries receives political support from various factions that 
see recreational fisheries as an alternative to professional fishing from a social, economic and 
conservation perspective. In the debate on how natural resources can best be used, it is often 
suggested that non-professional fisheries generate more value for the Swedish society than 
professional fisheries in social, national economic and conservation terms. Estimates of 2.3 
million people engaged in recreational fishing at least once a year (Fiskeriverket 2000) are set 
against the relatively small number of professional fishermen and used to argue for the rights 
of non-professional fishermen. Finn (1997) has highlighted aspects of sports fishing that 
portray this activity as one presenting good opportunities for development within the context 
of tourism. In his report, Finn discusses organised sport-tourism fishing activities that can 
generate economic revenues for rural coastal areas.
Subsistence fishing is a contributing factor to the socio-economic situation of local 
communities in rural areas including the archipelagos. Sport, eco-tourism, recreational, and 
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subsistence fisheries are often interrelated and presented as a public right sometimes 
independently of the level of business organisation lying behind. Also in this case there is a 
potential to engage the local fishermen with his local knowledge. 
Professional fisheries 
Appropriation problems derived from the allocation of the most productive areas (so called 
assignment problems) among professional fishermen were in all cases associated with the 
arrival of fishermen from outside the area.
Technical externalities due to interference between fishermen operating with static gear 
increased considerably in the summer months, and were largely related to seasonal recreational 
and subsistence fisheries. In other words, these problems had to do with interference by non-
local, non-professional fishermen. Those using static gear in inshore waters confirmed that 
they knew about and respected “each others sites”. There was, in effect, a distinct sense of 
“local archipelago tenure.” 
 “Everybody here knows where not to go, and as there is not much space left, the area is 
rather crowded with gear” {1.0#145}.
“Once an inland eel fisherman arrived and just started fishing here. I was watching him 
for some days and I asked “what did he think he was doing, fishing my sites? We had a 
conversation, I explained to him where my sites were and that was all” {0.0#139}.
In a sense, therefore, local fishermen fishing with static gear inshore can be seen as 
“proprietors” able informally to exclude other fishermen. Informal practices can in this way be 
important in securing de facto tenure rights. 
The answers to the questionnaire had indicated a concern over trawling among local 
fishermen fishing for Nephrops with creels. In Sweden the problem of trawlers and purse seines 
accidentally damaging static gear had previously been resolved by the demarcation of a general 
trawling limit creating static gear reserves closed to shore. Initially, the reserved area coincided 
with the Swedish territorial waters (4 nm); it was not grounded on relevant ecological 
information. Over time the resources in the Swedish territorial waters also had to be shared 
with vessels that earlier operated farther from shore. The trawling line lost its functionality of 
exclusion and the trawling limits again became a source of conflict. To resolve new conflicts 
the fishermen’s association (SVC) set up a trawling limits committee. As a result, the co-
ordinates of the limits were revised and the regulations changed. The authorities reached an 
accord that permitted trawling in public waters and under certain conditions to be defined by 
the National Board of Fisheries under special regulations. This allowed for regional variations, 
yet in most cases the 4 nm limits was abandoned and the operation of the more mobile fishing 
fleet was permitted in waters that had once been reserved for local fishermen who based their 
fishing on static gear. Today many local fishermen make use of old or small trawls.
Technological externalities which result in conflicts between trawl and creel fishermen are 
noted in a recent official report (Fiskeriverket 2001). The report briefly discusses the 
possibility of extending the trawling limits to expand the area available for creel fishing, a 
more ecologically friendly technique than trawling. However, in the same report it is 
concluded that such a decision would also affect the local fishermen operating from small 
trawlers. The interviews confirmed that technological externalities due to unclear assignment 
of fishing grounds had occurred in the area. However, when discussing these problems the 
fishermen explained that most local fishermen knew from experience where the trawlers 
operate and therefore avoided setting creels in such areas. In some cases the problem occurred 
at night involving trawlers from outside the area or inexperienced creel fishermen who had yet 
to learn where they should and should not set their creels. Related to these observations are 
factors of locality and the fact that local small-scale fishermen trawling in the area are – except 
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in the summer months – normally back home before 8 pm. The use of time specific trawling 
limits, e.g. one for daylight hours close to land and the other for the hours of darkness set 
further from the shore, have not so far been formally considered. 
These empirical findings appear to be in line with those reported in the literature. It is 
generally recognised that local fishermen do not normally trespass on the preferred fishing 
spots of other local fishermen (Schlager 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996). Empirical studies 
have shown that in general, fishermen take a positive attitude to formulating internal rules to 
address local assignment problems and physical interference with gear. These problems are 
often localised and clearly evident, and the rules easy to monitor and enforce (Ostrom et al 
1994; Schlager et al 1994).
The expansion of the fyke-net fishery was an issue in the minds of the shellfish fishermen, 
particularly those combining Nephrops and fish. To get an idea of the magnitude of this 
increased fishing effort one can compare the recommendations made today by the County 
Board Administration and by the fishermen themselves in the seventies. While the former 
recommends a maximum of 800-1000 fyke-nets per fisherman, in 1972 a recommendation of 
maximum 100 fyke-nets per fisherman was adopted by the association of SVC (SVC 1972). 
Some of the fishermen interviewed in the present survey suggested closing the fyke-net 
fishery, arguing that it gave them all a bad reputation and would fail any test of eco-
friendliness. Connections were also made with the issue of by-catches and seals. 
“The fishing of eel with fyke-nets should be prohibited; too many young cod get caught, 
a more selective type of gear is needed” {0.0 # 8}. 
“The eel fishermen are putting at risk the future of many other fishermen. Besides, it is 
too costly from a national perspective. We first pay taxes to import and release the seed, 
and we then pay again to compensate for damage done by the seals” {0.0 # 21}. 
Fyke-nets are normally used in relatively shallow areas within the archipelago, which are  also 
the nursery and feeding grounds for important species of fish including cod and plaice, and 
may lead to considerable bycatches of young finfish, especially cod (Svedäng 1999). The 
increased number of fyke-nets was, according to the eel fishermen, a response to ecological 
changes in the shallow sandy and muddy areas. Following the classification of problems by 
Ostrom et al (1994), in the fishermen’s argumentation degradation problems have developed 
into, assignment problems, maintenance problems and appropriation externalities.
The issue of a lack of control over other fishing and the state of the resource, in the sense of 
appropriation externalities across spatial scales, worried the fishermen very much. Similarly, 
the issue of free riding across institutional boundaries was in various ways frequently pursued 
in the interviews (see box 6.2).
On the one hand, the local coastal fishermen portrayed other fishermen, particularly those 
from the South fishing for cod and shellfish, as the scapegoat. The fleet from “GöteborG”
(GG) symbolically represents the latter, and was blamed for over-fishing and free riding on 
the local coastal fisheries. On the other hand, the cod and shellfish fishermen from the South 
were concerned about the behaviour of those fishermen involved in the semi-industrial 
fisheries for small pelagic species (herring, sprat and mackerel) in particular those who had left 
the association. They were also concerned at the appropriation of resources by fishermen 
from Denmark and the Baltic States.
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Box 6.2  Blaming “brothers” for being free riders
“Nowadays, when there is no fish, everybody wants to fish shellfish. The fishermen from the 
South have expanded their shellfish fishery quickly and intensively here” {0.0#129}. “We 
know what happens when the quota in Kattegat is reached; they come over and start fishing 
here as much as they can” {1.0#88}. “Unless they are also involved and follow the rules, we 
cannot regulate our fisheries” {0.0#21}.
“Herring can suddenly disappear, we know that; it has happened before, and when that 
happens and the herring fishery collapses we may have all these advanced vessels with large 
storage capacity being used for cod fisheries. Such a development will automatically make the 
medium-sized fleet go over to the shellfish fishery. Nobody can apparently control these 
people; the fishermen’s association and the authorities have failed to stop them. They will go 
where the money is” {0.0#131}. 
“The Danish fishermen take undersized fish anywhere; they do not care about minimum sizes 
and market anything. Meanwhile we are asked to introduce more and more selective gear, 
square-mesh panels and other devices to avoid that” {1.0#81}. 
“Today the Danes and the fishermen from the Baltic States are taking all the fish and in an 
unguarded moment the Spanish will also be here” {0.0#130}. 
“We know fishermen from the Baltic States are fishing large quantities and their fisheries are 
poorly accounted for in the analysis because many fishermen do not report their catches. It is 
not fair to ask the Swedish fishermen to stop fishing cod in the Baltic when they can observe 
that other fishermen are grabbing everything” {1.1#58}. 
“The Danes do not care, and there are more and more fishermen from the Baltic States 
everywhere. When it comes to the minimum size of cod, we have been trying to convince all 
other countries for years but without success. Their behaviour can easily become the norm” 
{0.1#28}.
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
No matter who was being interviewed, the scapegoat – the causal factor for this pattern – was 
always to be found in other functional groups, across geographical scales, political frontiers, or 
in the bureaucratic system, i.e. across imagined institutional boundaries. In general, what was 
happening elsewhere clearly affected their fishing strategy and their willingness to co-operate.
What happened at one institutional level, geographical scale and type of fisheries was 
perceived as a disincentive to resource conservation at local levels. The answers given by the 
fishermen also illustrate the consequences of fish being a fugitive common pool resource.
Fishermen are clearly aware of the high connectivity of the common pool resource system and 
the high interdependence and the problem of mismatches between ecological and institutional 
boundaries. These empirical findings seem to follow the pattern of problems identified by 
Schlager et al (1994) who have identified four ways by which fish migration can aggravate 
common pool problems: 1) users are more likely to attribute resource flow declines to the 
behaviour of users elsewhere in the system; 2) the users in one location cannot control the 
flow of resources even if they act collectively; 3) because no single  group can control the flow 
of resources and capture the benefits of collective action, users in any one location are less 
likely to provide benefits for users elsewhere in the system by restraining their own 
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appropriation activities; and 4) co-ordinating activities with users in other locations raises 
transaction costs.
The problem of free riding was not new. The very first regulation approved by the West Coast 
Fishermen’s Association (SVC) in 1930 confronted the problem of the invalidity of unilateral 
regulations beyond the political boundary. The regulation was unilateral in the sense that it 
prohibited SVC members landing small sized haddock in Sweden. As confirmed by Gerhard 
(1995), it did not take long for the regulation to be abolished, because a group of Swedish 
fishermen took advantage of marketing the small haddock in Denmark and Norway. The lack 
of common rules applied on a wider scale was already an issue. Even today the problem of 
free riding across institutional boundaries inhibits unilateral decision made in Sweden.28
Another recurrent strategy mentioned in the interviews was the race for fish.29  This relates to 
the intensification of resource appropriation and the concentration of the resource in the 
hands of the more powerful vessel owners. Time at sea has traditionally been regulated by 
coastal fishermen in Sweden as a means of allocating resources as equitably as possible. Today, 
the use of time has become largely an individual choice. With some exceptions, the same is 
true for the use of space in the Swedish territorial waters. Both can be seen as a product of 
open access regimes.
The race for fish in Sweden has resulted in quotas being exceeded, fishing stops occurring 
early in the year, and conflicts arising among the fishermen. It has also resulted in a loss of 
trust in the management regime and in those to whom responsibility for the distribution of 
resources has been delegated, namely the Fishermen’s Associations. In the autumn of 1999 a 
race for mackerel occurred. Shortly after the opening of the fishing season, 5 modern high-
tech vessels from Göteborg fished intensively outside Norway with an early exhaustion of the 
Swedish national quota as a result. The fishermen involved were regarded as “separatists” 
from the fishermen’s association. The mackerel race surprised the small-scale fishermen who 
had planned, but not yet started, to fish mackerel in the coastal waters of Skagerrak. These 
fishermen found that the opportunity to fish their share of the mackerel had suddenly 
disappeared, despite the fact that,
“…there was plenty of mackerel in the water” {0.0#8}.
To resolve the problem of a “lack” of mackerel confronting the small-scale fishermen, the 
administration decided to authorise the use of next year’s quota.
Although most fishermen would prefer to keep the principle of freedom of access, they are 
critical of the institutionalisation of strategies that, under the slogan “flexibility and freedom of 
access” mainly benefit single individuals.
“That type of freedom....is only for a few and is not wanted here” {0.1#23}.
“The “Olympic fishery” has to be stopped; we need to plan our fishery so it lasts on a 
year round basis and forever” {0.0#17}. 
The most salient arguments against the race strategy were: i) fishermen who do not participate 
in the race for fish strategy are unable to continue fishing; ii) the year round strategy of local 
coastal fishermen and their combination of seasonally based fisheries is disrupted; iii) less 
                                                          
28 The issue become highly relevant in 2002 when the Green Party of Sweden in the recent elections made their 
co-operation with the Social Democrats in the Swedish Government conditional upon a unilateral halt to the 
Swedish cod fisheries. No Swedish fisherman is prepared to stop fishing unless other European fishermen, 
particularly the Danes and those from the Baltic States, agree to act in the same way. 
29 The race-for-fish behaviour was also referred in the interviews as the “Marathon fishery” and “the Olympic 
fishery.”
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fresh fish is delivered to the market on a year round basis because large quantities of fish 
caught in the early part of the season have to go for processing; iv) prices during the period of 
excess supply are low, which affects those selling small quantities more than those selling large 
volumes; and finally v) an erosion of the social bonds, trust and sense of solidarity that are 
essential for collective action.
As can be seen in box 6.3 in the statements of fishermen working onboard modern vessels, 
wholesale traders and a few government officials, one can detect a tendency to look for 
rational, if sometimes highly selfish, explanations for the mackerel race.
Box 6.3  Why did the fishermen race for mackerel?
“The small pelagics come and go in cycles and we have to catch them when they are there” 
{1.0# 47}. 
“There is nothing wrong with using your own skills to compete in fisheries that otherwise are 
based on equal opportunities and treatment” {0.1#26}.
“We have invested a lot of money and need to get our returns; we cannot afford to think 
about other fishermen and stop fishing when we are in the middle of a good shoal” 
{1.0#49}.
“The race for mackerel happened because the national quota was too small. The fishery for 
small pelagics requires larger quotas. This is something any bureaucrat should understand 
when negotiating quotas” {1.0#50}. 
”One has to understand that it is only during this short period of the season that the level of 
fat in the mackerel suits the demands from the buyers. We can’t do much about it. It is the 
consumer who wants to have a fat mackerel” {0.1#28}.
“The race happened because the fishermen knew there were opportunities to fish Morocco’s 
waters” {0.2#35}. 
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
While some interviewees referred to a sense of individual freedom and justified their 
individual choice, others argued that the race for mackerel had more to do with the inability of 
the administration to negotiate better quotas. The governing role of the market and consumer 
preference was also offered as an explanation. Indeed, the race was often excused on the 
pretext of being synonymous with freedom and a response to the demands from the market. 
Finally, a few suggested that the race had to do with the open access in Europe and the 
potential of fisheries elsewhere.
It is worth mentioning here that the race strategy only makes sense when undertaken under 
certain conditions, often related to stock size, annual catch-quota regimes and large common 
pools. Apart from a market for the product, the race for fish or a “hit and run” strategy 
requires highly mobile and technologically flexible vessels with good storage capacity and a 
certain degree of spatial and temporal freedom of access. The ability to switch to new fishing 
grounds and new resources after the race is over is another necessary condition.
But the race for fish was not a new strategy, nor was it only related to non-members of the 
associations, and there are also cases where collective action aiming to avoid races has been an 
outright failure.
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Events from the 1990s, fresh in the memories of the local coastal fishermen, revealed that 
once the decline in catches of cod and other groundfish became critical, patterns of conduct 
based on the “hit and run” strategy spread in a contagious manner. As a response to this 
situation, a debate started within the fishermen’s associations about reviving operational rules 
that had previously been practised in Sweden, such as the use of market quotas or landing 
rations.30 In the early nineties these demands were translated into more formal appeals made 
jointly by fishermen belonging to a few local branches of SVC.
In the Swedish co-management model, resource allocation among the professional fishermen 
has been the concern of the Associations. The demands from coastal fishermen in the early 
nineties triggered an introduction of internal collective rules in the cod fisheries.31 In an 
attempt to slow down the increasing pressure on cod and to improve the allocation of 
available resources, rules commonly used by the deep-sea prawn fishermen were tested in the 
cod fisheries in the south of the Baltic. First, input rules based on time (three days fishing per 
week only) were tried. However, in other to get more fish out of the fishing time available 
some fishermen would trawl day and night. To resolve this problem a system of individual 
fishermen weekly quotas (FWQ) based on the size of the crew was tested. This time, in order 
to get more quota out of the system, some fishermen would enlarge the crew by bringing on 
board family members who were normally not active in fisheries. This led, in fact, to more 
protests from local fishermen who saw the allocation rules leading to a steady decline in their 
profits.
Local collective action had been instrumental in the allocation among the prawn fishermen in 
a way that was seen as equitable by them. But in the case of the cod fisheries, where users 
often fish far from their home waters and have diverse social backgrounds and economic 
positions, the conditions were not suitable for collective action to emerge and be strong 
enough to protect and share the resource in an equitable way. As a response to the claims 
from the local small-scale fisheries the system was adapted from fisherman weekly quotas 
(FWQ) to vessel weekly quotas (VWQ). In this case, in contrast to the prawn fisheries, the 
rations/quotas are allocated using the vessels’ registered tonnage as a criterion. This 
institutional arrangement is one that has probably come to stay in the Swedish cod fisheries. 
This time, because of complaints from the larger boat owners, the size of the VWQ was 
adjusted to the size of the vessel. Thus, to secure compliance, the FAs opted to petition the 
National Board of Fisheries to intervene and formalise the fishermen’s own internal, semi-
enforceable rules. When formalised, these internal rules were transformed into enforceable 
ones, and compliance was controlled by the state administration through the coastguard. 
The failure of the associations and fishermen to organise themselves around the problem of 
sharing the scarce cod resource cannot be attributed to a single reason. In chapter 3 a series of 
factors that have been empirically shown to increase the likelihood for collective action to 
work were introduced. Some were related to the resource and other to the users (see box 3.2 
and 3.3). In the present case, the predictability of cod was low, the demand for cod in the 
market high, and the fishing community very heterogeneous (in terms of residence, fishing 
strategy, size of vessel and technology). All these characteristics imply that any institutional 
arrangement introduced to limit use would affect the various groups of users differently; some 
                                                          
30 Landing rations or market quotas are a mechanism that the Swedish fishermen have historically used to 
constrain excess supplies to a saturated market, to distribute among themselves weekly rights to market’s 
demands. In situations where resources become scarce and the market is not saturated the system takes on 
another meaning, standing for the allocation of resources. It functions as a quota which is adjusted to either the 
size of the vessel (VWQ) or the number of men onboard (FWQ), expires weekly or every two weeks and is not 
tradable.
31 Here the term internal is used to mean sharing systems that have been designed and administrated by the 
fishermen themselves through their associations. These rules are semi-enforceable in the sense that they only 
apply to the members of the association. 
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would lose and others win, preventing the regulation from working. In fact, it led to an 
intensification of the race to fish, more protest and conflict, deliberate flouting of the 
regulations, and the erosion of the credibility and authority of the associations. Moreover, 
when resources are scarce, the incitement to race may also be found in specific “perverse” 
institutional arrangements, such as the possibility of using the unemployment benefit fund 
when regulated fishing stops due to the quota being exceeded.
During this period of turbulence some fishermen would leave the FAs and two other 
divergent processes would occur. One was that the government authority was formally asked 
to assume a central function of the FAs in the Swedish co-management system - namely the 
monitoring and control of internal allocation of resources among the fishermen. The other 
was that new organisational forms for coastal fishermen would emerge. As will be 
demonstrated in chapter 8, having observed the failure in the South, and in order to secure 
long-term access to the resources for the coastal fisheries, these new organisations of coastal 
fishermen would advocate a reallocation of the national resources. 
6.4.5 Marine reserves and fishery regulations 
Marine reserves and fishery regulations were also a factor identified by the fishermen as 
important, even if the respondents to the Väderö questionnaire mentioned them 
comparatively less often than the SVC delegates. In the interviews, rules and regulations were 
strongly highlighted by the fishermen.
The problems identified under the heading of competing fisheries can be discussed from an 
institutional perspective, in view of the fact that the purpose of such a management system 
should be to resolve appropriation and provision problems in the multiple use cpr by defining 
boundaries, rights and obligations, and allocating resources interalia. These institutional 
arrangements belong to a different analytical level or order than the analysis of uses in the cpr,
and will be examined in greater detail in the following chapters. The level also has to do with 
the constellation of and interplay between the actors involved. How these arrangements and 
actors influence local coastal fishermen’s capacities to access resources and take active part in 
the management of coastal fisheries will be examined in chapter 7.
The ideas of alternative management models and a marine reserve in the area were actually 
reaching a critical momentum in the late nineties, when the fieldwork serving this investigation 
was being undertaken. In chapter 8, these cases will be further discussed. 
6.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine what Northern Bohuslän’s coastal fishermen 
perceived to be problematic in their cpr situation. No matter what type of common pool 
resource, users will experience a variety of problems. The depletion of fish stocks and the 
sharing of available resources have been shown to be central to present conflicts of interest in 
Northern Bohuslän and is in turn related to development failures and the issue of internal 
diversity in fisheries and the increasing pressure of multiple uses affecting the ecosystem and 
the resources. Collaborative management assumes resource users are aware of their own and 
other users’ effect on the resource. Relatively few problems were given priority by the 
fishermen from Northern Bohuslän. Following Ostrom et al (1994) these can be categorised 
as follow:
 appropriation externalities due to rival predators within the ecosystem;
 provision problems due to the pollution;
 appropriation externalities and provision problems due to fisheries;
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 assignation problems and technological externalities due to expansion of sea-based 
recreation, and 
 problems in the management instruments.
The types of problems identified by fishermen are illustrative of the problems associated with 
the management of complex and highly mobile multiple-use common pool resources. 
Although they are manifested locally, the fishermen’s cpr situation extended far beyond their 
local fishing grounds and involved more stakeholders than those found in the local fishing 
community.
Fishermen seem to be aware that joint use of the ecosystem requires that the governance of 
fisheries be distributed between fishermen practising different fishing strategies, across spatial 
scales, institutional levels and sectors, both upstream and downstream. Their awareness of the 
poor state of the resources and the ecosystem and that others also influence the outcome does 
not mean that they are in a position to devise rules for resource management that fit such 
complexity. But such awareness is at least a good foundation because it helps them to 
understand the need to search co-management partners. Yet co-management is about 
interrelations and requires communication, and the local fishermen did not seem to have 
much experience in discussing their problems with stakeholders other than those who have 
traditionally been involved in the sectoral management of fisheries. Moreover, they believe 
their ability, individually or collectively, to influence these issues is weak.
The analysis exposed the complexity found in the cpr and how competing claims on coastal 
ecosystems make the management of coastal fisheries delicate, with conflicts of interest 
inherent in this complexity. One may speculate that the larger the scale of management and 
the number of users and stakeholders involved in the governance of the multiple-use cpr
situation, the poorer the individual users’ knowledge of each others’ effects and efforts to 
protect the ecosystem. Even when cpr conflicts involving subtraction can be attenuated, for 
example, by the segregation of users, e.g. a trawling limit, they cannot be entirely resolved. In 
multiple use cpr systems, where the state of the ecosystem and the resource (e.g. fish or 
shellfish) is the result of multiple users’ actions at different scales of the ecosystem, their 
efforts to reduce the impacts are difficult to identify. Furthermore, the impact of multiple-uses 
on the ecosystem cannot be measured simply by the aggregation of single uses. Thus, it is 
difficult to list who is doing “right” and who is doing “wrong”. As a result, the advocacy of 
unilateral actions is difficult unless there are clear incentives.
Uses having less easily identifiable subtraction effects were perceived as less problematic. The 
fishermen were in agreement in dismissing defence, aquaculture, harbour activities, and wind 
power as unproblematic factors; these activities are at present not very prominent in Swedish 
coastal waters. Many of the unproblematic activities can be described as situational activities in 
the sense that they have a clear position in time and space. Moreover, the source of the 
problem and the actors involved are easy to identify. Local negotiations among users and 
comprehensive municipal plans, which are commonly based on the zoning of uses, seem to be 
useful in the allocation of resources for these types of activity. Otherwise they do not appear 
to be problematic in the context of the study area and do not appear to warrant institutional 
change.
The assignment of space was definitely important for inshore static gear fishermen. Yet the 
interviews illustrated that problems relating to the assignment of space within fisheries, and to 
a lesser extent even technological externalities, appear in general to be internally (informally) 
solved by the fishermen. In this sense, the results support empirical findings of other authors 
such as Schlager (1994). But assignment problems were far from being the only ones identified 
by this group of fishermen least likely to be able to resolve appropriation and provision 
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problems in the cpr. Also the system of indirect representation within the fishermen’s 
association may increase their marginalisation from the management process.
Where assignment problems are combined with circumstances of scarce resources, the 
degradation of the local ecosystem and dislocated fisheries the problems of competition 
between fishermen can become much more severe and the capability of the fishermen to 
influence decreases. The fishermen were aware that they must share the resources with other 
fishermen and ecosystems with other users. This problem was certainly highlighted in the 
interviews, which illustrated the problem of appropriation externalities across ecosystems and 
sectors, and the sharing of common pool resources with fishermen whose livelihoods was 
based on different harvesting strategies. The example indicates that the use of spatial 
boundaries for the purpose of exclusion - e.g. imaginary lines - is not sufficient to resolve 
problems derived from the sharing of common pools. Wherever the limits are drawn there 
will be transboundary subtraction problems.
The resolution of conflicts involving the sharing of fugitive stocks and resource flows is rather 
more complex than simply solving conflicts derived from spatial and technological 
interference. Such problems are related to the mobility and dynamics of the resource, involve 
substraction and cannot be solved via, for example, zoning. They are appropriation problems 
involving the allocation of the yields in an efficient and equitable manner. The Fishermen’s 
Association (FA) has formulated rules to allocate resources among the community of 
professionals, but has not always been able to enforce them. This is particularly the case when 
high value migratory resources such as cod are involved, rendering the rules meaningless and 
the brake down of collective efforts to the point where they become counter productive. 
Appropriation problems and differences in the use of time and space create a serious point of 
contention between the more “modern, more mobile, non-local” fishermen from southern 
Bohuslän, and the more traditional local fishermen from northern Bohuslän. In those cases it 
is proposed that to meet ecological and social sustainability criteria the fishermen need 
management rights.
The fishermen seem capable of designing and enforcing informal institutional arrangements to 
address cross sectoral problems when the users involved can be clearly identified and the 
resources and problems in question have clear spatial and time co-ordinates. However, such 
conditions, where the users possess rich time and space based information, are not always 
present in coastal fisheries, and when the boundaries become imprecise – as in the case of the 
fuzzy community of recreational boat users – the fishermen find difficulties to address cpr
problems. Neither the boat owners nor the fishermen can independently adopt institutional 
arrangements to address the problems. The proliferation of user groups with imprecise 
boundaries requires the involvement of external assistance to mobilise a range of diverse 
organisations and run well-integrated information campaigns. This also means that the 
authorities have to play multiple roles in the co-management of the cpr.
Provision problems can easily exacerbate the fishermen’s problems of appropriation. As seen 
in chapter 3, provision problems relate to a lack of motivation and to insufficient investments 
in the maintenance and protection of the ecological qualities of the cpr. In theory, the issue of 
coastal pollution could prove enough to sap the energy of the fishermen and their willingness 
to provide for the resource and the marine environment. In Sweden eutrophication problems 
are seldom framed as conflicts of interest between land and sea based producers and 
production systems. Framing problems in this way may reveal opportunities for co-
management and the use of user platforms at the local level. These could be rather specific in 
terms of space and issues. However, since these waters form an important nursery area on 
which some North Sea fisheries depend, the deterioration of their nursery function can be 
seen as a factor constraining the fishing rights of local and non-local fishermen from several 
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countries. This raises the issue of connectedness across scales and life cycle management, 
which also has implications for co-management.
The co-management of the seal problem, for example, requires that all interested parties sit 
around the table. Even when the functional interplay in the cpr situation occurs between 
marine wildlife and fishermen at the local level, the conflict of interest is between people 
attaching different meanings to natural resources and wildlife and the decision-making spheres 
have to deal with these different meanings held by different groups in society. 
The results presented in this chapter indicate that the fishermen are aware that access to and 
control over fish and ecosystems flows and services, on which the abundance and distribution 
of fish depends, is de facto influenced by multiple actors and changes with the course of time. 
Attempts by fishermen to conserve their fisheries and protect the local ecosystem may be 
hampered by their uncertainty in relation to mobile resources, their perception of the 
behaviour of other fishermen at larger scales and users outside the fishery sector. Particularly 
when dealing with migratory species the user in one location cannot control the flow of 
resources. In these cases the fishermen need external assistance to provide them with 
information and negotiation arenas. What this implies for co-management is the building of 
poly-centric, nested decision making structures, as suggested by Ostrom (1999) and the idea of 
promoting inter-sectoral negotiations or users’ platforms at the local level, as suggested by 
Steins (1999).
The study revealed that despite the extended socio-political network needed to formulate 
solutions to the problems identified by fishermen in the complex cpr, contacts and discussion 
outside the local arena of fisheries are highly unusual among the small scale fishermen. 
Vertically, the contact network of the fishermen is largely single-stranded and limited to the 
delegates to the fishermen’s regional organisation, SVC. The latter were more inclined to 
manifest their dissatisfaction with current management instruments and were greatly 
concerned about the explosion of stakeholders now involved. Their inclination to blame 
management instruments and the actors involved in their formulation illuminates a problem 
of legitimacy for the present management model. The problematic of institutional 
arrangements and actors involved in their design has yet to be discussed. The rules play a 
crucial role in shaping the fisherman’s actions and the cpr situation, but can be treated as 
belonging to a different analytical level than the factual uses affecting the fishermen’s access to 
and appropriation of resources, as will be made clear in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
THE MARGINALISATION OF LOCAL FISHERMEN IN THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
As discussed in the previous chapters coastal fishermen share fish stocks, resource flows and 
ecosystems with various resource users, including other fishermen, making use of distinct 
strategies, and confront problems with scarce resources. The dynamics and complexity 
involved in the shared ecosystem, on the one hand, and various groups of resource users, on 
the other hand, have been shown to affect the coastal fishermen’s ability to tackle the problem 
and exert control over the resources in question. But the coastal fishermen opportunities to 
influence their own and other fisheries are also limited by a series of institutional 
arrangements.
This chapter examines how the problems of the coastal fishermen relate to the institutional 
arrangements and to the relations between the fishermen and other actors in fisheries co-
management. It enters into the issue of institutional interplay and discusses how aspects 
related to the choice of knowledge base and fishermen’s capacities in the design of 
institutional arrangements, can challenge the local fishermen’s ability to take collective action 
and preclude them from taking a more active part in co-management.
7.1 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This chapter focuses on institutional problems in the current management system, as defined 
in the interviews with fishermen and supplemented by information collected at meetings, 
informal consultations and documents.  The results are presented in a thematic fashion where 
various perspectives are highlighted. Even though the focus is on identifying the local coastal 
fishermen’s perspective and their perception of problems with the institutional regime, their 
views are contrasted with the opinions of other actors and non-local coastal fishermen. The 
non-fishermen referred to in this chapter are mainly civil servants working in fisheries and 
coastal management related issues within the state administration, including the national, the 
provincial and the municipal levels, but they also include fishery scientist and new actors. 
Basic data from the interviews were presented in chapters 4 and 5. It is worth noting that the 
fishermen were affiliated to various organisations and that their level of involvement in the 
organisational work varied. They identified themselves as belonging to the associations (FAs), 
some local organisations and two producer organisations (POs). The majority of these 
fishermen had also chosen the national SFPO as their producer organisation, but a few had 
chosen the local PO, NBPO. Some were members of Bohusläns’ coastal fishermen’s 
association (BKF),1 a local organisation bringing together fishermen independently of their 
affiliation to different FAs and POs. For the prawn fishermen from Northern Bohuslän 
working waters in and around the Norwegian trench, a less formal organisation, Koster -
Väderöarna fjord group (KVF), was important. 2
7.2 FLEET RESTRUCTURING
The fishermen associated the “lack of fish” with many issues, one of which was the expansion 
of the semi-industrial fleet. Bringing fleet capacity into line with available resources is a 
1 In Swedish: Bohuslänsfiskarförening
2 In Swedish: Kosterfjordgruppen
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declared goal of the European Union. Multi-annual Guidance Plans (MAGP) for fleet 
reduction schemes have been agreed within the framework of the Union’s Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP). In Sweden, since the mid 1990s, – notwithstanding disagreements about the 
dimensions of a viable fleet – capacity limits in terms of gross tonnage (GT) and engine power 
(KW) have been established for each segment of the national fleet.3 Within the total allowable 
tonnage scheme new vessels entering the fleet could do so only at the expense of existing 
ones. The small-scale coastal fisheries working with stationary gear on vessels under 12 m size 
were exempted from the fleet reduction scheme. Simultaneously, structural aid or subsidies 
were available through the Financial Instrument of Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), for renewal 
and modernisation of the fleet.4 The underlying argument for subsidies was the need to 
modernise the old fleet with its low economic efficiency and unsatisfactory safety standards. 
Only those member states which succeeded in reaching the targets set for capacity reduction 
within MAGP were to have full access to the modernisation grants.
With restrictions imposed on national fishing capacity and limited opportunities to increase 
the scale of the enterprise by commissioning new vessels, it became expedient to purchase 
additional capacity by buying up old vessels as they became available. Taken together with 
opportunities for modernisation grants through the structural funds, the system clearly 
benefited well established fishermen with access to capital.5 Market tonnage prices have varied 
between 12,000 and 22,000 Sw. cr. per ton6 and the scrapping premium has also proved 
attractive, particularly for the owners of small-scale boats (12m) who have no tonnage for 
sale. This premium and the tonnage market have also raised prices for vessels in the second-
hand market. This not only makes it more difficult to recruit young people into the industry, 
but also offers an inducement to traditional fishermen to sell their old vessels and close their 
businesses or alternatively buy a smaller vessel and diversify the business. At present many 
fishermen in Northern Bohuslän are operating with rather old, inefficient second-hand vessels 
which now have a high replacement value and all these strategies were present in the plans of 
the fishermen interviewed.
The capitalisation process and the technological imperative associated with the fleet 
development plans was matter of concern for the local coastal fishermen who predicted that 
in  a situation  with shortage of resources  and deteriorating ecosystem, their ability to fish and 
3 Under the fourth Multi-annual Guidance Programme 1997-2001, the Swedish fishing fleet had targets for the 
reduction in capacity measured in terms of gross tonnage and engine power, for each of the six segments 
according to which the fleet has been structured. The six segments are defined by a combination of vessel size, 
gear and target species. During the same period the prawn trawlers have a reduction target of 2.2%, the pelagic 
trawl and purse seine 0.5%, and the bottom trawl for cod and Nephrops 26.4%. The small-scale coastal fisheries 
segment, defined as all boats smaller than 12m with the exception of trawlers, was not subjected to reduction 
targets. At the time of this writing the member states of the European Union have the authority to redefine the 
segmentation and decide how the total national reduction targets should be reached. 
4 Modernisation grants were made available through FIFG. Modernisation and technological progress go hand in 
hand. Garcia and Newton (1997) quote a study by Fitzpatrick (1996) which estimated the relative value of 
technology progress in terms of increased catch for different fishing vessels. These types of studies indicate that 
in general there is a fleet over-capacity of at least 30 %. The target within the CFP is to reduce the European 
fleet by 30%. The issue of technological progress and what that means in terms of increased fishing power and 
fishing rights has been little discussed in Sweden.
5 For a discussion of the problem of unequal distribution of structural funds in Sweden the reader is referred to 
evaluations and reports such as the ones prepared by Helle et al. (1997) and Neuman and Píriz (2000). 
6 By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, the equivalent of 1000 Swedish crowns in US dollars was 
100.
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compete with other better endowed fishermen, would continue to decrease. In box 7.1 the 
fishermen’s worries regarding the concentration of fleet capacity and resource appropriation is 
illustrated. A prominent feature of their concern is the fear that the increasing presence of 
non-local fishermen and their growing share of the resources and political influence would 
ultimately decide the future of the local coastal fishery.
The reduction of the size of the fleet is expected to reduce the cost unit of fish caught and, 
provided quotas remain stable, to enable an increase in the economic returns from fishing, 
that is, higher economic efficiency in terms of higher productivity. The extent to which this 
Box 7.1  The market and concentration of tonnage in high-capitalised vessels 
“A few are buying up all the tonnage, soon they will own everything and with the tonnage also the
right to fish. What are we suppose to do, where are we suppose to go, then” {0.0#10}. 
“We do not want these high-tech large vessels here; there are not enough resources to share”
{0.0#20}.
“Some fishermen fish to earn more and more money, to buy more effective vessels with luxurious
leather sofas. Have you been to their homes? These are rich people, you know. You should pay
them a visit. We don’t want that fishery here, I’d rather fish less and skip the leather sofa but see
more of my kids. It is a matter of choice 10 of them or 1000 of us. You should go and ask the
Swedish people what they prefer” {0.0#13}. 
“The European policy is the end of us, our salvation is just to sell the vessel as scrap and retire.
Nobody will take over, the professional local coastal fisheries will die” {0.0#15}. 
“GG fishermen always want more and more, they search for new waters all the time. With their
vessels they drive other people to ruin” {0.0#2}. 
“Together with our vessels years of tradition and local knowledge will go to the scrap yard”
{0.0#19}.
“The bureaucrats from NBF support the idea of a mobile and flexible fleet, because a flexible fleet
can better adapt its fishing to changing conditions and collapses. The question is whether that will
be one more incentive to ruin local coastal resources and then go and fish other places” {0.0#23}.
“We don’t want to change to fishing with high tech vessels here, because, in the long term, one
will no longer have fish to eat or sell. This is a matter of lifestyle and morality, and it is time for
the Government to choose” {0.0#1}. 
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
may be possible in the coastal zone, where there is shortage of resources and other users affect 
the resource, can be questioned. Besides, the concentration of tonnage combined with other 
current institutional arrangements, e.g. shared quotas and TACs, can lead to the appropriation 
of resources and concentration of fishing rights by a few resource-strong commercial areas 
and fishermen, resulting in less social equity. Under the present conditions of total allowable 
catches and national quotas, this is a way of securing the appropriation of resources where, for 
a given size of national fleet, the accumulation of fishing capacity becomes a zero-sum game 
with win-lose outcomes. It results in competition for an ever-dwindling share of the resource 
and can easily turn into an incentive to race for vessel tonnage and fishing opportunities. 
Thus, one of the implications of the CFP structural plans in Sweden – and elsewhere – is that 
they may  well  lead  to  a  further  concentration  of resources in the more capital-intensive 
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segments of the fleet7. The Swedish case illustrates a situation where new licences are only 
issued in exceptional cases, and the dominant principle is free access under shared quotas and 
TACs; contraction of the fleet will only strengthen the more well-established fishermen. It is 
the fisherman from the larger urban ports like Göteborg, who has the financial means and 
business connections to enable the construction of new vessels as part of a continuing process 
of modernisation and accumulation of fishing capacity. It is the traditional fisherman, in the 
more peripheral rural communities, who is tempted to sell his vessel. When a local fisherman 
decides to sell his vessel, he is also denying himself, and future generations, their right to make 
a living off the local natural resources. In Sweden, the situation is further aggravated through 
the licensing system. According to the Fisheries Act (1993), to obtain a fishing licence in 
Sweden one has to have 3 consecutive years of economic dependency (main income) on 
fisheries (sometimes referred as historical track records). Even when the requirements for 
getting a fishing licence are not extreme in economic terms, licences have not been issued due 
mainly to the critical resource situation of cod. In any case, becoming a fisherman requires 
fishing experience and knowledge and access to fishing equipment, including a vessel. These 
skills and the fishing assets are normally transferred within the household, the extended family 
or the local community (Hasslöf 1949, Löfgren 1978, Hazlehurst 1994). The situation can be 
interpreted as one where the right of alienation, in the sense of Ostrom and Schlager (1997), 
applies and the reproduction of local knowledge is hampered. That the decision to sell the 
vessel is an individual choice is not considered problematic here. What is problematic, 
however, is that under the present institutional regime, the transfer of tonnage out of the local 
community also means the transfer of appropriation rights (and therefore fishing and 
management opportunities as well as jobs). This will limit the future contribution of local 
professional fisheries to keeping the archipelago in Northern Bohuslän alive. The regulations 
that have such effects should therefore be seen as a collective rather than an individual choice.
The interviews have illustrated how in Sweden “non-tradable” fishing rights are in practice 
traded with the vessel, and although MAGP targets address a collective need, namely an 
improvement in the state of the resources, their implementation is an individual choice, 
usually made without reference to the effects on and needs of the wider local community.
Reasoning along these lines one can argue that the vessel, which in Giddens (1997) 
terminology could be classified as an allocative resource, is becoming an authoritative resource 
that predetermines the definition of future rights. In this way, material assets or artefacts are 
also given authority to mediate rights in management. This illustrates what has previously been 
argued in chapter 3, namely that institutional changes – in this case the adoption of certain 
rules in fleet development plans – can result in the transformation of allocative and 
authoritative resources’ functions. This can be interpreted as a way whereby the 
institutionalisation of individual transferable rights is slowly introduced and mediated by the 
investment in material assets or individual goods.
One issue where the interviewees disagreed was in relation to the overcapacity of the Swedish 
fishing fleet and the relevance of the EU’s capacity reduction policy to the Swedish case.  At 
the beginning of this investigation, the official discourse was that a capacity reduction was not 
necessary. However, during the period of time when the research was taking place, the debate 
turned in favour of restricting the expansion of the fleet, particularly the pelagic fishing units 
based in and around Göteborg. More recently, the concentration of fleet capacity has become 
a delicate matter for both the Swedish Government and the FAs, principally the SFR which is 
7 It should be remembered here that the Swedish fleet does not have what are called distant factory vessels, 
normally referred as the industrial fleet in for example the Spanish fishery. The concept of industrial fisheries is 
in a Swedish context normally used to refer to what in international terms could be referred to as high-tech
middle size flexible fleet. In a negative way, the concept is also used to refer to fisheries that deliver fish for 
reduction.
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expected to represent the interests of all fishermen and guarantee some sort of equitable 
internal distribution. The FAs have tried to maintain a fragile coalition consisting of various 
interested parties, but dominated by non-local fishermen (see chapter 2). In the early years of 
the present decade, the CFP’s schemes were judged a failure. The mid-term review of the 4th
MAGP concluded that this programme was having only marginal effects on the excess fishing 
capacity and consequently a process of reform of the CFP with new regulations has been 
agreed8. Thus, the need to reduce the capacity of the Swedish fleet was not longer questioned 
by the Swedish authorities. But the issue of how this was to be done was and still is a relevant 
question. The concentration process is inconsistent with the policies of regional and rural 
development and is politically controversial because it raises the question as to what type of 
fisheries do the Swedish people want. It also raises the question as to what is needed to 
counter such a trend. One option much debated within EU, is the reduction – or possibly the 
elimination of – subsidies to fisheries.
By 1998, to neutralise the expansion of the segment of the fleet fishing on small pelagics at the 
expense of other segments of the fleet, the Swedish authorities decided to limit the trade in 
vessel tonnage, to vessels within each specific segment.9 According to the fishermen, this 
regulation was not effective. Its effectiveness was counteracted by another rule whose 
intention is to allow for flexibility in fisheries. In this latter rule, the definition of a segment is 
based on the main species of capture in the previous year. A vessel is considered part of a 
particular segment when at least 30% of the annual capture by weight is attributable to that 
species. Thus the rule allows for vessels to change segments; as one fisherman, cited below, 
explained one can easily convert a vessel from one segment to another before trading the 
tonnage.
“Due to the differences in volume and weight between for example prawn and pelagic 
species, reaching the 30% level can be done in a few weeks. Thus, you can transform your 
old prawn vessel into a herring vessel quickly, and then sell it to Göteborg” {0.0#24}. 
Many non-fishermen highlighted the fact that the state did not have the means to stop the 
concentration trend:
8 The new system, replacing the former system of MAGPs, will give more responsibility to the Member States to 
achieve a better balance between the fishing capacity of their fleets and the available resources. Reference levels 
will be set based on the MAGP levels set for 31 December 2002. For each gross registered tonne introduced in 
the fleet with public aid (which will only be available for the next two years, 2003 and 2004), Member States will 
have to decommission, without aid: a) an equivalent amount of capacity (1:1 entry/exit ratio) for vessels up to 
100 GT (gross registered tonnes) or b) 1.35 tonnes (1: 1.35 entry/exit ratio) for vessels over 100 GT. Over the 
period 2003 - 2004, Member States that grant public aid for the renewal of the fleet, will have to reduce the 
overall capacity of their fleets by a minimum of 3% compared to their reference levels. It will be up to Member 
States to ensure that the total fishing capacity of new vessels entering the fleet does not exceed the capacity of 
those being permanently removed and that fishing capacity is adjusted to the available fish resources. Aid for 
the renewal of fishing vessels is being phased out and will only be available for two more years (up to the end of 
2004) and only for vessels under 400 GT. It will be restricted to Member States, which have met their overall 
MAGP IV capacity targets, and its allocation will have to comply with the entry/exit ratios described above. 
Aid for modernization of fishing vessels will only be available for vessels that are at least 5 years old to improve 
safety, product quality or working conditions, switch to more selective fishing techniques or to equip vessels 
with the VMS (Vessel Monitoring Systems). EU aid will be restricted to Member States which have met their 
overall capacity targets set under MAGP IV. (for more information see: www.europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/
news_corner/press/inf02_61_en.htm)
9 The decision was triggered by new large investments by a few wealthy fishing families from Gothenburg in the 
so-called pelagic segment of the fleet (herring and sprat, mackerel and tobis). According to the rules, and 
provided the investor removes the same capacity (in tonnage) that he brings into the fleet, the authorities 
cannot constrain investment and economic expansion. Trapped by the rules the authorities could do nothing 
against this type of investment and permits for the new vessels had to be issued. This, despite the fact that the 
fishermen’s association (SFR) had recommended the authorities not to issue the permits.
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“The National Board of Fisheries does not have the tools, however, to limit investment, 
and those investing and not responding to the association are gaining economic power” 
{0.1#28}.
Thus, in spite of the rule adopted by the central authorities, the fishermen remain concerned 
about the transfer of vessel tonnage, a matter of particular importance to Northern Bohuslän, 
and what this means for the local access to resources.10
The local coastal fishermen also had ideas on how to counter such trend. A number of 
alternatives that could ensure that the vessel tonnage would remain in the local area were 
identified both in the interviews and in fishermen’s meetings organised in Northern Bohuslän.
One idea was to restrict the outflow of vessels to other areas or districts and only allow 
trading of vessels between those living in the area. A similar idea proposed by the FAs was to 
restrict the outflow of vessels during a given period, e.g. the first 12 months, or up to 7 
months after the vessel has been put up for sale. Yet another idea was to create pools of vessel 
tonnage to be administered locally e.g. by the Municipalities or the local branches of the FAs. 
A share of the tonnage would be available for sale to the local pool and the shares 
accumulated in the pool, could subsequently be offered to fishermen from the area and 
preferably to young people wishing to enter fisheries. In this way, the problem of youth 
recruitment in the area could also be mitigated. Other fishermen argued that any strategy to 
counter the outflow of tonnage from the region would yield the best results only when 
combined with subregional or local quotas. As one fisherman commented in a meeting,
“We cannot eat the tonnage if there is no fish left; the vessels tonnage by itself won’t 
help” {2.0#74}. 
Common to these various proposals by the local coastal fishermen was the need for 
differentiation (disaggregation) of the national fleet and transfer of “tonnage rights” to remain 
within the local communities. The proposals from local fishermen thus reflected an interest in 
making the right of management, exclusion and alienation a collective choice and offering 
collective solutions to moderate market forces and individuals’ behaviour. They wanted to 
maximise their benefits through wise economic decisions and at the same time protect the 
local community. However, the local fishermen were not influential enough for the ideas 
discussed by them in the meetings to have an impact on the institutional arrangements. The 
institutional framework could not handle the emergence of collective action for the adoption 
of such measures. That implied the merging of economic and social dimensions and 
rationalities. Based on the argument that “we are living in a market economy”, those opposing local 
control argued that everybody should have the right to sell his vessel and his tonnage 
wherever he can get the best price. In contrast to the concern of the local coastal fishermen 
from Northern Bohuslän related to future access and withdrawal rights to local resources, 
interviews with fishermen from the South and with non-fishermen revealed a tendency to be 
less critical of the situation. In their view the renewal and modernisation of the vessel was 
linked to technological progress and the efficient allocation of resources. Here, the vessel and 
technology were seen as an external phenomena having a life of their own and developing 
outside the sphere of influence of fisheries management. This view is actually supportive of 
the need to use means other than the vessel to manage the resource. Access to the latest 
10 In the case of Sweden, the displacement of the traditional fleet by the pelagic fleet has another connotation: 
fishing down the trophic web is highly criticised by the ecologists and reducing a large portion of the catches 
from pelagic fisheries to produce fishmeal, animal fodder and oil production is questioned by the 
environmental movement, which brings into the picture aspects of global justice and trade and the alternative 
cost of this fishmeal and fodder when compared to the Soya been from Brazil. Polarised questions, such as 
fishing for reduction or fishing for human consumption? make decisions uncomfortable for the Swedish politicians.
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technology was viewed as an individual right. As such, access to technology was disconnected 
from its possible impacts on the distributive aspects in a multiple-use common-pool resource 
system.
Box 7.2 collects together some comments from non-fishermen and non-local fishermen which 
illustrate this way of thinking. In this discourse, the fisherman from Northern Bohuslän was 
often used as a symbol of poor efficiency. Comments like those presented in box 7.3 below 
were not unusual in meetings and interviews with fishermen from South or the leaders of the 
FAs, who saw the coastal fishermen from Northern Bohuslän as inefficient and non-
representative of the fishery of the future. Furthermore, the type of technology used in 
Northern Bohuslän was used to explain why the problems or solutions identified by local 
fishermen could not be considered as reasonable grounds for institutional change. 
The excerpts from the interviews in box 7.3 illustrate this. In their view, a prototypical 
fisherman gains prestige mainly through his vessel and possibly through stereotyped gender 
roles. This phenomenon has been described by Hazlehurst (1994), who highlighted the role of 
Box 7.2 The imperatives of technology 
“One cannot prohibit fishermen from acquiring the latest technology and modern vessels; 
we live in a free country and a market economy. Technology has its own life; we can not 
limit technological development nor influence its market” {0.1#28}.
“Any strategy restraining technology development will bring Swedish fisheries to ruin 
because it will make the Swedish fishermen less competitive in the European market” 
{0.1#27}.
“A sustainable fishery, in economic terms, is one which allows a fisherman, without 
subsidy, to buy a new, more efficient vessel every 15 years” {1.1#58}. 
“No one in this country tells a farmer which tractor to buy. Why shouldn’t I be allowed to 
choose the vessel and the trawl I want?” {1.0#47}. 
“We have invested much capital in the vessel and need efficient technology to get 
economic returns” {0.0# 142}. 
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
artifactual structures, particular the vessel, in mediating the identity of a prototypical fisherman 
from Southern Bohuslän. This focus on the vessel can be contrasted with the local 
fishermen’s views on coastal fisheries discussed in chapter 5. The fishermen’s images about 
their own fisheries presented in chapter 5, indicate that they did not only fish from vessels; 
they fished from households, local harbours, and communities (in the sense of Jentoft 2000). 
These are “non tradable” resources which also play a role in the fishermen’s relationship and 
access to the local common pool resources. Fishermen making use of different livelihood 
assets have benefited unequally from the interventions. Yet the livelihood assets of the local 
fishermen seem to have been filtered out both when preparing the development plans for the 
fleet and also in the search for ways to neutralise their unintended effects. The marginalisation 
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of local fishermen and the filtering of their knowledge seem to occur at various levels in the 
institutional interplay.
7.3 ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 
Among non-fishermen, there was a tendency to focus discussion on TACs and the pros and 
cons of expanding the number of parameters involved in adopting an ecosystem approach. 
The discussion mainly concerned issues of uncertainty and accessibility, i.e. how reliable 
scientific assessment methods could be translated into a language that the fishermen could 
understand so as to convince them of the need for their implementation.
Scientists often reflected on how both fishermen and politicians undermined the reliability of 
the TACs. From their perspective the fishermen had done so by not reporting the “truth” in 
their catch log-books and landing returns11, while the politicians had not held to the scientific 
recommendations rigorously enough. In their view, the interests and considerations of 
politicians and fishermen had prevailed over the resource situation.
“If politicians and fishermen had from the very beginning followed the TACs then we 
would never have reached this level of stock depletion” {1.1#147}. 
Fishermen for their part questioned the reliability of TACs and the fishery science as unable to 
assemble a sufficient breadth of knowledge required for advice on the allocation of resources, 
particularly in reference to the relationships between species and their presence in the catch.
“Who can be so stupid as to give us a specific TAC-based quota for one species and 
prohibit the landing of another species that everybody knows has the same pattern of 
distribution and appears in the trawl with the first one? We cannot understand that way 
of thinking; there is a big gap between what the scientists recommend and the reality of 
our fishing” {0.0#15}.
In the interviews the fishermen emphasised problems in sharing the quotas and questioned 
the validity of the knowledge base used in determining boundary rules. The pattern of 
distribution of certain species such as hake, cod, haddock, pollack, saithe, and Nephrops, imply 
that their TACs cover larger geographical areas than just the Skagerrak Sea, i.e. the North Sea. 
Depending on the species, Skagerrak can be merged into Skagerrak-Kattegatt, Skagerrak-
Kattegatt-Baltic Sea, or the North Sea12, with the result that those fishing inshore in Skagerrak 
were crediting their catches to the same quota or allowable catch as those fishing off shore or 
in Kattegatt. This way of defining output boundaries, based on the “one stock- one TAC- one 
common Swedish quota” rule was considered highly problematic by coastal fishermen, who 
were often forced to share national quotas with the modern, mobile fleet on an “equal basis”. 
The problems with sharing of quotas, as perceived by fishermen, have also been reported in 
chapter 6 under the issue of free riding across scales (see box 6.2). 
11 The opinions of the Swedish fishermen about issue of misreporting and cheating in fisheries have been 
collected within the framework of SUCOZOMA via a nation-wide survey prepared by Ellegård and Eggert 
(2002).
12 At the time of this writing there were only a few quotas (e.g. mackerel) embracing large areas such as   
Skagerrak-Kattegatt-Baltic Sea, or the North Sea.
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The boundaries of the geographical areas to which quotas apply and the lack of boundaries to 
fishing communities with rights to extract resource units from the TACs and the quotas in 
these areas (under an open access principle) were matters of concern and criticism among 
local coastal fishermen.
“Sharing quotas with the fishermen operating in Kattegatt is not good for us” {0.0#127}. 
“The fishermen from the South are more specialised than we are, and fish the quotas very 
fast” {1.0#145}.
“Rather than organising our fisheries to get a portion of the quotas as soon as possible, 
we would like to plan our fisheries on a seasonal basis following the rhythm of nature” 
{0.0#25}.
In the case of the prawn fishermen, the problem of sharing the quota was aggravated by the 
size of the allocation to Sweden, considered by Swedish fishermen to be too small, especially 
in comparison to the Danish allocation with a smaller prawn fleet13. The prawn fishermen 
frequently commented on the negative impact that the principle of relative stability had on 
them as a group. The principle of relative stability is a key component of the European Union 
conservation policy counterbalancing the principle of non-discrimination or equal access. In 
an attempt to guarantee continuity of fishing opportunities for individual member states, and 
their fisheries dependent regions, this principle can have unintended consequences in the form 
of undesirable fishing patterns. The principle of relative stability is based on the rule that each 
member state of the EU is allotted a fixed percentage share of the TAC for all quota 
controlled species, in a given ICES area, based on historical catch records14. The allocation 
thus favours those who previously had maximised their catches, and in some cases this occurs 
at the expense of those who have attempted to conserve the resource.
“The European rules have been very problematic for us prawn fishermen. First, because 
when the TAC for prawns was distributed among the countries we were punished 
because we had fished too little for prawns just the years used to calculate our share. 
Then because the Government is not longer protectionist, the liberalisation of the market 
has led to lower and lower prices, and we cannot survive any longer”{0.0#7}.
13 This situation has for example been alleviated through quotas exchange with Denmark. 
14 Problems with the principle of relative stability have been discussed by for example Fraga Estévez (1999). 
Box 7.3  Critical views about fishermen from Northern Bohuslän 
“Has a vessel only fit for the scrap yard” {2.0#73}. 
“Believes he fishes, but in reality what he does is to take a daily tram-tour” {0.0#131}.
Is entirely dominated by his wife who forces him to be at home more than at sea” 
{0.1#26}.
“One cannot stop technological development and progress in fisheries simply because a 
group of fishermen have mismanaged their business and have no capital to reinvest. 
They are the ones lagging behind; they are the ones that have to adapt, not the rest” 
{1.1#58}.
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
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“In this stupid world, the more resources you have caught in the past the more you are 
allowed to catch today and tomorrow. Contrary to what normally happens in the movies, 
the one who wins in fisheries is the bad boy” {0.0#9}.
“If the Danes do not efficiently use the quota that has been allocated to them, then that 
quota should go to someone else” {0.0#129}. 
The principle did not favour the Swedish prawn fishermen who historically had regulated their 
fishery and considered that others were free riding on their historical collective efforts (see 
chapter 8). The prawn fishermen regarded the principle as a disincentive to conserve the 
resource. This case illustrates that time dependent models of allocation need some type of 
dynamic in order to adapt to local changes in terms of the resource base, the fishing strategy 
(e.g. use of time and space), and conservation effort, or the introduction of eco-labelling. To 
serve the interests of resource conservation such principles should be continuously reviewed 
so that they do not become a barrier to the resource conservation opportunities to be found in 
combining dynamic non-market driven (e.g. collective rules) and market driven mechanisms.
The effect on other fishermen’s views of the prawn fishermen’s strategies deserves to be 
highlighted here. They argue that the prawn fishermen have put themselves in that situation 
through unilateral or voluntary over-regulation of their own fisheries.
“The prawn fishermen have over-regulated their own fisheries; they can only blame 
themselves” {0.1#26}.
“All these local rules have only affected the prawn fishermen negatively; they’ve got less 
to share and can no longer compete” {1.1#58}. 
Such arguments indicate that the application of this principle is a disincentive to fishermen’s 
participation in co-management for resource conservation. Looking at the trade of tonnage 
and the concomitant concentration of resources is particularly interesting in Sweden, where 
with the exception of the semi-industrial fleet for pelagic species, the FAs and the majority of 
the fishermen reject the formal introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) (Ellegård 
and Eggert 2002). Within the present study a majority of fishermen preferred a quota system 
that would allow them to be more involved in the monitoring and control of quota uptake or 
the regulation of fishing effort in terms of time at sea. Their experiences with the selling of 
tonnage had made the local coastal fishermen very sceptical of the idea of introducing ITQs.
In box 7.4 the fishermen’s worries regarding the introduction of ITQs are illustrated. The 
procedures and criteria for the initial individual quota allocation were highlighted. The 
importance of finding a balance between individual and collective rights and between the 
rights of local and non-locals was a topic frequently raised in local fishermen’s meetings and 
by those interviewed. The fishermen referred to their own attempts to resolve problems of 
distribution related to geographical and social scales applied to the quota system. They pointed 
to the formation of the local organisation BKF, in the early 1990s, and their demands for a 
special quota for the coastal fishermen of Northern Bohuslän. According to members of 
BKF, the main purpose of the new organisation was to find means of ensuring a stable flow 
of resources for local coastal communities. The survival of local fish auction was also seen as a 
pre-requisite for their fishing activities.  The latter is a specific problem for local fishermen, 
which those landing their catch in urban centres like Göteborg or in a major landing centres in 
Denmark do not have to confront.
To secure long term access to the resources for the coastal fisheries, BKF advocated a 
differentiated allocation of the national resource including the creation of community quotas 
(CQ). In other words, the BKF fishermen tried to redefine the boundaries of quota 
management by reducing the geographical and social scale i.e. scaling down the unit of 
management. This was done by adding a new variable – place of residence or homeport. By 
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scaling down and making use of a territorial construction based on the local fishing fleet, BKF 
was abandoning the principle of free access to the resource and resolving the issue of non-
SVC members free riding on the associations semi-enforceable rules, without surrendering 
their collective responsibility to the central government administration (for further discussion 
see chapter 8).
Box 7.4  Northern Bohusläns local fishermen’s worries about ITQs 
“How to divide? If the first individual allocation is calculated on the basis of a fixed share of a 
quota, then those who have diversified their fishing will lose in the distribution. If it is 
calculated on the basis of the investment made, the rural fisherman with his second hand vessel 
will be the loser. If it is calculated on the basis of tonnage or the power of the engine then the 
small-scale fisherman will be the loser. Whatever we choose will have a negative effect on the 
local fisheries” {0.0#17}. 
“Developing ITQs for Nephrops may be easy but what about all the other species you get in the 
trawl? What would happen to those of us who switch from prawn to finfish depending on the 
demands of the market and the weather conditions” {0.0#7}. 
“The thing that worries me the most with regard to the idea of ITQs is the issue of inheritance. 
You see, my son is fishing with me (he is today only 16). But soon he would more or less 
automatically get a fishing licence. If we protect the prawns and he is well skilled he will 
manage, but I worry about the ITQs. Do you know what would happen if I get an ITQ and 
then die, would he inherit it? Suppose he gets a good price for it and sells it and then wastes 
the money….I do not like that…some fish will at least always be there”{0.0#11}. 
“Like the transfer of tonnage, the transfer of quotas will also bring our local communities to 
ruin. We need to join together here, not become more individualistic. The ITQs are made by 
the people from the major cities who only think about making money; we have to think about 
how this community is to survive” {2.0#84}. 
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
7.4 FRAMING OF REGULATIONS
The proposals made by BKF were based on previous experiences. The historical review of the 
Swedish fisheries (chapter 2) pointed to a situation where in the past the rules governing 
coastal fisheries were designed at the local level. The engagement of local fishermen in the 
management of coastal fisheries predates that of the engagement of the state in the regulation 
of offshore fisheries and the establishment of the fishermen’s associations (see chapters 2 and 
5).  The establishment of SVC in the 1930s, brought a new order where the organisation of 
collective action and fishermen’s management functions became partly centralised. The state, 
initially represented by the County administration at the provincial level and subsequently by 
the National Board at the central level, had the authority to issue formal regulations for coastal 
fisheries and stocks15 (Fiskeristyrelsen 1988).
15 “Formal” means here that the rules are legally enforceable. These are by no means the only rules governing the 
Swedish fisheries. 
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A formal takeover and concentration of regulating authority at the provincial level was first 
supported by the FAs (SVC), who saw this as an alternative to the privatisation of fishing 
rights in the inshore and the archipelagos of the West Coast (see chapter 2).
In the interviews the local fishermen revealed that their participation in management has 
decreased considerably over the last four decades. Several fishermen remembered the time 
when decisions regarding operational and even collective rules were taken locally.
Box 7.5  The local rules system in Northern Bohuslän 
“When my uncle here was active no fisherman left harbour before 05:00 and everyone 
lifted the trawl and returned home before 20:00. Besides, fishing on weekends within the 
15 nautical mile zone was prohibited” {0.0#15}. 
“We were organised in “fiskelag”. There were many “fiskelag” here and we met to discuss 
common problems and to organise community work. In those days there were no races 
and the fishermen who transgressed the rules were confronted by the social pressure of the 
group” {0.0#18}.
“When my father was an active fisherman, fishing around that island was not allowed 
because the lobsters reproduce there, and when I started fishing nobody caught lobster 
during the time they were carrying eggs. In those days, we had the right to protect the 
lobster in our own way; we do not have that right today. People come from anywhere to 
catch lobster here” {0.0#8}. 
“The idea of putting limits on the size of the trawls in home waters was first taken up at 
the community level in 1950”. But it was not until 1963, when the catch of prawn was very 
low, that consensus in the area was reached to present a proposal and fight for it within 
SVC” {0.0#10}. 
“When I started in 1935, there were no local regulations for prawn besides a fishing stop 
on Saturdays and Sundays, of course. Already in 1959 we allocated the prawns through a 
fixed allotment of max 480 kg per 4 men onboard, but we called it a ration. In this area we 
had developed individual quotas long before the scientists and bureaucrats started thinking 
about quotas and TACs; a good fisheries management requires a just sharing 
system”{0.0#19}
“We fishermen from Northern Bohuslän had the power to influence the prawn fisheries 
because there were no prawns in Southern waters. In the forties and the fifties we had 
much more influence than we have today” {0.0#11}. 
“Before the sixties my fisheries were more diverse, it was more adapted to the natural 
seasonal variation of the species on the coast. It was less monotonous and harmful for the 
environment but I do not know to what extent that type of seasonal fishing is possible 
today when there is almost no fish and the coastal waters are so polluted” {0.0#25}. 
“When I started fishing, time at sea was limited and so was the number of days at sea. 
Everybody knew the rules, and nobody from the surroundings here would dare to break 
them, because if he did the rumours would knock him down, and people from the village 
wouldn’t talk to him anymore” {0.0#127}. 
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
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The local rules were often based on the control of inputs in the use of time, space and 
technology (see box 7.5) known in the literature as parametric management (Acheson and 
Wilson 1996).
This information, when combined with the historical analysis and the interviews with local 
fishermen, indicate that the rules designed by fishermen relied heavily upon parameters of 
time and space and easily observable phenomena that facilitated their own monitoring of 
enforcement. How the fishing was done, where and when, were central aspects in the design 
of the rules, which were related to small areas. Prohibiting fishing during nights and weekends; 
seasonal closures directing the fisheries to other times and zones; limiting certain technology 
and gear sizes; catch size limits; fishing stops during breeding and spawning seasons and the 
sharing of market rights are examples of these local rules. 
Even though some of the rules can also be found in the present government driven 
management system, the present system is primarily based on output limits for single stocks 
(TACs). As discussed by Schlager (1990; 1994) and Acheson and Wilson (1996) one aspect 
that marks a difference between fishermen based rules and scientific based rules, is the scale 
and the use of TACs and quotas.
In the case of Sweden, fishermen have de facto controlled output by devising their own quota 
system. But what the fishermen shared through the quotas was not the right to a maximum 
fixed amount of fish, but the capacity of the market to absorb the fish at a reasonable price. 
What is important here is that the rules were designed and agreed by the fishermen collectively 
and were related to processes on a scale that was possible for them to observe. 
The local coastal fishermen perceived the entry of the offshore fleet into the coastal areas to 
be a turning point with regard to their ability to participate in the design and implementation 
of local rules. In the interviews, the local fishermen were eager to recount the events of the 
1970s (see box 7.6). A recurrent theme was how, in the 1970s, vessels from the South ruined 
the local fishing grounds and what was left of the local management system in Northern 
Bohuslän. Memories from the 1970s seem to play a particular role in fuelling the clash of 
interests between local and non-local fishermen in the area of study but also between local 
leaders. It was the establishment of the national exclusive economic zones, the expansion of 
the industrial fisheries and the acknowledgement by science of ecological dependencies across 
scales and the idea that the unit of management must be large enough to cover the various live 
cycles of the species, which in the late seventies led to the scaling up of management.
7.5 THE FILTERING OF NON-SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
Conventional management models, where the central government authorities play a central 
role, tend to rely on expert scientific advice. The social and ecological knowledge of fishermen 
is often bounded by place, time and context, and developed on the basis of long series of 
observations. The capacity of the authorities to acquire this type of knowledge is rather 
limited. Those supportive of co-management seek to incorporate fishermen’s social and 
ecological knowledge into the formulation of problems and the design of solutions. Among 
others Finlayson (1994), Jentoft (1998) and Rörling and Jiggins (1998) have highlighted the 
cognitive aspects of co-management and the need to broaden the basis of information. 
Cooperation between fishermen and fishery scientists was considered critical to the 
functioning of the current management system by most of those interviewed. In spite of this, 
the fishermen regarded their interplay with scientists as poor and one-sided. With only a few 
exceptions, where the relationship had evolved into personal and mutually beneficial in 
general the fishermen considered the relation with the scientists as unidirectional in the sense 
that they did not get much benefit out of it. Part of this problem is related to the differences
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in conceptualisations of fisheries management and what should be the focus of the research 
that supports decision-making. For example, one of the questions put to non-fishermen was 
how they conceptualised fisheries management. Non-fishermen had a tendency to relate this 
to the Swedish term fiskevård, which refers to resource conservation rather than the wider 
concept of fisheries management (fiskeriförvaltning). What at the beginning was seen as a 
question of semantics, has been shown to have more significance.
Fiskevård was described as a combination of functions and activities to protect and improve 
the state of fish stocks and the habitats of importance to them. Under this concept measures 
are to be taken on biological grounds. Thus the functions and activities of resource 
conservation are defined and undertaken by professionals working for the state authorities and 
within the framework provided by the European Common Fisheries Policy. The conservation 
of resources should be implemented on the basis of data produced by fishery biologists and 
through legal instruments and statutory enforcement. Fishery scientists saw their role in regard 
to resource conservation as the development of models for fish stock assessment and their 
application for the purpose of conservation. But this concept does not include the allocation 
Box 7.6  Memories from the 1970s of Northern Bohuslän’s local coastal fishermen 
“In the seventies, they came and fished finfish day and night, nothing was left - they ruined 
our best fishing grounds. Now they are here again and are ruining the shellfish also” {0.0#2}.
“They came and fished constantly, day and night, Saturday and Sunday”. “They did not let 
the seabed and the fish rest as we commonly did here” {0.0#3}. 
“The southern fleet has already once before ruined our fishing grounds without any 
consideration, we just don’t trust them” {2.0#79}. 
 “They have imposed their own non-rule system - the law of the jungle, once before and they 
will do so again, we just know it” {0.0#4}. 
“We have already learned once that the fisherman from the South is of a particular type: they 
could not care less about nature and locals’ rights, they believe they own all fishing grounds. 
They got the support from SVC which since then has represented their interests. These 
people land in SVC’s auction or deliver to SVC’s processing plant, so they depend on each 
other. We no longer have any influence in the associations. Our local divisions are too weak 
in economic and numerical terms” {0.0#14}. 
“We had our own rules here, but the whole local system was overruled and the Government 
did not care” {0.0#5}. 
“They came, they argued that the rules that apply ought to be the rules of the homeport. The 
regional as well as the national associations supported them. They said everybody should have 
the right to make use of their own fishing skills everywhere in Sweden” {0.0#128}.
“The only place where local rules are still at work is in the Koster-fjord. The prawn fishermen 
are the only ones who have been able to continue governing their fishery” {0.0#23}. 
Source: Interviews (1998-2001)
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of fishable resources, funds to the fishing fleet influencing technology, rules designed by the 
fishermen or the way management is organised. In the Swedish fisheries management system 
resource conservation (fiskevård), resource allocation and fleet development aspects have been 
treated in a separated and compartmentalised way.
The controversy over the Sunday and weekend stop was one of the issues raised frequently in 
the fishermen’s meetings and was followed up in interviews. The example of the “Sunday 
stop” discussed below provides an illustration of the problem with a limited knowledge base 
used in fisheries management when this has been conceptualised simply as fiskevård. It 
illustrates how a scientism in resource conservation has contributed to the 
compartmentalisation of different but interrelated type of knowledge and thus hindered the 
adoption of the fishermen’s knowledge in the co-management of fisheries resources. 
The fishermen from Bohuslän have historically practised a Sunday stop (Gerhard 1995) and 
for some periods, weekends stop. When SVC was created, the association adopted the Sunday 
stop rule. Through this process, the Sunday stop was transformed into a general rule 
applicable to all members of the association (semi-enforceable) and it became a source of 
many conflicts. Over time, the wider application of the rule lost support and today it is only 
valid inshore. The issue of a Sunday stop has, since the introduction of more industrial modes 
of production, been a matter of conflict between local fishermen and those who fish on 
weekly basis.
Among local fishermen the issue of a Sunday stop was not controversial, since these 
fishermen normally fished from Monday to Friday.16 The regulation of time at sea is part of 
their fishing strategy. Furthermore, fishermen from northern Bohuslän, considered a general 
Sunday stop to be a good way of giving the sea bed and the fish some respite from trawling 
activity and giving the fishermen a break, without others free riding in their absence.
In the mid 1990s, the Northern Bohuslän Producer Organisation (NBPO) submitted a request 
to the national authorities for the legal formalisation of the Sunday stop in Skagerrak. The 
petition from NBPO was forwarded to the Institute of Marine Research of the National 
Board of Fisheries (IMR), which regularly delivers scientific advice for fisheries management. 
IMR responded negatively, but mainly on the grounds of a lack of scientific evidence in 
respect to the prohibition’s assumed positive effect on the resources. The note prepared by 
IMR in answer to the petition from NBPO stated the following:
“From the point of view of stock conservation it is highly uncertain whether a fishing 
prohibition on Sundays will reduce fishing pressure, since an intensification of fishing on 
other days could compensate for such a prohibition…. Whether, however, the Sunday 
stop ought to be introduced for market or social reasons, we at IMR cannot 
judge…From the point of view of stock conservation, Sunday stops cannot be 
recommended” (Fiskeriverkets Havsfiskelaboratoriet 1995). 17
The note invites reflection on the type of rationality underlying the argument that effort might 
be intensified during the permitted fishing time. This assumes that there is scope for and a will 
to intensify effort on other days. But, if that is the case, it is also possible that intensification 
could occur without the measure being introduced. Indeed, the logic can be seen as a further 
illustration of a way of thinking strongly influenced by the rationality of “economic man”. 
16 An exception might occur when fishermen were forced to go out on a Sunday to remove their gear in bad 
weather. This was not controversial. In general the controversy of Sunday stop had more to do with the semi-
industrial fisheries.
17 The Swedish text states: ”Ur beståndsbevarande synpunkt är det mycket osäkert om söndagsfiskeförbud skulle minska 
fisketrycket, eftersom ett sådant förbud skulle kunna kompenseras med ett ökat fiske de övriga fiskedagarna. Om det däremot av 
marknads - eller sociala skäl bör införas kan vi på havsfiskelaboratoriet inte bedöma. ...ur beståndsbevarande synpunkt inte går
att rekommendera söndagsfiskeförbud...”(Fiskeriverkets Havsfiskelaboratoriet 1995).
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When IMR states that they cannot judge the social value associated with the Sunday stop they 
are actually revealing a set of problems. First, that they lack competence to assess the value 
associated with an instrument that is not directly related to the fish stocks. Second, that to 
undertake this kind of assessment is not the task of natural science. Third, that the scientific 
advice provided to fisheries management is highly specific.
Some of the fishery biologists interviewed argued that: 
“The Sunday stop has nothing to do with the fish stocks” {1.1#66}.
“The Sunday stop is a political goal not to be dealt with by fishery science” {1.1#63}.
“That is not science; it should be resolved by the fishermen. We scientists deal with the 
state of the resource” {1.1#57}.
It is interesting to realise that some scientists felt that the questions I posed to them were “not 
themes for scientific investigation but for the politicians to debate”.
These positions found support among the fishermen’s associations:
“The issue of the Sunday stop has to do with how the resources are distributed, 
something fishery biologist should not deal with and should be left to the politicians or 
the fishermen themselves” {1.1#52}.
Indeed, such expressions depict the use of scientific advice for fisheries management as 
limited to what is biological defensible, when in fact fisheries management may also involve 
aspects that are socially defensible.
In Swedish fisheries management, collective decisions involving distributive aspects have 
normally been taken by the fishermen’s associations and/or the politicians, but without 
specific scientific advice. In this way social aspects have been divorced from resource 
conservation aspects, when in reality the outcome in a cpr system is dependent on both these 
dimensions. Both are interrelated and equally important in the management of common pool 
resources.
The case of the Sunday stop can be contrasted with another case where non-scientific 
knowledge criticised by the local fishermen has been validated by the fishery scientist. This is 
the case of the minimum size for Nephrops. Large by-catches and discards of small Nephrops is a 
general problem in trawl fisheries for Nephrops. The problem is more pronounced in areas 
where a high minimum landing size (MLS) applies. The fishermen were critical of the fact that 
the MSL that applied to Swedish fishermen was considerably higher than that used in 
Denmark and the rest of the European Union. The MLS for Nephrops in Sweden is (13 cm).18
The issue is particularly controversial among the fishermen because the Nephrops in Kattegatt 
and in Skagerrak are considered as belonging to the same stock and the Danish and the 
Swedish fishermen draw from the same TAC (see chapter 2; table 2.3).
Studies made in Sweden report that the proportion of undersized Nephrops in the catch can be 
on average of 78% (Ulmestrand et al. 1998). The introduction of a square mesh panel in the 
cod-end of the trawl has been proved to be a more size selective gear for Nephrops fishing in 
Northern Bohuslän. Nevertheless, discards of about 25% of the Nephrops catch were common, 
and of the Nephrops discarded about 75% died. Yet the majority of the fishermen have been 
unwilling to invest in the more size selective gear.
18 More specifically the minimum landing size is defined as 40 mm carapace length (CL). This is the distance 
measured from the rear eye socket to the distal edge of the carapace. The size at which females reach sexual 
maturity varies within the size range 25-30 mm CL.
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Many local shellfish fishermen claimed that considering the high mortality of discarded 
individuals the minimum marketable size should be reduced if accompanied by an obligation 
to invest in the more selective gear. To do so would be an incentive for other fishermen to 
adopt the more selective gear, since there is a market for Nephrops of 11 cm size. In this case, 
the fishermen were looking for a harmonisation of the regulation in favour of relaxing the 
norms applied in Sweden. According to them, the discarded Nephrops – most of which will die 
after being returned to the sea –  would have a value of millions of kronor on the market and 
improve their income considerably.
“If I was allowed to market all the Nephrops from 10-11 cm up, instead of being forced to 
discard them and let them die, I promise you that I would consider the idea of reducing 
time at sea. The quotas could be also reduced based on that strategy. That would be 
much better for Nephrops I have yet to catch” {0.0#17}.
When putting forward their case for a revised Swedish MLS for Nephrops, the fishermen 
argued that the present norms had little to do with the biology of the species. The MLS for 
Nephrops had been defined mainly because of the demands from workers in the processing 
factories, who had found shelling Nephrops smaller than 15 cm difficult. Consequently, the 
MLS, agreed upon by the processing industry and the FAs (SVC), was 15 cm; in the late sixties 
it was reduced to 13 cm. Today, the bulk of Nephrops is sold fresh, and shelling is now very 
uncommon in Sweden. Nevertheless, the higher minimum landing size remains in use.
The purpose here is not to question the conservation value of adopting a higher MLS, but 
rather to illustrate that fishermen and scientists can interpret rules in different ways. The 
examples of Sunday stop and MLS for Nephrops further illustrate that when non-scientific 
knowledge is to be adopted in fisheries management it passes through a scientific validation 
filter designed only for biological facts. In the case of the minimum size for Nephrops, the 
scientific criterion used to test the proposal rule coming from the industry is conservation. 
The high minimum landing size can be validated on the basis of biological knowledge, because 
the higher the MLS the greater the opportunity for Nephrops to reproduce. The rejection of the 
Sunday stop was related to the scientists’ inability to explain how the Sunday stop would work 
in biological terms; here the result was almost certainly less conservation.
In a system where science is dominant, as with fisheries, traditional rules for which there is 
some scientific support are more likely to be adopted. Both examples illustrate that when 
critical distributive issues are brought to the table by groups of fishermen, biological facts are 
often used to moderate the demands. Surprisingly only a few scientists, with whom 
conversations were held, problematised the distributive (political) effects that various scientific 
results may have. In the Swedish system there is an image of scientists and officials as making 
the “scientifically objective and neutral judgements” and the fishermen and politicians as 
making the decisions affecting distributive aspects. 
7.6 LACK OF TRUST IN THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Many authors acknowledge trust as a prerequisite for co-management arrangements to work, 
but trust is difficult to measure. Local coastal fishermen indicated distrust of the main 
protagonists in the Swedish co-management system (see box 7.7).
Local coastal fishermen expected both the FAs and the Government authorities to understand 
their reality and act in their interest, to defend their own and their local community’s rights to 
continue fishing for their livelihood. Local fishermen argued that the FAs did not share these 
views. They also argued there was not an official vision about local coastal fisheries and that 
they lacked support.
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Local coastal fishermen recognised that as a group they exerted a weak influence within the 
FAs. This was related to problems of representation within the FAs both at the regional level 
and the national level. The central co-management system per se guaranteed neither trust nor 
local participation. Trust and participation, depend on how co-management is designed and 
on the building of institutions and mechanisms that involve and support fishermen at the local 
level. In general the communication with the main actors involved in decision making was 
considered to be poor. The fishermen found it difficult to trust decisions taken far from the 
local level, particularly when those decisions did not fit the problems they could observe in 
their home waters.
The leadership factor appears to be a key element of building trust at the various levels, the 
local, the regional and the national. The sense of “we” in the interviews and in the meetings 
Box 7.7 The lack of trust in the Swedish central corporatist co-management
“It is nice to be interviewed; this is the first time someone from Göteborg wants to hear my  
opinion” {0.0#10}. 
“Bureaucrats take decisions at their desks without consulting us, how can they know what is 
right and wrong?” {0.0#24}. 
“There are good people at the NBF [x, y mentioned] but decisions are taken by a handful of 
powerful persons who do not care about us. The marriage between SFR and the staff at the 
National Board of Fisheries has brought us to ruin” {1.0#14}. 
“We have to be careful when passing information to officers of NBF because the 
information is then used against us. Within NBF there are individual officers that are friends 
of the fishermen and there are those that are enemies of the fishermen” {2.1#148} 
“Locals we are able to manage, but when the central authorities get involved we are lost; 
therefore we need the support of a strong national association. However the one we have 
does not defend our interests” {1.0#84}. 
“There are scientists and there are scientists (x, y mentioned), I do not trust scientists that 
have a passion for sea worms and forget the people (x, y mentioned)” {0.0#6}. 
 “Our capacity to be influential in the FAs is very low and when we vote for these types of 
ideas, we lose…SVC should be reorganised…we have suggested that already” {0.0#24}. 
“We should be more strategic here up north, change our address and build up many branches 
of exactly 21 members” {0.0#13}. 
 “The association has abandoned us and we can wait no longer. We have to do something 
ourselves to change the situation, can you help us” {0.0#21}. 
 “The time of despotism is over (referring to SFR); it is time for us to negotiate directly with 
the authorities” {0.0#22}.
 “Somehow, I believe, we need a strong and politically informed leadership which can 
negotiate at the ministerial and the European level and that we have at SFR. But we also need 
local strong organisations that are more influential; as things stand today everybody opines 
but nobody listens to us” {0.0#5}. 
“I am not a member of SVC- being part of the main association is not of much help for me, 
only the economically powerful fishermen benefit there” {0.0#16}. 
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
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was remarkable and the feeling of trust as well as mistrust was often personified. This was 
particularly the case when referring to the behaviour of other fishermen. In meetings, specific 
individuals were often identified without mentioning their names but by just commenting: “we 
all know, who we mean”. At the local level informal interpersonal relations are often strong 
and trust develops in the practice of doing what has been collectively agreed and helping each 
other to get things done on the ground. Local presence and personal relations seem to be of 
importance in co-management. For example, only a small number of the fishermen 
interviewed trusted scientists. For the most part those fishermen had participated in research 
projects, developing personal relations with research staff from the government agency.  The 
centralisation of authority within the state and the intermediary role of the FAs seem to have 
created a co-management form that makes the development of communication with the local 
level difficult.
7.7 OBSTACLES TO MORE PLURALISTIC CO-MANAGEMENT 
Co-management is largely about agreeing upon rules of interaction, as well as the authority, 
roles, and distribution of responsibilities to each stakeholder. Who is involved and how, will 
certainly affect the fishermen’s capability to be influential. In the central corporatist co-
management system the authorities and the FAs have primarily discussed quotas, operational 
rules and financial support for the vessels, rather than who should or should not have a say in 
the decision making on what, and at which level. How co-management is to be organised and 
who to co-manage are not stipulated in the Swedish fishery regulations. This was considered 
problematic by the staff.
“The Swedish Fishery Law does not provide any guidelines or instructions on which 
stakeholders should be consulted, when and how; how co-management should be 
organised is not legally defined. The Government has given instructions on the 
constitution of boards and committees but the modality of consultation with the 
fishermen has just evolved as praxis” {0.1#55}. 
Table 7.1 presents a synopsis of views from the stakeholders and how these have 
accomplished their role. Three stakeholders were identified by all respondents as prominent in 
the management of fisheries: the National Board of Fisheries (NBF), the National 
Fishermen’s Association (SFR) and the European Commission.
In the late nineties Hasselberg (1997) identified the first two organisations and the 
Department of Fisheries in the Ministry of Agriculture, as the most influential actors in the 
Swedish fisheries. The ministerial department was hardly mentioned by the fishermen 
interviewed in this study, in spite of the fact that they saw the need for having strong leaders 
that could be influential at this level. In general, from the perspective of fishermen 
interviewed, the national governmental authority was the NBF, whose influence is now limited 
by decision making at the European level.
A pattern emerging from the interviews was that those who had been involved in the earlier 
system of co-management (FAs and NBF with its research institutes) were criticized for 
passivity by the local fishermen and their organisations, NGOs, government staff at the 
various levels and the wider scientific community. 
In one way or another, almost all the interviewees criticized the performance of the NBF19 and 
the SFR.20  The responses from local fishermen indicated that they perceived a lack of support 
19 The National Board of Fisheries works under the political instructions of the Department of Fisheries of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and should not be understood as a unified structure with one common position. It is an 
organisation consisting of differentiated structures, and a number of separate units, where the staff (~270) 
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from these organisations. The criticism of these organisations by fishermen refers essentially 
to their mode of working and the rules of the system, not to their existence. 
All interviewees agreed on the need for a more proactive role to be played by the NBF. The 
staff of the NBF, on the other hand, expected the ministerial level to give more clear 
instructions. In her analysis of relations of power in the Swedish fisheries, Hasselberg (1997) 
refers to this phenomenon as a vacuum of decision-making power, with poorly implemented 
policies as a consequence.
That the supra-national body, the European Commission, is widely recognised as the new 
central actor and largely responsible for the loss of national and local influence in the 
development of management solutions was made clear in most interviews. Membership in the 
European Union brought many radical changes to Sweden, not least in the real of marine 
fisheries. Not only was a new supranational level of government created, but many of the 
original rules applied to Swedish waters were replaced by universal rules designed in Brussels.
Following EU membership, the decision making process changed and became disengaged 
from the Swedish context and particularly from the reality in which local fisherman live and 
work. Many local fishermen were of the opinion that the distance between themselves and the 
organisations traditionally involved in co-management had increased. However, although the 
EU reinforced the role of the central administration and weakened the role of the FAs, it also 
made possible the establishment of independent Producer Organisations. The national system 
of price regulation was replaced by a European system which functions through such POs. In 
Sweden this led to a re-articulation of the vertical interplay within the industry and the revival 
of the local level, which in the case of Northern Bohuslän led to the reconfirmation of the 
local importance of coastal fisheries, but with a focus on shellfish. However, POs were not 
seen by the dominant actors as organisations that could take on wider management 
responsibilities (see table 7.1).
The late 1990s and the early years of the 21th century, characterised by interaction with 
Brussels and a situation of depleted coastal resources and witnessed a weakening of the 
authority of the associations and the Ministry and a reinforcement of the authority of the 
National Board of Fisheries.
Recognition of interdependencies and the limits to governing complex cpr through central 
management – where only the economic sector is invited to the negotiation table – has given 
rise to a global debate. In the management of natural resources, the development of new 
modes of interaction and co-operation between government and society (e.g. scientists, NGOs 
and resource users) can be observed. These new modes expand the scope of participation to 
new stakeholders.
In Sweden, certain changes broadening the scope of representation on the executive of the 
National Board of Fisheries had already taken place in 1991 (see chapter 2). New partners 
both from the government and civil society were getting involved and demanding a say in how 
fisheries resources are managed. The wider community of stakeholders put pressure on the 
authorities and the debate triggered new approaches to the issue of resource depletion and 
allocation and working styles. The representatives of these new partners had a tendency to 
enlarge the agenda of issues to be managed and demand more transparent decision making. In 
such a pluralistic constellation, the FAs have great difficulty fulfilling their intermediation role 
in co-management. This development was considered problematic by the fishermen, who felt 
they had enough problems within their own organisations and sectoral partners.
performs different functions and operates under different imperatives and pressures, even with contradictory 
goals. The contradictory nature of the main national goals for fisheries has been previously discussed by 
(Hasselberg 1997).
20 The dominance of this association has also been discussed by Hasselberg (1997). 
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Kooiman (1993) explains that in many spheres we can empirically observe how governance is 
shifting from unilateral to interactive models. This tendency has recently also been discussed 
in an official report assessing various sectors of the Swedish society, which in general terms 
proposes more locally driven, interactive and pluralistic modalities of management (SOU, 
2000:1). According to this study, in post-industrial Swedish society there are new stakeholders 
who wish to exert their influence. This process poses difficulties for conventional 
management systems and their use of conflict resolution methods where only a few selected 
partners having direct economic interests are invited to the negotiation table. A similar process 
taking place in Norway has recently been described by Mikalsen and Jentoft (2003). 
The profusion of new stakeholders and different answers to the question: who do we co-manage 
with, has put some tension into the relations between the traditional co-management actors 
who could no longer find solutions within closed circles. It also resulted in the establishment 
of new dissident organisations. As Mikalsen and Jenftoft (2003) argue in the case of Norway, 
so in Sweden a key question is how to make institutions more inclusive and representative of 
the various voices within the industry itself. This is an issue deserving attention from the 
authorities, the FAs and the new stakeholders. 
The new stakeholders (NGOs, BKF, POs, Prov Gov, EPA, scientific community in a wider 
sense, media, etc) are sometimes criticized by the fishermen, the FAs and the staff of the NBF 
for becoming too involved in the new emerging co-management model, at all levels of the 
hierarchy (see table 7.1 and box 7.8). In this situation the majority of those being interviewed 
expected “others” to take the lead or have the means to resolve the problems, though there 
was considerable disagreement as to who the influential “others” might be (see table 7.1). The 
scapegoats were many and usually identified with organisations and arenas beyond the circle 
of influence of the interviewed, meaning that the issue provision problems, derived from the 
complex characteristic of the common pool resource system, extend beyond the community 
of resource users. While some blamed inaction on the organisations which had the power or 
the mandate to undertake changes, others believed that only inputs from new actors, such as 
the conservation NGOs, or fishermen’s organisations at the local level, could contribute 
effectively to resolving the problems. At the administrative level some thought it was best to 
wait either for the ministerial level or the European Commission to give clear instructions as 
to the way forward. Others expected the problems to be resolved in time by market forces.
Even when there was disagreement among the interviewees over the effect of expanding the 
membership of the policy community to involve other stakeholders, the expansion was 
making room for new coalitions. While approximately two thirds of non-fishermen saw this as 
an opportunity to secure the inclusion of conservation in fisheries management at different 
levels and to promote more pluralistic and democratic procedures in decision making, one 
third saw the increased number of actors, many of whom had little real knowledge and 
experience of the fishing industry, as problematic. This view was endorsed by the majority of 
the fishermen interviewed but also by staff of the fishery administration.
The profusion of new stakeholders with different views of the problems and their solutions is 
understood here as a factor that has contributed to the temporary paralysis of decision-making 
noted by Hasselberg (1997) and confirmed by the interviewees. Inability to decide and act in a 
situation of increasingly diverse demands from different actors has been described by 
Kooiman (1993) as the traditional state administration’s governing failure, in acting as a 
catalyst for changing the modes of governance in different sectors of society.
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Box 7.8 The problem of inaction among traditional actors and the proliferation of 
stakeholders 
“We no longer have time to travel to the fishing harbours; now we travel to Brussels” 
{0.1#44}.
“Those delegated with the responsibility are not acting; the local fishermen from hereabouts 
should re-organise and get a management role” {0.1#40}. 
“Today the discussion and the decisions about our future take place far from here” 
{0.0#23}.
“We know the small ones are uninformed and marginalised from the political process, but 
we cannot do much about it, we do as much we can. Today, decision-making is too rapid 
and distant (Brussels). There is no time for reaction and consultation on the ground. We 
have lost power, when Sweden joined the EU the administration became much more 
centralised and the scientists and the administration got most of the power” {0.1#28}. 
”The politics of fisheries appear to be defined by a few. This implies that the association is 
losing its role and will collapse. The entire co-management system will collapse and we will 
get the ITQs” {1.1#97}. 
“There is not much I can do about the situation. A few bureaucrats in concert with the 
industry take important decisions in the Swedish fisheries. The decision making power is 
concentrated on a few with an iron curtain around them” {1.1#53}. 
“We know about the problems but we cannot proceed with any management reform unless 
we get instructions from the ministerial level” {1.1#133}. 
“The Swedish parliament has delegated management authority to the National Board of 
Fisheries. If the Board is waiting for instructions to act, then they have misunderstood their 
management responsibility” {0.1#45}.
“The State requires some form of representative organisation as a discussion partner, we 
cannot deal with individuals or a group of organisations. The optimal case from the 
administration’s viewpoint is to have one organisation to negotiate with. The involvement of 
new actors makes things more complicated for us" {1.1#53}. 
“Building coalitions with the conservation movement does not solve the problem. Those 
building coalitions with the conservation movement and Brussels are burying themselves” 
{1.1#99}.
“The conservation movement should get more involved and support a process of more local 
co-management; I do not understand why they are so passive in fisheries. In other sectors 
they are more aggressive” {0.1#43}.
“Fish and all the biodiversity that is caught in the trawlers are part of the ecosystem and 
cannot be left in the hands of associations defending private interests” {1.1#69}. 
“Producers Organisations should not have a management role. This is possible within the 
EU but we have said no to that possibility” {0.1#33}. 
“Too many people are becoming involved and this confuses us a lot” {0.0#11}. 
“I think the problems the coastal fisheries meet today will be resolved by the consumer 
through the market, with the introduction of eco-labelling of fish” {1.1#58}.
Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
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7.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
At the local level, the problems of depleted resources and the concentration of resources in a 
relatively few hands were associated with a lack of institutional capacity in responding to the 
resource crisis and its unequal effects. Not only is a sense of inequitable distribution of 
available resources felt by the fishermen but also an inability to influence decision making 
through participation and the deployment of practical knowledge. The fishermen found the 
structure of the current management system and the dominance of certain actors to be 
barriers to their involvement in management. The findings show that the Swedish central 
corporatist co-management model was unable to guarantee social equity or local participation. 
On the contrary, the interests and knowledge of local fishermen were filtered out at various 
levels and local fishermen were prevented from using their capacity to take collective action.
The discussion on development plans illustrated how fisheries as cpr have special 
characteristics where access rights and control over the resource can be mediated by a variety 
of assets and strategies. This suggests that rights in fisheries do not derive from what is written 
in the law alone. From the analysis it is not difficult to predict that should the outflow of 
vessel tonnage continue, the institutionalisation of a free “take away” service of fish and 
ecosystem services from the archipelago will emerge. The protagonists will not be the local 
coastal fishermen, but rather fishermen who have the means to invest capital in a modern 
efficient and all purpose-vessel.
The adoption of technology and the different livelihood strategies and uses of time and space 
in fishing create a serious point of contention between the more “modern” fishermen from 
southern Bohuslän and the more traditional local fishermen from Northern Bohuslän. The 
diversity and dynamics of the coastal marine ecosystem and the common pool nature of the 
fisheries resources make differentiation in terms of the fishermen’s livelihood strategies 
possible. This has implications for the extent to which the fishermen can make use of and 
draw benefits from different management models and interventions by the authorities. 
Certainly, one of the problems seems to be that the centralised system attempts to use a “one 
size fits all” policy approach both in terms of management scales and tools. Yet many of those 
interviewed fall all too easily into the trap of thinking that in a common pool resource system 
such as coastal fisheries, the introduction of differential rights and policies is unfair and could 
easily lead to greater inequity and loss of individual freedom. They tend to confuse equal rights 
with social equity. This way of thinking has delayed institutional change involving a process 
that recognises the issue of internal differentiation among fishermen. Heterogeneity and 
inequality among fishermen is intrinsic to the condition of fisheries as a genuine cpr. Such a 
situation calls for special attention in decision-making and particularly in allocating funding for 
technical capital investment at the individual level. This suggests there is a need for the state 
administration to provide new types of services to fishermen, services which relate to 
organisational matters, internal negotiations, conflict resolution, and interplay in co-
management – with re-organisation and re-staffing as probable consequences.
For a long time, the state has deliberately chosen to focus on regulating fishing activities at the 
operational level, and has limited its involvement in collective-choice allocation issues. Co-
management links between the state authorities and the local level seem to be missing. The 
state has focused on stock conservation and the administration of aid to individuals for the 
acquisition of technical assets used in fishing activities. This focus on fish stocks and fishing 
activity has unfortunately diverted attention from other social assets and capacities that 
fishermen can normally bring to bear on management. In this context the problems identified 
by local coastal fishermen are also associated with the conceptualisation of management and 
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the management system and with the tendency of scientific advice to filter out local 
knowledge which is thereby discarded in the decision making process.
The FAs were used as intermediaries in communicating with fishermen who were virtually 
regarded as a homogenous group. Through this process, the fishermen became increasingly 
dependent on the central bodies, and the associations became increasingly detached from their 
members. Local knowledge was neither gathered nor integrated. Scientific advice to the FAs, 
on which the distributive aspects of fisheries management have relied, has not been 
considered. As a result, local fishermen have lost confidence in the efficacy of the current 
management model and practices as well as in their leaders.
During the period of research, fisheries management in Sweden was clearly going through a 
transitional period when no one apparently felt responsible for the overall performance of the 
system and during which the number of stakeholders claiming the right to be a part of the 
decision making process was increasing. With so many stakeholders and scapegoats in a cpr, it 
is clear that the administration must learn to operate through “networks” of interdependent 
actors.  But the question that needs to be asked now is what then should be the roles and 
functions of the various stakeholders in co-management? How can new management 
institutions be more pluralistic without losing efficiency? 
With the sudden increase in stakeholders the fishermen find themselves in limbo. A failure to 
involve the fishermen in these emerging, more pluralistic management constellations can easily 
undermine their participation and their confidence in the management system. As Jentoft et al. 
(1998) noted, the more the fishermen are involved in the decision-making process, the more 
legitimacy the resulting regulatory process will be perceived to have. Legitimacy and trust are 
critical for the successful operation of any cpr management system and are central to the 
notion of co-management. The question that arises here is how a more pluralistic decision 
making system, in the sense of more stakeholders being involved in the co-management of 
coastal fisheries, can be designed and function so that the fishermen do not lose engagement 
and influence.
The previous chapters have shown that the use of common pool resources makes institutional 
interaction functionally inevitable. The present chapter has shed new light on the problem of 
how institutional arrangements and the institutional setting can become a barrier to the 
fishermen’s involvement in co-management. The institutional factors emphasised by the 
fishermen related to the design of development plans, the rules for allocation of available 
resources, the scientific advice, the issue of representation in co-management, and the growth 
in the number of stakeholders demanding a say in fisheries. All these factors, in except for the 
proliferation of stakeholders, have constituted a barrier to the use of their practical local 
knowledge in the present system and contributed to the marginalisation of local coastal 
fishermen. But they also form the roots of emerging institutions.
The extent to which the shift from users’ groups in co-management to stakeholders may or 
may not become a barrier for participation of local coastal fishermen in co-management 
remains to be seen. The fundamental question then is how the Swedish central corporatist co-
management can in practice be re-designed in order to better serve the needs of the local 
coastal fishermen. Are there practices and ideas at the local level that can offer some insights 
as to possible alternatives? To answer these questions, case studies, which emerged during the 
research process and which serve the purpose of discussing other forms of co-management, 
will be examined in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
CO-MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES FROM NORTHERN BOHUSLÄN
The preceding chapters support the argument that the centralised corporatist “co-
management” model has proven ineffective, not only in maintaining the long-term 
sustainability of the fisheries but also in dealing with social interdependencies derived from the 
use of the resource and the ecosystem and in making collective action work. In the present 
chapter, alternative forms of co-management are discussed. This is done by examining two 
examples from Northern Bohuslän where the local fishermen have taken initiatives to become 
more involved in co-management.
The first case study concerns the local co-management of prawn fisheries in the Koster-
Väderö archipelago1 and its submerged fjord (the Norwegian Trench), an area which has been 
chosen for the establishment of a marine reserve. This co-management system has been 
operating for several decades nested within the dominant regime and has recently come to the 
attention of the administration because it has been instrumental in the implementation of the 
EU’s-Habitats Directive. The second case study concerns a proposal for the establishment of 
a local coastal fishery management regime in Northern Bohuslän submitted by the Northern 
Bohuslän Producers’ Organisation (NBPO).
The sections in the chapter are arranged so as to provide answers to a number of questions 
and in this way discuss conditions for the emergence of more participative forms of co-
management. The questions are: 
What are the driving forces behind the fishermen’s collective action? 
What are central elements in their alternative models? 
How are the alternative models contested?
Are the alternative models feasible in the light of theoretical criteria?
8.1 SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The first case is, in effect, an old existing model; the second is a proposal for change that has 
not yet been tried. Both cases lend themselves to analysis of emerging institutional change and 
how new forms of co-management are contested. But to examine an existing local regime and 
a proposal requires some methodological scrutiny. The literature reviewed in chapter 3 
indicated that for common pool resource co-management systems to emerge and endure, 
certain basic conditions have to be in place. The emergence of co-management initiatives will 
depend on certain basic conditions, for example, the resource (R) and the community of users 
(U) (see box 3.2).
Cpr studies also indicate that the long-term sustainability of co-management systems is related 
to their scale and organisation, in the sense of who is invited to make decisions on what and 
how. Here the co-management arrangements made by the prawn fishermen and the tenability 
of NBPO’s co-management proposal are assessed in the light of the criteria outlined in 
chapter 3 and developed by Ostrom and her co-workers. Ostrom’s (1990) criteria for robust 
institutions of management for common pool resources (box 3.2), have also guided the 
1 The area addressed by the Väderö questionnaire discussed in Chapter 6 is situated in the southern part of this 
area (see figure 6.1).
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analysis and presentation of NBPO’s proposal, in order to give the analysis at least some 
elements of a common structure.
The information sources for the two case studies have been interviews, participation in 
meetings and various types of documents with an emphasis on correspondence and notices 
from the fishermen’s organisations. In the first case, which relates to the local management of 
prawn fisheries and the proposal to establish a marine reserve in the area of Koster-Väderö 
(involving the closure of prawn trawling), the data was collected through open-ended in-depth 
interviews, participation in discussion meetings and negotiations. Out of 29 fishermen 
interviewed (see chapter 4), 7 were prawn fishermen active in the Koster-Väderö Fjord group. 
The meetings on the issue of the marine reserve in Koster -Väderö were varied and included: 
one meeting between staff from the Tjärnö Marine Laboratories and local fishermen; two 
internal meetings of the Koster-Väderö fishermen group; a workshop organised by the 
County Board Administration and the local municipalities, involving local fishermen and 
researchers; a second workshop organised by the municipality and the fishermen’s association 
to discuss the future of fisheries in the area; two further workshops organised by the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SNV) where the issue of marine reserves was discussed 
with government experts and invited stakeholders’ representatives, including the fishermen’s 
associations; and, finally, three negotiation meetings involving the County Board 
Administration, the National Board of Fisheries, local fishermen and their associations. 
In the second case study, nine members of NBPO belonging to five different coastal 
communities, including the local leaders, were interviewed and a number of meetings were 
attended. Information about the NBPO proposal was collected by examining the 
correspondence from NBPO during the period 1996-1998, as well as all correspondence from 
NBPO filed in the National Board of Fisheries. The selected material consisted of 45 
documents (formal letters).
8.2 CASE STUDY 1 LOCALLY DRIVEN CO-MANAGEMENT BY PRAWN 
FISHERMEN IN THE KOSTER-VÄDERÖ 
ARCHIPELAGO
8.2.1 The features of  the resource and the users  
In Northern Bohuslän, not far from the shore, there is a deep-sea fjord, known as the 
Norwegian Trench and also referred to as the Koster-Trench and the Koster-Väderö Fjord 
(see chapters 2 and 6). The Trench stretches, within the base line, from the most western 
group of Swedish islands - the Väderö archipelago - in the south, to the border with Norway 
in the waters north of the Koster islands.
The Trench is a 70 km long submarine corridor of irregular depth and width, and with short 
lateral branches. The inventory of the marine biotopes in the area of Koster-Väderö was 
started in the 1970s following the establishment of the Tjärnö Marine Biology Laboratory 
(TMBL), situated close to the city of Strömstad. Until recently, the study of deep sea beds and 
marine life was poorly developed.  The area is considered an important habitat for shellfish, 
and recent studies indicate this area is most probably the one which has the highest diversity 
of marine species in Sweden (Nilsson 1997). The presence of reef building cold water corals 
has been reported in depths of the Trench (Lundälv and Jonsson 2000).  
The prawns (Pandalus borealis) enter the area with the currents in their early larvae phases and 
remain thereafter confined to the area during their adult phase when they migrate with the 
depths and in patches. The stock of deep sea prawn is characterised as falling within the safe 
biological limits (Sjöstrand 1999). Swedish landings from the area (about 200 tons per year) 
and from Skagerrak (2000-2700 tons per year), indicate stable catches for the last twenty years. 
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The catches also include Nephrops, cod and other species. The 2002 total value of landing of 
prawns was 216,000 €, which is approximately 10% of the value the total national landings 
(Concerted action 2003). Research on prawn and prawn fisheries has not been a top priority in 
Sweden. The fact that the quotas and volumes of landings are small when compared to the 
landings of other species, and that the fisheries and the state of the resource have apparently 
been stable for decades, and thus considered unproblematic by fishery biologists, probably 
explains the lack of attention given to this fishery.
The number of fishermen trawling for prawns in Skagerrak at the time of the present research 
was around 90 of whom no more than 20-30 operated within the base-line in the Koster-
Väderö Fjord. These fishermen who commonly work the Koster-Väderö Fjord waters are all 
residents of the area and members of SVC, the regional branch of the national fishermen 
association SFR. The fact that the Trench is close to land, confined and fairly exposed to 
strong winds, makes it a fishing ground where deep-sea trawling can continue even when 
operations in the rest of Skagerrak are difficult.
The fishermen working the Trench belong to two generations and the average age among 
those who hold a licence is rather high (see table 2.1). The crew members are commonly 
relatives and the level of investment in the fisheries is rather uniform. Vessel’s size working in 
the Trench varies between 10-19 m (gross tonnage between 1.5 - 60 ton) and the larger boats 
are relatively old (average 39 years).
8.2.2 Problems in the common pool resource situation and driving forces behind 
the fishermen’s collective action 
Trawling for prawn in the area began over a century ago in 1902, as a result of Norwegian 
influence. Hasslöf (1949) reports that the number of wooden sailing boats trawling for prawns 
in the archipelago expanded rapidly from four in 1902 to around 80 in 1914, under special 
authorisation of the Crown. Trawling between the islands of the archipelago and along such 
submarine corridor must have required specific local knowledge. It must also have required 
some exclusivity of access and the fishermen’s involvement in the design and implementation 
of voluntary rules, if conflicts due to physical interference between the sailing trawlers were to 
be avoided.
Sharing the market with the Norwegians has not been easy for the prawn fishermen. Until the 
end of the 1930s, when the auction at Strömstad, was opened, the bulk of the prawns caught 
by Swedish fishermen in this area was landed and sold in Norway2. When the local auction 
was opened, a major concern was to find the means of securing a regular flow of local 
landings. A regular supply of prawns to the buyers was a pre-condition for the local fishermen 
to keep their fishery, the local auction, and its related activities. Even if the local auction made 
life easier for the local fishermen, in that they no longer needed to deliver the prawns to 
Norway, this did not stop the supply of prawns from Norway to Sweden. On the contrary, the 
more industrialized Norwegian prawn fishery continued to take market shares in Sweden.
The Second World War, the temporary exclusion of Swedish fishermen from Norwegian 
territorial waters in the 1950s, the collapse of the Atlanto-Scandian herring in the 1960s and, 
finally, the establishment of EEZ-regime in the late 1970s were all events external to the 
coastal fisheries but used by local fishermen to explain the introduction of more industrial 
modes of production and offshore fisheries into coastal areas where fish was abundant. The 
2 Having an auction and landing in Strömstad was not worthwhile before the rail links to the main cities 
Stockholm and Göteborg acquired refrigerated wagons {0.0 #14}. The fishermen commented that until World 
War II the market in Sweden and the refrigerated transport facilities from this area to the major cities were 
poorly developed.
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prawn fishermen confirmed that during this period there was a progressive regression of 
trawling limits and erosion of local rules (see chapter 7). The accounts of prawn fishermen 
record that throughout the 1950s, ´60s and ´70s the number of vessels fishing the Norwegian 
Trench increased considerably.
“In the fifties and the sixties you could see 40-60 vessels operating here. This area cannot 
bear that quantity of vessels at once. Already in the fifties we started to discuss the 
banning of big trawls in this area” {0.0#18}. 
To conclude, the prawn fishermen acknowledged that they encountered assignment and 
appropriation problems in the use of this common pool resource. Assignment problems had 
to do with the small size of the area and crowding, while appropriation problems were 
associated with the intensity of harvesting. But the factor that gave rise to the design of 
appropriation rules, with their distributive effects, was the problem with the market.
Problems in the marketing of the product are often referred to as contextual factors in the cpr
literature (see chapter 3). Contextual factors affect the local cpr situation, but decisions about 
them are usually taken outside the local arena. When dealing with fisheries resources and 
marine ecosystems, contextual factors are recurrent factors triggering change and increasing 
ecological and social interdependence across scales. The number and effect of these 
contextual factors on institutional cross-scale dynamics is increasing with the globalization 
(Berkes et al 2003). Indeed, when looking at fisheries from the perspective of cpr, where the 
crux is social and ecological interdependence, the development of institutions in which local 
users can influence decisions will be essential to the formulation of adaptive responses to 
externally induced change.
8.2.3 The fishermen’s response and the development of  locally congruent rules  
SVC’s protocols and circular letters from the 1950s regarding prawn fisheries provide 
information on the adoption of closed areas, fishing stops, fishing hours, size and price 
regulations, and output and input regulations (see for example SVC, 1951; SVC, 1951a; SVC 
1952; SVC 1952a; SVC 1954; SVC 1955; SVC 1959).
In the 1960s the prawn fishermen proposed limiting the size of the trawls in the area, 
specifying both their physical dimensions and number of meshes.3 According to the fishermen 
interviewed the introduction of this smaller trawl was related to the limited resources available 
locally and to the increasing number of larger trawlers operating in the area which drastically 
affected the catch of other fishermen trawling in their wake. With time this regulation became 
codified in law and these trawls were referred to as “Paragraph” trawls. Further technical 
requirements developed by the local prawn fishermen have also been adopted in law and 
applied in the Koster-Väderö area within the trawling limit where trawling is allowed subject 
to the observance of local regulations. The prawn fishermen were of the opinion that the 
recognition by the authorities of their local technical rules had been important for making 
them work. 
These technical limitations have a clear exclusion and distributive effect because, together with 
rules limiting number of fishing days and the night trawling prohibition, they render the cost-
benefit relation for potential non-local users negative.
3 Another voluntary complementary regulation in the prawn fisheries is the Minimum Landing Size (MLS). 
Although the intention of this rule was partly market related, it had little to do with the protection of the stock 
because any discarded prawns do not survive, independent of their size. Several fishermen considered this rule 
an incentive not to fish for smaller sizes, something which local fishermen - knowledgeable of behavior of the 
prawns - can avoid simply by avoiding specific sites and depths at particular times of the year.
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With regard to problems of marketing, letters written by the prawn fishermen in the 1930s 
show that, for a long time, they tried different strategies to tackle the market competition with 
the Norwegians. One strategy was to persuade Swedish buyers to rely in the first instance on 
prawns landed in Sweden (supply preference). On several occasions, agreements with the 
principal traders and merchants have been struck, in which stable supplies were promised in 
return for preferential treatment.4 However, there were always a few buyers willing to act 
outside the rules thus distorting the agreement.
In the search for solutions to this market related problem, the fishermen devised internal 
output rules known in Sweden as “rations” or market quotas aimed at securing a uniform flow 
of fresh prawn to the market all year round. “Rations” are a mechanism that Swedish 
fishermen have historically used to constrain excess supplies to a saturated market, and are 
based on the allocation of weekly landing rights to match market demand. The rations 
function like an individual quota and have given long term planning. The ration system, which 
is an output regulation, can apply to a specific area and be used in combination with input 
regulations limiting manpower on board, the number of fishing days at sea and the time for 
trawling.
The Swedish fishermen’s ration system has previously been referred as fisherman weekly 
quota (FWQ) and vessel weekly quota (VWQ). But the quota used by the prawn fishermen in 
Koster-Väderö, applies to a specific area and days per week and can be referred to as 
Individual Quota and Effort Share in Space and Time (IQESST). It constraints output and 
input and consists of individual weekly non-transferable quotas for a maximum of 4 fishermen 
on board, and three days per week. Night and Sunday trawling is not been permitted. The size 
of the quota is adapted through the year and varies with the size of the TAC agreed.
Before Sweden became a member of the EU the rations were sanctioned by the FAs; at 
present they are sanctioned by the national producer organisation SFPO. By means of these 
semi-enforceable arrangements, the fishermen guarantee stable landings throughout the year 
and an equal share of the annual quota of prawns allocated to Sweden. Furthermore, the 
IQESST guides the input in terms of labour, because only quotas for a maximum of four men 
on board are allowed and the size of the individual quota decreases from the second to the 
third and fourth man onboard. A fifth man onboard is thus an additional cost because he has 
no ration to bring to the crew and his presence on board diminishes the value of the ration 
entitlements held by other crew member. When the resources became scarce and the market 
was not saturated, the ration system took on another meaning; it became a mechanism for the 
equitable allocation of the available resources among the prawn fishermen.
More recently, in the 1990s, a group of prawn fishermen from Strömstad bought out the local 
auction, previously owned by the Municipality. In this way, they were at least able to intercept 
the supply of prawns from Norway via land transport to the local auction. The Strömstad 
fishermen also invited Norwegian vessels fishing the surrounding areas to land their prawns 
on the Swedish side, in Strömstad.
The rules devised by the prawn fishermen have certainly played an exclusion role, reduced the 
number of fishermen and shaped the prawn fisheries in the Trench. 
4 Similar agreements between these fishermen and the Swedish traders aimed at boycotting the market of 
Norwegian prawns in Sweden were temporarily launched in the 1950s when Norway decided to expand its 
territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. This decision, which was later revoked by an international agreement 
between Denmark, Sweden and Norway, implied the exclusion of prawn fishermen from waters that had long 
been considered subject to international open access (SVC 1950). 
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8.2.4 Monitoring compliance with the rules and sanctions 
Despite the informal and semi-enforceable character of most of the local rules, compliance 
has been high in the area5. The entry of non-locals into the prawn fishery would normally be 
expected to reduce the level of trust and reciprocity and increase transactions costs 
substantially (Ostrom 1999). According to local fishermen, however, the prawn fishery does 
not suffer from a race to fish nor from quota busting; the “greed” of the fisherman has been 
restrained and single cpr problems collectively resolved. As one fisherman explained: 
“Morality and trust are important factors and most conflicts are resolved locally; 
difficulties arise when we have to deal with outsiders” {0.0#24}.
In the particular case of the fishermen trawling for prawns in Koster-Väderöarna, compliance 
is strongly influenced by ecological and social factors. Ecologically, the area has clear 
submerged geo-physical boundaries, which help to define the geographic unit of management 
and to delimit the user group. The fishermen operating here share a common history, are 
homogenous in terms of cultural background and social relations on land. Moreover, the 
number of fishermen trawling for prawns is relatively small (under 30) which facilitates 
communication and monitoring, and their level of investment in the fisheries is rather 
uniform. All these factors reduce transaction costs in the management of fisheries (Ostrom 
1990; Baland and Patteau 1996; Schlager 1999).
The majority of the rules are sanctioned by organisations at higher hierarchical levels; rules 
involving the introduction or constraint of technical aspects related to the fishing equipment 
(e.g. selective gear) have been sanctioned by the National Board of Fisheries, and rules dealing 
with the use of time and outputs rules are sanctioned by the FAs. This division in the 
sanctioning system is consistent with the division of roles between the government and the 
FAs in the Swedish co-management system (see chapter 2 and 7).
Instances of non-compliance by “non-locals” have been consistently reported to the FAs by 
local fishermen, but only in a few cases have they resulted in an internal investigation and 
fines.
One somewhat bizarre strategy to secure enforcement and at the same time minimise 
interpersonal conflicts within the group of local fishermen, was to repeat the fault that another 
fishermen was alleged to have committed and then denounce oneself to the local group of 
fishermen and/or to the FA.
“If someone here violates a rule, I will go and do the same as he did and then report 
myself as a rule-breaker first to the board of the local branch of the association and then 
to the regional branch; in this way, one can make the problem more visible and trigger a 
discussion” {00# 24}. 
The prawn fishermen explained that to maintain flexibility, they would generally avoid 
transforming their locally agreed rules into formal (statutory) regulations. In this way, the rules 
can more easily be changed and adapted to new situations. The adoption of the local rules by 
the FAs, even when this implies only semi-enforceability was considered sufficient. The need 
to codify the rules as part of the formal regulatory system appears to be linked to agreements 
involving the constraint or acquisition of technology. In combination with the government 
regulations the management system in the prawn fisheries is a mixture of informal and formal 
rules of interaction at the local scale and the regional scale. 
5 The views and attitudes of Swedish fishermen with regard to compliance and control have been recently 
reported by Ellegård and Eggert (2002) within the framework of SUCOZOMA. 
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To conclude, the management of prawn fisheries thus has elements of the basic design 
principles for long enduring collective action referred to by Ostrom (1990) (see table 8.1 and 
box 3.2).
Table 8.1 A comparison between Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for enduring cpr
  institutions and the Swedish prawn fishermen’s local co-management system. 
Ostrom’s design principles Prawn fishermen 
1. Clearly defined boundaries. 1. Boundaries of fishing community are defined by means of technology 
and other space and time based restrictions. Particular rules apply to a 
specific resource in a defined area. 
2. Congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules and local conditions.
2. Output and input rules both restrict and give an exclusivity which is 
beneficial.
3. Collective-choice arrangements. 3. Local fishermen have designed and adapted their own rules. 
Some of these rules have been adopted by SVC and applied to all 
Swedish prawn fishermen. 
4. Monitoring. 4. Research on prawns has not been prioritised. The Trench has 
permitted local monitoring of individual behaviour. Local fishermen 
have exerted peer pressure on each other.
5. Graduated sanctions. 5. The sanction system is weak. The fishermen do not have 100% 
control over compliance and rely on external actors such as SVC and 
the Coast guard.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms. 6. The fishermen meet regularly both formally and informally and are 
engaged in other social activities in their local communities. When 
needed, their technical rules have been codified. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to 
organise.
7. Despite some opposition, the fishermen have been able to organise 
and devise their own rules within the framework of a central co-
management model.
8. Nested institutions
For cpr that are parts of larger complex 
systems
8. The local co-management arrangements, only operative for the prawn 
fisheries in the area, interact with the dominant arrangements at a larger 
scale. Output rules for example have been adopted by the FAs and 
apply to all prawn fishermen. A few European rules appear to threaten 
the system.
Source: Ostrom (1990: 90) Source: Interviews (1998-2001) 
The prawn fisheries displayed conditions that, in the context of the international literature, 
should be favourable to the emergence and endurance of local management institutions. The 
number of fishermen is relatively small, the boundaries of the ecosystem and the fishery are 
clearly identifiable in geographical and social terms, and there is congruence between the 
fishing communities at sea and on land.
The characteristics of the Trench, with its ecological boundaries, suggest that the 
opportunities for decision making, monitoring and control over the use and social distribution 
of the local resources have, in effect, provided the fishermen with a bundle of rights. 
Furthermore, they have been able to influence decisions on prawn fisheries within the FAs. By 
being active in management, the prawn fishermen have been able to secure their long-term 
right of access to the resources in their local area. This position as holders of a bundle of 
rights (rights of access, appropriation, management and exclusion) can be argued to have 
enhanced their capacity to maintain prawn fisheries over the last 100 years. The prawn 
fishermen have not invested greatly in new vessels but in the development of “social capital”. 
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The institutional arrangements that have emerged seem to have clear implications for the use 
and the state of the resource at the local level. To what extent these conditions would enhance 
conservation of the same resource at other spatial scales would depend on the extent to which 
congruent regulations exist at larger scales. Thus, as long as non-local fishermen, external 
interventions or policies do not challenge the voluntary arrangements, the fishermen will 
prefer a locally driven, informal and flexible system of management.
8.2.5 Threats to the fishermen’s co-management strategies  
The interviews with officials of the National Board of Fisheries and representatives of the FAs 
indicated that there were doubts about the prawn fishermen’s local management system. The 
system was considered by many as contrary to the principles of a free market, technological 
progress, and equal access to fishing waters.
“The prawn fishermen’s rules are market rules and have nothing to do with resource 
conservation; these rules distort free competition in a market economy” {1.1 # 58}.
“These local rules have retarded technological progress and hindered development” {1.1 
# 59}.
“The local regime is still in operation only because the area is small and not interesting for 
the modern vessels; modern vessels need to work larger areas” {1.1 # 51}.
In the views of FA representatives, the local management of prawn fisheries in the Trench has 
endured not because local management is welcomed by the industry as a whole, but rather 
because in the specific local area the prawn fishery is economically insignificant compared to a 
more modern fishery. 
Underlying this way of thinking, therefore, is an argument that the emergence and endurance 
of the prawn fishermen’s local regime results more from the incapacity of outsiders to make a 
profit out of the limited area and its resource, than from the capacity of insiders to secure their 
fishing rights and keep the regime working within the given boundaries. Implicit in this 
argument is that management regimes in Sweden should address the needs of modern 
fisheries, rather than the needs of local coastal fisheries. It also implies a lack of reflection on 
the opportunities to be found in the attributes of these fisheries which may facilitate self-
organisation and collective action. Even though non-fishermen recognized the existence of 
the prawn fishermen’s local rules, their opinions about these rules mean that they can quite 
easily be challenged unless legally adopted. 
Within the EU, problems of market competition are resolved somewhat different and do not 
involve time, labour and catch limitation (input and output limitations) as agreed by the prawn 
fishermen and described above. Within the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), Producers’ 
Organizations (PO) are empowered to withdraw fish from the market if the price falls below a 
certain level. The Norwegians, whose prawn fishery is more industrialized than that in 
Sweden, are able to sell prawns at price levels where Swedish fishermen are paid the 
withdrawal price for fish not sold through the market.
“At any moment, cheap frozen Norwegian prawns may cross the frontier on wheels; 50 
% of the prawns now sold in Sweden arrive from Norway by land, undercutting the price 
of our fresh prawn” {0.0#7}.
“According to the rules we cannot sell prawns below 30 Swedish crowns per kilo, so it 
has happened that we have had to throw away the prawns. Imagine how people in 
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Stockholm would react if they knew that we have on several occasions been forced to 
paint beautiful red prawns green and dump them. We should at least be more intelligent 
in this country and use prawns to feed children at school or the elderly in hospital. The 
whole system is criminal” {0.0#14}. 
Market withdrawal, even when financial compensation is forthcoming, is a regulation that the 
prawn fishermen dislike and try to avoid. To re-establish a competitive market after a period 
of discards may take several weeks, sometimes months, with reduced incomes and wasted 
resources. Furthermore, the strategy threatens the image of coastal fishermen as quality 
oriented and environmentally friendly producers. Last but not least, the fishermen are 
concerned that repeated occurrences of withdrawal from the market could be interpreted by 
the authorities as a sign of fleet over-capacity.
Even though the Trench is situated within the base-line (defined as the archipelago’s outer 
belt of skerries) – which marks the limit for the European or Community waters and turns the 
prawn fishermen’s local management into a national matter – the decisions taken outside the 
area are still relevant. Overall, the fishermen considered their ability to compete with the 
Norwegians, based on collective restrictive action, had been partially undermined by 
overarching rules at national and European levels, including the so-called relative stability 
principle (see chapter 7).
The fact that PO’s could take some independent decisions with regard to market aspects was 
problematic to the prawn fishermen who for a long time have been able to define their rules 
through the FAs. The establishment of POs meant the emergence of a new mechanism with 
which they had to interact. In recounting their experiences, fishermen brought to light the 
problem of contradictory policies and instruments.
Worldwide, the process of selecting sites for protecting marine biological diversity was 
accelerated in the early 1990s, following UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the ratification of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1993. As a part of this process the Council of 
European Communities adopted a special Directive on the conservation of natural habitats and 
wild fauna and flora (Council of the European Communities 1992) and the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SNV) selected sites for the establishment of marine 
reserves (Grönqvist 1997). The archipelago of Koster-Väderö and the Trench is one of the 
prioritised sites (Nilsson 1997).  
For several years, the planning process for the establishment of marine reserves involved a 
limited number of experts from SNV, nature conservation NGOs and researchers (marine 
biologists). The discovery of reef-building corals such as Lophelia pertusa in the cold waters of the 
Koster-Väderö Fjord has attracted the attention of many marine biologists and nature 
conservation NGOs. The initial debates were very much influenced by biologically based 
arguments. Despite the fact that the most immediate threat to the biological diveristy was 
considered to be to the prawn fishing, and that the solution to the problem was to prohibit 
trawling in the area, it was several years before the fishermen were invited to the negotiation 
table.
That the prawn fishermen perceived this idea to be a major threat was revealed in the 
questionnaires discussed in chapter 6. Recent empirical experiences with the prawn fishermen 
(see below) seem to indicate that the capacities of local fishermen and their management regime 
can be instrumental in resolving conflicts of multiple-use involving nature conservation. Their 
capacities can also be instrumental to integrated coastal management (ICM), the process of taking 
decisions on the sustainable use, development and protection of coastal resources by taking due 
account of ecological and social interdependencies. 
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8.2.6 The value of  the prawn fishermen’s capacities in solving the marine 
reserve conflict 
In August 1995, and following the government decision to establish marine reserves, a group of 
local prawn fishermen was invited by scientists from TMBL and the Swedish Society for 
Nature Conservation to discuss the need to protect the corals and proposals for establishing a 
marine reserve in the Trench. The fishermen saw this proposal as the end of 100 years of 
prawn fisheries and local management efforts. Following this meeting 15 local fishermen 
created the Koster Fjord Group, an informal group to discuss how fishermen should 
collectively proceed with the marine reserve issue. But the debate over the Koster-Väderö 
marine reserve first reached critical momentum in early 1997, when several reports were made 
public.
Reports published by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SNV) identified the 
archipelago of Koster-Väderö and the Trench as one of the prioritised sites selected for the 
establishment of marine reserves (Grönqvist 1997) and described the area in biological terms as 
well as indicating the threats to biological diversity (Nilsson 1997; 1997a).  In these reports 
prawn trawling was identified as a direct threat to the biological diversity of the Trench. The 
other two critical threats mentioned in these reports were the suspended matter and nutrients 
washed down from the Glomma Älv watershed in Norway and the risk of incidents involving 
significant oil spills due to the increasing maritime transport passing through the area.
During the same period, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) decided to support a scientific project 
which was to be implemented by scientists associated with TMBL. The project aimed at 
documenting the presence and extent of living and dead hard substrates, particular corals, in deep 
waters by using a remotely operated vehicle (ROV)6.
Another important report made public that year was an assessment of the sustainable 
development of the archipelagos of Sweden commissioned by the Swedish parliament (SOU 
1996:153). The Commission which had carried out the assessment for the Swedish parliament 
had been receptive to ideas from different stakeholders, and the report addressed both the 
problems of resource distribution and the need for protecting the biological diversity in the 
area. The report included a short discussion of coastal fishery problems in Bohuslän, the issue 
of coastal pollution, the allocation of resources, and the introduction of environmental 
protection measures in the form of a marine reserve in the area of the Koster-Väderö Fjord. 
The Commission did not, however, recommend the establishment of a conventional marine 
reserve in the sense of “fencing off” the sea and closing the fisheries in the area. On the 
contrary, it called for cooperation between scientists, staff administration (officials), and 
fishermen, and highlighted the need for taking advantage of the creation of a marine reserve 
to further involve and develop the local small-scale fisheries in the area (SOU 1996:153: 115). 
Even though the report stated that the County Board Administration should intensify its work 
for the establishment of the marine reserve in Koster-Väderö, it also stated that protection 
should be seen in the broader perspective of maintaining fisheries resources and the small-
scale local fisheries over indefinite period of time. What the Commission actually suggested, 
though not explicitly, was a change of approach from the conventional marine reserves to 
“marine reserves without fences”; commonly referred in the literature as marine protected 
areas (MPA). The difference between marine reserves and MPAs is the that in the latter a plan 
for  protecting the ecosystem is made together with the users which are neither excluded from 
the area nor from the process of management (IUCN 1996; Borrini-Feyerabend 1997). The 
involvement of stakeholders in the planning, implementation and monitoring of MPAs is 
considered today an important factor to making this tool effective and sustainable in the long 
term (Kelleher and Kenchington 1992; Gubbay 1995; Pimbert and Pretty 1995; IUCN 1996; 
6 For more information about this project - Deep-water corals in the Skagerrak- and the ROV technique the 
reader is referred to http://www.tmbl.gu.se/wwf/abstract/html
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Dutton and Saenger 1997). The challenge of involving non-local, fugitive or fuzzy 
“communities” in co-management has partly been discussed in chapter 6. To involve local 
fishermen, on the other hand, should be easier. 
Notwithstanding the participatory intentions found in the report delivered to the Swedish 
parliament, a preliminary report produced by the WWF-TMBL project indicated the presence 
of problems derived from the physical effects of trawling the sea base and the corals.
During this period several open meetings were organised by the scientists, the County Board 
Administration and the Municipalities, most of them at TMBL, where various stakeholders 
expressed their concerns about the need to protect the corals and the reserve. In the meetings 
and seminars, the authorities and the scientists were inclined, on the one hand, to refer to 
Sweden’s commitments to European international agreements and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity as the main issue. In their presentations, the scientists and officials were 
rather selective and did not se the need to mention or discuss article 8(j) of the Convention, 
which refers to traditional knowledge and the governments’ commitment to establish 
mechanisms to ensure the effective participation of local communities in decision-making and 
policy planning. Referring to such aspects requires that scientists and officials addressing social 
science questions. 
Over time the number of actors involved in the debate increased and the fishermen found 
themselves in the situation of not knowing who their actual negotiation partners were. As a 
result these meetings were unsuccessful in improving communication between the authorities 
involved and the local fishermen. The situation overwhelmed the fishermen who felt 
misinformed and unable to communicate and negotiate a resolution. 
The fishermen perceived themselves as losers and the tension with the conservation interests 
increased. Threatening phrases such as the followings were not unusual:
“Who has given them the right to decide over our lives? We should ration the entrance of 
tourists to this area; if they want to see corals let them pay us local fishermen a fee, only 
then can I stop fishing” {2.0 #20}.
“Who does that person think he is to propose the establishment of a reserve in our place? 
Has he been here before? Is this about personal interests and professional careers? Bring 
him to me and I will tie a chain around his neck and cast him to the bottom of the sea” 
{2.0 #13}. 
“What the fishermen do not understand is that we could close the entire prawn fisheries 
in the area tomorrow and no one in Stockholm [meaning the ruling politicians] would 
notice it anyhow; nobody in the capital would care about their future. They will get 
prawns from Norway anyhow” {2.1#40}.
Those statements from meetings illustrate the fishermen’s general concerns; they refer to the 
differences between local and non-locals inhabitants regarding views of nature and its usage 
rights. They also show that 100 years of local management experience were being seriously 
threatened. In the meetings differences of approach between state authorities concerned with 
environmental issues at the central, the regional and municipal levels had become quite clear.
In Sweden, the external relations in co-management have been retained at the central level 
within the FAs. The prawn fishermen expected the leaders of the FAs to negotiate with the 
decision makers in Stockholm, as that was the usual way to deal with conflicts in the 
corporatist centralised co-management system. Even so, many prawn fishermen considered 
the formal commitment of the FAs at the central level in this issue to be both poor and 
ineffective. According to members of the group assistance from the FAs had not previously 
yielded any positive results and would not do so in this occasion either. Interviews with prawn 
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fishermen revealed how they had asked the board of the FAs for support but without much 
positive response.
Faced with a threat of closure for the Koster-Väderö fishery, they decided on their own 
course of action. The concerns of the prawn fishermen were considerable and the members of 
the Koster Fjord Group decided to become formally organised and recognised. Thus the 
group turned out to consist of members of 6 local branches of SVC7 and the local Producer 
Organisation, NBPO. In this way the group and its members were given a more formal role 
within the community of professional fishermen; they were given the authority to plan actions 
and represent the interests of the local prawn fishermen.8 This position also allowed them to 
be reimbursed by the local branches for specific expenses, reducing in this way their individual 
costs of involvement. The group has key leaders both among the older and the younger 
generation. They have pursued a clear participative style, read the scientific reports and debate. 
In their meetings, prawn fishermen discussed issues pertinent to the organisation of co-
management as an element of integrated coastal management. Table 8.2 lists issues discussed 
by the fishermen in their internal meetings. The issues raised by the fishermen help us to 
appreciate aspects and factors that need to be considered when fishermen are to be involved 
in new forms of co-management; particularly when this new form involves the resolution of 
new conflicts.
Several fishermen in the group felt that achieving a win-win solution was important to them, 
but not to the rest of the fishermen or the FAs. Thus to ask the FAs to take a leading role in 
the negotiations was a rather controversial matter. As discussed earlier, the prawn fishermen 
had over the decades developed a capacity for internal self-organisation and rule making, but 
the density of the “external social network” and their ability to act and communicate externally 
was poor. Thus part of their strategy was to communicate with people. The group engaged 
local politicians who highlighted the economic significance of prawn fisheries for the area, 
wrote articles in the local newspapers, collected signatures for a petition to send to the 
government, and organised demonstrations on the quays. The fishermen believed that media 
attention, a public campaign and the presence of local politicians were key ingredients for 
institutionalising co-management. Nevertheless, in Stockholm officials of the Environmental 
Protection Agency continued discussing the establishment of a marine reserve in the area.
In meetings with multiple stakeholders, the fishermen were asked to provide detailed 
information about how and where they trawled in relation to the corals, and which areas could 
be closed. The fishermen felt accused, and instead of providing the information required they 
argued that the very existence of the long lived corals was sufficient proof that they had been 
protected through use. Instead they tried to use the meetings to inform others about the rules 
that they had already undertaken voluntarily.
During this period the fishermen adopted further rules to improve the selectivity of their gear 
and to constrain trawlers known to cause physical damage to the bottom of the Trench. After 
a series of meetings and by a majority vote, the fishermen from the area agreed to limit the 
total length of the trawl wing and the weight of the trawl board, to adopt the use of sorting 
grids and to ban the use of double and triple trawls in the area.9 This time, however, before 
making the final decision, they discussed the available alternatives with the marine research 
7 The members of the group are from the following SVC branches Kungshamn (23), Smögen (31), Hamburgsund 
(26), Fjällbacka (34), Grebbestad (37) and Strömstad (32). 
8 The group was not formally registered as an organisation and did not have written statutes and working rules. 
9 A sorting grid (sorterande ristgaller) is a device introduced from Norway that facilitates the escape of small sized 
fish. In the inshore waters, some fishermen explained, where there are large fish, the sorting grid fills the 
function of sorting the small fish, particularly the seasonally abundant and non marketable Norway pout 
(Trisopterus esmarki) locally called “plugg” i.e. plug or stopper. When the plugg appears in large quantities it gets 
stuck in the net which has to be the properly cleaned. Fishermen fishing prawn offshore in Skagerrak, where 
there are no plugg, were against the introduction of this type of sorting grid because, according to them, in 
offshore waters it means losing fish of commercial size. 
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laboratories of the National Board of Fisheries. This process of consultation with experts 
working for the central administration helped to validate the proposals in the eyes of both 
those fishermen who were sceptical of further restrictions on fishing technology and those 
supportive of banning trawling in the Trench. In this sense, external scientific validation of the 
local knowledge played a role of interest mediation. It would also prove to be of help when 
these rules were then transformed into statutory regulations in the year 2000.
Table 8.2 Challenges to be overcome by local fishermen in integrated coastal
  co-management
Issues discussed by the Koster Fjord Group Aspects pertinent to the co-
management process 
Are the “sea worms” valued today more than the local people? Do 
the plants and animals go before fishermen? 
World views; diversity and changes. 
Who should have the right to decide on the use of local ecosystems, 
scientists and bureaucrats from urban areas or the local residents? 
Participation of affected resource 
users’ in the definition of the problem.
Lack of concern for the socio-economic significance of the prawn 
fisheries for the region and the city of Strömstad. 
Socio-economic linkages to the wider 
community.
The need to engage the Municipal Governments and local 
politicians in the negotiation process. 
National politics and local : non-local 
cleavages.
Lack of clarity concerning the mandate of the people involved in the 
discussions.
Mapping stakeholders and negotiating 
partners.
The significance, in terms of resource conservation, of their own 
voluntary rules. 
Recognising that allocative rules can 
have conservation effects. 
The potential to further develop the rules limiting the weight and 
size of the trawls in the area. 
Building on already existing rules.
How to convince other fishermen to adopt the use of sorting grids 
when trawling. 
Supporting the exchange of 
information between fishermen.
The need to make their voluntary rules public. Recognition and publicising of 
informal arrangements. 
The pros and cons of a legal formalization of the local voluntary 
rules.
Degree of formality, allowing for rule 
flexibility and adaptation. 
How the Norwegian fishermen might react? Would the marine 
reserve affect the Norwegians and what would happen if Norway 
closed their waters to Swedish fishermen? 
Analysis of impacts across scales and 
institutional hierarchies. 
The controversy between the idea of developing further and 
formalising their own local management system and the tradition of 
open access.
Clarifying differences between 
property rights and management 
rights.
The issue of their local management system being associated with 
NBPO’s controversial proposal for the establishment of a local 
management system on the entire coast of Skagerrak. 
New demands emerging in other areas. 
Management boundaries and scale. 
Whether it was problematic to involve some controversial leaders. Leadership issue. Discussing problems 
and not groups or individuals. 
The question of the mandate to take decisions and negotiate 
without the involvement of the FAs at the central level.
Roles and locus of authority in large 
organisations.
The lack of capacity to negotiate and the need to engage the FAs at 
the central level, where they had so far not received any specific 
support.
Skills at the local level. 
The availability of time and money for meetings and activities. Transaction costs and financial 
sustainability.
How to cope with new Environmental Protection Agency (SNV), 
the NGOs, the scientists, the press and provincial authorities. 
Facilitating communication. 
The need to have one spokesperson towards the media. Communication skills. 
Source: Participatory observations 1998-2001 
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By 1999 the situation had changed drastically, both institutionally and in terms of knowledge 
available about the biological diversity in the deep waters of the Trench. Institutionally, with 
the coming into effect of the Swedish Environmental Code in 1999, a County Administrative 
Board (Provincial Government) or a Municipality has the authority to designate valuable 
natural environments as habitats deserving special protection and establishing nature reserves 
(Ds 2000:61). In order to facilitate the establishment of reserves, the Code also entitled these 
two bodies to constrain economic activities such as fishing. This new delegation of 
responsibilities challenged the concentration of fishery management authority at the sectoral 
and central level and was questioned within the fishery sector, especially by the dominant 
actors in the central co-management model the National Board of Fisheries and the FAs.
In terms of available knowledge, the experts working with the ROV technique –  who from 
1998 and onwards had received additional support from SNV and the provincial government 
of Bohuslän – had succeeded in producing  detailed maps of deep coral reefs, together with 
multi-beam echosounder images of the seafloor at depths of up to 300 m. The administration, 
scientists, fishermen, NGOs and general public could now see on video the contours of the 
Trench and the coral reefs, and also evidence of the physical effects of trawling the sea bed 
and the coral reefs (Lundälv and Jonsson 2000). Based on this information and now holding 
the necessary authority, the County Board Administration took the leading role with regard to 
the establishment of the marine reserve, but opted for another approach than that originally 
suggested by the Environmental Protection Agency (SNV).  Under the framework of the 
Habitats Directive, it elaborated the idea of establishing a Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
under the Natura 2000 initiative. Following this process a proposal for the area identified 10 
hotspots where trawling should be banned (figure 8.1).
In comparison with the policies that had been pursued by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (SNV), which argued for a more conventional and stricter form of marine reserve and 
the Swedish Environmental Code that promotes stakeholders consultation in a more 
conventional style, in the management of a SAC the Habitats Directive encourages the active 
involvement of people who live in and depend upon the designated areas (Article 6). 
Following article 8(j) of the Convention of Biological Diversity, the directive not only 
promotes user participation, it also recommends a variety of protective measures (statutory, 
administrative, contractual, management and sectoral plans) to be considered by the Member 
State (Council of the European Communities 1992).
Compared to the Swedish Environmental Code, the Habitat Directive turned out to be a more 
flexible tool that permitted protection to be tailored to the ecological and the social context. 
Using this directive and Natura 2000 as a framework also permitted the application of the 
Fisheries Law as an instrument to protect particular hot spots from trawling. To proceed in 
this way was deemed less controversial by the fishermen, the FAs, and the National Board of 
Fisheries on whom the sectoral management relies. Using the Environmental Code, would 
probably have put fisheries and the authority of the central co-management system at a 
disadvantage relative to other interests.
The County Board Administration presented its proposal of ten sites (see figure 8.1) to a more 
fishery specific working group. The group consisted of representatives of the Koster Fjord 
Group, the FAs (SFR and SVC) and NBPO and experts from the National Board of Fisheries. 
The local governments concerned (Strömstad and Tanum) were also represented. The 
fishermen were now shown three- dimensional images of their fishing grounds (see figure 8.2) 
and were provided with detailed information about the location of the various species (site, 
bottom type and depth) acquired through the mapping. This visualization proved instrumental 
in persuading the fishermen to discuss the different sites and their relevance for the fisheries. 
Once the co-ordinates were given the fishermen had something concrete to relate to. 
Three (sites 4, 6 and 8 in figure 8.1) out of the ten sites identified by the scientists and 
presented by the provincial government were considered unproblematic by the fishermen, 
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Figure 8.1 Map of Koster-Väderö Fjord with 10 proposed sites for special 
protection from trawling.
Source: courtesy of Tomas Lundälv. 
http://www.tmbl.gu.se:16080/resdev/project/CUD.
who agreed that on these sites trawling could be banned. The sites were characterised by steep 
walls, which the local fishermen with their locally adapted gear did not trawl, or fringe zones 
with depths under 50-60 m. In discussing with the fishermen about how fishing was practised 
in these three locations, the conclusion was that banning trawling was unnecessary. The 
decision by the authorities to allow trawling at these three sites amounted to trusting the 
fishermen and validating the positive effect of the fishermen’s voluntary local rules which 
constrained the use of certain type of gear. Trusting the fishermen and minimizing external 
intervention in these sites was part of the conflict management strategy.
Other sites proved more controversial: notably sites 3, 5, and 9 on figure 8.1. The fishermen 
argued that in site 3, which was narrow and coincided with the area where they normally 
turned around and therefore trawled on the walls of the Trench, the protection of corals in 
Swedish waters also involved Norwegian fishermen. Any measure to be taken in this area 
therefore required consultation with their Norwegian counterparts and the corresponding 
authorities. This process resulted in the protection of the Swedish side and also a protective 
decree on the Norwegian side.
Site 5, a popular trawling area, led to some disagreements among the local fishermen (see 
below). Closing trawling at site 9, an important area of passage for those trawling in a south-
north direction, would require lifting the trawl and thus involve additional work and expense 
for those from the south. Here the partners agreed to limit the passage route to a narrow and 
specially defined corridor.
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A few individual fishermen with a vested interest in the outcome of the negotiation regarding 
specific sites were asked by the Koster Fjord Group to attend the meetings and explain their 
fisheries in relation to the site, and the impact that closure would have. The use of visual 
material was shown to be instrumental in motivating the fishermen to discuss details and 
reveal their local knowledge and to explain where, when and how of they trawled in relation to 
the hotspots and the corals.
When the fishermen exchanged views about their fishing in the area identified by the 
authorities, access to various fishing sites was referred in terms of “Tom, Dick and the 
grandson of old Harry”. The language used by fishermen illustrated the use of place and time 
as two main descriptors of the ecosystem, their interaction with them, and also the existence 
of local patterns of traditional sea tenure based on family history. During negotiations, their 
experiences in both fishing and management of the fisheries in the Trench mediated or 
potentialised both collective and individual rights and participation in the decision making. 
Christy (1982) uses the acronym TURF to refer to this type of territorial use rights in fisheries, 
explaining that such systems take a long time to evolve and are often embedded in cultural 
tradition.
Rights acquired by the fishermen and the internal capacity for organization, were shown to be 
fundamental for participation in negotiations involving a diversity of external actors and 
interests. Also important was the willingness of the officials from the County Board 
Administration to listen to all parties.
The negotiations were successful in defining a number of hotspots where trawling is now 
forbidden and in gaining legal support for exclusion of harmful technology and larger trawlers 
from the areas. The latter was achieved through the legal endorsement of the locally designed 
informal rules involving the use of sorting grids, and size and weight reductions on trawls used 
in the area. Furthermore, the depth limit for trawling in the area was extended from 50 to 60 
m. Finally the parties have agreed to continue working for the development of better gear, the 
improvement and dissemination of knowledge about the area’s significance in terms of marine 
biological diversity, and the extension of this mode of work to include the management of 
other inter-sectoral problems.
Figure 8.2 ROV technique based image of site nr 5 “Hälls island” in Koster-Väderö 
 Fjord  
 Source: Courtesy of Tomas Lundälv. Produced by Marin Mätteknik AB, Tjärnö Marin 
 Biological Laboratory, and County Board Administration of Västra Götaland.
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The negotiation was rather controversial within the large collective of professional fishermen 
and disappointed many fishermen. These fishermen were of the opinion that the Koster-
Väderö group had given up the fight. But, for the local prawn fishermen who were directly 
dependent on access to the Trench, the negotiations were a good compromise. What in 
chapter 6 was perceived by them as a general threat coming from the central level and narrow 
scientific advice – a marine reserve closing all trawling in the area – was reduced to specific 
sites and dissected case by case together with the local resource users. Had the marine nature 
reserve been formed as originally envisaged by the Environmental Protection Agency, and had 
the decision followed the normal top-down mode of delivery, it is more likely that the local 
voluntary agreements would have been irrevocably breached and the system of local 
governance seriously undermined. Failures of this latter type have been for example reported 
by Ostrom (1990) and Wide (1986).  
The Koster-Väderö case is now being presented to the public as a good local co-management 
example, where resource users, scientists and governmental administrators have agreed on a 
common platform for action. The representatives from the Koster-Väderö Group have been 
awarded an environmental prize and the inventory of corals continues and has now been 
expanded to new areas, including Norwegian waters and the officers of the County Board 
Administration predict new hotspots may need special protection from trawling.
At the time of this writing the scientists from TMBL and the leaders of the Koster-Väderö 
group had noted a few cases of non-compliance. Three local fishermen had on occasion not 
fully followed the agreed instructions about the closed sites, particularly at site nr 5 in figure 
8.2. To resolve the problem the leaders of the Koster-Väderö group opted first to approach 
the fishermen who did not fully comply with the rules and warn them. As a result they 
requested the local coastguards to keep an eye on this particular site. According to the leaders 
of the Koster-Väderö group the coastguards lack sufficient resources to control fishing in the 
area.10 The third option chosen by the fishermen was to discuss the issue with the local 
scientists at TMBL (who were actually aware of the infractions because they had found tracks 
of trawlers on the closed site). It was first then, that they came up with the idea of requesting 
obligatory special training for all fishermen trawling in Koster-Väderö. Their idea is that access 
rights or special fishing permits should be conditional on training in the ecological specificities 
of the area. However, as in previous cases, the Swedish fisheries law was not equipped to 
make distinctions of this kind. Unless the legal framework is reformed the fishermen’s idea on 
training has to rely on voluntary agreements sanctioned by the FAs. 
This case study indicates that fishermen can contribute directly to the management of local 
resources provided they feel they are part of the governing regime and see they will get long 
term benefits out of it. It indicates further that fishermen prefer local handling of conflicts and 
local solutions to more formal procedures. However, in the headquarters of the environmental 
protection agency (SNV), TMBL, and the conservation NGOs the idea of a general ban on 
trawling in the Trench remains latent and the debate about marine reserves continues. Finally 
it indicates that the negotiations with the prawn fishermen from Koster-Väderö have only just 
started and their capability to contribute to management has not yet been fully used.
In the case of the prawn fisheries in Koster-Väderö this is an issue which together with the 
import of frozen prawns from Norway, threatens 100 years of experience of self organisation 
and local management. The problems exposed by prawn fishermen suggest there is a need for 
a strategic reorientation by giving considerably more attention to mechanisms which value the 
importance of fishermen’s knowledge and their engagement in fisheries and coastal 
management.
10 The area coincides with political limits between EU/Sweden and Norway and sea based transport and 
 recreation is rather intensive. 
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8.3.1 NBPO in context 
The origins of Northern Bohuslän Producers Organisation (NBPO) can be traced to the early 
1990s, when the “gadoid outburst” (Svelle et al 1997) came to an end, resulting in declining 
catches and the contagious spread of  patterns of behaviour maximising individual returns 
such as the “race to fish” (see chapter 6). This behaviour was sometimes associated with 
misreporting – stating, for example, that catches taken in Skagerrak had been taken elsewhere 
in the Baltic Sea. Such a situation was certain to inflame the existing discontent among local 
coastal fishermen and to create further tensions between those from the northern and 
southern parts of Bohuslän, as was apparent from articles in the Yrkesfiskaren.
As a response, local coastal fishermen started to demand more control over the resources. 
Several of the fishermen interviewed described how they had tried again and again to persuade 
the FAs of the need to pay more attention to distributional aspects and internal sanctioning 
systems. The interviewees reported that initially their demands were directed internally to the 
regional branch of the FA (SVC) and focused mainly on reviving operational rules that had 
historically been practiced in Sweden, such as sanction systems, Sunday and/or weekend stops 
and the rationing of cod and other related gadoid species. In 1992, joint written appeals were 
made by local branches from Northern Bohuslän to the FAs, advocating differential 
allocations of the available national fishery resources “to secure long term access to the 
resources for the coastal fisheries”. Local branches from Northern Bohuslän started a debate 
on the regional distribution of the national quotas, which found further support in the various 
regions. In response to the growing turbulence, by the end of 1994 the FAs had agreed to 
introduce landing quotas for vessels involved in the cod fisheries in the Baltic Sea, where the 
race for cod had became critical for local fishermen mainly using stationary gears (net). 
Through this process an independent organisation for professional coastal fishermen of 
Bohuslän named Bohuslän’s Kustfiskarförening (BKF) came into being in 1993. Initially, the 
original members of BKF regarded themselves as dissidents from the main associations (FAs) 
and were treated as such, even though most retained their membership in the FA. With time, 
BKF would gain sympathisers and acceptance throughout the West Coast and the regional FA 
(SVC) would be compelled to recognise and refer to it as if it was its own suborganisation.
BKF’s central concern was to find a means of ensuring that resources were available all year 
round, as this was regarded as a pre-condition for the survival of the local fisheries. Thus BKF 
proposed that a share of the quotas allocated to Skagerak be reserved for fishermen belonging 
to Northern Bohuslän’s local districts (LL and SD),11 introducing a new criterion – place of 
residence – into the process of resource allocation. As with previous petitions made by local 
branches of SVC, the BKF proposal to take into account place of residence when allocating 
management rights was rejected. Considered contrary to the principle of free access to state 
owned resources. Events of this kind could easily pass unobserved by fishery researchers and 
managers in Sweden for whom the question of who should have a say in how the quotas 
should be allocated was an internal question to be resolved by the FAs.
In previous chapters it has been demonstrated that coastal fishermen from Northern 
Bohuslän have historically been able to co-operate and take voluntary measures to regulate 
fisheries, particularly in the case of less mobile species and on local fishing grounds (e.g. the 
case of prawn fishermen). This was the dominant local order before the 1960s-70s when more 
11 Fishing vessels in Sweden are registered according to districts made of groups of municipalities and in 
Bohuslän three districts remain, from north to south, Strömstad (SD), Lysekil (LL) and Göteborg (GG). 
8.3 CASE STUDY 2   THE EMERGENCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE CO-
MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL FROM NORTHERN 
BOHUSLÄN
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mobile fisheries expanded their operations along the Swedish coast. Before that time the 
problem for local coastal fishermen was getting good market prices for their fish rather than 
the ability to catch the fish in the first place.
The establishment of independent producer organisations (POs) (see chapter 2) was highly 
controversial and a source of conflict. Opinions about the role that POs were to play in 
Sweden varied considerably among the fishermen interviewed. With the exception of those 
working at the Municipal level or within the conservation movement, the majority of non-
fishermen interviewed were convinced that both the number and role of the POs should be 
limited. A re-organisation of the community of professional fishermen around autonomous, 
local or regional Pos, was seen by the FAs and the fisheries administration as a disuniting and 
retrogressive step and a threat to the existing model of management. The emergence of many 
small POs was thought likely to lead to a potpourri of marketing rules and standards and to 
challenging the political and mediation role of the FAs in representing as a coherent and 
unified whole. Thus the FAs and the central administration supported the idea of a single 
national producers’ organisation (SFPO).
Notwithstanding this oposition, in 1994 five POs were established in Sweden, one covering 
the entire country, SFPO, and four smaller POs, including the Northern Bohuslän Producers’ 
Organisation (NBPO); a set up which recognised regional differences in the resource base as 
well as the need for a national PO for aquaculture.
NBPO, which had a difficult birth and a rapid death, was created by a small group of 
fishermen who had been active in the establishment of BFK. With its headquarters in the 
fishery dependent municipality of Sotenäs, NBPO amassed about 70 local finfish and shellfish 
fishermen from Northern Bohuslän, led by a core group of well-informed and articulate 
fishermen.
To constitute a PO, producers must demonstrate sufficient economic activity, defined in 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2939/94 as a situation in which either the members represent at 
least 20% of the total number of vessels established in its economic area or account for at 
least 15% of the total volume of production of a species in the area (or at least 30% of the 
total production in a major port or market within the area). NBPO was created on the basis of 
the 30% rule, with its members responsible for at least 30% of Nephrops landings at the 
Smögen fish auction in Sotenäs, Northern Bohulän.
The creation of a local PO not only denoted the arrival of the CFP and its influence in the 
area but also made Northern Bohuslän’s dependence on shellfish much more widely known. 
As members of a PO, the shellfish fishermen of Northern Bohuslän had in theory gained a 
toehold in the policy process with power relations nominally shifting from the centre to the 
local level.
8.3.2 NBPO’s proposal for institutional change 
The inquiry into the future development of the archipelagos, commissioned by the Parliament 
in 1996 (see Case 1 above) had proved receptive to ideas from local fishermen. The 
consultation process had given the prawn fishermen, BKF and NBPO the opportunity to put 
forward a number of critical remarks on the established management system. In its report 
(SOU 1996:153) the Commission supported the introduction of an MPA in the area of the 
Koster-Väderö Fjord and the reallocation of national quotas between those fishing the coastal 
waters and those fishing off shore –in line with the local coastal fishermen’s views – it also 
discussed the introduction of local quotas and local transferable fishing licences. The 
Commission gave positive encouragement to developing Nephrops creel fishery and was critical 
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of the impacts of trawling on the seabed. Overall, the report was anxious that any new 
measures should not disadvantage the small-scale, local fishermen.
Faced with the challenges posed by shrinking fish stocks, market competition, concentration 
of fisheries resources, the establishment of a marine reserve and the risk that part of the local 
trawling being closed in the area, the NBPO fishermen offered an alternative management 
strategy.
The first formal proposal for the establishment of a local co-management regime in the 
coastal waters of Skagerrak was submitted by NBPO to the central government in 1997. This 
was done in connection with the process of consultation on the report on sustainable 
development in the archipelagos of Sweden (SOU 1996:153). As a PO, and through the 
procedure of referral consultation (see 2.4), they could now formally elaborate their position 
and put forward recommendations in relation to the issues and proposals discussed in the 
report.
NBPO’s proposal was based on the allegation that the present locus of co-management – as 
well as the scale and boundaries on which the present institutional framework is based – had 
serious shortcomings when it came to resolving local problems in an acceptable way. NBPO 
sought to redefine the ecological and social management boundaries, reallocate rights to the 
local fisheries resources, and alter the terms of representation and locus of co-management in 
the direction of increasing local participation in decision making. NBPO argued vigorously in 
the presence of the media and stakeholders who traditionally had been left outside the 
corporate central co-management model (namely sports fishermen, the nature conservation 
movement, academics, local politicians, and the county board administration). Moreover 
NBPO fishermen began to participate in research projects and the testing of selective gear. It 
invested time and resources in the development of external relations, beyond the conventional 
arena of fisheries management. For the NBPO fishermen their cpr situation was sufficiently 
problematic to warrant taking collective action for institutional change. In other words, the 
proponents believed there was another more effective way to organise the management of 
fisheries in the region.
In box 8.3, NBPO’s proposal is summarised. The concepts used by NBPO to describe the 
rationale behind their proposal have varied over the time. NBPO has used the Swedish terms 
for area management (områdesförvaltning), local management (lokal förvaltning), coastal zone 
management (kustzonsförvaltning), and regional management (regional förvaltning). However many 
of the non-fishermen interviewed considered the language of NBPO incomprehensible and 
their proposal unclear. Vague and unclear formulation of the proposal and rumours of a 
hidden agenda lying behind the proposal, aroused suspicion among other fishermen and 
structured the debate in terms of a personal defensive dialogue between charismatic leaders. 
The weak interest shown by the authorities in NBPO’s proposal finds its explanation in the 
dominant co-management regime where according to the Fisheries Law (1993) the National 
Board of Fisheries has the mandate to regulate fishing but only on biological grounds. The 
regulatory instrument available to the authorities did not provide guidelines on how to deal 
with distribution issues among professional fishermen. Internal distribution problems derived 
from the sharing of resources are expected to be solved on a voluntary basis within the FAs. 
The officials interviewed were of the opinion that to consider proposals like that put forward 
by NBPO (and the Sunday stop proposal discussed in chapter 7), the Swedish Parliament had 
to rewrite the Fisheries Law.  As with Sunday stop, this case also points to a common pool 
resource management system that attempts to separate what is ecological from what is social 
and economic; in this way the interaction between the social and the ecological systems is 
ignored.
187
Box 8.3 A brief account of NBPO’s proposal on local area management 
Purpose: The redrawing of management boundaries, clarifying the community of users and redefining the 
terms of representation in co-management.
Problem statement: The degradation of the coastal biotopes and fish resources which are the mainstays of 
the local coastal fishermen’s livelihood.
Policy statement: NBPO emphasizes the need to protect these waters due to their importance as nursery 
ground for finfish and shellfish. The proposal appeals for a more ecologically sustainable fishery that 
better suits the characteristics of the local coastal biotopes and the realities of the local communities 
depending on them. To collectively manage the area so that a balance between “coercion and 
legitimization” is reached and political controversies are avoided.
Boundaries: The area identified by NBPO extends from Paternoster’s lighthouse (the southern point of Tjörn
Island) in the South to the Norwegian border in the north. To define the seaward boundary NBPO first
suggested the12 nautical mile and then due to opposition, the 6 nautical mile limit. The socio-economic
boundaries are based on the cultural particularities of coastal fisheries where the degree of variation is
indeed conditioned by the characteristics of the exploited biotope. 3 sub areas are identified as deserving
special treatment: the Gullmar Fjord, the Koster Trench and Per’s Ground. In this sense the authorized
fishing community is predicted to be fishermen operating different types of fisheries, but in compliance
with the rules agreed for the area and its peculiar biotopes.
Management Committee: A management committee working under the supervision of the National Board 
of Fisheries and consisting of local representatives from the different producer organizations, the FAs, 
fishery scientists, municipal and the provincial government shall devise the rules. The rules are finally 
approved and codified by the NBF (In the more recent documentation conservation organizations are also 
to be invited).
Right of Entry: The management committee should approve fishing licences for the area. The coastal 
fishermen are considered as the main target group and the need to benefit the local communities was also 
raised. Priority should be given to residents and those who have traditionally fished in the area. Vessels of 
certain sizes (e.g. >20 -24 m) are to be excluded.
The rules: - A fixed share of the national quotas in Skagerrak to be reallocated to the management area. 
Depending on the state of the resources, licences to newcomers could be temporarily authorized and 
fishing stops implemented 
 - Weekend stop  
 - Adoption of rules designed by local prawn fishermen for Koster-Väderö Fjord should apply to 
 the entire area  
 - Highly selective techniques, as recommended by scientific studies, should apply
 - Prohibiting light fishing within the 50-m isobaths  
 - Reduced gear input in the eel fisheries 
 - Square mesh and increased mesh size in the N. lobster trawl  
 - Reduced gear input in the recreational fisheries after lobster 
Special features: It is suggested that the area should be used for research and monitoring and that the 
fishermen should actively participate in these activities. The committee should work on the development 
of green labeling and electronic auctions. A strategy for the use of EU structural funds should be 
developed. Norway and Scotland are seen as practical examples where local management is working. 
Denmark and Norway should be encouraged to do the same and the fishing rules in Skagerrak’s waters be 
harmonized.
Sources:   Prepared on the basis of Norra Bohuslän's P. O. 1997; Norra Bohusläns's P.O. 1998;
  Norra Bohusläns's P. O. 1999. 
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Unlike the case of the prawn fishermen (see 8.3) – a sort of success self management story in 
the sense of Ostrom (1990) – where the threat of local co-management being nullified by 
decisions made at higher levels was more or less satisfactory overcome, NBPO’s proposal has 
not been fully tested. Since 1997 the proposal has been further elaborated and articulated in a 
series of letters and documents addressing various stakeholders both within and outside the 
governmental sphere.12 The proposal can therefore be seen as an ongoing process by which 
alternative ideas to the dominant corporatist central co-management system are discussed, 
tested and promoted among various actors, contested and re-elaborated.
NBPO’s proposal was at odds with the main principles sustaining the dominant management 
regime and generated a debate. The differences of opinion between the local coastal fishermen 
from NBPO and the FAs was made evident in an open meeting jointly organised by World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), NBPO, a small group of local coastal fishermen from the southeast 
and the sports fishermen’s association in 2000. The topic of the meeting was coastal fisheries, 
and the potential for the establishment of local-co-management regimes in Sweden was the 
central item on the agenda. This meeting gave a new focus to the debate where the main 
question became how to reform the Swedish management system. Since then, the debate on 
the potential of local resource management has grown and become more pluralistic in 
Sweden.
12 Besides officials involved in fisheries among the remittances one can find high officials involved in environ 
mental policymaking at the national and regional level, commissioners and officials of the European 
Commission, and, European and Scottish fishermen’s associations and producers organizations. 
8.3.3 The tenability of  NBPO’s proposal in the light of  Ostorm’s design 
principles
The analysis of literature on common pool resource management presented in chapter 3 has 
indicated that the likelihood of success in the implementation of co-management institutions 
will depend in large measure on certain basic conditions being met, referred to by Ostrom as 
design principles for endurable cpr institutions (Ostrom 1990:90). Below, these principles have 
been applied to NBPO’s proposal and the socio ecological context from which it has emerged.
Clearly defined boundaries
The area discussed in the proposal includes from north to south the municipalities of 
Strömstad (80-90 licenced fishermen), Tanum (135-145), Sotenäs (100-110), Lysekil (40-45), 
Uddevalla (8-10), Orust (20-25) and Tjörn (100-110). To mark the southern boundary NBPO 
chose the Pater Noster lighthouse, outside the southernmost point of Tjörn Island. This 
location coincides with the zone regarded as the border between Skagerrak and Kattegat in 
oceanographic terms (see chapter 2).
The southern boundary as proposed by NBPO appears uncontroversial from a biophysical 
viewpoint. Paternoster lighthouse also has a cultural meaning; once an important toll post, it is 
still used to express distance from the home harbour. Expressions like “fishing within” or 
“outside the toll-station” were not unusual among older fishermen who saw it as an historical 
boundary marker between north and south, between “us and them”. As discussed in the case of 
the prawn fishermen, cultural ties to a fishing site or area can be an important factor because 
they can help to validate a management situation and the identification of management units. 
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In this case the cultural aspects associated with Paternoster may increase its acceptance as an 
“ecological” boundary even among those who do not necessarily see a link to the 
oceanographic phenomena characterising the zone.
To the north, the area proposed by NBPO coincides with the national border between 
Sweden and Norway. As with many administrative boundaries, it has little correlation with 
natural biophysical characteristics. On the contrary, it divides the submerged fjord running 
parallel to the coastline of Norway and Sweden in two. Employing different management 
options within the Trench on either side of its political boundary can scarcely be justified from 
an ecological point of view, and is difficult to understand, particularly for prawn fishermen 
living in the area who fish both sides. However, the boundary is important from a political 
perspective, particularly since Sweden joined the EU, for it now separates European 
Community waters from Norwegian waters. In the NBPO documents, no arguments were 
advanced for ignoring the political boundaries.
As core members of NBPO explained:
“There is not much one can do about this boundary” {0.0#22}.
“Obviously, co-ordination across political frontiers is needed; we expect Norway as well 
as Denmark to develop local coastal management systems, too” {0.0#23}.
To define the seaward boundary of the management area, NBPO first suggested a 12 nautical 
mile limit. NBPO’s proposal emphasized the need to include an area sufficiently extensive to 
cover “the variation of biotopes that are essential for the nursery and juvenile phases of most commercially 
important species in the area”. From the perspective of NBPO, the 12 nautical mile limit was 
sufficient to cover the most vulnerable biotopes in the area and was also appropriate from a 
CFP perspective.
According to the leaders of NBPO, the most appropriate limit would actually be the 160–180 
m isobaths (expressed in terms of “80-100 famn”), a depth which coincides with the migration 
patterns of young ground fish, especially cod. The use of cod’s migration cycle as a point of 
reference in the definition of the boundaries was also explained in ecological terms. The 
following extract from an interview explains the arguments underlying the use of cod as an 
indicator of ecosystem health in the area.
“You see, cod and other cod-like species mature comparatively later than other species 
and therefore stay a longer time in the area…up to three years. They and the shellfish are 
often found together and keep to distinct areas. This you can easily check by looking at 
the mix of species caught by bottom trawls; researchers should focus more on these 
things. Besides, young fish of the cod family feed on shellfish so their distribution does 
temporarily overlap. If we are able to protect the cod, so that it manages to spawn at least 
once, we are at the same time protecting all the other related species. Finally, as the 
demand and price paid for cod is higher than for other species and the number of 
permitted landings of bycatch is limited, for each cod landed probably 10 other fish are 
discarded, while for each young cod saved, 10 other fish are gained” {0.0#23}. 
NBPO leaders referred to local stocks of cod and discussed the incongruence between the 
biology of cod and other species and the scales of management. However, the use of depth as 
a boundary for management purposes was considered impractical, and the 12 nautical mile 
limit was considered to be somehow appropriate to the dynamics of the coastal zone and the 
ecosystem of the young cod and the shellfish.
190
However, using the 12 nautical miles would also mean the inclusion of Norwegian and Danish 
fishermen who, in Skagerrak, have been granted traditional rights up to the 4 nautical mile 
limits. Influenced by the opposition to the idea of making use of the 12 nautical mile limit as a 
management boundary, the NBPO-fishermen proposed 6 nautical miles as well as 4 nautical 
miles as possible alternative limits.
Yet NBPO’s leaders argued the 12 nautical miles choice was appropriate from the point of 
view of the CFP, which allows coastal states to take management measures within this zone 
(see chapter 2),13 though until quite recently (December 2002) it was anticipated that this limit 
would be only temporary and might be revised. Thus, by proposing the 12 nautical miles the 
fishermen hoped to retain preferential rights in the area beyond 2002. From a Swedish legal 
perspective, this coincides with the definition of territorial sea and the responsibilities of the 
Municipalities in terms of physical planning (Boverket 1995). Linking the role of the 
management committee to the boundary of the municipal waters and the municipal planning 
process would give greater validity to the use of the 12 nautical mile limits. This argument was 
not mentioned by the fishermen in the interviews.
The proposal identifies neither individuals nor households that will have the right to extract 
resource units from the area. In general, there was a consensus among the fishermen 
interviewed that the area should be open to all fishermen prepared to follow the rules 
independent of place of residence. NBPO suggested the transformation of the authorized 
fishing community into the group of those willing to comply with the management system 
defined for the area. In this sense, NBPO does not directly advocate a conceptualisation of 
the management community as one which is territorially fixed, small, and homogeneous. The 
13 Within the European Union it is possible to discern four limits for exclusion. The base-line delimiting the EU-
common fisheries waters, the coastal line which can be based on the 12 or the 6 nautical miles, an inner line 
defining access to fishermen from other countries but based on traditional rights and the lines of specific boxes 
(Shetland’s box) to which access is restricted.
14 The fishermen meant standard procedures could be used to issue local fishing licences. The logbooks could be 
checked and those that had reported for example 30-50% of their catch coming from this area would be 
authorized to continue fishing there. The fishermen interviewed said that they knew who has traditionally 
fished there and who has not. 
definition of collective choice and operational rules is devolved to a Management Committee 
working under the supervision of NBF.
Several fishermen argued that it was clear that by making use of specific variables when 
designing the rules, the Committee would indirectly define the authorized users. Among the 
NBPO fishermen interviewed, there was consensus that bottom trawlers of 100 ton GT 
capacity or more (equivalent length circa 20-24 m) and pelagic trawlers or purse-seiners of 150 
ton GT capacity or more (equivalent length circa 22-25 m) should be excluded. In spite of this 
detailed recommendation, the exclusion principles were not made clear enough in the 
proposals.
Yet, for the majority of NBPO fishermen it was clear that local fishermen, followed by those 
having historical track records in the area,14 should be given preference. The lack of clarity in 
relation to the issue of exclusion made non-NBPO fishermen anxious and was used as an 
argument against the proposal on the grounds that it was looking to exclude non-local 
fishermen from the area. Exclusion and the introduction of ITQs were seen from the outside 
as NBPO’s hidden agenda. 
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When considering what impacts the exclusion of vessels from the area might have on other 
coastal areas, the fishermen from NBPO argued that similar arrangements could be set up 
along the entire Swedish coast, thus encouraging coalition between NBPO and local coastal 
fishermen from the South East.
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
NBPO proposed restricting fishing time, gear, and certain technologies. NBPO fishermen 
highlighted the need to be able to plan their fisheries year round and take decisions on fishing 
stops. Adopting the Swedish market quota model applied by the prawn fishermen (see section 
8.3) which had gained the support of fishermen, was seen as one possibility by both NBPO 
and other local fishermen.  Limits to the appropriation of resources were to be defined by the 
authorities and instrumentalised in regional or local collective quotas.
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) were not mentioned in the documentation. That ITQs 
are not popular among the Swedish small-scale fishermen has been confirmed more recently 
by Ellegård and Eggerts (2002). But NBPO members did not reject the possibility of entitling 
individuals to a proportional share of the collective quota by e.g. introducing individual, non-
transferable, quotas. However, due to the species mix and the diversity of fisheries, the 
allocation of individual quotas was seen as too complicated an issue for which there was no 
clear procedure. The criterion on which the initial quota distribution was to be based was a 
further matter of concern among the fishermen (see box 7.4).
The NBPO documents suggest that the area should be regarded as a pilot area for testing 
experimental fishing and other research. It was proposed that scientists and fishermen should 
work together under the supervision of the NBF, with EU’s structural funding the project and 
the implement its results.
These allocation and provision rules were considered better and expected to result in net 
economic benefits rather than costs. In the interviews the leaders explained that such an 
approach could help to qualify local fishermen for some form of eco-labelling for their 
products (for which they expected WWF support)on the one hand, and further enhance the 
local tourism sector in which a number of fishermen had an active interest, on the other hand. 
In other words, any costs incurred through restrictions were expected to be balanced by 
improved income earning potential. 
Collective-choice arrangements 
An essential part of the NBPO proposal was the delegation of rule making authority to a 
management committee. The committee would act under the supervision of the central fishery 
administration (NBF) and consist of local fishermen from different organisations and fishery 
scientists, together with representatives of the municipalities and the county board 
administration. Individuals affected by the operational rules would be allowed to participate in 
the formulation of operational rules through their local representatives on the Management 
Committee. In this way institutional arrangements were adapted to suit a smaller geographical 
area, with decisions taken as close as possible to the local level and hence involve more user 
influence than is the case today. The committee would be given authority to grant local fishing 
licences, sanction operational rules, and adapt fishing pressure to the state of the resource on 
the basis of scientific advice. In this sense, it would be given a significant range of 
management and exclusion rights. The issue of granting licences was seen as particularly 
critical by the non-NBPO fishermen. 
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It is worth mentioning that the range of possible stakeholders representatives increased over 
time as the proposal was modified. In a more recent version, for example, nature conservation 
organisations are to be invited (Norra Bohusläns P. O. 1999). This mirrored the increasing 
number of stakeholders involved in fisheries (see chapter 7).
Among local fishermen, there were strong differences of opinion about who should and 
should not be represented on the committee, particularly if the committee were to be 
responsible for issuing fishing licences. A majority, however, were concerned that the size of 
the committee should be limited. Some considered the committee should involve primarily 
professional harvesters, fishery biologists and the authorities presently involved in fisheries 
management. Beyond this core membership there was little agreement. The involvement of 
the processing industry was, for example, not mentioned by any of the fishermen interviewed. 
Broadening the committee to include new stakeholders with little knowledge or experience of 
fisheries and who traditionally had not been involved in fisheries management was considered 
problematic. Ideas of involving representatives of environmental NGO’s and/or other fishing 
interests such as sport and subsistence fisheries proved relatively unpopular. Some were also 
critical of the idea of appointing local politicians to the committee, partly on the grounds of a 
potentially high turnover of political representatives. In general, there was support for a more 
local sectoral management committee, but scepticism of the role that a more broadly 
constituted committee might play.
Monitoring and graduated sanctions 
No specific reference is made in the proposal to monitoring compliance with the regulations. 
In general the fishermen preferred that the coast guard should continue to exercise the 
function of enforcement. The issue of sanctions is not mentioned in the proposals. But all the 
fishermen interviewed considered a strict gradual sanction system to be necessary. Several 
prawn fishermen considered the present control system to be incomplete because it included 
only the control of formal or legally adopted rules and ignored informal rules agreed among 
the fishermen. The system was also considered ineffective because sanctions were hardly ever 
imposed. A “three strikes you’re out” system culminating in the withdrawal of the licence was 
deemed appropriate by the majority of the local fishermen interviewed. The suggestion was 
that the coastguards should report all infringements to the management committee, which 
would be responsible for warning offending fisherman on no more than two occasions before 
the licence to fish in the area was finally suspended. 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
NBPO’s proposal is interpreted here as a response to the existence of conflicts within the 
ranks of the fishermen and their associations and the inability of the dominant management 
system to become a platform for conflict resolution. Fundamental to NBPO’s proposal was 
that it shifted the locus of co-management from the central to the local level and extended the 
invitation to participate in co-management agreements to a wider range of partners than those 
involved today. As such it would invest the management committee with a unique opportunity 
to become involved and have a say in both intra- and inter-sectoral issues and conflicts. The 
involvement of external actors and stakeholders in the co-management of fisheries was seen 
by NBPO leaders as a mechanism facilitating the introduction of new perspectives. In the 
interviews, non-NBPO fishermen indicated that fishery related conflicts should preferably be 
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resolved within the FAs at the regional and central level and not in a local arena. Similarly they 
were sceptical towards the involvement of people outside the professional harvesting sector.
Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
Considering that the right to organise is a fundamental right in Sweden, to examine NBPO’s 
proposal in the light of this principle can be seen as irrelevant. Nevertheless, in their accounts 
NBPO members reported that to establish the organisation they had to first petition the 
Prime Minister claiming the right of free choice of association. NBPO had a difficult birth and 
a weak ability to involve fishermen other than its own members. As previously mentioned, 
NBPO was created on the basis of the criterion that the membership of the PO represented at 
least 30% of the total catch of Nephrops in the area. This situation did not last for ever and the 
same principle led to the downfall of NBPO and its proposal.
Nested enterprises 
One problem which inevitably confronts the idea of local co-management – particularly in 
relation to highly dynamic ecosystems and fugitive resources – is how to deal with problems 
and interventions having their sources outside the local area. This requires achieving a sound 
working relation with neighbouring organisations and continuing adaptation to institutional 
dynamics across the various scales of the overall management structure.
This important aspect was not considered in the NBPO’s proposal, though from interviews 
with NBPO leaders it was clear that similar organisational structures were envisaged for other 
parts of coastal Sweden and that harmonisation with regulations in the wider Skagerrak would 
be an important issue. Indeed, interviews with the PO leaders indicated that some form of 
hierarchical structure would be needed to tackle the issue of cross institutional cooperation. 
Figure 8.4, similar in design to that prepared by Symes and Pope (2000) for England and 
Wales, presents an institutional structure for Skagerrak and the neighbouring seas as imagined 
by one of the interviewed NBPO-leaders.
By the time this thesis was written regional seas governance structures of the CFP were 
emerging. In the search for a more transparent, participatory, ecosystem-based approach to 
the CFP, the European Council has decided on the establishment of regional advisory 
councils (RACs) involving the fishery industry and other stakeholders (Council Regulation 
2371/2002 article 31). In this way better links to the supranational level were expected to be 
opened for the fishery sector and the fishermen.
The decision on RACs by the European Council of Ministers appears to coincide with the 
ideas of the leaders of NBPO. This is not surprising considering that the NBPO leaders had 
close contacts with the fishermen from West Scotland and the Scottish Fishermen Federation, 
which in its turn have lobbied for the granting powers to local and regional management. In 
the case of Sweden, the debate on the European fisheries policy reform appears to have 
strengthened the Swedish debate on possible management innovations, triggering a process of 
revision and “pluralisation” of the Swedish central, corporatist fishery co-management system. 
When compared to the dominant central corporatist co-management model, the proposal put 
forward by NBPO members introduces at least eight innovative elements: 1) it redefines the 
co-management scale; 2) it proposes a devolution of decision making to the local (regional) 
level; 3) it suggests a more pluralistic decision-making forum in fisheries co-management; 4) it 
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introduces the notion of area-based collective quota allocations; 5) it redefines a few 
operational rules emphasising the use of effort (time) and catch quotas and technical 
conservation measures within given spatial areas with specific ecological characteristics; 6) it 
reformulates the authorized fishing community on the basis of compliance with the 
predefined rules; 7) it suggests that the area be regarded as a pilot or demonstration project, 
supported from EEC and/or national funds; and finally 8) it envisages a nested institutional 
structure.
Figure 8.4 Co-management nested structure as envisaged by NBPO
Source: Interviews 1998-2001 
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In the language of Ostrom (1990), one can posit that these main elements introduce changes 
to local coastal fisheries management in Sweden at the constitutional, collective and 
operational levels. NBPO’s proposal could be interpreted as one that would extend the 
resource users’ positions from being authorised users, holding access and withdrawal rights, to 
becoming co-managers with additional management and exclusion rights (see Ostrom and 
Schlager’s (1996) typology of rights, reviewed in chapter 3). The NBPO proposal to redefine 
the boundaries of management did not evolve in a political vacuum but developed from a 
situation in which the PO members perceived a resource crisis and an imbalanced distribution 
of benefits, between the modern highly capitalised and mobile, dislocated fisheries, and the 
local, more small-scale coastal fisheries.
One question still to be answered is how far this kind of institutional change can be expected 
to find social acceptance in a heterogeneous group which has formerly been fishing under the 
principles of free access and equal treatment. An interrelated critical question is that of the 
extent to which the essential elements outlined above are understood to be feasible among 
those involved in fisheries management.
8.3.4 Recontextualising the NBPO proposal  
A critical question for the NBPO proposal is the extent to which the socio-ecological setting 
is likely to facilitate the emergence of collective action. Ostrom (1999a) has discussed 
attributes of the resources (R) and of the users (U) that may affect the users’ willingness and 
capacities to self organise and collectively pursue institutional change for the management of 
common pool resources (see chapter 3). The attributes highlighted by Ostrom are: 
For the resource: R.1 feasible improvement; R.2 indicators; R.3 predictability; R.4 spatial 
extent and
For the users: U.1 salience; U.2 common understanding; U.3 discount rate; U.4 distribution of 
interests; U.5 trust; U.6 autonomy; U.7 prior organisational experience.
In the following subsections, facts and perceptions about the resources and the users are 
reviewed in relation to the actual setting of the NBPO proposal. The arrows in parenthesis 
give an indication of to what extent these facts and perceptions about the attributes of the 
resources and the users may enhance Ń or reduce Ņ the likelihood of the fishermen self 
organising around NBPO’s proposal.
According to scientific assessment the shellfish is not at a point of critical deterioration and 
there may well be opportunities to improve both the fishery and its natural resource (feasible 
improvement: R.1Ń). Even though the biological study of Nephrops is rather recent, local 
fishermen can easily get access to local scientists from the three major Swedish marine 
laboratories and view their monitoring reports for free (indicators: R2Ń). Moreover, Nephrops
are rather sedentary in behaviour which facilitates the follow up (indicators: R2Ń) and 
prediction of the state of the stocks by both fishermen and scientists (predictability: R3Ń).
Thus, with regard to the attributes of Nephrops the conditions for the emergence of collective 
action seem to be favourable.
But NBPO’s proposal addresses not only the management of shellfish but also the 
management of fish whose availability is more difficult to predict (predictability: R3Ņ). The 
probability of the local fishermen getting organised around the management of fish stocks that 
have reached a critical biomass, such as it is in the case of cod, can be expected to be low 
(feasible improvement: R.1Ņ). The fact that cod is a bycatch of the eel and the Nephrops
fisheries complicates probably further the emergence of a collective action form that would 
involve the whole fishing community.
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The non-fishermen interviewed perceived the area selected by NBPO to be “too open”, “too 
large”, “too diverse”, or “too complex” to be managed as a unit and by a committee, from the 
local level (spatial extent: R 4Ņ).
The relevant fishing community consist of both locals (salience: U.1Ń) and non-locals 
(salience: U.1Ņ) making use of different livelihood strategies (distribution of interests: U.4Ņ).
As might be expected, the dislocated fishermen found the proposal of NBPO highly 
controversial (common understanding: U.2Ņ). The members of NBPO share their perceptions 
about problems with the resources with many other local fishermen from the area (common 
understanding: U.2Ń) but not with the more mobile modern fishermen coming from outside 
the area (common understanding: U.2Ņ). Exploiting local resources and then moving on to 
other grounds, a characteristic of the non-local fishermen, is not part of the strategies adopted 
by local fishermen and implicit in the NBPO plans (discount rate: U3Ń). Thus, problems with 
the current patterns of use and the regulations at work affect the local and the non-local 
fishermen, differently (distribution of interests: U.4Ņ).
The opposition from the mobile southern fishermen was predictable. The dislocated fishery 
requires larger areas and relies on the absence of boundaries, uniform policies, the established 
co-management order and generic rules. In their opposition to NBPO’s proposal, the issues of 
a loss of legitimacy for the existing system and the threat of exclusion together with distrust of 
the NBPO’s leadership were most frequently mentioned. Typical expressions in this group 
were:
“Are we going to allow a group of fishermen that are condemned to extinction to change 
a system that has worked well for decades? Shall I close my fishery in Skagerrak because 
of the Smögen fishermen? Since when has a group of fishermen the right to limit other 
fishermen’s rights? We are all equals” {1.0#101}. 
 “NBPO leaders have now discovered that they can travel to Brussels and in this way earn 
more money than they normally do by fishing. We don’t give a shit for the NBPO 
proposal; we prefer that things continue the way they are” {2.0#73}. 
Local fishermen were in general positive to adopting changes in their trawling technology and 
pursuing other regulations to reduce fishing effort (common understanding: U.2Ń). Thus the 
organisation of local fishermen around the management of Nephrops can be understood as 
theoretically feasible. By contrast, more modern mobile fishermen are far less likely to make 
the same concessions and are therefore unlikely to react in the same way as local fishermen 
(common understanding: U.2Ņ). Moreover, the ability of the non-local fishermen to benefit 
from any spillover effects from Nephrops management into other stocks will be considerably 
lower (feasible improvement: R.1Ņ). Therefore to predict their behaviour with regard to the 
natural resources outside the area would also be difficult (predictability R3Ņ).
Local non-NBPO fishermen who in general were critical of several aspects of the dominant 
regime were positive about the introduction of many of the operational rules discussed by 
NBPO-fishermen particularly the idea of allocating separate quotas to the coastal and offshore 
sectors (common understanding: U.2Ń). But they felt committed to the established co-
management order involving the FAs and did not believe that NBPO was the right forum in 
which to discuss changes in the management regime (common understanding: U.2Ņ). Many 
feared the implications that implementation of the proposal might have for their own business 
flexibility. In spite of sharing common views about the problems they did not share common 
images about the feasibility of the proposal (common understanding: U.2Ņ).
Less predictable, however, was the reservations of local prawn fishermen operating in the 
Koster-Väderö Fjord. One might have expected relations between the NBPO’s proposed 
Ņ
Ņ
Ņ
Ņ
Ń
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regime and the existing Koster-Väderö Fjord regime (section 8.3) to be positive. The prawn 
fishermen might reasonably have expected to gain from being nested within a supportive 
regime covering a larger area. But four arguments against NBPO and its proposal can be 
identified among the prawn fishermen.
The first relates to the lack of trust in NBPO’s leaders and has to do with previous experience. 
Previously NBPO had authorized its members temporarily to land more prawns per week 
than the fishermen’s weekly market quota or ration (FWQ) agreed by the national SFPO. This 
had been opposed not only by the prawn fishing community but also from within NBPO’s 
own ranks resulting in a few prawn fishermen leaving the organization. NBPO was seen to 
have challenged the central tenet of prawn fisheries management in Sweden. In this case the 
autonomy given to NBPO was problematic (autonomy: U6Ņ). Though the decision was soon 
revoked by NBPO, trust had been lost (trust: U.5Ņ). Cleary, NBPO also had difficulty gaining 
credibility among other local fishermen.
The second line of opposition was related to the fear of losing fishing rights in Norwegian 
waters. The prawn fishermen were afraid of the potential consequences that the establishment 
of a local management area in Swedish coastal waters might have in terms of their access to 
fishing rights in Norwegian waters. NBPO’s proposal had not been clear when it came to the 
issue of traditional rights in neighbouring waters.
The third argument was related to the fear of losing co-management rights. Several prawn 
fishermen were convinced that a coalition with NBPO and concomitant drive for the 
extension of local management rights to a larger area would generate turbulence in the FA and 
put at risk their own management rights in the Koster-Väderö area. Efforts to nest small scale 
arrangements within larger ones are usually motivated by a desire to promote the effectiveness 
of the smaller system by integrating it into a larger system. But unless NBPO’s alternative 
regime was welcome by the FA and clearly nested within and coordinated with a larger system, 
the prawn fishermen would not be willing to take the risk (feasible improvement: R.1Ņ).
Finally, NBPO leaders had also been willing to discuss and establish alliances with sports 
fishermen and the nature conservation organisations. These were the same conservation 
organisations that had promoted a ban on prawn trawling and the establishment of a marine 
reserve in Koster-Väderö, and were perceived by the prawn fishermen as a threat. NBPO had 
difficult gaining credibility among the prawn fishermen (trust: U.5Ņ).
The condition of having prior experience of organisation does not to seem problematic at the 
local level (prior organisational experience: U.7Ń) but it has been problematic at larger scales. 
Local fishermen are already organised around the maintenance of the local ports, the collective 
purchase of gear and other fishing assets, the marketing of their catch, through local branches 
of the FAs, and are members of other organisations such as BKF, NBPO and also the Koster-
Fjord group. Most fishermen were also active in non-fisheries related organisations in their 
communities.
To conclude, NBPO’s proposal involves a considerable number of users and four subgroups 
of fishermen: 1) NBPO members who look for solutions to the problems found in the cpr
situation in the reorganisation of a centralistic co-management model; 2) other local combi-
fishermen who despite the fact that they are only endowed with access and fishing rights and 
lack management rights do not see NBPO as the appropriate forum for solving the problem 
of sharing resources finding; 3) prawn fishermen who are endowed with separate management 
rights; 4) mobile non-local fishermen with medium size vessels whose historical records in the 
area differ considerably.
The proposal excludes the more industrialised fisheries that are empowered through vessel 
capacity, mobility, efficient technology and influence within the FAs. The fishermen belonging 
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to the first three sub-groups share basic characteristics. They are highly dependent on local 
resources, share a common understanding of the problems found in the cpr situation and the 
dominant regime, have similar discount rates and seek to develop their own rules and have 
interests in common with NBPO fishermen. When applied to the theoretical findings 
presented in chapter 3 their similarities could favour the emergence of a common 
management regime but this would require a process involving communication about the 
alternative solutions to the problems. The more mobile fishermen, on the other hand, share 
none of these basic characteristics. They are not affected in the same way as local fishermen 
by the current patterns of use and management system. To find a common solution involving 
this group is particularly challenging.
In summary, when one looks at the attributes of the users in the specific setting of the NBPO 
proposal, they appear to reduce the feasibility of any form of organised self-management to 
endure, particularly if such management system is to involve locals as well as non-locals and 
cover the whole 12 nautical miles fringe.
As with previous proposals for institutional change made in the early 1990s, the NBPO 
proposal also failed. However, in contrast to previous attempts in the early and mid nineties 
debated almost exclusively in fisheries specific circles, NBPO abandoned the traditional circle 
of national fisheries co-management. In favour of engaging new actors, it handed over the 
proposal to the environmental movement and the research community. Thus, when the 
debate initiated by local fishermen from Northern Bohuslän converged with a discussion on 
the issue of depleted resources led by the scientific community and the reformulation of the 
CFP, new opportunities for local co-management were opened up.
8.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter has discussed two local co-management proposals driven by local fishermen; an 
old and an untested one. In their solutions, fishermen have introduced institutional 
innovations that involve constitutional changes, collective arrangements with spatial 
separation of user groups, the assignment of collective quotas, input (time) based regulations, 
and limiting the adoption of certain aspects of technology. In this way new boundaries are 
drawn and a different, often local, concept of entitlement to specific rights with regard to 
coastal waters and resources emerges. Such solutions have a redistributive potential and are 
perceived as posing a threat to the dominant principles of free access and equal treatment.
In the prawn fishermen’s case the driving forces behind the fishermen’s collective action were 
market problems, problems of equity emerging from the sharing of resources, or conflicts 
derived from spatial interference. The raison d’être for these experiences was not primarily 
resource conservation.
The management practice here identified is embedded in a system of voluntary operational 
rules constraining catch, time and technology which secure spatial or territorial use rights at 
the scale of the Trench. The fishermen’s own rules governing prawn fisheries in the area have 
adapted over time to cope with cpr situations that became critical for the users. With a 
relatively high degree of autonomy, the fishermen have developed their own system of rules 
and this is adapted to meet the challenges of local conflicts and market problems.
The attributes of the ecosystem in terms of its submerged physiographic boundaries, 
combined with the patchy distribution and rather sedentary characteristic of prawns, together 
with strong social bonds among local fishermen, are conditions that have probably allowed 
the system to work. The local regime poses no real threat to other fishermen and is therefore 
accepted; moreover its redistributive potential is weak. To other non-local fishermen, the 
Trench with its local management system transmits the notion of the right of exclusion and is 
seen as an economic disincentive.
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The property regime governing the prawn fisheries remains a “common property” regime. 
The prawn fishermen operating in Koster-Väderö Fjord have made clear their ability to 
manage the local resource without incurring Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”. The formal 
state of ownership (in this case state owned waters and fisheries resources under free access) is 
not seen as dysfunctional for sustainable resource use and management in this line of 
argumentation.
This case study also demonstrated that the fisheries in these waters were far from being 
governed solely by formal institutional arrangements and based on conventional scientific 
knowledge. Following Ostrom et al (1994:15), with regard to the prawn fishermen’s case, it 
could be said that given the present ecological, social and institutional context, there is no 
alternative set of institutionally feasible strategies other than the one designed by the local 
prawn fishermen, that could produce a better outcome for the appropriators either 
individually or collectively. Thus these fishermen are not confronting a dilemma. The case of 
prawn fishermen could have been listed among Ostrom’s (1990) success stories but the 
management system was in a fragile condition because, despite its existence, had neither been 
documented nor formally recognised as legitimate or effective by the national authorities and 
the FA.
The local voluntary rules are nested in a system made up of informal (unenforceable) and 
formal or codified (enforceable) rules. In this way it appears that the prawn fisheries 
management system is nested in a harmonious working relation with institutions at a higher 
hierarchical level in the overall management structure. In contrast to normal practice in the 
dominant regime, the rules have been initially devised to serve local governance needs and 
then adapted and scaled up. However, the analysis in section 8.3.4 showed that wider policies 
and arrangements at a higher hierarchical level were threatening the local management system. 
Whether scaling up or scaling down (i.e. from inshore towards offshore or from offshore 
towards inshore) in the nesting process has any significance for the outcome, is a question that 
certainly deserves further research.
The prawn fishermen’s local co-management regime has proven to be instrumental as a 
platform for negotiations in the resolution of conflicts of multiple-use. Solutions to problems 
identified outside the local arenas could easily threaten the existence of the local management 
system and the fisheries in the area. The debates over the marine reserves have exposed this 
weakness and forced the prawn fishermen to develop new communication channels and a 
greater capacity for articulation, participation, and representation in arenas of negotiation with 
a diversity of actors.
At the outset of the marine reserve debate, the prawn fishermen’s social networks were limited 
to the local level and were insufficient to exert an active role in co-management and negotiate 
with the increasing number of stakeholders claiming rights to natural resources and involved 
in the establishment of marine reserves. The local arena for collective action was shown to be 
weak and isolated in relation to external actors and the central level. The group finally had to 
rely partially on mediation by the FAs which reinforced the local capacities to cope with 
external relationships in co-management. Probably, any negotiation conducted solely on the 
basis of their own resources would not have been legitimated by other fishermen nor 
considered sufficient by the central authorities. The fishermen’s reaction directed negotiations 
to the local level where local knowledge combined with scientific evidence was instrumental in 
the mitigation of a conflict.
Natura 2000 negotiation process also influenced the roles and improved relations in the 
Swedish fisheries co-management system where the common tradition was to take decisions 
in closed circles at the central level. Until the negotiations with the prawn fishermen were 
“concluded”, their local management model was seen as controversial and a device likely to 
cause stagnation. Through the negotiation process, a local co-management system was 
recognized by the administration and the FAs and their relationship with local fishermen 
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improved. The local users’ previous experiences and their management rights, clarifying who 
were the negotiating partners, the engagement of the local municipal government, and the use 
of visual materials to describe the Trench, were all factors which facilitated the negotiation of 
measures to protect marine biological diversity from the effects of trawling. Nevertheless, the 
negotiation process would probably not have been successful if the fishermen involved had 
not held a complex bundle of rights including management and exclusion rights in the sense of 
Ostrom and Schlager (1996), and taken up the position of proprietors, within clearly defined 
boundaries.
NBPO-fishermen were articulate and quickly developed external relationships with local, 
national and international strategic actors and stakeholders outside the traditional circle of the 
national fisheries co-management system. The driving forces behind the initiative were the 
shortage of resources and the failures of the dominant co-management system to allocate 
resources equitably, as perceived by a group of local shellfish fishermen who found 
themselves in a cpr dilemma.
In the case study, the redrawing of boundaries and the shift of locus in co-management were 
two central elements in the local fishermen’s strategy to generate better outcomes. NBPO 
fishermen claimed the same bundle of rights that the prawn fishermen already possessed: 
management and exclusion rights. NBPO’s proposal sought to redefine the conditions under 
which fishing was to be sanctioned in the coastal zone. To achieve those objectives they 
suggested a redefinition of the unit of management in ecological and social terms. By doing so, 
they questioned the established order in the Swedish central co-management system. NBPO’s 
proposal had a redistributive potential and threatened the economic interests of non-local and 
more industrial coastal fisheries; it also threatened the economic interests holding power 
within the FAs, and SVC in particular.
When tested against the theoretical ideals for common pool resources management 
institutions, the latter proposal can be seen to be incomplete, and the specific social and 
ecological conditions far more complex than those found in the literature on successful cases. 
NBPO's proposal comes from a rather homogenous group of local fishermen but involves a 
rather diverse group of fishermen in terms of fishing strategies, endowments and rights, and is 
concerned with the management of a variety of resources, some of them much more fugitive 
than prawns. The feasibility of implementing the proposal was related to the issue of internal 
diversity and weakened by NBPO’s inability to communicate and organise the local fishermen 
in the area. The debate was often hampered by misinformation and personal disputes, and lack 
of trust made the emergence of collective action unlikely. The failure of the NBPO members 
to develop a proposal attractive to all those fishing in the area, is not surprising. Given this 
heterogeneity any rules designed to limit use would tend to benefit one subgroup over 
another, rather than benefit all in a similar manner (Ostrom 1990).
The case of NBPO’s proposal illustrates the collision between two coastal fisheries 
management regimes and diverse property rights and exposes the fragile coalition that the FAs 
rely upon. It could be argued that NBPO's proposal was well timed in relation to the criticism 
and reformulation of European policies and the debate on regionalisation and localisation of 
fisheries management, but failed to galvanise in the short term a sufficiently wide base of 
support within the ranks of the Swedish fishermen and the actors involved in the corporatist 
central co-management regime. At times when fishery managers are keen to promote 
privatisation (ITQ) or to reinforce costly output controls as the only way out of problems 
derived from the allocation of depleted resources, ideas such as these should have some 
resonance. In fact in Sweden, the debate about these two cases has served the purpose of 
introducing perspectives other than that of Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” regarding 
local co-management opportunities. It has generated a momentum that has contributed to the 
recognition and better understanding of the potentials for nesting co-management regimes 
within the dominant national large scale system. 
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CHAPTER 9
HAULING HOME CO-MANAGEMENT:
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS AND PRECONDITIONS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing, the scientists’ concerns over the critical status of most commercial fish 
stocks in the North Sea and the coastal waters of Skagerrak have resulted in the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, offering its most trenchant recommendations to the 
European Commission and the member countries to take immediate action to drastically 
reduce fishing pressure. To ask the question what constitute barriers to fishermen’s involvement in the 
management of coastal fisheries appears crucial today. 
In Sweden as well as in the rest of Europe, the current fisheries management system is 
criticised for its inadequacy in coping with the increasing problems of degraded coastal 
ecosystems and fish stocks and the development trends within the fishing industry. The 
criticism has converged around the diagnosis of management shortcomings relating to:
1. resource conservation and maintenance of biological diversity [the ecological 
dimension];
2. social equity and conflict mitigation [the social dimension];  
3. the economic viability of local coastal fisheries [economic dimension]. 
The Swedish management system, characterised in this thesis as a centralised co-management 
model with corporative influences, has been slow to respond to these deficiencies. Faced with 
a situation with depleted resources and demands from a wide spectrum of stakeholders, both 
within and outwith the fisheries sector, and in recognition of the many international and 
European commitments, the Government of Sweden recently made clear the need for 
institutional reform. In the search for alternative management approaches, the government 
emphasises the importance of: giving local coastal fishermen a better chance in a regional 
development context; developing new arenas for consultation affording greater influence for 
the stakeholders; and testing collaborative management initiatives at the sub-national – local 
and regional – level (SOU 2003/04:51). In time, this is expected to lead to a more effective 
form of fisheries management, with less top down coercion and increased responsibility on 
the part of those exploiting fisheries resources and their ecosystems. 
In this thesis, various institutional aspects of the issues relating to shared fisheries resources 
and ecosystems in the coastal waters of the Skagerrak have been analysed. This has involved 
applying a resource user oriented approach and a common pool resource theoretical 
perspective to determine how the community of users, and the system of rules through which 
they operate, have affected the participation of coastal fishermen in co-management. In this 
way, the analysis has attempted to get to grips with the problems posed by institutional 
barriers to the effective involvement of local fishermen in co-management.
During the course of the research, the context of an institutional change has been uncovered. 
The change consists mainly of the nesting of local and regional more pluralistic co-
management in an otherwise more centralised co-management regime with corporatist 
influences.
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In this final chapter, the findings in relation to institutional barriers to the fishermen’s 
involvement in coastal fisheries management are summarised and discussed. Although the 
study focuses on the management of coastal fisheries in western Sweden – and the 
investigation is based mainly on issues defined by the fishermen themselves – with all the 
limitations this may have for generalising the findings, the results can be related to previous cpr
research and to the ongoing Swedish policy debate. The latter is important in the context of 
the need for institutional change being acknowledged by the Swedish government. 
9.2 REVIEWING THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In the management of Swedish professional fisheries, formal decisions have been taken at the 
central level, either at the European level, by the government, by the government in 
agreement with the fishermen’s associations or by the fishermen’s associations themselves. 
The system has no institutional arrangements for structuring co-management relations at the 
local level; it can therefore be described as “incomplete”.
This centralised form of management, to which the concept of “co-management” seems 
difficult to apply, has neglected the specificities of the local coastal ecosystems and become a 
barrier for the involvement of local fishermen in co-management. This thesis has identified six 
major and interrelated domains in the management system from which barriers to the 
involvement of local fishermen in co-management can be derived:
1. the modernisation processes and the loss of local management rights; 
2. the way in which the management system is organised and the division of roles in co-
management;
3. the balance of power in the fishermen’s associations; 
4. the use of generic rules and incentives;  
5. the conceptualisation of fisheries management and the over reliance on biological facts; 
6. the dissociation of coastal management and the proliferation of users’ groups with 
imprecise boundaries. 
9.2.1 The modernisation processes and the loss of local management rights 
The historical description in chapter 2 indicated that at the beginning of the 20th century, 
access to the coastal zone and the fisheries resources was free and open to all, but the 
management regime resembled what is described in the literature as communal governance or 
community based management. The locus of management authority regarding fisheries in 
coastal waters, as well as the principal arena for resolution of conflicts of use was the local 
level. In other words, decisions were taken close to the level where the socio-ecological 
interaction occurs. This system worked well as long as resource users at the local level devised 
the local rules and the resource base was abundant. 
The case of prawn fisheries management (chapter 8) support previous cpr studies in 
maintaining that local resource users can make credible commitments, agree upon rules and 
engage in collective action and in this way transform the open access regimes. What was 
important to the use of the resource was the question of how and by whom the rules 
governing fishing were designed and implemented with regard to the local social and 
ecological systems. In such cases it was the system of local management rules that guaranteed 
the allocation of resources and attenuated future claims to the use of local ecosystems. Thus 
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the findings of this study confirm that in fisheries the form of ownership is not a decisive 
factor for having a management system or sustainable outcomes. 
In the second half of the 20th century, changes in fisheries management were characterised by 
modernisation and a decreased role and authority for the local level. Among the important 
tendencies of modernisation that influenced this management shifts from local to central 
levels were:
i) the intrusion of industrial modes of production into the coastal waters;  
ii) the institutional modernisation of resource users’ organisation, with the transfer of 
responsibility from the local community to professional associations; 
iii) the institutional modernisation of the state with the centralisation of management 
authority at the national and supranational level; 
iv) the scaling up of the management unit;  
v) the idea of scientific knowledge as the only valid kind; 
vi) the professional specialisation of coastal fishermen;  
vii) the globalisation of the market; 
viii) the proliferation of new users of the coastal ecosystems. 
It was found that since the 1950s, the coastal communities of Northern Bohuslän have 
witnessed various processes all tending to scale up the management of fisheries and expand 
the user community. These tendencies are neither new nor specific to Sweden and many have 
been identified in the introduction (chapter 1) as tendencies that progressively led to the 
dysfunction of traditional management institutions (the fishing community) and the 
marginalisation of the local coastal fishermen in Europe; with increased pressure on coastal 
natural resources and weakened local institutions and collective action. The findings in 
chapters 2, 6, and 7 indicated that the local management systems displayed an inability to 
function under the impacts of modernisation and the national government failed to develop 
an adequate alternative. This indicates that the authority of local institutions and the local rules 
can be undermined and faded out, which is supportive of findings reported by other cpr
studies (Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom and Schlager 1996).
In Sweden, the loss of local management rights and institutional arrangements (with local rules 
often based on space and time) and the origins of the current fisheries management regime 
can also be traced to a number of “external factors”. The food security issue during the world 
wars, the collapse of fish stocks in distant waters (notably the Atlanto-Scandian herring) and 
the adoption of a new international access regime to the seas (EEZ) are examples of external 
factors determining the situation of local fishermen in Northern Bohuslän. Such factors 
triggered institutional changes that were disarticulated from the views of reality held by local 
fishermen, who, as a consequence, have no contingency plans and need time to perceive the 
impacts of the new situation, organise and react. 
The issue of external factors is also related to the unit of management. To account for the 
mobility of fish stocks and allow for flexibility of fishing, the Swedish system has preferred to 
make use of relatively large units of management and a semi-open access system under generic 
rules. External factors will, however, affect fisheries operating in different physical and socio-
cultural environments differently and their specific adaptation strategies will certainly affect 
their relationships in the common pool situation with both winners and loser. Alongside with 
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these processes, local fishermen in Northern Bohuslän witnessed local resource dependency 
shifts, from small pelagics to gadoids and from gadoids to crustaceans. 
Together with the increasing incursion of the offshore sector in the coastal waters, the 
processes of modernisation, globalisation of the markets and social changes in the coastal 
areas, have made the borderline, which once marked the differences between traditional 
inshore fisheries and modern offshore fisheries more and more blurred. Nevertheless, this 
study showed that despite this tendency of convergence, turning difficult the identification of 
discrete fishing communities, local coastal fisheries have specific characteristics.
The coastal fisherman of Northern Bohuslän was shown to be a local resident, who fishes 
near his home (no farther than 6-12 nautical miles from the base-line), fishes various species 
depending on the season, uses various gear, lands his catch in the local port, spends more 
nights per week at home than on the boat, allowing the ecosystem to rest at night and at 
weekends. He possesses situational knowledge about the local ecosystem and the social 
system, trusts his fellow locals, distrusts non-locals and does not wish to invest in his vessel 
more than he can actually earn. This leads to the question of the potential use for these 
specific characteristics in management.
9.2.2 The organisation and the division of roles in co-management  
The tendencies of modernisation outlined above strengthened the central components of the 
management system, turning the national fishermen’s associations (SFR) and the government 
administration (NBF) into the main protagonists in the co-management of the Swedish 
fisheries.
In the Swedish management model management responsibilities were divided between: 1) 
stock assessment, monitoring, biologically grounded regulations, enforcement and financial 
development assistance in the hands of the National Board of Fisheries and 2) social order 
and distributive aspects in the hands of the fishermen’s associations.
This differentiation of roles can be seen as a clear and reasonable separation of management 
functions in a co-management system. However, the model assumes that in the management 
of complex and transient common pool resources, it is possible to separate allocation from 
conservation and development; when in practice this is only possible as an analytical exercise 
because they act together and the outcome is the result of their interaction. Indeed, one of the 
important implications of looking at fisheries through a common pool resource perspective, is 
that the dynamics of interrelations between the social and the ecological systems in fisheries 
are exposed. When this occurs, the separation of management into functions and tools 
addressing resource conservation (ecological dimension), allocation (social equity dimension), 
and productivity (economic efficiency) seems artificial. In complex common pools these 
aspects act together and their particular effects out there cannot be separated out and dealt 
with in isolation. They need to be treated in an integrated way.
The simple division of tasks at the central level between the fisheries authority and the FAs 
has inhibited the involvement of the fishermen in resource conservation and the involvement 
of the state in allocation, when these should be seen as closely interrelated and treated 
together in co-management. It also appeared to hinder the systems ability to respond to 
feedbacks in one or domain. 
The model was found to hinder the flow of different types of knowledge and led to situations 
where the partners involved did not value each others’ contributions.
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9.2.3 The balance of power within the fishermen’s associations 
The fishermen’s associations had clear tasks to play in fisheries management: to represent and 
defend the professional fishermen’s economic interests; to negotiate with the governmental 
authorities and other relevant actors in the public and private sector; and to resolve internal 
conflicts among professional fishermen through for example resource allocation. The study 
has shown that local coastal fishermen expected that the associations would articulate their 
interests and promote institutional changes more beneficial to them. Relegated to the role of 
branches of the associations at best, local fisheries communities could no longer define their 
own rules, without their endorsement by the regional or the national associations, comprising 
members relying on different modes of production and with different interests. 
The fishermen’s associations had a polyvalent model of organisation, with local branches and 
a series of fishing committees, with opportunities to discuss local issues and interests and a 
space to discuss on cross scale issues related to the use of a particular resource (e.g. herring or 
prawn) or fishing gear (trawl). However, the analysis has shown how this organisational form, 
with the tendencies of modernisation above discussed, the social changes in the coastal zone, 
and the strong economic interests of SVC in the processing sector, became less and less 
sensitive to the diversity that characterises local coastal fisheries. The balance of power tilted 
towards those fishermen who did not reside within the ecosystems they exploited, that is, the 
modern mobile fisheries from the Göteborg area. This had the concomitant effect of 
neglecting local coastal fishermen in the managerial representation of interests and 
discriminating against their fisheries as outdated, non-modern and inefficient.
The study highlighted tensions within the fishermen’s associations and the difficult internal 
relations in such heterogeneous organisations. When the situation became critical, the FAs 
were shown to be unable to coordinate grass-roots responses and make the changes necessary 
to fulfil their allocative function. A loss of trust was the inevitable result. Local coastal 
fishermen were highly critical of the appropriation of resources by the dislocated fisheries and 
their operational strategies based on a “hit and run” approach in which annual quotas were 
rapidly exhausted. A common feature of the results from this study was the existence of a 
clear “local/dislocated” division between the fishermen. There were clear contradictions 
between their worldviews. 
The Swedish co-management model assumed that the articulation of local fishermen’s 
interests could be achieved in a system where participation in decision-making process was 
organised through indirect representation at the central level. The present study has shown, 
however, that the system of representation within the associations constituted a barrier to the 
articulation of these interests blocking attempts by local fishermen to be influential in 
management. The fishermen did not believe it possible for sufficiently robust collective action 
to emerge from within the associations which would help in resolving problems of resource 
appropriation and free riding and also assist in securing a more equitable allocation of the 
available resources. Demands for changes in the rules, discussed in chapter 7 and the cases 
discussed in chapter 8, indicated that local branches had lost their power of influence 
proceedings internally and they had therefore to redirect their demands to the authorities and 
look for new coalitions outside the fisheries sector.
The way in which the fishermen are organised in a co-management system and the 
organisations’ capacities to respond to changing circumstances, can affect the fishermen’s cpr
situation and can become crucial to their ability to get involved in management. This supports 
previous studies by Jentoft (1989) who, basing his findings on similar experiences with 
fishermen’s associations in Norway, suggests that in general fishermen will tend to identify 
206
themselves with smaller rather than larger organisations. The size of the organisation also 
relates to the building of trust, essential for collective action. The building of trust requires of 
time and effort and learning from shared experiences. 
This is not to say that fishermen’s associations do not have a role to play in co-management 
but rather that they have to develop a modus operandi that allows for the recognition of local 
specificities. Only on the basis of full recognition of these local specificities can coastal 
fisheries become sustainable. 
9.2.4 The use of generic rules  
In this study the issue of resource concentration and marginalisation of local coastal fishermen 
and their knowledge in the co-management process were also found to be related to the use of 
generic rules based on principles of equal treatment of a unified collective. The policies and 
management instruments systematically treated coastal fishermen as a unified group. In 
chapters 5, 7 and 8 the differences between institutional reality and the local coastal 
fishermen’s perception of their reality became apparent. Examination of rules illustrated, for 
example, how the use of limits in terms of fleet capacity when combined with overall catch 
limits (TACs and national quotas) in a semi-open access regime, has led to the appropriation 
of resources by a relatively small group of fishermen. Even though such measures are thought 
to operate independently, in a complex common pool resource system they will operate in an 
interactive way. Tied to the national quota system and the semi-open access regime, the 
purchase of tonnage is a way of securing the appropriation of resources by those exploiting 
large-scale ecosystems with win-lose outcomes. It results in unfair competition for an ever-
dwindling share of the resource and can easily become an incentive for the race to acquire 
vessel tonnage and fishing opportunities. In this case, the market-based approach tends to 
favour resource strong areas and individuals. Under the present management system the 
transfer of vessel tonnage, from the rural communities in the North to the urban communities 
in the South, will diminish the contribution of local fishermen to the management of coastal 
fisheries, the reproduction of local knowledge and the reality of a living archipelago. This 
tendency has been reinforced by development plans which for many years have focused on 
the vessel and, in this way, assisted more mobile fishermen to secure their appropriation rights 
through deployment of material assets.
Chapters 5 and 7 highlighted problems with development plans that adopt a standardized 
approach to the improvement of technical capital – the vessel – which is falsely assumed to be 
equality relevant to all categories of fishermen. This “one instrument fits all” approach is 
clearly inappropriate in addressing needs and capacities of local coastal fishermen, whose 
strategies to secure rights to fish may be based on other criteria than material assets.
The investigation has shown how the concentration of resources and property rights in the 
hands of a few can occur within a specific public policy framework and a discriminatory 
institutional context, despite the existence of principles of equal treatment and policies of 
access to resources on equal terms. It is argued here that in the management of common pool 
resources there is certain to be a bounded discriminatory effect and is made explicit in the 
analysis of the support given to resource users. In relation to this specific empirical finding, 
the study illustrated how different fishing strategies under the framework of generic 
institutional arrangements, can de facto generate entitlements to common pool resources. 
These findings indicate that the argument by Ostrom (1999) that central governments tend to 
use a small set of variables and generic rules is also pertinent to a country like Sweden. 
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Certainly the contents of these standard packages meet the needs of the administration to 
exercise authority, administrate and expend funds, reach targets and monitor their use. The 
dominant mode of participation in co-management through representation at the central level 
has further strengthened the tendency of the central authorities to view fishermen as a 
uniform collective of members having the same interests, needs, capacities and opportunities. 
But the local fishermen’s livelihood strategies were shown to have implications for the extent 
to which they could make use of and draw benefits from external interventions and assistance 
offered by the administration. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 showed that the means commonly used 
by local fishermen – namely allocation of time, situational knowledge, gear and catch diversity, 
seasonality and pluri-activity – are not yet fully integrated into development plans or Swedish 
fisheries management. This is not meant to imply that all development assistance addressed to 
users of common pool resources should be cut off. Rather, development assistance can be 
redirected to facilitate their organisation of collective actions. However, this means choosing 
forms of development assistance that focus less on material assets and more on human 
resources, their organisational capacities and management rights needed to co-manage the use 
of coastal ecosystems.
9.2.5 The conceptualisation of fisheries management and the over reliance on 
biological facts 
The analysis in chapter 7 showed that the predominant conceptualisation of fisheries 
management among scientists and officials was found to be problematic, first, because it was 
frequently reduced to the work undertaken by the authorities and by the fishery biologists, 
and, second, because it focused on operational regulations that could be rationalised only on 
biological grounds.
The scientific approach has been to predict the short-term changes for given fish stocks and 
to adapt fishing plans to such predictions. It is postulated here that the division of roles has 
largely prevented the use of other scientific knowledge, such as social science, as a basis for 
management as a whole (conservation, allocation and development). In this study, this was 
clearly visible in the tendency to give scientific biological knowledge the leading role in 
management and to concentrate the scientific advice to only the authorities, when also the 
fishermen’s associations did have a role to play in management. 
In general terms, the management of fisheries has been based on the conventional idea that 
fisheries are successfully managed if the total allowable catches (TAC) are not overdrawn. 
Following this assumption biological and technical knowledge has then been translated into 
operational regulations designed to adjust the level of catches. Factors related to the issue of 
the social interactions that occur when fishing and when the regulations are implemented have 
been excluded from the assessment exercise. 
It is argued here that the lack of attention to internal diversity in management is closely related 
to the narrow conceptualisation of fisheries management which has been strengthened by the 
way fisheries management has been organised. This conceptualisation seems to have 
permeated the work of both researches and administrators where:
1. fishermen’s rules and knowledge are systematically excluded from the analysis of the 
management system at work;
2. making distinctions among fishermen are related to the internal allocation of the 
available resources, disconnected from opportunities for conservation, and left in the 
hands of the fishermen’s associations;
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3. development plans direct support to the individual fisherman in relation to his capital 
assets(the vessel), disregarding the potential to support the development of conditions 
for collective action.
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 revealed that the fishermen had extensive local knowledge and 
understanding of interrelations in the social and ecological systems and that learning from 
their previous experience and adaptations to external factors affecting the ecological and/or 
social environments may generate new insights for the management of complex common pool 
resources. But each of these circumstances above works against the development of local 
coastal fisheries as a sub-community with locally specific (differentiated) interests in the large 
“community” of professional fishermen. In fact, part of the lack of specific policy attention 
and research is related to the lack and difficulty to find common definitions. In the absence of 
an institutional framework recognising differences and facilitating effective differentiation 
across scales, the centralised fisheries co-management system that has evolved in Sweden has 
been unable to come to terms with local socio-ecological variations. This calls for the 
strengthening of local structures. 
9.2.6 The dissociation of coastal management and the proliferation of users 
groups with imprecise boundaries
The coastal waters of Skagerrak supported a “fishing community” of professional fishermen 
with different endowments who fished according to different strategies. But the pool of 
resources on which the local fishermen depended extended well beyond local fishing grounds, 
and the resource users well beyond local and non-local fishermen. In spite of that, the 
management of fisheries was much a sectoral concern and the involvement of fishermen 
dissociated from the involvement of other resource users depending on and/or affecting the 
local coastal ecosystems.
The findings in chapters 5, 6 and 8 indicated that, in general, fishermen were more likely to 
grapple with cpr problems having clear place-time co-ordinates. The analysis of the fishermen’s 
perceptions with regard to problems in a multiple-use situation showed that the allocation of 
space was mainly an issue for those using static gear in inshore waters. The findings support 
other cpr studies by Ostrom et al (1994) and Schlager (1994), suggesting that local coastal 
fishermen normally posses ample time and place based information and that this facilitates 
their situational co-operation and their involvement in the management of local fisheries.
But the analysis of the multiple use cpr situation in chapter 6 also illustrated that in the case of 
fisheries, time and place based information is not always available and the boundaries of the 
community of users are imprecise (fuzzy). As a result, the information about the subtraction 
of resources can be difficult to specify.
Pollution, seals and to a lesser extent sea-based recreation activities were problematic issues 
from a boundary point of view. Local fishermen can with difficulty handle problems having 
imprecise boundaries and different points of origin, such as pollution and sea-based 
recreation. In these cases, there is a compelling case for external mediation and assistance. 
In this context it is important to discuss how the various users could get involved in and 
contribute to coastal management. While it is important that the fishery sector bears as much 
of the costs of its environmental impact as possible, care is needed to ensure that other 
sectors, both land- and sea-based, also bear the costs of their impacts on the ecosystems and 
the fisheries resources. This is important if local coastal fishermen are not to assume the costs 
of other users who impact on the ecosystems; it is also of central concern for the involvement 
of fishermen in the co-management of local coastal ecosystems.
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In some cases, pollution sources maybe related to local point-sources which could facilitate 
the use of stakeholders’ concerted action or “users’ platforms” as proposed by Steins (1999). 
This is a method that has been tested in watershed management and could be a promising 
mechanism for exploring the scope for mutual gains in the coastal communities. The Natura 
2000/Koster-Väderö negotiation process, where fishermen are involved in the management 
of biological diversity together with other local stakeholders and government agencies at local, 
regional and national levels, seems to be a fruitful living experience.
The lack of time and place based information also applies to the fuzzy boundaries of the 
expanding sea based recreation “community”. Responses to this type of problems will 
probably be left to the adaptive strategies of individual fisherman and capacities to mobilise 
local authorities, planners, and the wider local community. The fact that fishermen found 
subtraction and user’s groups with imprecise boundaries problematic, but problems related to 
spatial access with clear coordinates less problematic, partly explains their lack of involvement 
in physical planning process at the municipal level and the limited use of these plans at sea. 
The plans, based on spatial segregation, are certainly useful for resolving problems of 
assigning space but less appropriate for coping with problems of subtraction across different 
temporal and spatial scales and dealing with ill-defined communities of users. This makes it 
difficult for the integration of problems identified by local fishermen in what are, in effect, 
static coastal management tools.
At the time the fieldwork was being undertaken, the problems associated with seals affected 
mainly coastal fishermen using static gear, though many other fishermen perceived the seals as 
“the tip of the iceberg”. Seals and cormorants may function as “competing users” and, 
through damaging gear and reducing possible catches, affect the fisherman’s ability to benefit 
from the cpr. But neither cormorants nor seals can claim rights. Their rights are defined by 
society as part of its prevailing values. The inclusion of new values suggests that there is 
support for more inclusive pluralistic management arrangements leading to the question of 
how are those “new voices” in society to be represented in co-management institutions.
Local coastal fishermen are aware that joint use of the coastal ecosystem implies that 
governance of fisheries is distributed across scales and sectors, both upstream and 
downstream, and that their capacity to extend their influence across scales and sectors will be 
weak. Indeed, management crises in fisheries are critical not only because they involve a 
complex and connective ecosystem and various administrative levels, but also because they 
involve many diverse users operating and affecting each other’s potentials. This study 
indicated that attempts by fishermen to conserve their fisheries and protect the local 
ecosystem may be blocked by their perceptions about the agency of other actors within and 
outside the fishery sector and on a larger scale. Such perceptions make the advocacy of 
unilateral decisions and actions to conserve the ecosystem difficult.
This leads to the probably obvious conclusion that the larger the space occupied by the 
resource in all its life cycle phases, the scale of management and the number of users involved 
in the multiple-use cpr situation, the less certain it will be that local fishermen can deploy their 
situational knowledge to the conservation of the local resources and ecosystems. On the other 
hand, it leads to the conclusion that the involvement of local fishermen in multiple uses and 
the management of multiple-use activities within the coastal zone may contribute to improve 
the situation with the coastal resources. It also strengthens the argument that the management 
of complex cpr requires of the development of wider networks and institutions that address 
spatial and temporal cross scale and sectoral linkages.
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9.3 THE LESSONS FROM LOCAL CO-MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES IN NORTHERN 
BOHUSLÄN
In chapter 5 it was found that the coastal fishermen of Northern Bohuslän made a 
fundamental distinction between the actual fishing community sharing coastal waters and 
resources, and fishermen fishing in home waters. Time was a reference to space in the sense of 
the close to home ecosystem was a central variable in their self-conceptualisation.
The coastal fishermen’s description of their fishing strategy (chapter 5), the type of problems 
they identified (chapters 6 and 7) and were able to resolve (chapters 6 and 8) – as well as their 
historical accounts of local rules (chapters 2, and 7) – all confirmed that in the search for 
solutions to common pool resource problems, the management of coastal fisheries should 
gradually increase the use of specific time and place information possessed by local resource 
users. Fishermen’s knowledge better fits the use of qualitative input measures (often referred 
to as parametric management) than output quantitative measures. It also supports the idea that 
an increased use of the knowledge about the dynamics of patterns of concentration of 
ecological resources in the coastal zone, could improve fisheries management.
In the fishermen’s accounts, coastal fisheries in home waters exhibit properties resulting from 
the complexity and dynamics of both the biophysical and the local social context. Closely 
associated with these, was the issue of compliance with rules and trust. The local coastal 
fishermen’s perspective supports an institutional reform where the analysis rests on the 
standpoint of socially embedded rationality. In the local fishermen’s accounts, the viability of 
the coastal ecosystem and the local community are highly interrelated and paramount. This 
interdependency does not, however, seem to be properly addressed in the dominant 
management regime. The disregard of distinctions in coastal fisheries has made among other 
things difficult the evaluation of the present and potential contribution by local coastal 
fishermen. It is in this context that the descriptive variables of coastal fisheries, as articulated 
by the coastal fishermen, give some insights into the opportunities for making management 
distinctions within the fisheries. These findings can therefore be helpful to the definition of 
ecological and social boundaries suggested as a precondition for endurable management 
institutions in a large number of previous cpr studies.
The management of the prawn fisheries (chapter 8) is in some ways an exception in Swedish 
fisheries management, where self-regulation has developed with very little external 
intervention. It is a locally driven management system nested in an otherwise state driven 
centralised co-management system. The local institutions that govern the prawn fisheries have 
been stable for 100 years and are known and understood by the fishermen. The prawn 
fishermen’s local organisational capacities and their voluntary rules have for a long time been 
used to adapt to changes in the social and ecological system. The fishermen have developed 
operative rules which clarify aspects of the fishing gear and collective rules which clarify the 
distributive terms. The latter have been accomplished by defining individual rights with 
respect to fishing time, space and weekly output share. Local rules have emerged partly to 
resolve conflicts derived from spatial interference and the appropriation of limited resources 
in a confined area and partly as an adaptation to the market. However, by resolving these 
collectively, the appropriation of prawns has been balanced and dominant individual strategies 
constrained.
The prawn fishermen hold management rights or a “claimant” position. They have developed 
a sense of “local ownership” and taken for granted their right of exclusion, even though this 
right has never been formally granted. This is in line with the findings of other authors (Hanna 
et al 1996; McCay 1996) who postulate that the form of ownership is not a decisive factor in 
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the management of fisheries. What is decisive in this case is how the rules governing the 
fisheries were designed, practiced, monitored, controlled and continuously revised with regard 
to the local social and ecological systems. The case of the prawn fishermen in Northern 
Bohuslän confirmed Ostrom and Schlager’s (1996) conclusions that for local level governance 
structures to work well, they must first take into account the nuances of the physical and 
socio-cultural environment in which they operate. In the management of the prawn fisheries, 
attributes pertaining to the domain of boundaries of the resource and the ecosystem (prawns 
in the Trench), the appropriators (a relatively small number of local fishermen) and external 
threats have enhanced the emergence of collective initiatives to overcome new, more complex 
cpr problems.
The characteristics of the seabed and the behaviour of the resource, prawns, showed to be 
conditions that facilitated the development of time and space-based rules.
The prawn fishermen have been able to articulate their interests and retain their management 
influence both locally (via the local branches and local communities) and across scales (via the 
specific prawn fisheries committee of the fishermen’s association). On a larger scale, in 
Skagerrak the rules governing the Swedish prawn fisheries have been less restrictive, though 
still congruent with the local rules. There are good reasons to believe that part of the success 
in the management of prawn fisheries is related to such nested arrangements. The physical 
presence of the “Trench” (though a submarine feature) has certainly enabled the legitimisation 
of a local regime among the collective of fishermen at large. However, with the disruption of 
the social order in the FAs and plans for a marine reserve the whole system was placed in 
danger.
What was perceived as a general threat, in the form of a marine reserve closing all trawling in 
the area, was solved through a negotiation process where the local resource users in discussion 
with other stakeholders, was reduced to site specific adaptations. This process would probably 
not have been successful had the fishermen not held a complex bundle of rights including 
management and exclusion rights and taken up the position of proprietors, within clearly defined 
boundaries. The organisation and experience of local fishermen regarding the management of 
prawns proved instrumental as a platform from which to negotiate collective rules addressing 
the impacts of fishing operations on other marine species. The case demonstrated that sectoral 
management experience among local users can be instrumental for integrated coastal co-
management initiatives taken by the authorities and other stakeholders. The process required, 
however, the introduction of changes at the constitutional level with the involvement of 
multiple, local, provincial and national levels of the state administration and the fishermen’s 
organisations.
The formal recognition of the co-management authority of the prawn fishermen by other 
stakeholders is an important factor for the successful outcome of the negotiations. Had the 
decision concerning the marine reserve followed central, top-down mode of delivery, it is 
more likely that local voluntary agreements would have been breached and the system of local 
governance seriously undermined. Local rules in this and other areas of Sweden’s coasts have 
been undermined in the sixties and seventies under the influence of industrial modes of 
production and large scale management; the same could also have happened in Koster-Väderö 
under the influence of nature conservation goals and large scale management. In this case, 
however, the informal local rules were recognised by the authorities and some were codified.
Through this process of codification the prawn fishermen’s management rights were made 
public. Actors within and outwith the fishery sector have carefully observed the legitimisation 
of the prawn fishermen’s management rights.
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This strengthens the proposition that the delegation of management authority to the local 
level must be legally formalised and enforced. However, the issue of formalising informal rules 
is still rather delicate in Sweden because of the administration’s restricted mandate with 
respect to distributive aspects and non biologically-grounded rules. This restricted mandate, 
and the consequent shortcomings of the management system and knowledge supporting it, 
partly explains the lack of resonance that the local fishermen’s proposals have had in the 
National Board of Fisheries. 
The second case, consisting of the proposal for local co-management presented by a newly 
established producer’s organisation, NBPO, threw further light on the preconditions for 
increased involvement of fishermen in management. NBPO’s proposal could be interpreted as 
one that would extend the resource users’ position from being authorised users, holding 
access and withdrawal rights, to becoming co-managers where the co-management system as 
such was to be granted exclusion rights.
However, NBPO’s proposal was unwelcome and faced a bleak outlook. The management unit 
identified by NBPO had diffuse social and ecological boundaries. The “fishing community” 
working the area consisted of local and non-local groups of fishermen dissimilar with regard 
to their fishing strategies, withdrawal rate and exposure to the supply of fish. Moreover in this 
area there were different forms of property rights and management modes. Within this 
heterogeneous group problems concerning the availability of resources and their possible 
solutions were perceived differently. At the local level, the fishermen’s opposition to NBPO’s 
proposal was influenced by their scepticism with regard to exclusive and transferable rights, 
whether based on area or quota; it rekindled old disputes and personal distrust and provoked 
fear of recrimination from the fishermen’s associations. Here, all preconditions for an 
increased conflict rather than common solutions were present.
As depicted in chapter 8, local leaders and new actors can play a significant role in establishing 
new arenas for debate and in this way shape organisational change within the fishermen’s 
associations. Actors and instruments other than those at the central level, are shown to play an 
important role in that they have, on the one hand, developed new channels for 
communication between the local fishermen and their organisations, the central authorities 
and the world outside fisheries and, on the other, they have experimented with a new modus 
operandi. Among the new instruments able to exert an influence on the debate and the modus 
operandi were the POs and the Habitat directive. Actors with a significant role in triggering 
debate are the Commission for Sustainable Development of the Archipelagos of Sweden and 
the NGOs. The NGOs, for example, sustained the debate started by NBPO. In the case of 
the prawn fishermen and the search for solutions to the protection of deep sea corals, the 
County Board Administration with the assistance of local scientists adapted the modus 
operandi.
The development of wider networks seems to be needed when dealing with resources whose 
governance is highly distributed as in the case of coastal marine ecosystems and fisheries 
resources. The social network developed by local leaders of NBPO and the prawn fishermen 
from Northern Bohuslän allowed them to test and elaborate their proposals for institutional 
change with various actors at different levels. It facilitated the development of new 
mechanisms and the introduction of new perspectives. Through these processes the local 
fishermen were able to innovate on the basis of previous experience.
At the time of this writing most local coastal fishermen in Northern Bohuslän were positive to 
try the local co-management of coastal fisheries. They also now perceived fisheries were in 
crisis and this made them willing to make local collective action work and improve the 
situation with the resources and the ecosystem on which their livelihoods depend. This 
213
development indicates that when confronted with critical situations fishermen belonging to 
the same group of users or “fishing community”, in the sense of Schlager et al (1994), can 
overcome old disputes and agree on collective action. Moreover that even local fishermen 
belonging to a same community need time to come to terms about institutional change.
The likelihood of emergence of institutional change in Northern Bohuslän may be influenced, 
among other things, by the following factors:
i) the excludability implicit in the ecosystem and the local permanence of the resource; 
ii) the type and size of the user-community ; 
iii) the social and ecological management boundaries used, and the scale of the 
management unit; 
iv) the degree of delegated management authority and its formalisation; 
v) the information and coordination across institutional scales;  
vi) the presence of stakeholders and their worldviews; 
vii) the approaches to local knowledge adopted by scientists and managers;  
viii) the opportunity to combine conservation, distributive and market rules; 
ix) the development of multifaceted social and economic relations within the local 
community;
x) the transaction costs involved; 
xi) the availability of communication and mediation skills;  
xii) type of external assistance. 
A question that emerges at this point is how to make outsiders more fully aware of and 
committed to local socio-ecological conditions and management systems. Ostrom (1999a) 
argues that one way is to alter the composition of those who use a common-pool resource so 
as to increase the proportion of participants with a long-term interest in sustaining the 
resource and who are therefore likely to look for reciprocal arrangements and generate greater 
mutual trust. But another way is to make “visiting fishermen” formally accountable to the 
local management system. For this to happen, the local management systems must be 
recognised by the authorities and the fishermen’s associations. It also implies the integration 
of management functions across the different scales.
Nevertheless, local co-management faces a delicate situation in which the emerging 
management system has to take into consideration other local management systems working 
side by side and a mixture of existing overarching levels and structures of management, all 
with their own particularities. Clearly, the issue of sharing access to resources is one of the 
most difficult to resolve in Swedish fisheries management.
9.4 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
According to these empirical findings, it is clear that the future of fisheries in coastal waters 
and their relation to the coastal communities, will depend on how we deal with fish stocks and 
ecosystem as a common pool resource system and in particular with interactions between 
users. The marine coastal ecosystem is open and dynamic, with high resource diversity, and 
lends itself to multiple uses and many different users. The high degree of connectivity and 
unclear ecological boundaries î together with low storage capacity, high mobility and 
fluctuation of living marine resources spending different stages of their live cycles in 
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interlinked adjacent or distant ecosystems î implies that resource users become 
interdependent – ecologically and socially – across different scales of space and time. Not only 
can the outcomes, in ecological as well as social terms, change in unforeseen ways but the 
conditions for use and management can also vary.
The concept of common pool resources has been used to draw attention to features inherent 
in the nature of certain resources such as fisheries that are critical to their governance and 
sustainable use. First, the exclusion of specific beneficiaries from access to and use of the 
common pool is both difficult and costly to achieve; in other words, the system infers low 
excludability. Second, under conditions of sustained pressure of use, users will progressively 
reduce their own and other users’ potential harvest; in other words, the system suffers from 
high subtractibility. Therefore in fisheries the actions and benefits of a fisherman cannot be 
separated from what other users do in relation to the same ecosystem or interconnected 
ecosystems. This makes collective action of resource users essential to fisheries management.
The frameworks for analysis of the common pool resource situations and factors influencing 
the emergence of institutional change developed by cpr scholars have been shown to be 
fruitful. When applied to the management of fisheries they exposed more variables than those 
accounted for in the conventional fisheries management models. They also indicated that to 
think of “fish” as discrete stocks, of “fishermen” as non-cooperating individuals, and of 
“vessels” as discrete units of production, is a reductionistic approach. The position of the 
analyst studying and making decisions in fisheries needs to be broadened, a more 
interdisciplinary oriented debate is necessary, and the users’ perception of the institutional 
(social) system mediating their interaction with the resources and with other users must be a 
primary concern. In this sense, the application of an actor-oriented approach has shown to be 
fruitful in making visible the differences of meanings and various views of the actors involved 
in the use and management of coastal fisheries resources. It was also useful to contrast the 
knowledge of local users with the institutional domain. 
Looking at fisheries resources through the common pool resource concept has proved a fertile 
approach, creating an increased understanding of the social and ecological interdependency, 
implicit in the joint use of such resources. It provided, however, little guidance as to the 
preconditions needed to cope with problems derived from the sharing of fisheries resources 
with other predators in the ecosystem. This suggests that most cpr studies have defined the 
issue from an anthropocentric perspective where problems are seen as arising from situations 
in which the appropriators and the claimants are the same. This is a shortcoming, especially 
with an ecosystem-based approach to management still under elaboration.
The review of cpr studies indicated that, under certain conditions, resource users do take 
collective action and avoid the overuse of the resource. Earlier cpr studies have been criticised 
for their methodological approach, which tended to oversimplify the situation so that it no 
longer mirrored the complex reality found in most coastal areas. The cpr situation confronted 
by the coastal fishermen of Northern Bohuslän was certainly complex, implying a need to 
reorient the enquiry to capture those more complex cpr conditions. Despite the 
methodological shortcomings it is argued here that the conceptual apparatus, principles and 
ideas developed by the cpr school of thought is able to generate new insights into coastal 
fisheries management.
The cpr perspective helped, in particular, to demonstrate the impact that uniform policies and 
generic rules can have when applied to the use of this type of resources. This type of uniform 
treatment is ineffective, and probably a major source of inequity in terms of resource 
allocation. When the main elements represented in the framework (see figure 3.1) were broken 
down into its many constituents, they represented a source of heterogeneity that clearly 
affected the pattern of interactions in the common pool situation both within the social 
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system (or groups of users) and between this and the ecological system. In the use and 
management of complex common pool resources, material assets, rights, rules and 
management systems work together and potentialise each other, so that the properties of one 
become a platform for construction or enabling further development of others. Uniform 
incentives and institutional arrangements may thus empower or inhibit the resource users’ use 
of particular allocative and authoritative resources, through which access to and control over 
natural resources is gained and further institutionalised. A more satisfactory account of the 
interwoven relationships between rules addressing material assets and the transformation of 
property rights is lacking in fisheries. Understanding how institutional change enables such 
dynamics of transformation is in urgent need of additional research.
The cpr school of thought proposes that for local level governance structures to work well, 
they must first take into account the nuances of the physical and socio-cultural environment in 
which they operate; that is, each setting will require different and particular rules, specially 
designed to take advantage of specific attributes or confront specific problems. While the 
study of relationships and internal agreements among resource users at the local level is 
important, the complexity characteristic of coastal fisheries implies it is not sufficient.
The characteristics of living marine resources suggest the use of large marine ecosystems as 
the unit of assessment and management of the fishable stocks. But the unanswered – and 
possibly unanswerable – question is how large? Small areas are inappropriate due to the 
migration of finfish species but large areas are difficult to handle in practice and can easily lead 
to a disregard of the underlying social and ecological complexity. Even if the ecological 
boundaries are defined, the problems derived from the shared use of resources and 
ecosystems will remain. The likelihood that a local coastal fisherman will be able to capture the 
benefits that may derive from his efforts to contribute to maintaining the production capacity 
of a specific coastal ecosystem – or at least avoiding its degradation – is lower than is the case 
for users who husband, for example, a forest.
This is related to the debate on “the privatisation” of the commons. In theory the ownership 
of natural resources – or the exclusive right to appropriate them – is alleged to allow the 
owner to plan resource use and harvest in a sustainable way. But at sea, there is no such clear 
direct link between ownership of the resource and the right holders’ de facto opportunity to 
appropriate resources and draw benefits from resource conservation. In the use of complex 
and transient common pool resources, such as fisheries, the rights granted to resource users 
and their opportunities to draw benefit from them are two different things, and this difference 
is a difficult matter to deal with. Therefore, in the absence of an adequate system of 
management, which guarantees future claims to the use of local ecosystems, the sense of 
“ownership” in fisheries is only realised when the fish has been caught. In fisheries, the failure 
to elaborate clear property or use rights has hindered the development of effective 
management. How far this is possible, in theory and in practice, remains an ongoing subject of 
debate.
The issues of heterogeneity, mobility and interdependency across different scales that 
characterise the nature of fisheries and living marine ecosystems call for complementary 
arrangements in management. In general, the globalisation of the market affecting the supply 
and demand side of fisheries, the separation from "the geography of place" and the 
recognition of interdependency at the ecological, economic, and socio-political levels calls for 
more thorough analysis of the external factors. External factors play a role in shaping not only 
the system of rules at the various institutional levels but also the fishermen’s internal relations 
and collective actions (Edwards and Steins 1998). 
To match the complexity of fisheries in management calls for more thorough analysis of 
external relations between multiple users and other actors with management responsibilities 
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(e.g. government and the scientific community) across spatial and temporal scales. Ostrom has 
identified the need for nested enterprises and proposed the matching of this complexity 
through polycentric multi-layered systems of governance (Ostrom 1999;1999a).
The empirical testing of these ideas needs further research. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
absence of such work may have delayed the application of results from early cpr studies to the 
management of fisheries. It is in this context that co-management studies which refer to the 
external relations between users and authorities can be a useful if not vital complement. One 
way to develop cpr management studies, so that they better serve the management of fisheries, 
is to encourage interdisciplinary debates on collective action, property rights and co-
management to converge and pay much more attention to spatial and temporal scales and 
cross scale linkages. 
9.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As mentioned in the introduction, the Government of Sweden recently made clear the need 
for institutional reform. The Swedish case illustrates the need to develop the external relations 
between the government authorities and the local industry, as well as to strengthen the 
development of local fisheries co-management institutions (LFCM) where the interests of the 
local communities can be articulated and become an integrated part of fisheries management. 
In this thesis, some of the processes and factors that have contributed to the destabilisation of 
the Swedish fisheries management system have been analysed and are visualised in figure 9.1. 
The slow reaction time of the system is not surprising considering that any reform will require 
the accommodation of new stakeholders in the co-management structure and involve a 
redistribution of power from the central to the local level. Today, the ideas of the fishermen 
of Northern Bohuslän have gained considerable support both within Swedish government and 
among other local coastal fishermen, who in the mid nineties were opposed to local co-
management. Today they are supportive of reforming the co-management system so that 
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Figure 9.1 The destabilisation of the Swedish centralised co-management model
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collective and operative-choice rules can be agreed and tested in relation to the social and 
ecological specificities of the Skagerrak coast. With depleted fisheries resources and degraded 
coastal ecosystems, the challenge implicit in a local co-management approach to high priced 
resources cannot be underestimated.
However, before developing local institutions the premise of local co-management must be 
formulated in practical terms and with regard to the specific terrain. The cases discussed in 
chapter 8 provided some insights into the processes and conditions that may be needed for 
the success of such a process.
In contrast to other authors, there is no suggestion here of a total transfer of management 
responsibilities and authority to local fishermen, but rather the institutionalisation of co-
management at the local level. Nor is it proposed to transfer the entire political and 
administrative power to the regional or local governments. Local autonomy could put at risk 
the important institutional coherence across scales and create instead a social space that would 
facilitate the marriage of the economic and political interests of the local elite and so lead to 
new processes of fragmentation and marginalisation in the sharing of the local commons. 
Actually a basic assumption that supports the twining of the state and the users’ community in 
management is that the latter has limitations in managing common pool resources due to 
interdependency and transboundary aspects, particularly in the light of external factors, 
multiple interests and the emergence of new claimants.
The challenge for fisheries management is not only to build participatory institutions at 
various levels, but also to develop spatial and hierarchical links that guarantee resource 
conservation and equitable distribution of resources. From this perspective an exclusive focus 
on the local would not be appropriate. To propose local co-management approaches is in this 
case not the same as suggesting a retrenchment of government responsibilities for common 
pool resources management. On the contrary, the basic idea is to reform the institutional set 
up so that it will allow users to participate. This analysis does not argue for a return to the 
“good old days” privileging those who once had customary rights but rather for the further 
development of the existing institutional framework so that it embraces and gives recognition 
to the local level.
The findings of the thesis strengthen the argument that, in order to increase the involvement 
of fishermen in the management of coastal fisheries, co-management institutions should be 
considered as a hierarchical set of nested systems efficiently linked across different scales. It 
also suggests that in Sweden there may be scope for using different resource allocation 
models, where both individual and collective rights are combined.
It proposes further that the fishermen’s associations and the state have an important role to 
play in articulating the interests of local resource users and recognition of their local 
management rights. The role of other actors is seen as a platform from where innovation and 
debate can be continuously triggered. Communication, negotiation, coordination and 
harmonisation across hierarchical levels are crucial processes in fisheries management; 
someone has to act out the role that guarantees users participation in these processes and 
ensures that at least some of the fruits of self-regulation are enjoyed by those directly involved. 
Today in Sweden, only the state, under the scrutiny of the various stakeholders and the 
scientific community, can fulfil this role. 
However, based on the analysis in this thesis, it can be argued that further involvement of 
fishermen in management will require the reformulation of national policies and legislation 
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addressing coastal fisheries as well as a the revision of the roles and functions of the traditional 
co-management actors. An institutional reform in Sweden would have to at least involve:
i) the recognition of local management rights; 
ii) a multi-layer co-management structure which fosters user participation at all levels;
iii) new legislation enabling the consideration of the ecological, economic and social 
dimensions of fisheries management and their local specificity; 
iv) the integration of knowledge provided by a wider group of disciplines and by the local 
fishermen;
v) the integration of social, economic and ecological criteria in the development 
incentives;
vi) new working strategies within the administration and the FAs. 
Implicit in this is the reconstruction of the nexus relations between the resource users, the 
government authorities and the fishermen’s associations and to change the roles of the 
partners involved. For the incorporation of local levels of co-management in Sweden to be 
successful, considerable time must be devoted to rebuilding trust within the associations and 
between the fishermen and the government authorities as well as the research community. To 
work effectively with local resource users, new skills may be needed within both the 
administration and the FAs. To encourage the organisational and institutional development 
needed for their collective action to succeed suggests a need for new working strategies in 
providing different services to the fishermen. In table 9.1 some necessary changes are 
highlighted.
A key issue when reforming the Swedish co-management system then becomes deciding what 
management functions are most appropriate for the local level. There is no given formula to 
the answer. Nor can the transfer of management functions be made immediately. On the 
contrary, it suggests a phased or stepwise procedure in which monitoring and evaluation play 
an important role in “learning process” at all levels. The institutional change and the 
development of local co-management institutions should be approached as a continuously 
evolving process, which is ecosystem specific and adjustable over time. Folke et al (2002) refer 
to a type of management where institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested 
and revised in a dynamic, ongoing, self-organised process of learning by doing as adaptive co-
management.
The de-localisation and sectoralisation of fisheries management as well as the disregard for 
local knowledge are of some consequence to the resilience of both the ecological and social 
systems essential to the living archipelago policy. On the one hand, the management system 
becomes less able to flexibly take into account and assimilate local knowledge about changes 
in the local ecosystem and resource base; this risks weakening the ecological resilience of 
coastal fisheries, through the tendency to overuse resources. On the other hand, the system 
becomes less able to flexibly utilise knowledge about the local social system/community and 
patterns of livelihood; and this risks weakening the social resilience of fishing communities. 
Local communities become increasingly dependent from external income generating activities 
and resources (e.g. tourism and subsidies). It can be argued that from the perspective of a 
living archipelago, the integrity of the ecosystem and the viability of the local communities are 
simply “two sides of the same coin” and that for each of them to survive their relation of 
interdependence should be safeguarded.
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Table 9.1  Essential changes for Swedish fisheries management  
Dimension From To 
Type of management Command and control 
Reactive and addressing 
artefacts and individuals 
Co-management
Proactive and addressing 
collectives
Locus of management authority Central and International Local, Regional, Central, 
International
Stakeholder involvement Corporatist  Pluralistic 
Participation style Informative and consultative Interactive 
Knowledge used Scientific, disciplinary 
Quantitative
Interdisciplinary, Local 
Quantitative and Qualitative 
Property rights Less specified 
Access and withdrawal oriented
Universal
More specified 
Management oriented 
Differentiated collective and 
Individual
Unit of management ICES-Divisions,
Single stocks, vessels 
Socio-ecological systems 
Single stocks, fishermen 
Central variables in management Spawning stock biomass
Volume of landings 
Categories of vessels
Species selectivity of gear
Spawning stock biomass
Ecosystems functions 
Time and space
Categories of fishermen
Size selectivity of gear 
Development Support Sectoral and focused on the 
vessel
Multi-purpose and focused on 
social assets
To summarise, the foregoing analysis has indicated that what is commonly referred to as a 
“natural resource crisis” can be seen to be a crisis in management or in governance, deriving 
from (or leading to) a situation of institutional turbulence. Even when this thesis does not 
discard the use of individual quotas in some specific fisheries, it argues that the solutions are 
not to be found in just privatisation or more command and control based regimes. In 
addressing resource use and distribution problems, no single type of property or management 
system can be prescribed as a remedy. Policy must not only focus on the development of 
property rights regimes, but must also take careful consideration of the socio-ecological 
context in which these are to be exercised, the management system and the knowledge base 
on which the rules and decisions are based.
This study sustains that there is a form of fishery by local people that can be considered as 
socially and ecologically adapted and not fully exposed to the dominant, individualistic, 
economic rationality. It postulates that there are institutional barriers in the current 
management systems which tend to block, or at least delay, the use of local fishermen’s 
management capacities and the emergence of local institutions. These barriers, which stem 
from the treatment of fishermen as a homogenous collective of individuals who can only act 
according to an economic rationality, have contributed to turn depletion into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
When looking at fisheries in the light of the cpr perspective, the condition of inequality among 
fishermen becomes an intrinsic one. The complexity, dynamics and diversity of the ecological 
and the social system makes inequality in terms of individual appropriation of resources 
inevitable. Processes of differentiation with regard to power, influence, knowledge, experience, 
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skills, interests, values and attitudes are constantly going on as a consequence of changes in 
within these subsystems and their interaction. This condition is however, aggravated by 
external interventions believed to be equally relevant to all categories of fishermen and 
offering a “one size fits all” approach. The effect of undifferentiated policies and management 
instruments has been growing inequality in terms of resource appropriation and economic and 
social instability.
The study has revealed that conventional models and instruments in fisheries management are 
part of the problem leading to the managerial shortcomings mentioned above. Because, these 
models and instruments do not yet relate to fisheries as the complex common pool resource 
system it is, where the outcome – in ecological and social terms – is the result of the 
concurrence of the attributes of the ecosystem, the community of users, their assets, the 
system of rules and external factors. Processes of change in all these domains will trigger 
changes in the social and ecological interaction and the linked systems. 
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APPENDIX 1 
NAMES OF COMMON COMMERCIAL SPECIES
IN THE COASTS OF SKAGERRAK 
English Latin Swedish 
Norway lobster / 
Nephrops
Nephrops norvegicus Havskräfta
Deep-sea prawn or 
Northern pink shrimp
Pandalus borealis Nordhavsräka
Lobster Homarus gammarus Hummer
Crab Cancer pagurus Krabbtaska
Blue mussel Mytilus edulis Blåmusslor
Plaice Pleuronectes platessa Rödspotta
Sole Solea vulgaris Äkta tunga 
Whiting Merlangius merlangus Vitling
Cod Gadus morhua Torsk
Turbot Psetta maxima Piggvar
Common dab Limanda limanda Sandskädda
Flounder Platichthys flesus Skrubbskädda/Flundra
Long rough dab Hippoglossoides platessoides Lerskädda
Mackerel Scomber scombrus Makrill
Haddock Melanogrammus aeglefinus Kolja
Saithe Pollachius virens Gråsej/Sej
Hake Merluccius merluccius Kummel
Dogfish Squalus acanthias Pigghaj
Herring Clupea harengus Sill/Strömming
Sprat Sprattus sprattus Skarpsill/Vassbuk
Eel Anguilla anguilla Ål
Ling Molva molva Långa
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APPENDIX 2 
THE RESEARCH TASK, THE TOOLS, THE INFORMANTS AND THE TYPE 
OF DATA 
Research task Research tool Key Informants Type of data 
Find out theoretical 
perspectives and 
concepts.
Review of literature. International scientific 
community with focus 
on social scientists. 
Empirical results and 
theoretical analysis. 
Understand the 
ruling definitions of 
coastal fisheries. 
Review of official 
documents. 
Participation in 
meetings.
Policy makers.
Policy makers and staff 
administration.
Interviews
Statements, decisions, 
definitions, views. 
Opinions and views. 
Describe the scene 
and the roots of the 
dominant fisheries 
management regime.
Review of literature.
Review of 
documents. 
Examination of 
logbook-based
database.
Secondary numerical 
data.
Swedish fisheries 
scientists and 
bureaucrats.
Fishermen’s
associations.
Fish auctions. 
Historical accounts, 
ethnographic studies, 
resource assessments, 
social statistics, and 
fishermen’s reports or 
logbooks.
Explore problems in 
the multiple use 
commons as 
regarded by the 
coastal fishermen.
Questionnaires
Study of Municipal 
plans.
Grey documents. 
Open-ended semi-
structured interviews. 
Professional fishermen 
operating in the 
Väderö area outside 
Fjällbacka.
Delegates to the 
regional fishermen 
association.
Coastal fishermen 
Complementary actors. 
Written answers to 
multiple choice 
questions and open 
questions.
Reports on the state of 
the environment. 
Perceptions.
Explore fishermen’s 
perception of coastal 
fisheries.
Open-ended semi-
structured interviews. 
Coastal and non 
coastal fishermen. 
Fishermen’s
associations.
Informants connected 
to fisheries. 
Statements.
Perceptions.
Explore problems in 
the current 
management system. 
Study of documents, 
legal instruments and 
regulations. Semi-
structured interviews. 
Informal
consultations.
Participation in 
fishermen’s and 
administration’s
meetings.
All categories of 
informants from the 
fishery and nature 
conservation sector 
Complaints.
Statements.
Perceptions.
Explore management 
alternatives as 
regarded by the local 
fishermen and 
compare to the 
findings in the 
literature
Study of 
correspondence
Semi-structured
interviews.
Participation in 
meetings and 
negotiations.
Comparison with 
literature.
Local fishermen 
(NBPO) and 
government
administration.
All categories of 
informants from the 
fishery sector. 
Informants from 
Nature conservation. 
Proposals and ideas. 
Accounts of history. 
Views. Perceptions. 
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APPENDIX 3 
GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
With the fishermen
1. When did you start fishing? 
2. What is your main fishery? 
3. Where have you fished most of the time? 
4. How did your fisheries look like last year (1997 or 1998)?
5. Would you mind drawing your fishing pattern on this time-line for me? 
6. Why do you follow that pattern? 
7. Have you always followed the same pattern? 
8. Which natural factors influence your fisheries most? 
9. If I was your son and you wished to teach me an important aspect of your fisheries what would that be? 
10. Which other species do you associate with your fisheries? 
11. Are you a coastal fisherman? Why do you refer to yourself as a coastal fisherman?
12. When does a fisherman stop being a coastal fisherman? 
13. Is fishing a good business?  
14. What could you do to improve your income from fisheries? 
15. What problems do you meet? 
16. What would you like to change in fisheries? 
17. Is any other factor specially threatening your own ability to continue fishing? 
18. Can you do anything about it? 
19. Who can do anything about it? 
20. Are you able to influence the decisions about that factor?  
21. Are there other aspects you find to be problematic?  
22. What would you do to improve the situation? 
23. Do you have any special proposal? 
24. If you had the opportunity to make decisions what would you change about your and other fishermen’s 
fishing?
25. Would you change any of the factors here below?  
26. The fishing ground; The target species; The kind of fishermen; The vessel; The fishing gear; The fishing 
time; The quotas; The number of fishermen. 
27. Tell me why.  
28. Any other special factor? 
29. Who can influence these factors? 
30. Can you influence the decisions that are taken in fisheries?
31. Have you considered the idea of making radical changes in management?
32. Have you heard about a proposal to create a sort of local committee or board for the management of 
fisheries here around?  
33. What is your opinion about it?  
34. Are there any special issues that you think a local board should not deal with? 
35. What aspects do you think such a local board could decide on? 
36. Who do you think should have a sit and who shout not on such a board? 
37. Are there other rules which apply here than the ones decided by NBF? 
38. Do you fishermen have your own rules? 
39. Did you have your own rules before...Do you remember what these rules were about?
40. Do you know why that rule is no longer working?  
41. What do you think about enforcement and punishment in fisheries? 
42. Have you heard about the idea of a marine reserve in this area? What do you think about that? 
With the non-fishermen 
1. How would you define coastal fisheries? 
2. What do you think are the main problems of the Swedish coastal fisheries today? 
3. What do you think are the underlying reasons of these problems? 
4. Do you have any ideas on how to overcome these problems? 
5. What is fisheries management from your point of view? 
6. Is there anything special in the present management system that you would like to change? 
7. Do you and your colleagues (in the Ministry, research centre, NGO, FAs, etc) discuss alternative ways? 
8. Which alternatives are the one you discuss most? 
9. Are you aware of proposals for change in the management system coming from the fishermen?  
10. How do you interpret these proposals?
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APPENDIX 4 
ACRONYMS
ACFM  Advisory Committee on Fishery Management.  
BKF  Bohuslän's Coastal Fishermen Association.  
CBD  Convention on Biological Diversity.  
CFP  Common Fisheries Policy.  
CITES  Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species.  
CL  Carapace Length.  
cpr  Common Pool Resources.  
CPR  Common Property Resources.  
CQ  Community Quotas.  
DDT  Diclordifenyltricloretan.  
EBFM  Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management.  
EEC  European Economic Comission.  
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zones.  
EIA  Environmental Impact Assessment.  
EQO  Environmental Quality Objectives.  
EU  European Union.  
FA  Fishermen's Association.  
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.  
FCA  Fisheries Cooperative Association.  
FDA  Fishing Dependent Areas.  
FIFG  Financial Instrument of Fisheries Guidance.  
FIFS  Fiskeriverkets Författningssamling.  
FWQ  Fisherman Weekly Quota.  
GEF  Global Environmental Facilities.  
GT  Gross Tonnage.  
HELCOM  Helsinki Commission:The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission.  
IAD  Institutional Analysis Development Framework.  
ICES  International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.  
ICES-WG-ECO ICES-Working Group on the Ecosystem Effects of Fishing.
ICM  Integrated Coastal Management .  
ICZM  Integrated Coastal Zone Management.  
IMR  Institute of Marine Research of the National Board of Fisheries.  
IQ  Individual Quotas.  
IQESST  Individual Quota and Effort Share in Space and Time.  
ITQ  Individual Transferable Quotas.  
IUCN  The World Conservation Union.  
IUU  Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing.  
KFG  Koster Fjord Group.  
kW  Kilowatt.  
LFCM  Local Fisheries Co-management Institutions.  
LME  Large Marine Ecosystems.  
MAGP  Multi-annual Guidance Plans.  
MBAL  Minimum Biologically Acceptable Limit.  
MFU  Maritime Fishermen's Union.  
MISTRA  The Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research.  
MLS  Minimum Landing Sizes.  
MPA  Marine Protected Areas.  
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MSVPA  Multi-species Virtual Population Analysis.  
MSY  Maximum Sustainable Yield.  
NBF  National Board of Fisheries.  
NBPO  Northern Bohuslän Producers' Organisation.  
NEAFC  North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission.  
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation.  
nm  Nautical Miles.  
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
PCB  Polycloratedbiphenyls.  
RAC  Regional Advisory Council.  
ROV  Remotely Operated Vehicle.  
SBC  Statistiska Centralbyrån. 
SBL  Safe Biological Limits.  
SFA  Shetland Fishermen's Association.  
SFC  Sea Fisheries Committees.  
SFPO  Shetland Fish Producer Organisation.  
SFPO  Sveriges Fiskares Producers Organisations.  
SFR  Sveriges Fiskares Riksförbund.  
SFS  Svensk Författningssamling.  
SNV  Swedish Environmental Protection Agency.  
SOU  Statens Offentliga Utredningar.  
SSB  Spawning Stock Biomass.  
SUCOZOMA Sustainable Coastal Zone Management program.
Sw. cr.  Swedish Cronor.  
SVC  Svenska Västkustfiskarnas Centralförbund.  
TAC  Total Allowable Catch Limits.  
TMBL  Tjärnö Marine Biology Laboratory .  
TPFR  Territorial Private Fishing Rights.  
TURF  Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries.  
UNCED  United Nation Conference on Environment and Development.  
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
WWF  World Wildlife Fund.  
VWQ  Vessel Weekly Quota.  
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